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ABSTRACT 
The Sudanese Islamic Bank has adopted a rural development programme to 
tackle some of the problems of the Sudanese rural sector. The thesis presents an 
assessment of the viability and success of the programme with special reference to 
the small farmers. 
The problems encountered in the Sudanese rural sector are extremely difficult 
and highly complex, including abundant physical resources and a poorly developed 
economic base. The experience of Sudanese Islamic Bank with the adoption of 
musharakah as the major financing instrument represents a positive example which 
Islamic banks in Sudan and elsewhere should seek to generalize. It corroborates the 
viability not only of musharakah as a financing instrument, but also of financing 
operations in the productive sectors of the economy. 
One of the major problems with the implementation of the rural development 
programme in Sudan and elsewhere is that developmental projects are conceived 
and formulated in virtual disregard of the perceptions of the beneficiaries. This has 
been especially true in the development of agriculture where superficial temporary 
measures and uneconomic prestigious projects have been undertaken instead of 
attempts being made to tackle the main causes of the problems encountered. 
The Sudanese Islamic Bank through its rural development programme seeks to 
avoid the limitations of such projects. It seeks to ensure that its interventions would 
meet three basic requirements: acceptability, continuity and replicability. Also it 
wants to demonstrate to other Islamic banks that its experience in musharakah 
financing has proven that such an instrument is economically viable and popular 
among the poorer sections of the population. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The decade begining with 1970 marked a time of major transformation and 
reorientation. In the early years of its fifteenth century, beginning in 1970-1980, 
Islam is in the midst of a new surge of dynamism. In this vigorous reaffirmation, 
there are elements of both continuity and creativity. This resurgence is the product 
of developments within modern society and the continuing appeal of the Islamic 
tradition. 
In the twentieth century Muslim countries have faced formidable political and 
social challenges: the struggle for independence from colonial dominance, the for- 
mation and development of independent nation states with all the pressures and 
problems of modernization. The history of Islam in the modern period reflects the 
continued interaction of the Islamic tradition with the force of change. 
One of the major developments in the Muslim countries in the last two decades 
was the emergence of Islamic banks. The motivation for the establishment of these 
institutions comes from a desire of various Muslim communities to formulate and 
reorganize their social, economic and in particular, financial activities on an interest 
free basis in view of the divine injunction against interest. Thus, increasing interest 
has been shown in functioning of the Islamic banking system, especially implications 
of absence of the interest rate mechanism on the economy and operation of the 
financial sector. 
Islam possesses its own paradigm of economic relations within the context of 
an Islamic system based on injunctions and norms, derived from the Quran and 
the Sunnah. The shariah specifies, inter alia, rules that relate to the allocation 
of resources, property rights, production and consumption, and the distribution 
of income and wealth'. The core of the Islamic framework is the mechanism for 
allocating financial resources, the rate of interest is replaced with the rate of return 
Iqbal, Z. and A. Mirakhor, `Islamic Banking', Al-Tawhid, A Quarterly Journal of Islamic 
Thought and Culture, April- June 1987, p 91. 
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t 
r 
on real activities. A variety of methods and instruments based on risk and profit- 
sharing, are discussed in this thesis. 
Although the absence of interest is a central characteristic of an Islamic financial 
system, it is by no means the only one. Without interest, questions arise as to 
how the system is to be implemented, how it will function, and what will be its 
economic implications. In what follows, possible answers are provided to some of 
these questions. 
To this end two main points need to be stressed, first, Islam aims at building a 
socio-economic order based on justice and considers economic activity as means to 
an end and not an end itself. It enjoins Muslims to harness natural resources, which 
are a trust from Allah for carrying out rightful activities, but abhors exploitation 
and man made inequalities of income and wealth. Second, Islam is deeply concerned 
with the problem of economic development, but treats this as an important part 
of a wider problem, that of total human development. The primary function of 
Islam is to guide human development on correct lines and in the right direction. It 
deals with all aspects of economic development but always in the framework of total 
human development and never in a form divorced from this perspective'. That is 
why the focus, even in the economic sector, is on human development, with the 
result that economic development remains an integrated and indivisible element of 
moral and socio-economic development of human society. 
The purpose of this thesis is: 
First, to explain the basic principles of the shariah concerning the elimination 
of interest from the economy and to analyse the impact of these developments on 
banking operations. 
Second, to demonstrate that the problem with the conventional commercial 
banking is the nature of an advance. This comprises a fixed return plus a guaranteed 
return which is not in harmony with the purpose for which the money is being 
' Ahmed, K., `Islam and the Challenge of Economic Development', in Islam in Transition: 
Muslim Perspectives, edited by J. J. Donohue and J. L. Esposito, 1982, pp. 217-222. 
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sought. The latter involves enterprise for which their can be no certain return. It is 
suggested in this thesis that the Islamic banking model removes this contradiction 
and makes the legal nature of the contract in harmony with the nature of the 
activity. 
Third, to argue that a financial system based on an Islamic framework of profit- 
sharing would be relatively more stable and efficient in allocating resources com- 
pared to a traditional interest-based system. We will analyse the framework for the 
profit-loss-sharing system (mudarabah) in more detail. 
Fourth, to show that the Islamic banking system based on equity (musharakah) 
is fair and just. If for example a person is interested in keeping the value of his 
wealth intact he should keep it to himself. But if he wants to make money in a 
world in which making money is surrounded by many risks he should not avoid 
the risk and put it wholly on someone elses shoulder. If a risk is shared, then all 
those who share it are entitled to a return. With the danger of losing part of one's 
capital comes the hope of gaining more. This hope is confirmed by the experience 
of the world in which we live. So justice and fairness prevails in the sense that in a 
single transaction, if an investor wants to gain, he should take the risk of incurring 
the losses. If funds are advanced for a large number of transactions or a succession 
of transactions or they are advanced to a diversified clientele then the provider of 
funds should have nothing to fear. It is expected that, on average, the investor will 
end up with a gain. This is certaintly the case with Islamic banks because they 
are at the same time (financing new partners) in industry, agriculture and trade. 
The bank's expect, on balance, to avoid losses because of diversification. We also 
acquaint ourselves with other modes of financing by Islamic banks which include, 
beneficial loans (qard al-hasanah), deferred payment sale (bai muajjal), purchase 
with deferred delivery (bai salam) and leasing (ijara). 
Fifth, the financial system, including fiscal and monetary policies in an Islamic 
economy will be examined in detail. At the same time attention will be focussed 
throughout the thesis on the principal models of Islamic banking. The first model 
relies on the concept of profit-sharing, and integrates the assets and liability side 
3 
based on a principle called the two-tier mudarabah. The second model divides the 
liability side of the bank balance sheet into two windows, one for demand deposits 
(transactions balances) and the other for investment balances. 
Sixth, the main obstacles to Islamic banking and some possible remedies will 
be examined. 
Seventh, there will be a discussion concerning the contribution of agriculture to 
the Sudanese national economy. We will also analyse the main reasons for economic 
deterioration and its implications. 
Eighth, we will examine analytically the financial institutions in Sudan. The 
importance of informal credit financing will be assessed since this sector is still 
playing an important role in the rural areas. 
Ninth, the Agricultural Bank of Sudan, its role and significance in rural devel- 
opment will be assessed and the methodology for the case study, and its scope, will 
be identified. 
Tenth, we will examine the Sudanese Islamic Bank, its role and importance in 
rural development. 
Eleventh, the experience of the Sudanese Islamic Bank in musharakah financing 
will be analysed. 
Finally, having accomplished the above, general conclusions will be drawn and 
some recommendations made to assess the overall significance of musharakah fi- 
nancing by the Sudanese Islamic Bank in order to formulate policy implications for 
the future. 
1.1. Explanation of the Basic Principles of the Shariah Concerning the 
Elimination of Interest from the Economy 
The prevailing banking and financial system strikes at the very root of the 
fundamental principle of shariah as it tends to promote concentration of wealth in 
a few hands and breeds inequalities. Interest which is the kingpin of the modern 
banking and financial system serves as a powerful tool of exploitation of one segment 
4 
of society by another. 
It has created "haves" and "have-nots", and serves as a barrier to the achieve- 
ment of maximum welfare for the maximum number of people. It is in this context 
that Islam forbids interest and it is for the achievement of the egalitarian objec- 
tives of Islam that the Muslim world is now embarked on the task of Islamising the 
financial system by unfettering it from interest. 
The chapter will be divided into nine sections. The purpose of this chapter is 
to first discuss the problem of interest, second to briefly analyse the literature on 
interest in modern economic theory and third to discuss the problem of prohibiting 
riba in Islam. Fourth, we define riba, which is commonly known as interest on all 
kinds of loans and seems to dominate the Islamic World. Fifth, we also point out 
the various types of riba. Sixth,. the difference between riba and trade is highlighted 
and seventh the adverse effects of riba on the economy are considered. Eighth, we 
examine the rationale for the prohibition of interest and finally some conclusions 
are drawn. 
1.1.2. Interest 
Even though the stand of Islam on the question of interest appears to be quite 
unequivocal, the fact is that in the modern economic system in the western world, 
interest plays a very important role, and it is almost inconceivable that the system 
could function without the interest component. Interest has been viewed not only 
as an integral part of the price mechanism whereby savings and investments are 
regulated in a "laissez fair" system but also as an important policy instrument with 
which government interventions can influence and control the economy. 
From a theoretical standpoint, interest has been a debatable subject among the 
economic and political theorists. Abu Saud defines "interest as the excess of money 
paid by the borrower to the lender over and above the principal for the use of the 
lender's liquid money over a certain period of time"'. 
Abu Saud, M., `Money, Interest and Qirad in Islam', Studies in Islamic Economics, Leicester, 
The Islamic Foundation, 1983, p. 64. 
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Economists have presented different interpretations of interest which are rele- 
vant and are mentioned below: 
1- Samuelson states that "Interest is the price or rental for the use of money"4. 
Thus he equates the price with the rental use of money considering its service exactly 
as the service of a medical doctor or of a tractor. As for considering interest as rent 
for money, the first objection is that every rent comprises an element of depreciation 
(even in static conditions, i. e. everything being equal). First, money as a means of 
exchange is not supposed to depreciate, and second when one uses the doctor's or 
the tractor's service, both of them remain almost intact. You don't rent something 
that perishes or disappears once you use it. But when you use money once you lose 
it forever. How can it then be rented. 
2- Don Patinkin gives the following more confusing definition: "Interest is one 
of the forms of income from property, the other forms being dividends, rent and 
profit"'. Here, Patinkin considers interest as a part of the functional share earned 
by capital goods as those of the functional share earned by capital goods as well as 
money-capital. 
3- J. M. Keynes did not define interest, but mentioned the rate of interest as 
"Money rate of interest is the percentage of excess of a sum of units of money 
contracted for forward units of time over the spot or cash price of the sum thus 
contracted for forward deliverys'. 
The Islamic, socialist, and a number of capitalist 8conomists have questioned 
these explanations on both theoretical and technical grounds. They often stress the 
point that money-capital cannot be treated as capital goods on the same basis as 
productive factors. 
It is pertinent to remark here that lending of money for interest was depreci- 
ated, and in most cases prohibited, by all the biblical religions. This prohibition 
Samuelson, P., Economics, 10th edition, McGraw Hill, New York, 1976, p. 50. 
` Patinkin, D., Studies in Monetary Economics, Harper & Row, New York, 1972, p. 118. 
Keynes, J. M., The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, London, 1936, p. 
22. 
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seemed to be rooted in moral objections to the taking of interest. However, leaving 
aside consideration of ethics, morality and distributive justice, if we look to various 
economic theories as they have evolved in the west, we find little agreement with 
regard to the justification of interest. Added to this basic disagreement on the 
justification of interest, some prominent economists regard interest to be the main 
element in trade cycles which hampers the smooth flow of economic activity. 
An eminent western economist, Roy Harrod, ' regards the abolition of interest 
as the only way to avert a collapse of capitalism. Not only this; he speaks with 
great admiration for an interest-less society in his work on Economic Dynamics. 
Harrod clearly recognizes that "it is not the profit itself, earned by service , 
by 
assiduity, by imagination, by courage but the continued interest accruing from the 
accumulation that makes the profit taker eventually appear parasitical. . ." and 
categorically states that an interest-less society which will be a "totally new kind 
of society" would be "the correct and final answer to all that is justly advanced by 
the critics of capitalism". 
1.2. Interest in Modern Economic Theory 
In this section we will briefly analyse the various theories of interest in modern 
economic theory. 
1.2.1. Modern Fructification Theory 
Henry George is the founder of this school of thought and this theory bears 
some resemblance in its basic concepts to Turgot's fructification theory of inter- 
est. He justified interest on capital when invested in an industrial, agricultural or 
commercial enterprise, on the ground that the owner of capital can make it yield a 
permanent yearly income by buying land with it. The owner will not be inclined to 
invest his capital in other enterprises unless he can expect just as large a net return 
as he could obtain through land. 
' Harrod, R., Towards a Dynamic Economics, London, 1973, pp. 58-81. 
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1.2.1.1. Criticism 
Boehm Bawerk objects to the natural division of capital into a fruitful type 
and a barren type which, he thinks, is impossible to support. This introduces 
the same type of error as the physiocrats, who regarded agriculture as the only 
productive process of production. Besides, George has failed to explain "the original 
phenomenon of interest by which he claims to explain all subsequent instances of 
it"8. He says that all classes of goods must bear interest. Both corn and cattle 
for example bear interest. But why do those bear interest? He fails to give any 
reasonable explanation. 
1.2.2. Modified Abstinence Theory 
The chief exponent of this theory is Schellwien. His views are similar to Marx's 
socialist theory insofar as labour time is regarded as the only yardstick to measure 
the value of goods. According to him, it is not only the consumability or usefulness 
of a good, but also the actual consumption of it which exercises the determining 
influence on its value. The value at which all goods aim is realised only upon 
consumption. 
This, he says, takes place in two kinds of cases. The first of these occurs where 
a temporary non-consumption of goods is necessary to enable them to enter into 
consumption at all. Thus, fruit must be allowed a certain period of time for ripening. 
In so far as such a time interval is necessary between the completion of a product and 
its consumption, that interval necessarily brings about an enhancement in value9. 
And according to him, the second kind of case involves those instances in which 
the production of an article requires that other commodities are not consumed. 
That applies in any case in which capital is required for production. And since the 
capital that is being used in production is, to put it simply, withheld from consump- 
tion, the commodity must guarantee compensation for such non-consumption, and 
necessitate a corresponding increase in the value of the commodity. 
° Boehtn-Bawerk, E., Capital and Interest, History and Critique of Interest Theories, Vol. I, 
Libertarian Press, U. S. A., 1959, p. 339. 
° Boehm-Bawerk, op. cit. pp. 341-347. 
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1.2.2.1. Criticism 
Many economists, including Boehm Bawerk, regard this two-fold interpretation 
of consumption of capital as erroneous, fallacious and ridiculous. They argue that 
Schellwien takes both positions simultaneously; he regards the capital as consumed 
for which the buyer must pay its full value and the next moment he regards the 
same capital as withheld from consumption so that the commodity must also provide 
compensation for this non-consumption. 
1.2.3. The Austrian Theory (The Age or Time-Preference Theory) 
According to this theory, interest arises, from a difference in value between 
present and future goods. Among American economists J. B. Clark, I. Fisher, F. 
Fetter, N. Palten and S. M. Macvane support this theory. There are many others 
among English, American, Italian, German, Scandinavian and French economists 
who can be classified with the above theorists. 
The chief exponent of this theory is Boehm Bawerk. The central formula by 
which Boehm Bawerk claims to give an explanation of the phenomenon of interest 
is the undervaluation of future goods in relation to the present. "Present goods 
are" he says, "as a rule, worth more than future goods of like kind and number"lo. 
After explaining the cause of interest, which according to him, is the superiority 
of the present goods over the future goods, he tries to give his reasons why people 
prefer present goods to future goods. Then he explains the important factors which 
affect the rate of interest and re-affirms the importance of the capitalistic process 
of production. Thereafter his conclusion regarding the rate of interest is that it is 
determined by the marginal productivity of capital in relation to the element of time 
in production. Thus, infact, he arrives at the same conclusion as the supporters 
of the Marginal Productivity theory of interest with the only difference that he 
11 
emphasises the significance of the element of time in production. According to him, 
the rate of interest is determined by the marginal productivity of capital which 
diminishes as the period of production is prolonged. 
10 Boehm-Bawerk, op. cit. p. 338. 
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Boehm Bawerk's theory of interest has been further expanded by K. Wicksell. 
His important contribution to the theory of interest lies in the emphasis on the 
relationship between the rate of interest and the price level and the influence of 
monetary factors in dermining the rate of interest. 
1.2.3.1. Criticism 
In the opinion of Cassel, "this formula of undervaluation of future goods in re- 
lation to present" is, however, ambiguous and has, in fact, two different meanings 
even with Boehm-Bawerk himself. 
Boehm Bawerk's analysis of the reasons for the undervaluation of future goods 
is also insufficient. He gives three such reasons but fails to show how they work 
together". 
Furthermore, the psychological subjective foundations on which, Boehm Bawerk 
tries to build his age theory of interest, are completely untrue and unrealistic. In 
fact a large number of people save for the future without having any consideration 
whatsoever, for the rate of interest, merely because they consider many of their 
future needs more important than the present ones. Many people save for future 
mishaps, accidents, and old age. The majority are likely to save and actually do 
save, whenever they have the capacity to do so, for the education and training of 
their children and even for holidays. And all these savings are done without any 
regard for interest or the premium on savings. 
1.2.4. General Criticism of Interest Theories 
A critical study of the historical development of the phenomenon of interest has 
shown that interest is paid to an independent factor of production, which may be 
called either waiting or postponement or abstinence or use. But all these theories 
have failed to answer or to prove why interest is paid or should be paid to this 
factor. Some point to the necessity of waiting; others to the necessity of abstinence 
or postponement, but none of these explanations answer the question. Neither 
the mere necessity of waiting or postponement or abstinence nor the mere use or 
11 Cassel, G., The Nature and Necessity of Interest, London, 1903, p. 62. 
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productivity of capital is enough to prove that interest is a necessary payment for 
the employment of capital in production. Besides, these theories have failed to 
answer how a variable factor can possibly determine a fixed factor like the rate of 
interest? 
Cassel brings in scarcity as a very strong and valid argument for the payment 
of interest for the services of capital. He argues that the purpose of the price is 
to check demand and stimulate supply, and therefore the price must be brought 
up to the level where it causes demand and supply to meet. But the question is 
still unanswered. Why should interest be paid? It is not a valid argument to say 
that interest should be paid to capital for its scarcity. It does not explain why this 
payment should be made to capital and even if it does, the meaning of scarcity is 
not very clear. Thus it seems obvious that Cassel's theory does not rest on firm 
theoretical foundations". 
1.2.5. Modern Theories 
Many modern economists such as Wicksell, Hayek, Schumpeter, Keynes and 
Hicks have attempted to explain the phenomenon of interest with reference to the 
quantity of money in circulation and the demand for money. Some of them have 
tried to find the solution to the problem as to how interest is determined by (i) the 
Indirect Monetary approach. This group of theorists hope to find the answer to 
the problem of interest by an analysis of the changes in the quantity of money, the 
velocity of its circulation or in the demand for money. Others have preferred the 
(ii) Direct Monetary approach method and have tried to explain the rate of interest 
as a purely monetary problem. Keynes is the modern representative of the second 
line of approach. 
This difference between the approaches of monetary theorists has produced 
two rival theories. One is the loanable funds theory which is supported by B. 
Ohlin, Robertson, Hicks and many other economists, while the other is the liquidity 
preference theory which is supported by Keynes and his followers. 
" Qureshi, A. I., Islam and the Theory of Interest, 1946, Lahore, p. 34. 
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The main difference between the two approaches to the problem of interest is 
that the supporters of the former theory hold the view that the rate of interest 
is determined by the supply of and demand for loanable funds. In contrast the 
supporters of the latter are of the opinion that the rate of interest is determined by 
the supply of and demand for money itself. 
1.2.5.1. The Loanable Fund Theory 
The Loanable Fund theory of interest is based on the thorough analysis of two 
concepts of saving and investment. In the opinion of the supporters of this theory, 
the rate of interest is merely the price of credit and is, therefore, determined by the 
supply and demand for credit. 
In other words, the rate of interest, according to this theory, is determined by 
the supply of and demand for loanable funds. If the demand for loanable funds is 
in excess of supply, other things being equal, the rate of interest will rise and if it 
is less than the supply, the rate of interest will fall. The advocates of this theory 
believe that "the dynamic movement of interest is determined by the excess demand 
which exists in the loan (money) market" 13 
The demand for and the supply of loanable funds are influenced by investment 
opportunities, total savings and bank credit respectively. If investment opportuni- 
ties resulting from new inventions tend to increase demand for loanable fund more 
rapidly than the available total savings and credit facilities during any period of 
time, the rate of interest will rise and vice versa. 
1.2.5.2. Liquidity Preference Theory 
The importance of liquidity preference in determining the rate of interest is 
greatly emphasised by Keynes. He says that shifts in liquidity preference can have 
very significant effects on the rate of interest. While explaining what determined the 
rate of interest, he pointed out that psychological time-preferences of an individual 
required two distinct forms of decisions14. 
" Patinkin, 0., Money, Interest and Price, 2nd ed; New York, 1965, p. 265. 
" Keynes, J. M., op. cit. p. 166. 
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The first, concerning the propensity to consume, determines for each individual 
how much of his income will be consumed and how much will be saved for future 
consumption. 
The second, having made the decision to save, involves deciding in what form 
savings should be kept. In particular it is necessary to decide whether to keep them 
in the form of money i. e., liquid assets or in the form of securities. According to 
Keynes it is the second decision which is important in the theory of interest and 
not the first one. 
Keynes believes "that the mistake in the accepted theories of the rate of interest 
lies in their attempting to determine the rate of interest from the first of these two 
constituents of psychological time-preference to the neglect of the second, and it is 
this neglect which we must endeavour to repair"". 
Keynes holds that the rate of interest depends upon two things: 
(i) The state of liquidity preference (demand aspect). 
(ii) The quantity of money (supply aspect). 
There are in fact several reasons why people will like to keep their wealth in 
cash. These may be classified according to their motive as: 
(a) The transaction-motive, i. e., money required for personal and business ex- 
change; 
(b) The precautionary motive, i. e., money required for unforeseen contingencies 
and future security; and 
(c) The speculative-motive, i. e., trying to profit from price movements in the 
securities market. 
The demand for cash for the first two motives is almost stable and mainly it 
is the third motive, i. e., the speculative motive, which, owing to the uncertainty of 
the future, is likely to require a larger quantity of cash. Therefore, in general, as 
'a Keynes, op. cit. p. 167. 
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the liquidity preference for the speculative motive weakens, the rate of interest falls 
and vice verse. 
It may, however, be pointed out that liquidity preference changes in accordance 
with the changes in attitudes of the people towards the economic and political 
future. Thus it seems that the rate of interest is dependent upon factors which 
are highly psychological in nature. Further, the so-called psychological factors are 
themselves conditioned by more objective events in the economic and political arena: 
and may even be influenced by the conventional factors. 
In brief, interest rate is a price which fluctuates according to the supply and 
demand for money. The supply is fixed by the banking system and the demand is 
determined by the preference for holding cash. As long as the supply remains fixed, 
the price or rate (of interest), varies with the demand for money16. 
1.2.5.3. Stock and Flows Theory 
It is, in fact, an attempt at co-ordination between "real" and "monetary" ap- 
proaches in the theory of rate of interest. It is argued that both, real and monetary 
factors, have to be taken into account in a complete theory of the rate of interest. 
Scitovszky is the chief exponent of this group. Swedish economist E. Lund- 
berg and Hayek also hold similar views about the co-ordination of the "real" and 
"monetary" approaches to the problem of interests'. These attempts have not been 
successful in achieving their objectives. In addition to the confusion between stocks 
and flows, they suffer from the inadequacy of the partial equilibrium analysis. 
1.2.6. Criticism of Liquidity Preference Theory 
According to Robertson, interest in liquidity preference theory is reduced to 
nothing more than a risk-premium against fluctations about which we are not cer- 
tain. He also condemns Keynes view that "interest is not reward of not-spending 
's Dillard, D., The Economics of John Maynard Keynes, Theory of a Monetary Economy, Crosby 
Lockwood & Son, London, 1950, pp. 164-180. 
" Patinkin, op. cit. pp. 375-380. 
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but reward of not hoarding" 18. 
Harrod does not like another point in this theory. Keynes insists that interest 
is solely the reward for waiting. This undue insistence, according to Robertson, 
appears to be one-sided and not very successful for Keynes' case. 
1.2.7. Criticism of Monetary Theories 
The monetary theories, like marginal productivity theories, have made no at- 
tempt to answer the question, why should interest be paid? or why interest is paid? 
They have simply ignored this question and have sought refuge in the theory of 
value. They say that like any other commodity, the price of capital is determined 
by the demand for and supply of money. 
But it seems that they have forgotten the basic difference between the two 
problems: the theory of value is a problem of exchange, while the theory of interest 
is a problem of distribution. Both loanable funds and liquidity preference theories 
are basically supply and demand theories of interest and explain it with reference 
to the supply and demand for loanable funds and money respectively. But they do 
not give any justification for the phenomenon of interest. 
According to Boehm Bawerk, the study of all these theories "reveals the develop- 
ment of three essentially divergent basic conceptions of the interest problem". One 
group, the representatives of the productivity theory, treats the interest problem as 
a problem of production. The Socialist exponents of the exploitation theories treat 
the interest problem as purely a problem of distribution, while the third group, the 
supporters of the monetary theories, seeks in the theory of interest, the problem of 
value". 
There is no doubt that all these theorists, have been confused by the very 
magnitude of the phenomenon of interest, and have avoided the main issue as to 
why interest should be paid? They have, indeed, spent all their energies in solving 
the problem either of waiting or abstinence or productivity or "labour value" or 
Robertson, D., Essay in Monetary Theory, London, 1946, p. 25. 
19 Boehm I3awerk, op. cit. pp. 348-354. 
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"the determination of value" and have not said anything about the origin or the 
justificiation of the institution of interest. 
1.3. Prohibition of Riba (Interest or Usury) in Islam 
The modern banking system is organized on the basis of a fixed payment called 
interest. When the entrepreneurs borrow money from the commercial banks they 
have to promise to return the principal amount along with an additional payment 
(interest) worked out on the basis of a fixed rate. Hence after the term of loan 
expires, the bank usually gets back the amount lent along with the interest payment. 
It does not matter whether the entrepreneur made a profit or incurred a loss. To the 
entrepreneur, interest paid to the bank becomes an item of cost which is included-in 
the price of the commodity ultimately paid for by the final consumer. The depositors 
also get interest on their deposits though at different and definitely lower rates. Thus 
the bank gets monetary resources at lower rates of interest and advances them to 
borrowers at higher rates. The difference between them is what constitutes a bank's 
income. In a market economy, the banks are profit-making institutions. They need 
to maximize their profit by advancing the money at a higher rate than the rate 
at which they get it. Thus borrowing and lending of money takes place at a price 
called the interest rate, which is the pivotal point of all banking activity. 
These practices of the modern commercial banking system are in conflict with 
the principles of Islam which strictly prohibit riba (interest or usury). Islam is 
opposed to exploitation in every form and stands for fair and equitable dealings 
among all men. To charge interest from someone who is constrained to borrow to 
meet his essential consumption requirements is considered an exploitative practice in 
Islam. Charging of interest on loans taken for productive purposes is also prohibited 
because it is not an equitable form of transaction20. 
1.4. The Meaning of Riba 
The prohibition of riba is ordained in Islam by verses in the Holy Quran as well 
70 Ahmed, Z., `Prohibition of Interest in Islam', Journal of Islamic Banking .4 Finance, 
Karachi, 
Pakistan, Vol. 1, No. 1,1984, p. 20. 
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as the sayings of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). Riba literally 
means increase, addition, expansion or growth. It is, however, not every increase or 
growth which has been prohibited by Islam. In the shariah, riba technically refers 
to the"premium" that must be paid by the borrower to the lender along with the 
principal amount as a condition for the loan or for an extension in its maturity. In 
this sense, riba has the same meaning and import as interest in accordance with the 
consensus of all the jurists without any exception. The Holy Quran instructs the 
people to shun riba and administers a stern warning to those who do not abide by 
the Divine injunctions in this regards. The Holy Quran says: 
"Those who swallow riba can not rise up save as he 
ariseth whom the devil hath prostrated by (his) touch. That is 
because they say : Trade is just like riba, whereas Allah per- 
mitteth trading and forbiddeth riba. He unto whom an admo- 
nition from his Lord cometh, and(he) refraineth(in obedience 
thereto), he shall keep that which is past, and his affair hence- 
forth is with Allah. As for him who returneth(to riba)such are 
rightful owners of the fire. They will abide therein. Allah hath 
blighteth riba and made sadaqat fruitful. Allah loveth not the 
impious and guilty". (II: 272-276) 
"0 ye who believe, observe your duty to Allah and 
give up what remaineth (due to you) from riba, if you are (in 
truth) believers. And if ye do not, then be warned of war 
(against you) from Allah and His Messenger. And if ye re- 
pent then ye have your principal. Wrong not, and ye shall not 
be wronged". (11: 278-279) 
This verse of the Holy Quran makes it absolutely clear that the institution 
of interest can never be tolerated in an Islamic economy. Moreover, the prohibition 
of riba appears in the Quran in four different revelations. The first of these, in 
Mecca, emphasised that while interest deprived one of the wealth of Allah's blessings, 
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charity raised it many times21. The second, in the early Medina period, severely 
disapproved of interest. It placed those who took riba in juxtaposition with those 
who wrongfully appropriated other people's property and threatened both with 
severe punishment from Allah. The third revelation, around the second or third year 
after Hijra, enjoined Muslims to keep away from riba if they desired their own welfare 
(in the comprehensive Islamic sense). The fourth revelation, near the completion 
of the Prophet's mission, severely censured those who take riba, established a clear 
distinction between trade and riba, and required Muslims to annul all outstanding 
riba, instructing them to take only the principal amount, and forego even this in 
case of the borrower's hardship. 
1.5. Types of R. iba 
Islamic jurists have classified riba in two types: 
1. Riba al-nasia (Interest in debt) 
The term nasia means to postpone, defer, or wait, and refers to the time 
that is allowed to the borrower to repay the loan in return for the "addition" or the 
"premium". Hence riba-al-nasia refers to the interest on loans. 
The prohibition of riba al-nasia essentially implies that the fixing in ad- 
vance of a positive return on a loan as a reward for waiting is not permitted by the 
shariah. It makes no difference whether the return is a fixed or a variable per cent 
of the principal, or an absolute amount to be paid in advance or on maturity, or a 
gift or service to be received as a condition for the loan. The point in question is the 
pre-determined positiveness of the return. It is important to note that, according 
to the shariah, the waiting involved in the repayment of a loan does not by itself 
justify a positive reward. Therefore, the nature of the prohibition is strict, absolute 
and unambiguous. 
2. Riba al fadl (Interest in barter) 
Islam, however, wishes to eliminate not merely the exploitation that is 
21 Chapra, M. U., `The Nature of mba in Islam', Hamdard Islamicus, Pakistan, Vol. VII. No. 1. 
1984, p. 4. 
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intrinsic in the institution of interest, but also that which is inherent in all forms of 
unjust exchanges in business transactions. 
Riba al fadl is the excess over and above the loan paid in kind; it lies in the 
payment of an addition by the debtor to the creditor in exchange of commodities 
of the same kind. The following tradition of the Prophet Muhammad is cited as 
evidence thereof 
It is related that Abu Said al-Khudri said: 
"The Prophet Muhammad (peace be on him), has 
said that gold in return for gold, silver in return for silver, 
wheat in return for wheat, barley in return for barley, dates in 
return for dates and salt in return for salt, can be traded if and 
only if they are in the same quantity and that it should be hand 
to hand. If someone gives more or takes, then he is engaged 
in riba and accordingly has committed a sin". 
There is disagreement among jurists as to whether the injunction applies 
only to the six commodities mentioned above or whether there is some general 
principle which emerges covering a whole class of commodities. Since this kind of 
riba is not our concern we will not discuss these differences here. 
To sum up, riba al-nasia and rriba al fadl are both essential counterparts 
of the verse "God has allowed trade and prohibited riba" (11: 275). While riba al-nasia 
relates to loans and is prohibited in the second part of the verse, riba al fadl relates 
to trade and is implied in the first part22. Because trade is allowed in principle, 
it does not mean that everything is allowed in trade. Since the injustice inflicted 
through riba may also be perpetuated through business transactions, riba al fadl 
refers to all such injustices or exploitation. While riba al-nasia can be defined in a 
few words, riba al fadl encompassing a vast array of business transactions, is not so 
easy to specify. 
32 Chapra, op. cit. p. 8. 
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1.6. Difference Between Interest and Trade 
It is necessary to explain the reasons which actuated Islam in forbidding 
interest and permitting trade. Islam in making trade lawful and interest unlawful, 
stipulates that there are fundamental difference between them. It is on the basis of 
these that the two cannot be treated on a par, from the economic and the moral 
point of view. 
(1) In trade the purchaser and the vendor exchange on the basis of equal- 
ity. For the purchaser derives profit from that which he has purchased from the 
vendor, while the latter gets profit in consideration of the labour and time which 
he spent in procuring that commodity for the purchaser. Compared with this, in 
interest transactions there is no division of profits between the two parties on the 
basis of equality. The creditor gets for himself a definite amount of money for his 
loan but all that the debtor is certain of is the time to use the money. During this 
time period it is not always possible to make a profit. If borrowing is for domestic 
needs, then certainly there is no possibility of any profit accruing over the time 
period of the loan. If the borrower has obtained the financing with a view to invest 
in some business, he stands some chance of producing a profit. The result is that 
one of the two parties to the interest transaction gets profit "certainly" while there 
is no certainty of profit in the case of the other23. 
(2) From the point of view of trade, the moment a commodity is ex- 
changed for its price, the transaction comes to an end. The purchaser does not 
give anything after that transaction to the vendor. In their transaction whether of 
houses, land, or other material, the original remains intact and is returned to the 
owner afterwards. It is only for the use of it that the hirer has to pay rent to the 
owner. But in the case of interest, the debtor actually spends the amount borrowed 
from the creditor and has to return the same amount with an addition by way of 
interest. 
Looked at from the economic point of view, the difference existing be- 
23 Qureshi, op. cit. p. 98. 
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tween trade and interest becomes of fundamental importance. This gives an enor- 
mous power to trade as one of the dominant factors in economic progress and the 
creation of a great civilisation. Interest becomes, on the other hand, one of the 
disruptive forces from the point of view of society. Again from the ethical point of 
view, interest creates in man the undesirable weaknesses of miserliness, selfishness, 
lack of sympathy, and workship of money. It uproots the very foundation of hu- 
manity and mutual help. Thus, both from the economic and ethical points of view, 
interest is one of the leading causes of ruin for mankind24. 
1.7. Adverse Effects of Riba 
The prevailing system of financial relationships based on the fixing of 
return in the form of interest is the cause of all inequities and serves as a powerful 
tool of exploitation in society. Because it is unfair both to the user and the provider 
of funds, it hampers the process of capital formation and optimal utilisation of 
resources, both physical and human. 
To illustrate, let us examine the impact of interest on the investor. The 
starting point here is that a firm will undertake an investment programme provided 
it can borrow money at an interest rate lower than the prospective yield on the 
project. While various modifications are required, the fact remains that no project 
on which the prospective yield is less than the interest rate will be undertaken if 
the firm must borrow to finance it. But in fact conditions are far more stringent25. 
For one thing, an allowance would be made for risk in this context, that 
is, for the risk that the estimate of yield is incorrect. Bearing in mind the common 
business rule that the purchase of a capital asset is undertaken only when there is 
a reasonable assurance that its cost will be fully recovered in a period far shorter 
than its life, it is clear that the allowance for risk is frequently very high, perhaps 
a multiple of the interest rate. Then there is the further risk to be considered 
which the management understandably deems very important, the enhanced danger 
24 Qureshi, op. cit. p. 1. 
18 Sheikh, M. A., `Interest and Unemployment', Islamic Studies, Islamabad, Vol. VIII, March 
1969, No. 1, pp. 9-46. 
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of bankruptcy with every increase in the firm's debt. Considering this risk too, 
management may require an anticipated rate of return far above the interest rate 
as a compensation. 
Every rate of interest projects several risks in the mind of the investor 
which have a direct relationship with the rate at which he can borrow money. These 
risks have often been lumped together as the risk of enterprise. We have to add the 
borrower's risk which is concerned with the assurance to be able to pay interest on 
the borrowed sum. None of these risks will be counted at a rate lower than the rate 
of interest because it is the rate of interest that sets the pace for both the rewards 
we seek in our venture and the risks we run in our undertakings. Interest then is 
inversely related with investment decisions and so long as interest dominates an 
economy, unemployment must persist. 
Ever since the end of the second world war most governments have been 
concerned with creating jobs to reduce unemployment. But the result is something 
very different from the one anticipated. As governments pushed ahead with the 
creation of jobs the price level started rising. A race developed between wages and 
prices which threatened to disrupt the entire monetary system. There is no remedy 
to it except to raise the rate of interest to undo the process of the forced creation of 
jobs; so that, unemployment increases and governments again start on the vicious 
circle beginning with the creation of jobs26. 
We do not have enough space here to trace all the influences of interest, 
such as those on profit, rent, prices, wages, capital formation etc. but we can say 
in short, that the interest-based financial system has failed to resolve the socio- 
economic problems. A substitute must be found to save the economic system from 
the ill-effects of interest. 
Ahmed, S. M., `Banking in Islam', Journal of Islamic Banking and Finance, Karachi, Pakistan, 
Vol. 2, No. 2. June 1985, p. 23. 
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1.8. Rationale of the Prohibition of Interest 
Next let us look at the rationale of prohibition of interest in Islam. This 
has to be viewed in the context of the basic characteristics of an Islamic economic 
system. The fundamentals of an Islamic economic system may be enumerated as 
follows: - 
(a) All persons should have at least the minimum needed for subsistence; 
(b) Undue concentration of wealth in a few hands should be prevented; 
(c) Hoarding should be discouraged and the use of wealth for productive 
purposes should be encouraged; 
(c) The economic system should function so that there is no room for idlers; 
in other words, reward should accrue solely as a result of the expending 
of efforts, except in the case of naturally handicapped and involuntarily 
unemployed. 
The delineation in the Holy Quran of the practice of interest as an act of 
"war with Allah and his messenger" provides a clue to the philosophy behind the 
prohibition of interest in Islam. It is a clear pointer that the institution of interest 
is something which runs counter to the scheme of things which Islam stands for and 
which Allah wants to see established on earth. That the words "Allah has blighteth 
riba and made sadaqat fruitful" occur in verse 276 of Surah Al-Bagara also point 
towards the fact that the practice of interest militates against the objectives of an 
Islamic society while sadaqat promote these objectives27. 
The main points of the rationale for prohibition of interest in Muslim 
countries may be listed as follows: 
(1) Transactions based on interest violate the equity aspect of economic 
organisation. The borrower is obliged to pay a pre-determined rate of interest on 
the sum borrowed even though he may have incurred a loss. To insist on payment 
Ahmed, Z., Concept and Models of Islamic Banking: An Assessment, Paper presented at the 
Seminar on Islamization of Banking under the auspices of Institute of Bankers in Pakistan, 
Karachi, November 1984, p. 5. 
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of a pre-determined rate of interest irrespective of the economic circumstances of 
the borrowers of money is against the Islamic norm of justice. 
(2) The interest based system discourages innovation, particularly on the 
part of small scale enterprises. Large industrial firms and big landholders can afford 
to experiment with new techniques of production as they have reserves of their own 
to fall back upon in case the adoption of new practices does not yield a good 
dividend. Small scale enterprises hesistate to go in for new methods of production 
with the help of money borrowed from banks as the liability of the banks for the 
principal sum and interest has to be met irrespective of the results while they have 
very little reserves of their own. 
(3) Under the interest based system, banks are only interested in recover- 
ing their capital along with the interest. Their interest in the ventures they finance 
is therefore strictly limited to satisfying themselves about the viability and prof- 
itability of such ventures from the point of view of the safety of their capital and the 
ability of the venture to generate a cash flow which can meet the interest liability28. 
Since the return the banks get on the capital sum lent by them is fixed and does not 
vary with the actual profits of the ventures to whom they lend, there is no incentive 
for the banks to give priority to ventures with the highest profit potential. 
(4) The interest based system dampens investment activity because it 
adds to the costs of investment. If interest rates are raised to contain monetary 
demand in situations where excessive fiscal deficits are fuelling inflation, private 
investment receives a severe set-back leading to "st agflation". This has actually 
been the experience of a number of developed countries in recent years. 
(5) The interest-based system is security oriented rather than growth 
oriented. Because of the commitment to pay a pre-determined rate of interest to 
depositors, banks in their lending operations are mostly concerned about the safe 
return of the principal lent alongwith the stipulated interest. This leads them 
to confine their lending to the already well established big business houses or such 
7B Ahmed, Z., op. cit. p. 7. 
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parties as are in a position to pledge sufficient security. If they find that such avenues 
of lending are not sufficient to absorb all their investible resources, they prefer to 
invest in government securities with a guaranteed return. This exaggerated security 
orientation acts as a great impediment to growth because it does not allow a smooth 
flow of bank resources to a large number of potential entrepreneurs who can add to 
gross national product by their productive endeavour, but do not possess sufficient 
security to pledge to the banks to satisfy their criteria of creditworthiness. 
1.9. Conclusions 
As we noted earlier, the principal reason why the Quran has delivered 
such a harsh verdict against interest is that Islam wishes to establish an economic 
system where all forms of exploitation are eliminated. It is concerned in particular 
with the injustice perpetuated when a financier is assured of a positive return with- 
out doing any work or sharing in the risk, while the entrepreneur, in spite of his 
management and hard work, is not assured of such a positive return. Islam wishes 
to establish justice between the financier and the entrepreneur. 
Under these circumstances it is difficult to see how anyone could justify 
interest in an Islamic society. The difficulty in understanding the prohibition comes 
from a lack of appreciation of the whole complex of Islamic values and particularly 
its emphasis on equity not equality. Private property rights are respected through 
the inheritance laws. Justice is equated with morality, and it is in the interest of 
justice, not equality, that riba must be prohibited. 
f 
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CHAPTER TWO 
PROBLEM OF DEBT FINANCING 
AND ISLAMIC VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine problems of debt financing and con- 
sider Islamic views on the subject. The chapter is divided into five sections and 
at the end of each section the Islamic opinion is outlined on the questions being 
examined. First, we discuss government debt, second, private sector debt, third, 
external debt, fourth, debt financing from the firm's point of view and finally draw 
some conclusions. 
Government debt consists of two parts. Internal debt (which, we also refer to as 
the public debt) and the external debt. Public debt is the debt owed by the citizens 
of a country in a collective capacity (i. e. as the government) to themselves in their 
individual capacities. This is quite distinct from the debt owed by the government 
to citizens and governments outside its jurisdiction. The term "national debt", it 
is often suggested, should be reserved for this other category of debts. 
What should be regarded as constituting the public debt has been a debatable 
point on which there has been no consensus of opinion. Attempts have been made, 
for example, to define public debt by the structure of ownership. Thus Professor 
Earl R. Rolph referred to government debt as "national debt" held outside official 
agencies, or in other words that debt held in private hands otherwise known as the 
net debt, the publicly-held debt, or outstanding debt'. He stressed that an exchange 
of assets between the treasury on the one hand and a government corporation or 
the central bank on the other is merely "a book keeping arrangement"' and should 
therefore not be regarded as giving rise to a debt obligation of any significance for 
economic analysis. 
Itolph, E. R.., `Debt Management: Some Theoretical Aspects', Public Finance, Vol. 16,1961. 
pp. 105-6. 
Rolph, E. R., `The Principles of Debt Management', American Economic Review, Vol. XLVII. 
June 1957, p. 305. 
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Studies in the areas of debt policies and the principles and techniques of debt 
management have been devoted largely (and perhaps inevitably) to debt policies 
and management in developed countries. Consequently, like most other fields in 
economics, debt theories have developed largely against the background of these 
economies and generally towards the achievement of economic policy goals which 
are of special interest to them. The background and structure of underdeveloped 
economies differs widely from those of the developed economies. Similarly, although 
it has been argued that economic policy goals in both developed and underdeveloped 
countries are basically similar, ' the priority orderings and emphasis are certainly 
different'. 
The existence and adequate development of economic institutions and the appro- 
priate orientation and responsiveness of economic behaviour within the economy are 
basic requirements for the use of economic policy instruments. That these features 
of underdeveloped economies tend to differ considerably from those in the devel- 
oped economies, results almost always in serious limitations on the effectiveness of 
economic policy instruments in the former. Similarly, these differences often condi- 
tion the appropriateness and/or the mode of application of particular instruments 
of policy for specific goals in ways quite different from the latter. In particular, the 
path of growth of the public debt, the pattern of impact it has on the economy, and 
its usefulness as an instrument of economic policy in developing countries, depends 
very much on the existence and stage of development of the co-operant factors and 
institutions. 
2.1. General Characteristics of Public Debts 
Public debts are incurred through public loans, which may be classified in var- 
ious ways. In the first place, a loan may be either voluntary or compulsory. The 
chief advantage of a voluntary loan, as compared with a tax, is that different lenders 
Heller, W., `Fiscal Policies for Underdeveloped Countries', in Readings in Taxation in Devel- 
oping Countries, It, M. Bird & Oldman, 0. (eds. ), (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967), 
pp. 5-6. 
Chelliali, R. J., Fiscal Policy in Underdeveloped Countries, (London: George Allen & Unwin 
Ltd., 2nd ed., 1969), pp. 19-20. 
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are free, according to their'circumstances and inclinations, to subscribe as much or 
as little as they please. But this disadvantage is lacking in a forced loan, which 
must be compulsorily subscribed on the same basis as a tax. The chief advantage 
of a tax, as compared with a voluntary loan, is that it leaves behind it no trail 
of charges for interest and repayment of principal. But this advantage is lacking 
in a forced loan, though the rate of interest on the latter may be lower than on a 
voluntary loan. 
In the second place, the conventional two way classification into short and long 
term debts, therefore, appears to rest on an attempt to distinguish between these 
highly liquid instruments and less liquid ones. Treasury bills are usually taken as 
typifying short term securities. These can in fact be taken to be the most liquid of 
government debt instruments. This is because: (i) they are usually issued for 91 
days or less during which time the risk of serious depreciation in the value of money 
is likely to be minimal; (ii) they can be sold easily on the market without any undue 
risk of loss; (iii) they are readily acceptable to the banks at face value as security 
for loans because of their "near money" nature and (iv) they are discountable at 
the central bank. 
Within this liquidity framework, the medium term debts can also be subsumed 
into the two way classification. Thus, in so far as medium instruments do not have 
the features of liquidity given above, it will appear that the proper place for them is 
with the long term instruments. However, occasionally, medium term instruments 
are issued subject to conditions of easy discountability similar to the case of the short 
term instruments. In that case, the liquidity character of such medium instruments 
becomes so enhanced so as to qualify them for inclusion in the short term category. 
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2.1.1. Economic Effects of Public Debt 
The character of the expenditure for which debt is incurred will determine 
whether the effect is (a) employment-creating, (b) utility-creating, or (c) efficiency- 
creating, or some combination of these. The character of the expenditure will affect 
the standard of living. But once the debt has been incurred, its subsequent impact 
upon employment and the distribution of income will be the same regardless of the 
purpose for which the debt was incurred. 
We now encounter the question of whether a public debt imposes any such 
serious rigidity upon the economy. A. H. Hansen, believes that it does not. The 
interest on the public debt is serviced by taxation, the successful collection of which 
depends upon the maintenance or increase from the long-run standpoint of the 
national income as a whole. The solvency of the government is not subject to the 
risk of structural changes which may cause the decline, or even death, of certain 
industries and thus profoundly affect the income of private corporations. Moreover, 
the cyclical fluctuations of income are less serious for the government than for 
the private sector of the economy. In the first place, the incomes of many private 
corporations fluctuate far more violently than the income of the economy as a whole. 
Much more important, however, is the fact that the individual corporation with a 
low income in the depression phase of the cycle is placed in a dangerous financial 
situation. Corporations with a heavy load of debt may, in seriously depressed 
conditions, be forced into bankruptcy and may be unable to carry the interest 
burden, or at any rate be unable to raise necessary new funds for expansion in 
the subsequent revival period'. The government is placed in no such dangerous 
situation by reason of cyclical fluctuations of income. Indeed, the government is 
not only able to, but may, to the advantage of the economy as a whole, engage in 
borrowing when the national income is temporarily low. 
8 Hansen, A. If., Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles, George Allen & Unwin ltd, London, 1941, 
pp. 135-185. 
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2.1.2. The Role of the Central Bank in Dealing with Public Debts 
The central bank stands in a unique position vis-a-vis other arms of the gov- 
ernment with respect to dealings in public debt. This is not only because, the bank 
is responsible for the management of the government debt but also because of its 
note issuing function. The bank does not have to be in custody of private sector 
funds or unutilised budgetary allocations to enable it to invest in government secu- 
rities. It can buy securities by simply issuing new notes or creating deposits for the 
government and the extent to which it can do this is only limited by whatever legal 
or other institutional limitation is placed on the volume of currency it can issue. 
It follows that the capacity of the bank to invest in government securities can be 
influenced by varying its note-issuing capacity. 
Being responsible for the management of the public debt the bank usually acts as 
a buffer between the treasury and the securities market. When a new issue is floated, 
it is customary for the bank to take up whatever part of the new issue that is not fully 
subscribed to by the public. But these amounts taken up by the bank are peddled 
through the market as soon as possible afterwards. The implication here is that the 
money supply is temporarily increased as the bank takes up unsubscribed issues but 
the resulting increase in the money supply is withdrawn as soon as possible after 
market sale. 
This would not matter very much where the market for securities is well de- 
veloped and demand for them is high enough to absorb whatever excess the bank 
takes on, either at the time of issue, or within a short time after it. In economies 
where the securities market is not at an advanced stage of development and demand 
for securities from the general public is low, the bank might find it difficult to sell 
much of the new issue it has taken up. This means that for every successive issue 
of a new security by the government, the bank's holding will tend to increase. The 
bank's support to the government under these circumstances is inflationary. In ad- 
dition, it might tend to indicate the weakness of open market operations as a tool 
of monetary control. J^ 
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It might be useful to look at holding of debt by the bank from the point of view of 
resource withdrawal from the private sector. Money supply increases when the bank 
purchases government securities and decreases when its holding of securities falls. 
When the bank sells to the private sector, monetary resources are thereby withdrawn 
from the private sector and when it purchases from this sector, monetary resources 
in the private sector correspondingly increase. If the bank purchases directly from 
the treasury it enables the government to withdraw real resources from the private 
sector through its purchases of goods and services. Consequently, either way, the 
bank's holding of debt has important implications for the variation of resources in 
the private sector. 
2.1.3. The Government Role in Minimising the Budgetary Burden of Debt 
This is perhaps a good point to turn to an examination of the budgetary burden 
of public debt. The problem falls into two parts, the amortization of the debt, and 
the cost of borrowing especially as typified by interest payments. To a considerable 
extent the use of debt finance is criticised on the ground of the alleged necessity for 
an increase in tax to amortize and/or pay interest on the debt. 
It is a fact that a tremendous growth in the debt of most advanced countries had 
been caused by financing of war. Expenditure on war neither yields returns to the 
government nor generates growth from which government revenue can benefit. One 
does get a slightly different picture, however, when one considers debt finance in 
times of peace. The government can also incur debt in anticipation of tax revenue, 
or to finance capital projects or on behalf of government corporations. Repayment 
of such debts will surely not create a budgetary burden of the same magnitude as 
debts incurred to finance a war. 
For example, if a capital project financed by debt aids economic activities, e. g. 
road construction, electricity, etc., its effect would be reflected in increased tax 
revenue. Only to the extent that the induced increase in tax revenue falls short of 
the debt and interest payable, do repayments constitute a budgetary burden. 
However, a debt management problem arises as to the desirable liquidity struc- 
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ture of the economy or the financial strength of the government to meet its obliga. 
tions when such debts fall due for repayment. Thus, if debts become due at a time 
when the government is attempting to reduce liquidity of the economy, or when, 
as a result of the demands of other essential programmes for expenditure, it has 
to mobilise all possible resources, the best way out would be to find a way of con- 
verting the maturing debt into a longer one. This conversion can be done in one of 
two ways. The holders can be induced to exchange the expiring debt for conversion 
issues bearing higher yields. Alternatively, the process of continuous borrowing can 
be adopted. This involves the government raising new debts to pay off the maturing 
ones. The new debts raised can be longer or shorter depending on the reason why 
the government is not paying maturing debts without raising new ones. 
The cost of public debt falls into two broad categories, administrative costs and 
interest payments. Administrative costs are incurred in issuing, retiring, and paying 
interest on debt instruments. A few suggestions have been proposed as to how these 
costs can be reduced. Important among them is the number of debt instruments 
the government uses. Reduction in the number of instruments used makes for 
considerable simplification which would save the government the expenses incurred 
in putting several types on the market and the multiplicity of records necessitated 
by the use of numerous types of instruments. An extreme view was proposed by 
Simons, ' that government borrowing should in fact be made on a long-term basis 
only. 
Turning now to the problem of interest cost, the relatively low rate of interest 
at which short-term debts can be raised vis-a-vis long ones might tempt one to 
suggest that the government should concentrate on the use of short term securities. 
But, considering the implications of short-term borrowing for the liquidity of the 
economy and monetary control, it is clear that the disadvantage will occasionally 
outweigh the advantage of lower interest rates. Besides, the rate of interest on 
short-term borrowing is not likely to be the same at all times. It will tend to rise 
Simons, H., `On Debt Policy', Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 52, December 1944, pp. 
356-361. 
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with an inflationary trend and might well rise above what the government needs to 
bear on long-term borrowings contracted during non-inflationary periods. 
While discussing the use of long or short borrowing as a means of reducing 
interest payments, it might be useful to examine yet another extreme possibility, 
that of monetary expansion, since the government owns and controls the machinery 
for printing money'. There is the temptation to uphold this argument on a few 
grounds. 
Firstly, it can be argued that taking up of government securities by the central 
bank merely cloaks money printing. Thus the government should print money 
directly rather than burden itself with interest commitment and administrative 
costs by employing an intermediary. Secondly, short-term securities are as good as 
money and serve, in the hands of banks, as a basis for credit expansion just as cash 
does. If the government needs money or wishes to increase liquidity it could just as 
well print the money necessary. Thirdly, the government does not pay interest on 
printed money whereas it has to on loans raised. 
On a close examination, however, it would be realised that attempting to avoid 
interest payments by printing money would only result in bigger problems. A first 
argument against this is that the ease of printing money might be so tempting that 
the government might fail to apply the brakes when necessary. A stronger argument 
against it is the excessive increase in liquidity that successive issues of cash would 
create. If money printing were substituted for short-term borrowing, this would 
pose serious problems of liquidity control. It should be considered that short-term 
debt instruments are at least less liquid than cash and are not as acceptable as or 
cannot be converted to an acceptable medium of exchange without some loss. This 
factor provides a valuable check on money supply which would be lost if printing of 
money were substituted for borrowing through the issue of short-term securities. A 
vital instrument for the control of banks credit expansion would thereby be lost. In 
the absence of securities which could be manipulated, the central bank would have 
' Adewumi, 0., `The Use of the Public Debt Instrument in Nigeria', unpublished Ph. D thesis, 
University of Edinburgh, 1973, p. 93. 
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to rely solely on specific credit controls. 
From the discussion above, it will seem that the success of minimising the bud- 
getary burden of debt in reducing interest costs depends, like many other manage- 
ment techniques on too many "ifs". These "ifs" unfortunately happen to be so vital 
that they will always tends to mitigate the achievement of cost reduction as a goal 
of debt management. 
2.1.4. The Islamic Views on Public Debt 
In general, the government's need for debt finance mainly arises for three differ- 
ent reasons. It needs short-term finance to bridge the time gap between expenditures 
made and revenues collected or received. This need is presently met by the sale of 
treasury bills. Secondly, it needs medium and long-term finance for industries in 
the public sector as well as public utilities like transport , electrification etc. 
Lastly, 
it needs huge financial resources to meet natural calamities or to mobilise defence 
expenditure during a war. 
From the first case above, there is no net productivity or actual return involved 
out of which a share could be ascribed to the money capital borrowed. Since a price 
is already set on loanable funds in the investment market, the government has to 
pay interest for these short-term loans, usually obtained by selling treasury bills of 
short maturity. The interest paid eventually comes out of the tax revenue. Since 
the lenders are moneyed people and it is they who pay most of the taxes in a welfare 
state, it amounts to taxing the same class of people to pay them interest. The cost 
of administering the tax, to the extent that it is related to interest payment must, 
therefore, be regarded as a social waste as well as an extra burden on this class 
necessitated by this irrational arrangement8. 
Financing public sector industries and utilities through interest-bearing loans 
suffers from the same irrationality which attends investment in the private sector. 
The value productivity of investment in the public sector is as uncertain as it is in 
° Siddiqi, M. N., Issues in Islamic Banking Selected Papers, The Islamic Foundation, Leicester, 
1983, p. 77. 
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the private sector, hence guaranteeing a positive return to the supplier of money 
capital is unfair. It amounts to transferring the entire burden of possible losses to 
the society as a whole, while assuring the suppliers of money capital of a guaranteed 
increment to their wealth. 
Most of the huge public debts that the modern governments are carrying origi- 
nated during wars that were financed by raising interest-bearing loans. It is argued 
therefore that the state should either raise funds by taxes or, if these are not suffi- 
cient, by compulsory interest-free borrowing from individuals and business. These 
should be in accordance with income and/or wealth and should be amortized over 
a specified period of time from war taxes. Such taxes should continue even after 
the war, perhaps at a lower rate, until the debt has been fully amortized. 
The emphasis has to be on the careful evaluation of government expenditures 
and the elimination of as much fat as possible. Every effort should be made to 
increase efficiency in government spending and reduce wastefulness and corruption. 
It would be more appropriate for an Islamic state to finance all its normal 
recurring expenditure out of tax revenues. For this purpose, there is generally 
no justification for deficits under normal cirumstances. Deficits essentially imply 
postponing the payment for services received by the present generation to future 
generations. Since the future generations, like the present one, do not wish to pay 
for past deficits and also wish to postpone even a part of their own burden to the 
future, the public debt burden continues to rise exponentially. The argument that 
"postponing" is for services to be enjoyed by future generations is not valid. In 
the case of government consumption or wasteful expenditure and war financing, 
the increase in internal public debt no doubt represents the transfer of the burden 
to future generations. Even in the case of government capital formation, it must 
be borne in mind that the present generation is receiving benefits from projects 
financed by past generations. It would be fair to expect that the present generation, 
like past ones, would leave behind more capital than it has received. The financing 
of all consumption spending as well as a part of the capital outlays out of tax 
revenues would not lead to a continual and rapid expansion of the public debt as 
35 
has been the case in most developed as well as developing countries°. 
The easy availability of credit to governments on the basis of willingness to pay 
interest has led to loose financing by governments. Banks pay "little attention to 
how borrowing countries were managing their economies" and "how their loans were 
being used". Very often governments borrow for a short-term because under normal 
circumstances short-term loans are easier to get and can be rolled over smoothly. 
The tragedy is that the funds raised-through debt are not used for investment in 
"real" assets but simply to meet current expenditures, to purchase unnecessary 
defence hardware, or to finance projects having no economic justification. The 
result is a steeply rising mountain of "dead-weight" debt with a continuing rise in 
the debt-service burden. The resort to debt is made more and more as a means 
to put off painful, belt-tightening decisions. But greater borrowing now leads to 
even more borrowing in the future to maintain the economy on its path of artificial 
growth and to continue the debt-service payments. 
To conclude this section, it is however, inevitable that the Islamic state must, of 
necessity, tailor its expenditure policy carefully and try its utmost to make the best 
use of available resources. This will be possible only if wasteful and unnecessary 
spending is avoided. This would necessitate that defence outlays be held within 
reasonable bounds, wasteful expenditure be eliminated, corruption be kept under 
control through moral reform of the society, and welfare spending be designed, not 
to enrich the vested interests but, in conformity with the teachings of Islam, to help 
those who are really in need. 
In spite of this policy of honest austerity, the Islamic state can and should 
have reasonable deficit levels. One way of meeting these deficits would be equity 
financing of projects which are so amenable. If every effort is made to reduce 
waste and finance government projects on an equity basis to the extent feasible, the 
excessive borrowing now being resorted to may not be necessary. Equity financing 
would, however, demand maximum efficiency and discipline in the management 
Chapra, M. U., Towards a Just Monetary System, The Islamic Foundation, Leicester, 1985. 
pp. 132-138. 
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of such projects which unfortunately is not the case in most public sector projects. 
Deficits which need to be incurred even after the introduction of austerity and equity 
financing, may be financed, in national emergencies, by compulsory lending to the 
government and, in normal times, by borrowing, partly from the commercial banks 
and partly from the central bank. The borrowing from the central bank should be 
within the limits dictated by the goal of price stability. 
It needs to be clearly stated that there is no escape from sacrifice and austerity, 
if economic development and general well-being are to be pursued. 
2.2. Private Sector Debt 
The ultimate goal of debt policy is to influence the liquidity of the private sector 
in such a way that will lead to the achievement of the desired goal. This can be 
successfully done if the participation of the private sector is sufficiently large to form 
a significant proportion of their assets holding. If it is very low, for example, issue 
or retirement of debt will hardly go any way to influence their liquidity structure 
and thus effect a change in their economic behaviour. It will appear therefore that 
a very important problem of debt management is to ensure as much participation 
of the private sector as possible. 
To start with, let us attempt to analyse briefly the various factors that influence 
the investment decisions of different categories of investors in the private sector. 
2.2.1. Private Individuals 
Investment by private individuals can be either indirect through participation 
in pension schemes or direct through compulsion by the government, or through a 
conscious attempt to save out of net disposable income and put the saving into a 
form that yields a dividend. 
A person saving for his old age is likely to be extremely concerned about the 
security of his investment (where security is defined in term of low risk of loss of both 
financial and real value of investment). He is therefore likely to choose between bank 
deposits, investment in real property, investment in business shares, or investment 
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in government securities. The choice of the last two is likely to be influenced largely 
by his knowledge of such modes of investment and how to get into them, as well 
as his idea of the relative security of the assets, while investment in the second will 
depend on the size of his income. 
Similarly, for the other group of savers, these features of investment in real 
property might give it a relatively high weight in their decision. On the assumption 
that this class of savers are prepared to take some risk, an additional investment 
opportunity is open to them. This is to employ any saving they have in running a 
small scale business. 
From the discussion, the following general picture emerges: 
The distribution of investment in the private sector between government se- 
curities and private business is affected by (i) the relative yield on both, (ii) the 
investor's concept of relative security, and (iii) the degree of indifference of private 
investors between yield and security". 
One can therefore conceive of rates of substitution, for each investor, of yield 
for security and vice-versa. Such rates will differ from one investment group to the 
other depending on their investment motive. For groups where the income motive 
is strong, the rate of substitution of yield for security will be high and investment 
will be more interest elastic. However, for groups whose investment motive is to 
provide for a specific future eventuality, e. g. old age or future projects, the rate of 
substitution of yield for security will be low, hence investment will not be interest 
elastic and the security element will be stronger. This means that the strategy to 
adopt in increasing the private sector's investment in government debt is either to 
increase the yield or security, depending on which group is the target. 
Consequently, short term loans will attract more participation by the private 
sector than long-term ones. Also, increasing investment in long term debt will have 
to be secured either by (i) offering a substantially higher rate of interest which more 
10 Tobin, J., `Liquidity Preference as Behaviour Toward Risk', Review of Economic Studies, 
Vol. VVX, 1958, pp. 65-86. 
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than compensates for whatever discount of value people might place on the mone- 
tary value of the investment or (ii) offering on such terms that the debt instruments 
are guaranteed against a loss in real value. 
2.2.2. Business Firms 
The business firm's decision to invest in government securities will also have to 
revolve around their idea of the relative profitability of alternative ways of utilising 
investible surpluses. 
Four possible alternatives are open to them. A firm can keep its surplus in the 
form of balances in the bank, plough it back into its operations, invest in some other 
business enterprise, or invest in government securities. One naturally expects the 
second alternative to take priority, but only in so far as the firm thinks it has got to 
the limit of its expansion possibility, or does not have enough surplus to increase its 
scale of operation, or feels that it can get a higher return on any other alternative 
than the current return on its capital. Only then will these other alternatives come 
up for consideration. 
Where a firm wishing to expand does not have sufficient investible surplus, it 
can do one of two things. It can, for example, borrow from the banks such extra 
funds as are necessary to make the expansion possible provided the interest to be 
paid is not above the expected increase in profitability that might result from the 
expansion. An alternative to that is to put whatever surplus there is into financial 
assets as a temporary investment until it is able to muster enough funds for its 
programme. In that case, short-term government securities might be an attractive 
proposition. 
2.2.3. Consumer Debts and Islamic Views on the Subject 
The requirements of daily life are becoming more and more complex. Therefore, 
the importance of consumption loans for the genuine requirements of individuals 
can hardly be over-estimated. Consumption loans are more or less unproductive in 
nature, though their influence on the productivity of the community has an indirect 
bearing in so far as it stimulates production and supply. 
39 
Some families finance their major purchases by borrowing money from a com- 
mercial source. Others find it necessary to borrow money to pay off their consumer 
debts or to meet emergencies. Borrowing money from a lending institution depends 
on the family's credit standing as well as on its needs. Higher-income families and 
those whose income is based exclusively on earnings are more apt to obtain such 
loans". 
The younger families (where the head is under 30 years of age) and the older 
(where the head is over 50) borrow money less often than those of middle age. 
Families headed by persons between 30 and 39 years of age most often take out loans. 
This age pattern suggests that through the life cycle debts are shifted from stores to 
banks and finance companies, and the younger families are apt to turn to stores for 
installment credit. As their debts mount and payments become increasingly more 
difficult to meet, they are inclined to obtain loans to pay off their other debts. In 
this way they obtain relief in the form of small monthly payments at the cost of a 
longer period of indebtedness. 
From the above analysis, consumer credit can be viewed as a case of the break- 
down of a system of exchange that is inherently unstable because it rests upon the 
consumer's poor credit status and his ignorance. The risk factor becomes evident 
in the breakdown resulting from missed payments. Often this is not independent of 
the consumer's lack of sophistication. But some consumers become overextended 
because they have been victimized by the high-pressure salesman who urge too 
great a debt burden on them. And sometimes the failure to maintain payments is 
a consequence of the merchant's trying to exploit the consumer's ignorance. When 
this is discovered, the consumer may stop payments. 
Since the system also rests upon the consumer's ignorance, this too contributes 
to its instability. The exchange system becomes strained when events suddenly 
make the consumer aware that he did not know what he was doing. He realizes 
that he has been exploited when the merchandise he buys falls apart, not after a 
" Caplovitz, D., The Poor Pay More, Consumer Practices of Low-Income Families, The Free 
Press, New York, 1967, p. 99. 
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few years, but in a few months or even a few days. 
With respect to consumer credit Islam does not encourage a high consump- 
tion economy like that under capitalism. Credit for this purpose should hence be 
discouraged as should thepu rchase of such goods even for cash payment. There- 
fore, a substantial part of instalment credit may not be necessary. The rest, which 
is considered necessary for realising Islamic objectives, could be arranged by the 
instalment business on a mudarabah basis from individual financiers and financial 
institutions with whom the dealers have a profits-and-loss sharing arrangement. 
The business concerned has to raise equity finance for its entire financing needs. It 
is on this total financing that the firm would normally be sharing profits or losses 
and not on individual sales. If the firm has not raised sufficient equity finance, it 
will be constrained to rely on cash sales. If it expands into the area of instalment 
sales beyond the limits justified by its resources it could fall into trouble. 
Also the cost of servicing instalment sales are notoriously high, necessitating a 
very high rate of interest on instalment credit. The price the consumer actually 
pays for these articles is much higher than its market price. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that recourse to consumer credit may eventually result in a lower standard 
of living. Easy availability coupled with high-pressure advertising and aggressive 
sales promotion leads many families into indebtedness to an extent hardly justified 
by their present assets or future income prospects. 
Business firms would therefore have to raise sufficient equity, if they wish to 
expand sales beyond the volume permitted by their own equity. They would also 
have to manage their cash flows wisely without over-extending themselves. 
Instalment purchases of socially necessary goods, like taxis, sewing machines, 
cottage industry equipment and the like, which are in keeping with Islamic val- 
ues and goals, could be arranged through financing from the private sector on a 
profit and loss sharing basis and supplemented by financing from specialised credit 
institutions established by the government. 
In short, the institution of easy consumer credit is responsible for many ills 
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for those directly involved, besides its painful effects at the macro-economic level. 
It puts the debtor families under great psychological strain. It leads to break up 
of homes, ill health and even loss of jobs. Eventually the debtor may end up in 
complete ruin, economically as well as otherwise. 
Social intervention to prevent these evils can hardly succeed without striking at 
the root of this institution. We have already noted that no rationale exists for fixed 
interest charges on consumer credit. If it is desirable to facilitate the acquisition of 
consumer durables the society has to find some alternative ways of doing so. 
2.3. External Debt 
2.3.1. Origins of the Problem 
In the early 1980s, interest rose internationally as the United States budget 
deficit increased (due to tax cuts and rising military expenditure). Borrowing 
increased, but lenders would only provide funds at higher interest rates. These 
domestic US developments were reflected in the Euro-markets. 
The bulk of external debt is soverign debt: amounts owed abroad by national 
governments, by their decentralized agencies, or by private firms but with public 
guarantees. However, a considerable portion of the debt owed by the private sector 
is without public guarantee. The World Bank estimates that 80% of long-term 
developing countries' debt was public or publicly guaranteed in 1981, and 20% was 
private. 
Higher inflation tends to cause higher interest rates. When this occurs, higher 
current debt service must be paid, because approximately two-thirds of developing 
countries debt is at floating interest rates tied to the London Interbank Offer Rate 
(LIBOR). But higher inflation also erodes the value of the debt that eventually is to 
be repaid. Accordingly, high interest rates caused primarily by high inflation have 
the effect of causing a great present cash flow burden in return for eroding the real 
value of outstanding debt. 
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In effect, they cause accelerated amortization of the debt in real terms'. 
Export stagnation was driven both by global recession (which caused export 
volume growth to decline) and by dollar appreciation and commodity price erosion 
(lowering the dollar value of export earnings). Domestic policies in debtor countries 
also played a role in increasing debt in important cases. 
According to the latest OECD statistics published in 1985, total debt of LDCs 
at the end of 1984 amounted to $889.5 billion. Out of this debt, an amount of 
$533.3 billion, which equals, 60%, consisted of bank credits. Compared to the LDC 
debt at the end of 1980, a doubling has taken place. 
The top ranking debtor countries are Brazil ($105.4 billion), Mexico ($94.7 
billion), South Korea ($44.4 billion), Argentina ($44.4 billion), Indonesia ($32.7 
billion), and Venezuela ($28.7 billion). Most of these countries, since the early 
1980s, have found that they are unable to even service, let alone repay their debts. 
Since the literature on external debt and the main causes of it can be found 
in various detailed studies, we will, therefore, not discuss the issue here, as our 
objective in this section is mainly to examine briefly the origin of external debt and 
to present the Islamic views on the subject. 
In sum, there are significant domestic as well as foreign causes of the debt prob- 
lem. Nonetheless, it would be inaccurate to indicate that the bulk of the debt 
contracted has failed to go into productive investments; the evidence tends to indi- 
cate that most borrowing was productively used. But it remains true that because 
the magnitudes of the external economic pressures on developing countries became 
so great, there was little margin left for domestic policy error. In evaluating domes- 
tic policy, it must also be kept in mind that the sharp decline in the global economy, 
the rises in interest rates, and oil price increases were generally not predicted, and 
few would have advocated the extremely cautious borrowing policy that would have 
been consistent with foreknowledge of these global shocks. 
Cline, W. R., International Debt, Institute for International Economics, Washington, 1984, 
p. 2. 
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2.3.2. Islamic Views on the Subject 
Islamic economists take the view that the international debt problem would not 
have reached its present dimension if the prohibition of interest payments had been 
followed by the international banking business. Consequently the debt problem 
could be reduced provided that the prohibition of interest payments is considered 
in the future. In accordance with this view credit based upon interest payments 
should be replaced by equity financing. 
But first the question can be raised regarding the economic problem and what 
is it that is wrong? The answer would depend essentially on our basic philosophy 
of life as this will determine our analysis of the underlying cause of the problems. 
No treatment can be effective unless it is addressed to the mainspring of the crisis. 
Nevertheless, the mistake commonly committed is that the source of the crisis is 
sought in symptoms: huge budgetary imbalances, excessive monetary expansion, 
large balance of payments deficits, rise of protectionist tendencies, insufficient for- 
eign aid and international debt. The result is that the remedies adopted, ease the 
crisis only temporarily. After a short time, the crisis reappears, deeper and more 
serious. 
The Muslim countries are not different. They are faced with the same problems 
as other countries. They are, however, thoughtlessly following the west in everything 
and committing the same mistake of looking only at the symptons. No serious effort 
is being made to analyse the underlying source of their problems and to determine 
a proper strategy for solving them in the light of their own value system13. Within 
the Islamic perspective, the roots of the crisis lie deeper and no effort to solve 
the problems through cosmetic changes will succeed. There is need for a thorough 
reform. 
Generally speaking, debt finance whether government or private or coming 
through international "aid" agencies, is supposed to help increase production in the 
debtor countries which should eventually be in a position to pay back, with interest. 
13 Chapra, op. cit. p. 20. 
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The practice is justified on the basis of the alleged net productivity of capital. In 
the nature of things, however, uncertainty of the value productivity of capital is 
most pronounced in this sector for a host of reasons. 
Not all the debts obtained by poor countries go to finance development. Part of 
it may go to finance needed consumption. In some cases it may go to finance defence 
mobilisation or part of the aid may go to finance the cost of government. These 
non-productive uses could not possibly provide for repayment of the principal, much 
less for creation of additional value to justify payment of interest. 
Insofar as external loans were utilised for productive purposes they were usually 
attended by circumstances which greatly reduced their efficiency in serving the real 
long-term interests of the debtor countries. Creditors imposed strategies designed 
to serve their own interests rather than those of the aid recipients. 
Other negative effects of "aided" development have been the worsening distribu- 
tion of income, increasing social unrest and an ever more wasteful use of resources. 
For the creditor countries and their multinationals, it was an exercise in creating 
new markets for their exports and making the debtor economies more and more 
dependent on their own economies14. 
Also poor countries have been goaded into debts far beyond their means and 
induced to use the resources so obtained in an extravagant way. They have learnt 
to live beyond their means and not to tighten their belts, save, economise and work 
hard to build a better future. The easy availability of loans and the possibility of 
continuing to borrow with no chances of repayment in sight have further aggravated 
the situation. For this, the main blame lies on the basis on which these transactions 
were effected, commitment to repay with interest irrespective of the actual outcome 
of the utilisation of these resources. 
The present system of interest bearing loans and three decades of debt financing 
have not been able to make the debtor countries self-sufficient or even less depen- 
dent, not to speak of their being able to generate surpluses to pay back. This has 
14 Siddigi, op. cit. p. 79. 
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put the world economic order under heavy strain. The rationale of interest bearing 
debt in the context of international economic cooperation is being seriously ques- 
tioned, and it can hardly bear close scrutiny. Much of the entire world community is 
convinced of the need for a new economic order radically different from the present 
one. It has, however, yet to realise the priority of abolishing interest as the basis of 
rich-poor financial transcations as the first step towards such a change. 
2.4. Debt (Bond) Financing from the Firm's Point of Views 
A firm, wishing to raise funds to meet its financing requirements, has a variety 
of alternatives available for consideration. It may issue common stock, bonds, pre- 
ferred stock, convertible debentures, and so on, to raise funds. There are different 
types of bonds which have varied features. 
A bond is a promissory note issued by the firm to an investor. Firms, of course, 
do not issue bonds in £1,000 denominations one at a time. Rather, after assessing its 
financing requirements the firm will issue millions of pounds worth of bonds and sell 
them to thousands of investors. Each new debt issue is governed by an indenture 
or contract between the borrower (the firm) and the lender (the investor). The 
contract agreement contains covenants or terms and provisions such as the interest 
rate, maturity date, redemption price, safeguards for lenders, and so on". 
Bonds can be either registered or bearer bonds. The holder of a registered bond 
has the bond recorded in his name in the company's book and receives the interest 
payments automatically. A bearer bond is not registered in anyone's name. The 
bond possessor is the assumed owner also. Bearer bonds have coupons attached to 
them. At scheduled dates these coupons are redeemed by the owner for the interest 
payment. 
Typical types of bonds include mortgage bonds, debentures, subordinated deb- 
entures, and income bonds. It is not necessary here to explain the different types 
of bonds given the subject of this thesis. 
11 Mathur, I., Introduction to Financial Management, Macmillan, New York, 1979, pp. 401-403. 
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2.4.1. Role of Debt in the Financial Structure of a Firm 
In modern business organizations capital requirements are so immense that a 
single source of finance is insufficient. Therefore, we notice that large corporations 
in general have a diversified ownership structure. But what is somewhat difficult to 
understand is that these organizations use different kinds of financing methods. 
The question then is, why do firms obtain funds through different forms of 
financial instruments? In particular, why do firms use both debt and equity to 
finance their capital needs? 
Now, suppose the owners of a firm purchase some capital input this year which 
will produce some output next year. Suppose, furthermore, that if the input level 
is y, next year's output, which for the sake of simplicity may be assumed to consist 
of the same goods, is OF(y) , where 0 is some parameter which may 
be a random 
variable. Consider the following two financing possibilities open to the owners of the 
firm. They can borrow an amount y this year, pay back (1+ r)y next year, where r 
is the rate of interest, and keep the residual, namely qF(y) -(1 +r) y. Alternatively, 
they can sell a claim to some portion of next year's output up to a value of y 
and then, when next year's output is produced, they can settle the claim and keep 
whatever is left. Thus we have two possible methods of finance which apparently 
yield two different returns to the owners. The first of these is called debt financing 
(or bond financing) and the second equity financing16. 
Controversy started after the Miller-Modigliani theorem which states that the 
value of the firm is independent of its financing decisions. This result was questioned 
given the fact that most firms have some amount of debt and equity in their capital 
structure. Many writers have tried to place the role of debt in a firm's capital 
structure by relaxing the assumptions of the Miller-Modigliani theorem. In the 
beginning, efforts centred on the no-bankruptcy and no-taxes assumptions. If the 
probability of bankruptcy is positive (and it is costly to go bankrupt) then firms 
and individual borrowers cannot have equal access to credit markets. Firms can 
" Nickell, S. J., The Investment Decisions of Firms, James Nisbet, England, 1978, pp. 149-151. 
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issue debt at a lower rate than individuals and this raises the value of the firm. 
On the other hand if debt payments are tax deductible then again, debt would be 
cheaper relative to equity. 
Many authors like Stiglitz, Jensen and Meckling and Grossman and Hart have 
a relaxed and a somewhat different assumption of the Miller-Modigliani theorem: 
that the firm's production function is independent of its financial structure1z. 
Stiglitz, Jensen and Meckling consider the situation of an investor who has 
access to an investment project but does not have sufficient funds to finance it. If 
the investor raises funds by issuing equity, then as he will have a less than 100% 
interest in the project he will not manage it as carefully as he would had he been 
a full owner. If, on the other hand, the investor issues debt his incentive to work 
is reduced much less since, except in bankrupt states, he gets the full benefits of 
any increase in profits. Thus to Stiglitz, Jensen and Meckling, debt is a way of 
permitting expansion without sacrificing incentives. 
Suppose for example a firm has decided to drill an oil well. Suppose further that 
the firm has to raise the funds from outside sources. If the firm issues debt then 
it has to pay a fixed sum of money to the lender while if it issues equity then the 
lenders owns a share in the oil well. Finally, assume that it is costly for the lender 
to monitor the performance of the project. If the lender relies on the reports of the 
firm there might be an incentive problem: the firm would tend to under-report the 
project's performance. 
2.4.2. Disadvantages of Debt (Bond) Financing 
Mathur believes that financing with debt increases the firm's financial risk be- 
cause of increased levels of fixed charges in the form of interest expenses. During 
adverse conditions a firm can stop its dividends. However, a firm encountering ad- 
verse conditions cannot avoid its interest payments. The presence of interest-bearing 
debt in the firm's financial structure increases the firm's exposure to bankruptcy". 
" Klan, W. M., Towards an Interest-Free Islamic Economic System, The Islamic Foundation, 
U. K & The International Association for Islamic Economics, Islamabad, 1985, pp. 54.55. 
1° Mathur, op. cit. p. 409. 
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Debt financing involves dealing with indentures and covenants. The conditions 
and requirements imposed on the firm by bondholders may limit the firm's financial 
mobility in future years. 
There is a limit to how much debt financing by a firm is going to be deemed 
acceptable by the firm's creditors. If a profitable firm is 100% equity-financed, it 
normally would not have any problems with additional equity financing. However, 
even if a firm is profitable, investors may be reluctant to buy its new bonds if they 
feel that the firm is already over leveraged and has a high financial risk. A firm that 
exceeds or tries to consistently exceed industry-accepted norms for debt financing 
may find the market very unreceptive to its new financing instruments, irrespective 
of whether they are bonds or common stock. 
2.4.3. Islamic Views on Debt Finance 
We have to consider the relationship between the creditor and debtor from the 
perspective of the creditor. He is always concerned about the safe return of the 
principal lent along with the interest stipulated. The best way to ensure this is 
to advance money only to creditworthy borrowers who have enough assets to fulfil 
their commitments. The creditor's interests are best served when the borrower has 
the ability to meet his obligations irrespective of the fate of the actual project in 
which the loan is to be invested. Even if the project seems to be sound he will 
hesitate to make a loan if the borrower does not have sufficient assets independent 
of the projected enterprise. Debt finance goes to the most creditworthy parties, not 
to those with the most promising projects. Since the financiers get only the market 
rate of interest as stipulated in their contract with the borrower, the prospects of 
the entrepreneur making a higher than average rate of profit are not of immediate 
relevance to them. What matters more for them is safety, which may at best require 
a reasonable expectation of making enough profits to pay the contractually fixed 
interest. 
Let us turn our analysis and consider the creditor-debtor relationship from the 
perspective of the debtor. The user of investible funds is naturally keen to employ 
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them as profitably as he can. This may sometimes require innovation and exper- 
imentation with new methods of production. But the contractual obligation to 
repay the principal and pay interest irrespective of the results of enterprise acts as 
a severe constraint19. This is true of small farmers and small-scale enterprises who 
do not have any reserves of their own to fall back upon in cases where the adoption 
of new practices does not yield good dividends. The refusal of the supplier of capi- 
tal to share the uncertainties involved deprives the society of possible gains in the 
productivity of capital through innovation and the adoption of new techniques. 
We have argued above that in an interest-based system of financing productive 
enterprise, expected profitability ceases to be effective in ensuring an efficient allo- 
cation of investible funds because of the terms on which these funds are supplied. 
We shall now proceed to argue that the debt financing method is unjust and results 
in a maldistribution of income and wealth in society. 
The entrepreneur, for example, tries his best to make profits since his own 
rewards always rest on his making a profit. The possibility of loss in a business 
enterprise arises not only from the quality of entrepreneurship but from the nature 
of the world in which the enterprise is carried out. Therefore, there is no justification 
for prescribing a certain return when in the nature of things it is uncertain. Money 
capital seeking a positive return through enterprise ought to and must bear this 
uncertainty. 
When the enterprise incurs a loss the entrepreneur is made to bear the loss 
and pay the interest out of his own assets. This may result in his disability insofar 
as future entrepreneurial activities are concerned. From the social and individual 
point of view this is very unfortunate. As we have mentioned above, the incidence 
of loss does not necessarily imply bad entrepreneurship. It is in the nature of the 
world around us that some enterprises sometimes fail. It is sufficient to caution the 
entrepreneurs that in the case of failure they go unrewarded for their entrepreneurial 
services, earning no profits. But to disable them by depriving them of part of the 
assets accumulated in the past is hardly justified. It encourages the wealth owners to 
19 Siddiqi, op. cit. pp. 69-74. 
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act as lenders and rentiers rather than expose their wealth to entrepreneurial risks, 
either directly by investing them in owner-enterprises or indirectly by offering them 
as collateral against loans obtained for enterprise. In a system of debt financing, 
the wealthier owners who choose to lend and wait, steadily grow richer over time 
whereas wealth owners who choose to expose their wealth and abilities to the risks 
of producive enterprise have no such guarantee. 
Also the contractual commitment (between the entrepreneur and the financier) 
to repay the loan with interest is not in harmony with the reality. There is no 
justification for obliging the entrepreneur to pay interest if there is no positive return 
on the money capital invested. To claim the contrary, as prevalent in the interest- 
based system, requires that money capital be regarded as essentially of productive 
value; but this is not the case. Value is a market phenomenon and not an intrinsic 
property of money capital. Given the uncertainty of prices of the products the total 
value resulting from the employment of money capital in production may be more 
than, equal to, or less than its own value. This is true irrespective of who employs 
the money capital, its owner or someone else to whom it is advanced. 
The injustice of the interest-based system to the savers and creditors becomes 
much more pronounced in an inflationary situation. When the rise in the rate of 
interest may lag far behind the rise in prices and profits, depositors may actually get 
a negative return if the rate of interest is lower than the percentage rise in prices. 
The lending rates of the banks also fail to keep pace with rising prices, leaving 
businessmen to collect the profits. 
2.5. Conclusions 
In this chapter our objective has been to analyse the problems of debt financ- 
ing and to express the Islamic views on the subject. We have briefly explained 
government debt, private sector debt, external debt and debt financing from the 
firm's point of view. We argued that prohibition of interest and its replacement by 
profit-sharing is feasible and desirable for the good of society. 
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To appreciate the rationale of this change, one has to grasp the Islamic view of 
the relations between man and man and the nature of the world in which man en- 
gages in productive economic enterprise. It is an uncertain world in which the value 
product of enterprise cannot be predetermined. To claim a predetermined positive 
return to money capital when capital and enterprise jointly engage in production 
runs counter to this reality. It amounts to exploitation of the entrepreneur by the 
owners of capital, as the entrepreneur is left alone to bear the uncertainty which 
in reality is devolved on both. This arrangement is considered unjust according to 
Islamic principles. 
Islam abhors injustice and exploitation and seeks to forge economic and other 
relationships on the basis of justice and cooperation. In an Islamic economic frame- 
work, a replacement of the unjust and exploitive institution of interest by the just 
and cooperative arrangement of the profit and loss sharing system is, therefore, a 
socio-economic as well as a moral spiritual imperative. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
THE PROFIT-LOSS-SHARING SYSTEM 
MUDARABAH 
Introduction 
In the preceding chapter we have examined the problem of debt financing and 
the Islamic views on the subject. Under the traditional model of financial inter- 
mediation, the primary mode of finance is debt, and interest is the corner-stone of 
financial transactions. One hardly finds examples of other modes of financing under 
the present system. In fact interest is so deeply embedded in the present system 
that an ordinary bank and a common user of bank services cannot imagine dealing 
in capital without the medium of interest. 
The proposed Islamic model of financial intermediation is in the nature of ven- 
ture capital financing. Under this system, a bank writes two sharing contracts. 
On the savings side, the bank guarantees no fixed return to the saver, and on the 
investment side, the bank does not require any fixed return from the investor. It 
should be clear that under such a system the banks, acting in the best interests of 
depositors, pursue an active financing strategy. More precisely, under the proposed 
Islamic system all capital is risk-capital, since all funds are received and provided 
on the basis of sharing in the profits and losses of the enterprises. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine analytically the framework for the 
profit-loss-sharing system called mudarabah. The chapter is divided into seven sec- 
tions. First, we discuss the economic and philosophical principles of Islam and 
banking under Islam. Second, we define and explain mudarabah ,a subsection crit- 
ically examines mudarabah as a company, its legitimacy and prerequisites. Third, 
different types of mudarabah are identified, and fourth modern applications of the 
profit-loss-sharing system reflecting the ethical basis for contemporary adoptation 
are discussed. Fifth, financial intermediation is examined and, sixth, the effects of 
the profit-loss-sharing system on saving and investments are analysed. Finally some 
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conclusions are drawn. 
3.1. The Economic and Philosophical Principles of Islam for Banking 
There is a consensus among Islamic economists that there are two key elements 
to the economic philosophy of Islam: 
"One related to the real or ultimate owner on earth and the other related to 
the relationship between man and the real owner". Thus, the first principle states 
that Allah is the creator of everything on earth and in the heavens. This argument 
is evidenced by the Quran: - 
"Allah's is the sovereignty of the heavens and the 
earth and all of that between them. He creates what he will. 
And Allah is able to do all things". ( Verse 17) 
Also in Sorat AL-Imran, theQuran States : 
Say: "0 God! Lord of Power (and Rule), Thou 
givest Power to whom Thou pleasest, And Thou strippest off 
Power From whom Thou pleasest: Thou enduest with hon- 
our Whom Thou pleasest, And Thou bringest low Whom Thou 
pleasest: In Thy hand is all Good. Verily, over all things Thou 
hast power". ( Verse 26) 
These and many other verses of the Quran consider resources of various 
kinds as the gift of Allah. Human beings are only trustees who should utilise these 
resources in an efficient way to fulfil Allah's will for establishing prosperity on earth 
for the good of all mankind. 
Accordingly, a Muslim entrepreneur is considered only a "vice-regent" 
on earth and this principle of the "vice-regent" man brings us to the second key 
element of the philosophy of Islam. Man's right to ownership is obtained by proxy 
from Allah and as Allah made man his "vice-regent", man must function according 
to his teachings and in the end be accountable to Allah for all deeds; be they good 
or bad. 
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The principle of economic trusteeship thus suggests that the object of a 
maximisation of profit is not the objective of an Islamic institution. The Islamic 
firm should rather be satisfied to realise a "reasonable" or "fair" level of profit if 
that enables it to achieve the more important goal of "doing good to please Allah". 
The same would apply to a Muslim customer of such an institution who invests or 
deposits funds on a profit or loss basis. 
Although Islam recognises the differences in the capabilies of* different 
people, nevertheless it is obvious that in order to satisfy its requirements of economic 
and social justice, certain basic necessities must be guaranteed to every citizen of 
the state. These include food, clothing, shelter, health services and education'. No 
citizen, even if his earning capacities are close to zero, can be denied these rights 
under Islam. There are various reasons for it being so. Firstly, all of these basic 
necessities are essential for a human being. The second reason, closely allied to 
the first, is that the Islamic requirements for the development of human individuals 
cannot be satisfied unless everyone gets a chance. If a person is denied any of the 
basic necessities, his chances to develop are thereby dimmed and may in fact be 
negated. In fact, the establishment of economic and social justice is necessary for 
this very purpose. This brings us to a consideration of two important points which 
concern traditional economic theories. 
The first concerns the motivation and behaviour of individuals (ent- 
repreneurs and customers) within the Islamic framework. A hallmark of economic 
theorising is the assumption that the rational individual will "act in his interest" 
when exercising a choice, and secondly that economists should not be concerned 
with the motives behind man's economic behaviour but primarily be concerned 
with what constitutes an economic relationship. 
All of the Quranic verses quoted above, suggest that the owners, man- 
agers of an Islamic bank or an Islamic firm are to direct their energies and efficiency 
to the investment and spending of wealth within the permitted domains of expen- 
Rahman, F., `Economic Principles of Islam', Islamic Studies, Journal of the Islamic Research 
Institute, Islamabad, Vol. VIII, March 1969, No. 1, p. 3. 
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diture and investment, in such a way that fulfils their and their dependents needs 
without infringing on the interests of the community. This in turn will create good- 
will for the firm's products or bank's services. Similarly the expenditure of firms on 
charities and good deeds must follow the same guidelines. In effect, such expendi- 
ture is akin to spending on advertising but this is not to suggest that spending on 
good deeds by an Islamic firm will be a complete replacement to advertising. 
Islamic enterprises can fulfil important social functions. These include 
direct payments to the poor and needy in the community and expansion in the 
number of workers employed by the firm even beyond the level warranted by profit 
maximisation. This will help in alleviating the problem of unemployment. "Good 
deeds" may also take the form of building hospitals, schools or mosques'. 
Moderation in fulfilment of economic ends is emphasised in Islam and 
greed is decried, as is extravagance (israf ) and excessive expenditure on goods 
and services prohibited by Islam (tabthir). Economic relations, particularly in the 
production and exchange of wealth should be cooperative in nature. Indeed, coop- 
eration is seen as one of the basic values in Islam's economic philosophy. This does 
not however rule out free and fair competition in the market provided that all eco- 
nomic agents adhere to Islamic morality. Nevertheless, competition is emphasised 
in opposition to monopoly, the elimination of which is regarded as a prerequisite to 
ensuring justice and growth. 
The economic philosophy of Islam also creates a powerful drive for de- 
velopment. Indeed, development efforts are seen by the true Muslim as striving 
in the cause of Allah . Islamic principles are consequently a motivating 
force for 
development'. 
' Elzubeir, E. K., `The Marketing of Islamic Banking Services with Particular Reference to 
the Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan', unpublished Ph. D thesis, City University Business School, 
London, 1984, p. 72. 
3 Siddiqi, M. N., A Survey of Contemporary Literature on Islamic Economics, Paper presented 
at the International Conference on Islamic Economics, Mecca, Saudi Arabia, April 1975, p. 
21. 
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3.2. Meaning of Mudarabah and its Definition 
Al-Mudarabah implies that one person hands over money to another for 
the purpose of investment. The first party is called the investor or money owner 
while the second party is called the mudarib. In a sense, therefore, the mudarib is a 
trustee or agent. The money lender or money owner is normally a sleeping partner. 
The net profits realised are divided between the two parties according to certain 
ratios agreed upon in advance. Any loss on capital is borne by the owner of the 
money and the mudarib's only loss is his efforts and the expected profit. Of course, 
the mudarib can be sued for any wilful act or negligence on his part. 
Al-Mudarbah is a type of contract that prevailed between the Arabs in 
the pre- Islamic era of paganism (jahilia) and later Islam endorsed it as a mean of 
investment and profit sharing. Three Arabic terms are used to designate this kind 
of business organization: qiradh, muqaradah, and mudarabah. The terms are inter- 
changeable with no essential differences in meaning or connotation among them. 
The divergence in terminology was probably originally due to geographical factors. 
The Hanafis and Hanbalis, following the convention prevailing in Iraq, have used 
the words mudarabah. Meanwhile, the Malekis and Shafeis have used the word 
qiradh or muqarahad following the convention in Hijaz. 
In fiqh, both mudarabah and qiradh refer to a profit and loss-sharing (PLS) 
contract of a company in which the first party (or parties) the rabbulmal, 
(or the 
capitalist) participates with financial capital, and the second party, the mudarib, (or 
the worker) with his effort. The resulting profit is apportioned between the two 
parties according to a preagreed formula. 
3.2.1. Mudarabah as a Company 
Contemporary writers of Islamic jurisprudence have defined mudarabah 
as a profit-loss-sharing (PLS) contract. Since this contract is a form of a company, 
it would be helpful to review the related classification of contracts and companies. 
Companies are classified into two categories. The first category is the 
property company in which an asset and/or its services are jointly owned by more 
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than one person. The property company is either voluntary or obligatory. The 
second kind is the contractual company in which persons agree on some course 
of a joint action, particularly a formula for providing capital and sharing profit. 
Contractual companies are of five kinds: 
1- Rein Company: in which a number of persons jointly provide capital 
and effort for investment. Neither capital nor effort need to be shared equally, while 
profit is to be divided according to a preagreed formula. 
2- Mudarabah Company: in which persons provide a second party with 
specific resources for investment for a pre-specified share of the profit. When the 
profit share of the capital provider is set to zero, the company collapses to a mere 
(interest free) loan. The second party may accept such an arrangement for the 
benefits resulting from pooling some of its resources with those of the first party 
in investment. The larger size of capital could bring forth higher profits on the 
investment of the second party's funds. 
3- Labour Company: which is composed of persons pooling their efforts 
and expertise to undertake jointly certain tasks and share the returns according 
to some preset proportions. It is not necessary that members of such a company 
should have the same profession, nor the returns gained be a result of the efforts of 
all. 
4- Parity Company: which gives all partners equal power to act on behalf 
of each of the others in all fields. It thus encompasses all the categories of companies 
combined. Parity in power between partners has been critically considered and some 
insist that they also should be equal in wealth. Others, noting that absolute parity 
cannot be ascertained, stated that such a company could be prohibited'. 
5- Goodwill Company: in which partners do not provide any capital. 
Instead they use their goodwill to obtain credit from suppliers. This is why the 
Shafei and Maleki schools prohibited such company, noting that companies are 
Al-Jarhi, M. A., Mudarabah, Principles and Practical Applications, Paper presented at the 
Seminar on Islamic Financing Techniques, December 1984, Islamabad, p. 2. 
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related to either effort or capital, whereas both are absent. However, the Hanafis 
and Hanblis have approved it on the basis of the effort it involves. 
To conclude this section, one can say that mudarabah is best viewed 
as a company in the form of a contractual arrangement. This view facilitates its 
treatment as a set of economic relationships, within a legal institutional framework. 
3.2.2. Legitimacy of Mudarabah 
As mentioned above, mudarabah is based on the principle of bringing 
together the capital, on the part of the capital owner, and know-how and labour 
on the part of the mudarib (labour partner). The mudarib employs and invests the 
capital within the framework agreed upon with the capital owner in the fields of 
activity agreed. The given profit is to be divided between the two partners according 
to a pre-determined and agreed upon percentage that has been pre-publicized. As 
for loss, it is to be borne by the capital owner entirely unless it is proved that the 
mudarib was neglectful or incurred an infraction to the conditions of the mudarabah. 
Only then can the mudarib be made accountable for the loss'. 
A mudarabah may be undetermined (general) in which case the mudarib 
is entitled to select and evaluate the fields of employment and investment in line 
with his experience and know-how. It may also be limited (oriented) in which case 
the capital owner authorises the mudarib to employ and invest this capital in a 
certain line of activity or project. 
3.2.3. Prerequisites 
There are five conditions which need to be satisfied in order to have a 
legitimate mudarabah . They include the contractual form, and conditions related 
to partners, capital, labour (effort), as well as profit. 
6 El-Sarraf, M. F., `Financial Dealings in Islamic Banks', Journal of Islamic Banking and 
Finance, Karachi, Pakistan, Vol-1, No. l. 1984, p. 12. 
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(A) Contractual form: 
As a contract, mudarabah must contain the two main elements, viz, an 
offer and its acceptance. It must be noted, in addition, that the contractual rela- 
tionship between the two parties: rabbulmal and the mudarib is flexible in the sense 
that it fits into different moulds, some of which are: 
1- When the mudarib receives the capital he is considered as a trustee 
who is obliged to return the funds, if requested before starting to work. 
2- When the mudarib starts working he becomes an agent of rabbulmal, 
acting on his behalf. 
3- When profit is realized the relationship becomes a contractual company 
in which profit is to be shared. 
4- If the mudarib violates some of the conditions or restrictions contained 
in the contract, he becomes an usurper who is fully responsible for guaranteeing the 
return of the capital in full. 
(B) Conditions related to partners: 
Mudarabah partners must be legally competent. Rabbulmal (capitalist) 
must be competent to appoint an agent, either directly or through his legal guardian. 
The mudarib must be competent to act as an agent. 
(C) Conditions related to capital: 
The mudarabah capital should have the following characteristics: 
1- It should be in monetary, or at least in financial form, not in mer- 
". chandise form. The reason is that the value of merchandise might change during 
the period of mudarabah , which introduces uncertainty to the value of capital and 
hence, to the profit. 
2- It should be present either at the time of concluding the contract or 
at the time of starting opertions. 
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3- It should be of a quantity and quality known at contract time. 
4- It should not be in the form of debt ( receivables ), for debt may or 
may not be collectable. It is possible that the mudarabah contract appoints the 
mudarib as a collecting agent to collect the debt and then invests it. If the debt is 
owed to the mudarib himself, it should be present with him at the time of contracts. 
5- It should not be composed of funds mortgaged with the mudarib 
against a debt owed by rabbulmal , even 
if rabbulmal allows the mudarib to use 
the mortgaged funds for investment. 
(D) Conditions related to labour: 
The mudarib , who represents labour in the mudarabah arrangement, 
is 
supposed not to violate the rules of the contract. He is also supposed to stay within 
the restrictions set out by the rabbulmal , provided that such restrictions 
do not 
completely close the door for investing the funds. 
It is questionable whether the mudarib can be asked to provide guar- 
antees. Scholars have agreed that an absolute guarantee of capital automatically 
nullifies the mudarabah contract, with the exception of the Hanafis who nullify the 
condition keeping the contract in effect. Meanwhile guarantees against negligence, 
contract violations, and inability to meet one's obligations are permissible. 
Also it is questionable whether the rabbulmal is allowed to work with the 
mudarib. Some scholars give a negative answer, on the basis that the mudarib must 
have full authority to act. Some Shafeis reason that when rabbulmal can appoint two 
mudaribs, neither would have full authority. Therefore, they allow the rabbulmal to 
work with the mudarib even if this limits the latter's power. 
Abu Ghudda7 uses this opinion as a basis of approving the participation 
of rabbulmal in contemporary companies, in managerial or technical capacities, es- 
pecially as these companies have legal (as opposed to natural) personalities where 
° Abu Ghudda, A. S., Mudarabah or Qiradh and its Contemporary Implications, Paper presented 
at the Second Islamic Bank Conference, Kuwait, 1983, pp. 4-5. 
Abu Ghudda, op. cit. p. 15. 
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decisions are made by a selected group. 
(E) Conditions related to profit: 
Profit, according to the Hanafc opinion can be earned in three ways. 
The first is to use one's capital. The second is to employ one's labour. The third 
is to employ one's judgement which amounts to taking a risk as in the case of 
subcontracting. 
In a mudarabah, the way profit must be apportioned between rabbulmal 
and the mudarib must be agreed upon and stated in advance. Since profit is defined 
by Muslim scholars as growth of capital, the share of the mudarib must be related 
to the profit and not to the capital'. 
3.3. Types of Mudarabah 
The shariah distinguishes between two types of contracts: a limited man- 
date and an unlimited mandate mudarabah .A mudarabah contract with unlimited 
mandate is one in which the investor authorizes the agent to act completely at 
the latter's discretion in all business matters. In this case, the agent may perform 
many transactions such as buying and selling all types of merchandise as he sees 
fit, buy and sell for cash and credit, hire helpers as needed, rent or buy animals 
or equipment, travel with the capital, mix the amount of investment with his own 
resources, give the invested money as a mudarabah to a third party, and invest it in 
a partnership with a third party. The agent may practice all of these things because 
these are the customary practices of a merchant. He may not however provide a 
loan, because a loan is viewed as a favour on the part of the lender, and not as a 
commercial transaction from which some advantage can be expected'. 
In the case of a mudarabah contract with a limited mandate, the agent's 
freedom of action is somewhat restricted, especially with respect to transactions 
with third parties as mentioned above. In addition, the investor could impose a 
° A1-Jarhi, op. cit. p. 10. 
° Udovitch, A., Partnership and Profit in Afcdieval Islam, - Princeton University Press, 1970, p. 
204. 
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variety of specific restrictions which could appear in a limited as well as in an 
unlimited mandate mudarabah, and could be related to location, object, or methods 
of trade. 
The medieval Islamic commercial institution of mudarabah is viewed by 
Islamic economists and jurists as being important to the economic life of society. 
The owner of capital may not find his way to profitable economic enterprise, and 
the person who can find his way to such an activity may not have the capital. 
Capital and enterprise play an important role in attaining prosperity. The mud- 
arabah contract is essentially a profit sharing contract which has the implication of 
transforming labourers into entrepreneurs. 
3.4. Modern Applications of the Profit-Loss-Sharing System and the Eth- 
ical Basis for Contemporary Adoption 
When mudarabah was used during the early years of Islam, the number 
of investors was limited, the size of capital was small, and technology allowed for 
simple commercial, agricultural and manufacturing ventures. However, the form 
of mudarabah as a PLS company is easily adaptable to quantitative as well as 
qualitative changes. 
Contemporary conditions require a creative institutional framework, wi- 
thin which the PLS company arrangement can develop to face the challenges of a 
huge number of investors, enormous financial resources, and ever expanding tech- 
nological frontiers. 
The method employed in adopting medieval financial practices to modern 
banking and investment is to modify modern institutions so that they embody 
the principles implicit in the former. These principles can be summarized in the 
following four important ones. First, risk-taking, when related to a commercial 
enterprise, is a socially productive economic activity and, consequently, entitled to 
a reward. Second, a related point is that loans created are to finance socially 
productive economic activity. Third, financial risk rests solely with the lenders 
and not with the managers and agents. Fourth, interest is prohibited because it 
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is a predetermined fixed sum due to the owner of loanable funds irrespective of 
the outcome of the business enterprise which makes it tantamount to a contract 
involving riba'o. 
In order to develop a description of contemporary Islamic banking and 
its adaptation of ethically based financial practices, the following sources were used. 
First, there are numerous studies in articles and books on the issue, which started 
appearing, as early as the 1940s. These studies began to be taken seriously in 
the Middle East in the early 1970s, where several Islamic banks and investment 
companies were formed. The second source of information is found in the organi- 
zational reports of these institutions. Third, published and unpublished literature 
written mainly for academic seminars and national and international seminars on 
Islamic banking provide an ample source of information. In this section, the dis- 
cussion will mainly concentrate on some applications of mudarabah under banking 
and non-banking arrangements. 
A- Banking Arrangements 
Banks here are meant to be a particular kind of financial companies which 
include the acceptance of deposits. They are capable of providing certain services, 
e. g., bank guarantees, letters of credit, etc. Banks therefore carry out the same 
functions of financial intermediation which finance companies undertake. 
On the demand side, banks can obtain funds through selling stock as well 
as taking investment deposits. The latter can be done either directly or through 
marketing investment (general and specific) certificates. These certificates have the 
same characteristics as those issued by a finance company. On the supply side, 
banks can finance investment through purchasing stock, direct placing of funds, 
and purchasing of investment certificates issued by financial and non-financial com- 
panics. 
El-IIadour, It. I., `The Islamic Economic System: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of 
Money and Banking in the Islamic Economic Framework', unpublished Ph. D dissertation, 
Utah State University, Logan, Utah, U. S. A., 1984, p. 135. 
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B- Non-Banking Arrangements 
Generally speaking, people can channel their savings to investment di- 
rectly through either fund placement or shareholding. 
(1) Fund Placement: 
A saver can place his funds directly with an investor who could be an 
individual business or a company, both working in trade, production, or services. 
This form is a straightforward mudarabah contract which would satisfy the necessary 
conditions mentioned above. 
In an Islamic economy, it should be permissible for individual and cor- 
portate business concerns to accept investment deposits. These are funds placed 
with such institutions for investment purposes according to the rules of mudarabah. 
These deposits can be collected against deposit certificates which can be standard- 
ized legally into two forms: 
a- General investment certificates. 
b- Specific investment certificates. 
Such certificates can be issued in various denominations and maturities. 
They would be tradable, which would create a secondary market for them. 
(2) Shareholding: 
Savers can hold stock in companies which carry out investments them- 
selves directly, or in companies which place funds with other direct investors or hold 
stock in companies, i. e., financial and holding companies. 
3.5. Financial Intermediation 
It is clear that trade, production and service companies would be at- 
tracting funds of a maturity structure suited for their own operations. Finance and 
banking institutions, meanwhile, have to accept funds in the maturities desired by 
savers, which may not be best suited for the maturities demanded by investors. 
It is therefore a common complaint that a finance or a banking institution has to 
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attempt to balance the generally shorter maturities on the saving side with the 
generally longer maturities on the investment side". This is usually done through 
producing a financial asset (an investment certificate) of higher quality than could 
be produced by the individual saver, for the same maturity. However the higher 
quality of financial assets will not assist in transforming shorter (saving) maturities 
to longer (investment) maturities without an effective secondary market. 
3.6. The Effects of a Profit-Loss-Sharing System on Savings and Investment 
Banks and other financial institutions can contribute to the economic 
development of a country by providing a market for savers and investors in which 
their complex needs are matched. Savers keep their wealth in various form of real 
and financial assets. Depending on the individual preferences, assets (and liabilities) 
must have certain features of safety, liquidity, and yield. In developing countries, 
savers usually hold a large part of their non-financial wealth in the form of land, 
livestock, inventories (e. g. foodstuffs), and to a certain extent in durable consumer 
goods. Wealthier individuals, but sometimes even poor people, hold valuables such 
as gold and jewelry. The share of productive capital goods is relatively small in 
comparison with non-productive assets in total wealth. 
Financial institutions can change the composition of savers wealth by of- 
fering certain financial assets that correspond better to the needs of savers in terms 
of liquidity, security, and yield. It may be less risky and cause less transaction cost 
to hold savings in monetary form rather than in real goods. Banks transfer the as- 
sets attracted to investors who then use the funds for income yielding investments. 
Without financial intermediation, savers would probably channel a smaller volume 
of funds directly to investors because of a preference for safe and liquid assets. Fi- 
nancial institutions can therefore reconcile the needs of savers and investors through 
the transmutation of relatively safe, liquid, short-term financial claims into riskier, 
less liquid, long-term real assets. 
" Al-Jarhi, op. cit. p. 20. 
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The financial system thereby improves the allocation of scarce resources 
and enables a faster development of the economyl". 
The introduction of financial intermediation based on the PLS principle 
has potential impacts on the bahavior of savers, banks and investors. Theoretically 
speaking, it can be asked whether the adoption of a PLS system may lead to a 
reduction of savings and retardation of financial intermediation and development. 
Increased uncertainty in the rate of return is one argument that supports this as- 
sertion. The few studies that have considered the question have tended to compare 
the effects on savings of a fixed and certain rate of return with those of an uncer- 
tain rate of return, implicitly assuming the same mean rate of return with greater 
variability. The result, obviously, shows a reduction in savings. The conclusion, 
however, is far from obvious when both risk and return are allowed to vary. 
The results of an analysis in which risk and return variability have both 
been taken into account depend on assumptions regarding the form of the utility 
function and its risk properties, for example, the degree and the extent of risk aver- 
sion, the degree to which the future is discounted, whether or not an increased risk 
is compensated by a higher return, and finally the income and substitution effects 
of the increased uncertainty. It has been shown, for example, that when future 
non-capital income is subject to risk, decreasing temporal risk aversion is a suf- 
ficient condition to increase the uncertainty about future income and to decrease 
consumption and increase savings. With respect to capital income, the combined 
substitution and income effect of increased uncertainty is shown to be indetermi- 
nate. Other studies have shown that under reasonable assumptions, in the face of 
uncertainty, households will increase their savings as a precaution. 
Theoretical analysis has not, therefore, provided a clear-cut testable hy- 
pothesis in this regard, and it becomes an empirical question whether saving will 
increase or decrease in an Islamic system. It can however, be reasonably expected 
that "a rational planner may make more provision for the future when the future 
" Gurley, J. G. and E. S. Shaw, `Financial Intermediaries and the Savings-Investment Process', 
The Journal of Finance, Vol. XL, No. 2, May 1956, pp. 257-276. 
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becomes more uncertain", 
There is no strong theoretical reason to believe that on balance savings 
will decline as a result of introducing an Islamic economic system13. However, the 
PLS system turns savers into entrepreneurs, at least to some extent, by encourag- 
ing them to participate directly in the financial success of the investor's business, 
thereby also sharing the risks involved. The type of uncertainty a saver then faces 
in an Islamic financial system differs from the one of a traditional banking system. 
In the latter the expected yield depends on the nominal rate of interest banks offer 
on various forms of term deposits and on the expected rate of inflation. While the 
nominal rate of interest is fixed, uncertainty arises from the fact that the actual 
inflation rate may differ from the rate expected at the time the act of saving took 
place. 
In an Islamic banking system not only is the expected rate of inflation a 
risky variable, but so also is the nominal yield on an investment deposit. Therefore 
the riskiness of the expected real yield of an investment deposit consists of two 
components: uncertainty concerning the ex post nominal return that will be received 
and uncertainty concerning the inflation rate. If these two sources of uncertainty 
are independent, then it is clear that the aggregate uncertainty of the real yield 
on bank deposits will be greater under a PLS system than under a fixed interest 
system. 
Where an Islamic banking system works side by side with traditionally 
operating banks, the effects on savings are unambiguously positive, since the menu 
of savings instruments is expanded, and no existing savings outlet is eliminated. 
Savings attracted into PLS accounts will include not only existing savings from 
other assets, but also savings of individuals who either had a religious inhibition 
concerning the use of the traditional banking system, or who consider the economic 
characteristics (risk, return) of the new assets sufficiently superior to the old ones 
to induce additional savings. 
13 Iqbal, Z. and Mirakhor, A., `Islamic Banking', Al-Tawhid, A Quarterly Journal of Islamic 
Thought 6 Culture, Vol. IV, No. 3, April-June 1987, pp. 90-145. 
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In terms of bank's relations with borrowers, a PLS system clearly in- 
volves more direct involvement. It is to be expected that banks would require more 
information about the business activities they finance, and would be more likely to 
seek to influence the business decisions of borrowers. To some extent, the enhanced 
role of the banks could be used to improve the skills of investors. Especially in 
small business and agriculture, banks could provide information and expertise that 
increases the profitability of investments. They could also support entrepreneurs by 
providing technical and managerial assistance. Moreover, banks within the frame- 
work of the PLS system are entrepreneurs themselves which can influence business 
decisions positively. Therefore, possibly negative effects on the investor's willing- 
ness to accept risks because of thorough credit supervision might be compensated 
by the comprehensive support provided by Islamic banks. Lastly, in sharing losses 
as well as profits, banks could function as absorbers of shocks stemming from the 
real sector and thereby reduce the cost of adjustment14. 
For reasons given above, it seems likely that the administrative resources 
required to operate a PLS system effectively would be greater, though it is hoped 
that the resulting higher costs could be offset, or more than offset, by an improved 
allocation of investment. Concerning the latter, greater involvement by institutional 
providers of funds in the uses to which such funds are put should probably have a 
positive effect. 
3.7. Conclusions 
The mudarabah is of great importance to the economic life of the people, 
for the owner of capital may not find his way to profitable economic activity, and the 
person who can find his way to such activity may not have the capital. Prosperity 
cannot be attained except by means of both of these, that is, capital and economic 
activity. By permitting this contract, the goal of both parties is attained. 
" Karsten, I., `Islam and Financial Intermediation', IMF Staff Papers, December 1981, pp. 
19-23. 
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Moreover, this form of business organization has a very healthy effect 
on the position of the labourers. They feel happy and satisfied for they share the 
profit. They even work harder because every increase in the gross profits increases 
their share of it. It is, therefore, a very successful and popular form of business 
organization. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
MUSHARAKAH (EQUITY PARTICIPATION) AND 
OTHER FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 
OF ISLAMIC BANKS 
Introduction 
In the contemporary world there is always a dilemma for the entrepreneur who 
has a promising idea for a new venture. How is he to raise the capital necessary 
to launch the venture? Borrowing the money is probably out of question. If the 
normal interest rate is 6% but the venture has a, 10% chance of failing within a 
year, the lender will probably charge interest at a rate of 16%. High interest, plus 
amortization, will impose heavy fixed costs on the venture from the outset and 
this will increase the danger of failure, and in turn the interest rate. Moreover, 
if the venture's prospects can not be predicted with reasonable confidence, it, will 
be very difficult even to calculate an appropriate interest rate. The alternative 
must be for the entrepreneur to admit a partner to the business who is entitled to 
receive a portion of profits from the venture, if any, in exchange for contributing the 
necessary capital to it. The partner's compensation is determined automatically by 
the fortunes of the business. There is no need to compute an interest rate and there 
are no fixed costs of debt, the partner will receive his profits only if and as earned. 
However, Islam aims at establishing a social order where all individuals are 
united by bonds of brotherhood and affection like members of one single family. 
This brotherhood is universal and not parochial. It is not bound by any geographical 
boundaries and encompasses the whole of mankind and not any one family group, 
tribe or race. 
The purpose of this chapter is to thoroughly examine the framework for mushar- 
akah (equity participation)- and other financial instruments of the Islamic banks. 
The chapter is divided into eight sections. The first will define musharakah and 
give its historical background while in the second the different types of musharakah 
will be identified. The third will deal with the conditions of present day musharakah 
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and the fourth analyses equity financing and its channels of investment in an Islamic 
society. The fifth will identify the steps to be taken to transfer to an equity financing 
system and the sixth is concerned with the role of equity financing in mobilizing 
funds and stabilization of the system. The seventh section describes other financial 
instruments of Islamic banks. Additional subsections are included which examine 
ijara (leasing), murabaha (cost plus financing), qard al- hasanah (beneficence loans), 
bai muajjal (deferred payment sale), bai salam (purchase with deferred delivery) and 
tadamun (solidarity). Finally some conclusions are drawn. 
The concept of brotherhood and equal treatment of all individuals in society 
and before the law is not meaningful unless accompanied by economic justice such 
that everyone gets his due for his contribution to society or to the social product 
and that there is no exploitation of one individual by another. The Prophet aptly 
warned: "Beware of injustice for injustice will be equivalent to darkness on the 
Day of judgement". This warning against injustice and exploitation is designed to 
protect the rights of all individuals in a society (whether consumers or producers and 
distributors, and whether employers or employees) and to promote general welfare, 
the ultimate goal of Islam. 
Of special significance here is the relationship between the employer and the 
employee which Islam places in a proper setting and specifies norms for the mutual 
treatment of both so as to establish justice between them. An employee is entitled 
to a "just" wage for his contribution to output and it is unlawful for the employer 
to exploit his employee. 
4.1. Definition of Musharakah & Its Historical Background 
Musharakah or shirkah can be defined as a form of partnership where two or 
more persons combine either their capital or labour together , to share the profits, 
enjoying similar rights and liabilities. 
From the very inception of human society, the methods to meet day to day 
needs have been changing with the change of social, economic, scientific, cultural 
and political circumstances, especially habits, fashions and the standard of living. 
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These methods regulate the commercial activities and vary from place to place and 
time to time. The Arab society at the time of the rise of Islam had very simple 
financing methods and forms of business peculiar to that society. 
The advent of the Holy Prophet saw the practice of musharakah already pre- 
vailing over the commercial activities in Arabia. He not only ratified it, but also 
himself did business on the basis of musharakahl. 
After Hijra, the muhajireen and the ansar were declared by the Prophet to be 
brothers. Subsequently they joined as partners, in the form of musharakah, muzara 
and musaqat , 
in their trade and commerce. The nature of the transaction, in the 
different forms, is identical. The different nomenclature in arabic refers to diverse 
activities such as muzara in agriculture, musagat in gardening and musharakah in 
trade. The musharakah of capital and labour is called mudarabah. These four 
forms were so developed that they became independent institutions and the jurists 
formed detailed rules about them. There is a consensus of opinion among the jurists 
of all schools of thought (including Hanfia, Maleki, Shafei, Hanbali and Shia) that 
musharakah is a valid and legitimate contract in Islam. The jurists, however, differ 
over its form, conditions and other details. 
4.2. Types of Musharakah 
Originally musharakah or shirkah (Partnership) was of two types, namely, 
(a)Shirkah al-milk (non-contractual partnership) 
(b)Shirk-ah al-ugood (contractual partnership) 
Shirkah al-milk (non-contractual) implies co-ownership and comes into existence 
when two or more persons happen to get joint-ownership of some asset without hav- 
ing entered into a formal partnership agreement; for example, two persons receiving 
an inheritance or a gift of land or property which may or may not be divisible. The 
partners have to share the gift, or inherited property or its income, in accordance 
with their share in it until they decide to divide it., If the property is divisible and 
Irfani, A. M., Musharakah and its Modern Applications, Paper presented at the Seminar on 
Islamic Financing Techniques, Islamabad, December 1984, p. 2. 
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the partners still decide to stick together, the shirkah al-milk is termed ikhtiyariyyah 
(voluntary). However, if it is indivisible and they are constrained to stay together, 
the shirkah al-milk is characterised as jabriyyah (involuntary). 
Shirk-ah al-ugood (contractual partnership) can, however, be considered a proper 
partnership because the parties concerned have willingly entered into a contractual 
agreement for joint investment and the sharing of profits and risks. The agreement 
need not necessarily be formal and written, it could be informal and oral. Just as 
in mudarabah, the profits can be shared in any equitably agreed proportion. Losses 
must, however, be shared in proportion to the capital contribution. 
Shirk-ah al-ugood has been divided in the fiqh books into four kinds: 
al-mufawadah (full authority and obligation); al-inan (restricted authority and obli- 
gation); al-abdan (labour, skill and management); and al-wujuh (goodwill, credit- 
worthiness and contracts). 
In the case of mufawadah the partners are adults, equal in their capital con- 
tribution, their ability to undertake responsibility and their share of profits and 
losses. They have full authority to act on behalf of the others and are jointly and 
severally responsible for the liabilities of their partnership business, provided that 
such liabilities have been incurred in the ordinary course of business. Thus each 
partner can act as an agent (wakil) for the partnership business and stand as surety 
or guarantor (kafil) for the other partners. 
Ivan on the other hand implies that all partners need not be adults or have an 
equal share in the capital. They are not equally responsible for the management of 
the business. Accordingly their share in profits may be unequal, but this must be 
clearly specified in the partnership contract. Their share in losses would of course be 
in accordance with their capital contributions. Thus in shirk-ah al-inan the partners 
act as agents but not as sureties for their colleagues. 
Shirk-ah al-abdan is where the partners contribute their skills and efforts to the 
management of the business without contributing to the capital. 
In shirkah al-wujuh the partners use their goodwill, their credit-worthiness and 
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their contacts for promoting their business without contributing to the capital'. 
Both these forms for partnership, where the partners do not contribute any capital, 
would remain confined essentially to small-scale businesses only. 
These are, of course models. In practice, however, the partners may contribute 
not only finance but also labour, management and skills, and credit and goodwill, 
although not necessarily equally. 
4.3. Types of Modern Musharakah and its Conditions 
The modern business concerns being run on the basis of musharakah (as defined 
above) are as under: 
1. Partnership: It is regulated by- 
(a) Partnership rules framed by the government, 
(b) Business practices. prevailing in the business community. 
2. Limited company. This type of musharakah is strictly controlled by the 
statutory rules framed by the government. Its commercial activities are, however, 
influenced by the business practices (urf ). 
3. Co-operative societies. This musharakah is also governed by statutory rules. 
Its commercial activities are influenced by the practices prevailing in the business 
community. 
The above modern musharakah principally resembles shirk-ah al-inan. The de- 
tails are, however, considerably -different due to change of urf and other factors 
including modern commercial techniques, economic conditions and legal require- 
ments. Let us discuss briefly the conditions of musharakah, which are those of 
shirk-ah al-inan. Other types of musharakah mentioned by jurists are nearly obso- 
lete nowadays. 
Capital to be invested by the partners may be unequal. For the majority of the 
jurists the capital should be in the shape of currency and not in the shape of goods. 
Chapra, M. U., Towards a Just Monetary system, The Islamic Foundation, Leicester, 1985, 
p. 251. 
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The condition for capital to be in the form of currency only was imposed when it 
was difficult to refer to the goods in terms of currency. This was true in the days 
of barter, systems when the jurists framed the rules, but now goods are generally 
referred or accounted for in terms of currency. This condition should, therefore, be 
waived. In limited companies and co-operative societies the capital is invested in 
the form of equal units of currency called shares and the intended partners buy as 
many shares as they wish. This practice has universally been accepted as urf and 
is therefore according to Islamic principles. 
4.3.1. Management 
Musharakah is run and managed by the will and equal rights of participation of 
all the partners. Different aspects of musharakah business are as follows : 
1. Every partner is an agent for the others, as all the partners benefit from 
the musharakah business. When a contract of musharakah is made the condition 
of agency is automatically presumed to be in existence in the contract. The actual 
possession of a partner over a property of the musharakah business is considered as 
possession of other partners in as much as if a partner purchases half portion of a 
specific good for himself and half portion thereof for the musharakah. When he takes 
possession of that specific good, this possession will be considered as possession of 
all the partners. If, however, a partner purchases some goods for himself only, it is 
exclusively for him and not for the musharakah business. 
2. Every partner enjoys equal rights in all respects in the absence of any condi- 
tion to the contrary. 
3. Any condition regarding participation in and administration of the mushar- 
akah and variation in the share of profit on this ground is valid. The contract of 
musharakah is not invalid on grounds of a condition of non-participation in the 
musharakah business, but on the ground that a share in the profit exists. 
4. Every partner has a right to participate actively in the affairs of musharakah 
if he wishes. 
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In all modern forms of musharakah, the partners have equal rights as mentioned 
above. In the limited companies and cooperative societies the shareholders delegate 
their powers (rights in respect of administration etc. ) to some among them to be 
called directors or given any other appropriate title. In a partnership concern the 
partners, by a mutual agreement, distribute among themselves their responsibilities, 
duties and jobs. As mentioned above these practices are valid being urf of business 
community. 
4.3.2. Distribution of Profit 
The basis for entitlement to the profits of a musharakah are capital, active 
participation in the musharakah business and responsibility. Profits are to be dis- 
tributed among the partners in business on the basis of proportions settled by them 
in advance. The share of every party in profit must be determined as a proportion 
or percentage. No fixed amount can be settled for any party3. 
Limited companies and co-operative societies distribute their profit according 
to the capital of share-holders. If any share-holder participates actively in these 
modern musharakah he is paid for it and such payments are regarded as the expen- 
diture of musharakah. This is modern urf and there is nothing un-Islamic in this 
urf. 
4.3.3. Liability of Loss 
All the jurist are, unanimously, of the view that the, loss shall be borne by 
the partners according to their capitals. In all forms of musharakah (i. e. limited 
companies, co-operative societies and partnership) the loss is borne on the basis of 
capital invested. 
There can be little doubt, after the citations above, of the unanimity of the 
principle. The jurists have categorically laid down that a party which has no capital 
invested in an enterprise, does not have to share its loss. From the explanation of 
the jurists, it is clear that it is not possible, after investment of capital, to avoid 
Siddiqi, M. N., Partnership and Profit-Sharing in Islamic Law, The Islamic Foundation, 
Leicester, 1985, p. 22-23. 
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the risk of loss in the enterprise. This is a direct consequence of the prohibition 
of interest in Islam and is of fundamental importance for our analysis. The jurists 
point out that this is because of the fact that loss means destruction of a part of 
the capital and hence, as it occurs, is a liability of the owner of capital alone. 
However, according to modern commercial practices the loss does not cut down 
the respective capitals of the partners or share-holders, but remains as it is in 
the accounts books of the musharakah in order to be adjusted against the future 
profits. It is pertinent to note that while adjusting the loss against future profits 
the accounting procedure automatically works in a manner so as to bear on the 
capitals subsequently. 
4.3.4. Withdrawal of Members 
In the early days of Islam the musharakah were generally formed on a short term 
basis, mostly of a joint venture type. It was, therefore, quite easy for a partner to 
withdraw from a musharakah. The withdrawal did not create many problems such as 
the taxation of capital expenditure, the continuous nature of business activities and 
goodwill. This is why the old jurists did not feel any need to impose restrictions on 
the withdrawal of a partner, but in the present complicated commercial practices, 
legal requirements and public control entangle a musharakah for a considerable 
period so deeply and firmly that no partner or shareholder can be absolved of 
his liability as such. So according to a modern urf the shareholder of a limited 
company cannot withdraw from it and receive back his capital invested therein. He 
can, however, sell his share to any person desirous of becoming a shareholder of 
that company. In a partnership business a partner can be permitted to withdraw 
and receive his capital back after fulfilling his liabilities as a partner according to 
terms and conditions settled between the partners. 
4.3.5. Limited Liability 
A distinguishing feature of modern musharakah (except the partnership) is the 
limited liability of their shareholders. They cannot be held liable for more than the 
amount of capital they have invested. This requirement makes it necessary to regard 
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the musharakah as an entity separate from the individuality of the shareholders. 
This common urf has given way to safe and stable musharakah resulting in big 
commercial organizations and flourishing business4. 
To sum up this section, the shirk-ah al-Ivan, which implies unequal shares and is 
recognised by all schools, may tend to be the most popular. In this case, the profits 
are divided in accordance with a contractually agreed proportion, since the shariah 
admits an entitlement to profit arising from a partner's contribution to any of the 
business assets. However, the shariah makes it clear that losses are to be shared in 
proportion to the contribution made to capital. This is because losses, constitute 
an erosion in equity and must be charged to the capital. If a loss has been incurred 
in one period, it must be offset against profits in the subsequent periods until the 
entire loss has been written off and the capital sum restored to its original level. 
However, until the total loss has been written off, any distribution of "profit" will 
be considered as an advance to the partners. Accordingly, it would be desirable to 
build reserves from profits to offset any losses that may be incurred in the future. 
The real world situation may be a combination of mudarabah and musharakah 
where all partners contribute to the capital but not to the entrepreneurship and 
management. It this case profits need not be shared in accordance with capital 
contributions. They may be shared in any proportion agreed to by the partners, 
depending on their contribution to the success and profitability of the business. 
4.4. Equity Financing 
Equity financing in an Islamic economy may have to be for either an indefinite 
period, as it is in the case of the stock of the joint stock companies or shares in 
partnerships, or a definite (short, medium or long) period as it is in the case of 
borrowed capital (loans, advances, bonds and debentures). Since borrowed capital 
would also be on the basis of profit-and-loss sharing and could not be interest-based, 
it would be in the nature of temporary equity financing and would mature on the 
expiry of the specified period. Such financing would hence not carry the, same 
Irfani, op. cit. pp. 23-24. 
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connotation as it does in the capitalist economies. It would, like equity capital but 
unlike qard al-hasanah, not enjoy any lien on the assets of the firm. 
The inability to secure a lien on the assets of the business financed, possible in 
the case of interest-based lending, would make the financiers more careful in eval- 
uating the prospects of the business and cautious in providing finance. Moreover, 
it would be difficult to find medium or long term financing in an Islamic economy 
without sharing the ownership and control of the business. Expansion of the busi- 
ness would hence be closely related to the distribution of ownership and control. 
Similarly it would not be possible for anyone to earn an income on savings without 
being willing to share in the risks of business. Thus ownership, fruits and risks 
of business would become more widely distributed in an Islamic economy than is 
possible under capitalism. 
There are three types of borrowers who are looking for funds to satisfy their 
financing needs. These are (i) private sector investors looking for funds to finance 
their expanding business ; (ii) private sector borrowers seeking funds to finance their 
consumption needs; and (iii) governments seeking funds to finance their budgetary 
deficits. Can the needs of all three categories of borrowers be satisfied within the 
framework of equity financing? It is only the subject of private sector equity finance 
which is ý discussed in this section. Whether or not, and to what extent, equity 
financing can be used to meet the needs of consumers and government are issues 
which were discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
4.4.1. Channels of Equity in an Islamic Society 
Islamic banking is equity-oriented and the Islamic instruments of financing 
would ideally be based on profit and loss sharing. This would bring a fundamen- 
tal change in the role of Islamic banks and would convert them from creditors to 
pärtners5. 
The channels that equity investment may take in an Islamic society are the same 
a. Qureshi, D. M., The Role of Shariah Based Financial Instruments in a Muslim Country, 
Paper presented at the Seminar on Developing a System of Islamic Financial Instruments, 
Malaysia, May 1986, p. 12. 
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as elsewhere, namely, sole proprietorship, partnership (including both mudarabah 
and musharakah and joint stock companies. Cooperation can also play an important 
role in an Islamic economy because of its harmony with the value system of Islam 
and the valuable contribution it can make to the realisation of its goals. 
(i) Sole Proprietorship 
Generally speaking, the entrepreneur depends essentially in this case on his own 
finance and management. He may be able to supplement his financial resources by 
supplier's credits which played an important role in Muslim society in the past and 
tends to be a major source of short-term capital. 
If the sole proprietor needs substantial extra resources on a temporary basis 
for a specific consignment or profitable opportunities, he may raise the necessary 
finance from individuals or firms or financial institutions on a profit-and-loss sharing 
basis, in which case his sole proprietorship will merge into the mudarabah form of 
organisation. If his need for funds is of a permanent nature, he may consider the 
entry into his business of other partners and take advantage of the mudarabah or 
musharakah forms of partnership, depending on whether he needs merely finance or 
managerial ability as well to complement his own business talent. 
What this implies is that an enterprising businessman in an Islamic society need 
not be constrained in his ambitions by his own finance. He can still expand his 
business by securing funds on a profit-and-loss-sharing basis. This should actually 
be better for him as well as the financier in terms of justice; the entrepreneur does 
not have to pay a predetermined rate of return irrespective of the outcome of his 
business and the financier does not get a low return even when the business is paying 
high dividends. Since the ultimate outcome of business is uncertain, one or other of 
the two parties, entrepreneur or financier, suffers from injustice in an interest-based 
arrangement and Islam wishes to eliminate injustice. 
To sum up the sole proprietorship form of business organisation, along with 
mudarabah financing, needs to be encouraged as it will help achieve the goals of 
Islam. It provides self-employment, and enables the entrepreneur to stay in his 
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own town or village, thus helping reduce concentration of population in a few large 
urban centres. 
(ii) Partnership 
It is the relationship which exists between two or more persons carrying on a 
business in common with a view to profit. 
The definition provides us with three requirements for a partnership in that 
there must be a business, that it must be trading (carrying on), and that it must 
have the capability of making a profit. 
Where, at the beginning of a business, one partner provides, say £5,000 in, cash 
and the other provides the professional skill and expertise to make the venture work 
it will be a matter for them to decide how the rewards of the business are to be 
shared out°. In the absence of any agreement no interest will be paid on capital, 
profits will be divided equally and, in the event of a dissolution, the second partner 
will be required to bear an equal share of any loss of capital, although he will not 
be entitled to share in the increase in value of capital unless it has been turned into 
partnership property. 
The distinctive features of the partnership is the right of each of the partners 
to participate in running the firm and it is this right which gives rise to a number 
of obligations which partners have towards each other. If it is accepted that each 
partner participates then it is obviously important that there is a sound relationship 
between them. 
Partnership in an Islamic society may take one of two juristic forms, mudarabah 
" or musharakah. The Islamic jurists have proposed other forms of partnership to 
provide credit and finance for Agricultural, manufacturing and trading purposes. 
These are: 
(1) Consecutive Partnership 
Smith, P., Essential Business Law of the Family Business, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1979, 
pp. 10-28. 
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This instrument of financing is a real innovation on the part of the Islamic banks. 
The formula is used as a basis for the distribution of profits among depositors, who, 
in Islamic banks, hold a middle place between shareholders of equity on the one 
hand and depositors and or lenders on the other. Consecutive partnership formula, 
practised by all Islamic banks, considers depositors of one financial year as partners 
in the proceeds of that financial year, regardless of matching between the periods 
of projects in which their funds were used. Indeed, even some proceeds pending 
from previous years, for which accruals or provisions were made, are included in 
the proceeds of the year in question. On the other hand, some yields corresponding 
to the said financial year are excluded, if they are not yet due, and left to a future 
year. 
Such an accounting system was necessary to reconcile the depositors' need to 
withdraw funds, regardless of the liquidation of investment in which their funds 
are used, with the continuity of the bank's investments which constantly flow in a 
mixed basket, and the need to make regular accounts every financial year, as an 
accounting unit for this basket. 
(2) Agricultural Partnerships 
Privately owned agricultural land could be exploited in one of the three ways: 
(a) directly by the owner, (b) indirectly by renting it (ijara), (c) through agricultural 
partnership. 
The two main frameworks in traditional Islamic law for agricultural enterprise 
are (a) muzara'a (share cropping) and musaqat (water partnership or tree-sharing). 
Both these techniques typically afford a partnership between capital and labour. 
(a) Sharecropping 
Muzara'a (sharecropping or crop partnership) is a contract whereby the landlord 
puts his agricultural land at the farmer's disposal to farm and the farmer undertakes 
to give the owner an amount of the agricultural products. This framework is, of 
course, based on the generally accepted view that there should be a partnership 
between capital and labour. 
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(b) Tree-sharing 
A contract is termed musagat (water partnership or tree-sharing) when one 
person strikes a deal with another person calling for the latter to trim and water 
those fruit trees whose fruits are either one's own, or are at his disposal, in exchange 
for an amount of the fruits, as agreed upon. If a contract of musaqat or treesharing 
related to fruitless trees, like willows and sycophants, it is not valid. However, it 
would be valid in such trees as henna whose leaves are used or in those trees whose 
flowers are used'. 
(iii) A combination of sole proprietorship and partnership 
In practice, business organisations would reflect a combination of sole propri- 
etorship and mudarabah or a combination of musharakah and mudarabah. Not all 
savers can, or are interested in participating in the management of a business and 
may be just looking for opportunities to invest their surplus funds for short, medium 
or long-term periods. They could in this case make financing available to on-going 
businesses and share in the profits and losses in accordance with agreed ratios. 
(iv) Joint stock companies 
These constitute along with financial institutions the most convenient form of 
investment available to a majority of savers, who have neither their own businesses 
to invest in nor the ability to evaluate running business or become sleeping partners. 
Corporate shares would be more attractive to them because of the relative ease with 
which they can acquire them when they wish to invest, or to sell them when they 
need the liquidity. In the light of Islamic teachings it will however be necessary 
to reform joint stock-companies to safeguard the interests of share holders and 
consumers, and also to reform stock exchanges to ensure that share prices reflect 
more or less the underlying economic conditions and do not fluctuate erratically in 
response to speculative forces. 
Amin, S. H., Islamic flanking and Finance, Vahid Publications, Iran, 1986, pp. 34-35. 
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(v) Cooperation 
In addition to the above forms of business organisation, which are all profit- 
oriented, "cooperation" , which is service-oriented, could make a rich contribution 
to the realisation of the goals of an Islamic economy. With the emphasis of Islam 
on brotherhood, "cooperation" in its various forms to solve the mutual problems of 
producers, businesses, consumers, savers, and investors should receive considerable 
emphasis in a Muslim society. -- 
Cooperative societies could render a number of valuable services to members, 
including temporary financial accommodation when necessary through a mutual 
fund, the economies of bulk purchases and sales, maintenance facilities, advisory 
services, assistance or, training for solving management and technical problems, 
and mutual insurance. Cooperation is a mutually beneficial relationship for all 
concerned, and everyone's participation is completely voluntary'. 
Informal cooperation between craftsmen and businesses is quite widespread in 
Muslim history. In all these forms of informal cooperation, businesses rendered 
services to each other without receiving any profit, commission or remuneration. 
These different forms reflected not only Islamic brotherhood and mutual trust but 
also fulfilled the common needs of businessmen on a mutually cooperative basis. 
Historical experience has shown that during the jahiliyah (pre-Islamic) period, 
trade (over many territories) stretched over long distances and all financial resources 
were mobilised on the basis of either interest or mudarabah and musharakah. Islam, 
however, abolished the interest basis and organised the entire production and trade 
on the basis of mudarabah and musharakah. With the abolition of interest, economic 
activity in the Muslim world did not suffer any decline. In fact there was increased 
prosperity. 
A combination of several economic and political factors, including the ability to 
mobilise adequate financial resources, were responsible for this prosperity. All these 
Hessen, R., `The Modern Corporation and Private Property: A Reappraisal', Journal of Lain 
and Economics, Vo1. XXVI, June 1983, p. 287. 
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factors together provided a great boost to trade which flourished from Morocco and 
Spain in the west, to India and China in the east, Central Asia in the north, and 
Africa in the south. Therefore, the economic prosperity in the Muslim world had 
made possible a development of industrial skill which brought the artistic value of 
the products to an unequalled height. 
Mudarabah and musharakah were the basic methods, by which financial re- 
sources were mobilised and combined with entrepreneurial and managerial skills for 
purposes of expanding long-distance trade and supporting crafts and manufacture. 
They fulfilled the needs of commerce and industry and enabled them to thrive to 
the optimum level given the prevailing technological environment. 
4.5. Steps to be Taken to Transform to an Equity Financing System 
It was mentioned earlier that to abolish interest implies that all businesses in 
Muslim countries, including industry and agriculture, currently operating on the 
basis of a mix of equity and interest-based loans, would have to become primarily 
equity-based. 
This requires that all financial needs of a permanent nature, whether for fixed 
or working capital, should normally be expected to come out of equity capital in 
an Islamic economy. This broader equity-capital base may be supported to the 
extent necessary by medium-and long-term mudarabah advances. Short-term loan 
financing, even though in a profit-and-loss sharing framework, may be resorted to 
only for bridge-financing or temporary shortage of liquidity resulting from seasonal 
peaks in business for which purpose it may not be desirable or feasible to have a 
permanent increase in equity. 
A number of steps would need to be taken to bring about the transformation 
to an equity-based financing system in the gradual Islamisation of the economy of 
Muslim countries. 
Firstly, projects should be selected for funding through partnerships primar- 
ily on the basis of their expected profitability rather than the creditworthiness or 
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solvency of the borrower°. This factor, together with the predominance of equity 
markets and the absence of debt markets, has led Muslim scholars to conclude that, 
potentially, in an Islamic system, there would be : (a)'a greater number and variety 
of investment projects that would be seeking financing; (b) a more cautious, selec- 
tive, and perhaps more efficient project selection by the savers and investors; and 
(c) a greater involvement by the public in investment and entrepreneurial activities, 
particularly as private equity markets develop. 
Secondly, to enable firms to increase their equity it may be necessary to "reg- 
ularise" the existing stock of "black" money (arising from tax evasion), the major 
outlet for which currently is mainly capital outflows or conspicuous consumption. 
This move should help draw a substantial volume of such funds into the fold of 
investment. Without this move it may be difficult to increase equity because there 
may not be a sufficient volume of "white" money in the economy for this purpose. 
In the next chapter we will be discussing this issue in the context of the middle east 
stock markets. 
Thirdly, tax laws should be revised to treat interest payments in the same way 
as dividends and profits are now being treated, and taxes should be levied on gross 
profits before interest payments. In fact, it would be desirable to impose a higher 
rate of tax on the interest portion of the gross income than that applied to profits 
to accelerate the transformation to an equity-based financing structure. 
Fourthly, the tax structure of Muslim countries should be streamlined to ensure 
that it does not discourage investment and channel even legally earned profits into 
"black" money. While Islam does allow the levying of taxes to a reasonable extent to 
meet all necessary and desirable state expenditures, it does not permit an unjust tax 
structure which penalises honesty and creates the un-Islamic tendency of evading 
taxes. 
Finally, the formation of appropriate financial institutions and investment banks 
should be encourged to make venture capital available to businesses and industries 
Iqbal, Z. and A. Mirakhor, Stabilization and Growth in an Open Islamic Economy, Paper 
presented at the International Seminar on Islamic Economics, Islamabad, August 1987, p. S. 
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and thus enable them to undertake necessary investments. In the process they 
would also provide investment opportunities to savers who are either unable to find 
lucrative opportunities, for direct investment, or are unable to locate partners or 
mudaribs for profitable investment of their savings. 
4.6. The Role of Equity Financing in Mobilising Funds and Stabilization 
of the System 
Given Islam's emphasis on equity financing, there should be a greater urge to 
save for investment in one's own business. If there are profitable opportunities 
for investment which cannot be exploited by reliance merely on internal cash flows, 
access could be had for premises, equipment and supplies through leasing, murabaha 
or bai muajjal, and supplier's credits. Businesses desiring further expansion could 
also mobilise resources on the basis of profit, mudarabah or musharakah. Market 
forces will take care of those who act in a self-defeating manner. Nevertheless, a 
state-regulated proper auditing system can be instituted to safeguard the interest 
of investors. 
Joint stock companies should also play an important role in an Islamic economy. 
Their shares would be available to investors who are not active or do not wish to 
make their funds available to sole proprietors or partnerships. Corporate equities 
constitute a substantial proportion of total capital formation in capitalist societies. 
In an Islamic economy, it is always possible for an individual investor to di- 
versify and reduce his risk by making financial institutions and investment trusts 
a vehicle for his investment because such institutions diversify their own risk by 
properly regulating their exposure to different sectors of the economy as do indi- 
viduals and firms. It must be clearly understood that the return on equity in an 
Islamic economy will not be equal to just "profit" but will rather be the sum of what 
constitutes "interest plus profit" in the capitalist economy and is. called "return on 
capital" . 
It will include the reward for saving and risk-taking, on the one hand, 
and entrepreneurship, management and innovation, on the other. 
Hence the Islamic system should be able to ensure justice between the 
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entrepreneur and the financier. No one would be assured of a predetermined rate of 
return. One must participate in the risk and share in the outcome of business. This 
may not necessarily change the total outcome. It would no doubt change the distri- 
bution of the total outcome in accordance with the Islamic norm of socio-economic 
justice. It would also eliminate the erratic and irrational fluctuation between the 
shares of the savers or financiers and the entrepreneurs. Hence situations where 
the savers suffer (if interest is low and profit is high) or the entrepreneurs suffer 
(if interest is high and profit is low or negative) would be eliminated and justice 
established between the two. The impact of this should be healthly on both savers 
and entrepreneurs. 
When it comes to the question of stability, it must be realized that the sta- 
bility of any economic system may be evaluated either empirically or analytically. 
Empirically, the simulation of an econometric model of a given economy has been 
successfully tried to evaluate stability. The results of such investigations, however, 
lack the generality of analytical results10. Furthermore, this approach cannot be 
employed in the present case since a full-fledged Islamic economic system does not 
as yet exist. 
Analytical methods of examining stability have also been developed by econ- 
omists and have provided important general results. Such methods have not yet 
been applied to study an Islamic economy and have in any case their own limitations. 
More importantly, stability is quite responsive to government action and regulations, 
hence a definitive analysis requires the specification of several institutional details. 
All things considered, there appears to be room for offering some remarks on 
the stability of an equity-based Islamic economy. The profit in the equity-based 
system will be dependent on the profit-sharing ratio and the ultimate outcome of 
the business. The share of the entrepreneur or financier cannot fluctuate violently 
from month to month. Moreover the distribution of the total return on capital 
(profit plus interest) between the entrepreneur and the financier would be deter- 
10 Zarqa, M. A., `Stability in an Interest-Free Islamic Economy: A Note': Pakistan Journal of 
Applied Economics, Vol. II, No. 2, Winter 1983, Pakistan, p. 182. 
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mined more equitably by economic considerations and not by speculative financial 
market forces. In case of dividends it can however, be reduced in bad times and, in 
extreme situations, even passed. So the burden of finance by shares is less. There 
is no doubt that in good times an increased dividend would be expected, but it 
is precisely in such times that the burden of higher dividend can be borne. This 
factor should tend to have the effect of substantially reducing business failures, and 
in turn dampening, rather than accentuating, economic instability. Minsky argues 
that when each firm finances its own cash flow and plans to invest its own retained 
profits, there is no problem of effective demand, the financial system is robust and 
investment has great inertia. When firms can raise outside finance direct from ren- 
tiers or through the banks, they are liable to instability. Schemes of investment are 
planned that are viable only if the overall rate of investment continues to rise. A 
fragile debt structure is built up. When the acceleration in the rate of investment 
tapers off, some businesses find current receipts less than current obligations, and a 
financial collapse occurs". During a boom, equity holders experience capital gains 
and increase the ratio of expenditure to income; when the boom breaks, thriftiness 
increases. Thus, long-run average growth may occur in cycles. 
Interest rate volatility has defeated all efforts to restore stability to exchange 
rates. In a fixed parity system it is impossible to keep the exchange rates pegged 
because of the movement of "hot" money to take advantage of interest rate differ- 
entials. The effort to keep the exchange rate pegged leads to a significant loss of 
central bank reserves and impairs confidence in the strength of the currency. In 
a floating exchange rate system, where the rate tries to find its own equilibrium 
level and fluctuate excessively from day to day in response to international interest 
rate movements bearing no relationship to underlying economic conditions, it be- 
comes difficult to predict exchange rates. This renders long-term planning almost 
impossible. A country facing a recession is unable to keep its interest rates low 
because such a policy leads to an outflow of funds, depreciates the exchange rate of 
" Minsky, H. `Summary of Minsky's Argument' by Joan Robinson in "What are the Questions"?, 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XV, No. 4. December 1977, p. 3331. 
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rency, and raises the cost of living12. To prevent an even deeper plunge in the value 
of its currency, the recession-ridden country is forced to maintaint interest rates at 
a higher level than dictated by the need for recovery. This, in turn, slows down the 
recovery and undermines confidence in the government. 
The elimination of interest and its replacement by profit-loss-sharing would 
not only change the level of uncertainty but also redistribute the consequences of 
uncertainty over all parties to a business. It would moreover, by removing the daily 
destabilising influence of fluctuating interest rates, bring about a commitment of 
funds for a longer period and also introduce a discipline in investment decisions. 
In such an environment the strength or weakness of a currency would tend to 
depend on the underlying strength of the economy, particularly the rate of inflation, 
and exchange rates. Accompanied by the Islamic emphasis on internal stability in 
the value of money, exchange rates should prove to be more stable because all 
other factors influencing exchange rates, such as cyclical developments, structural 
imbalances and differences in growth rates, are of a long-run nature and influence 
expectations about long-term trends in exchange rates. 
Morever, in the Islamic system, there will also be a greater interdependence 
and a closer relationship between investment and deposit yields because banks can 
primarily accept investment deposits on the basis of profit-sharing and can provide 
funds to the enterprises on the same basis. Due to the fact that the return to 
liabilities will be a direct function of the return to asset portfolios and also because 
assets are created in response to investment opportunities in the real sector, the 
return to financing is removed from the cost side and relegated to the profit side, 
thereby allowing the rate of return to financing to be determined by productivity 
in the real sector. It will be the real sector that determines the rate of return 
to the financial sector in the Islamic financial system rather than the other way 
around. For these reasons, Islamic banking tends to reduce the vulnerability of the 
capital importing country to fluctuations in the level of capital inflows and to a 
sharp slowdown of new investment due to uncertainty among investors. 
" Chapra, op. cit. pp. 120-121. 
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In the Islamic system, no such instability exists when a bank, rather than issuing 
fixed liabilities, issues shares to its depositors. In this case assets acquired by the 
banks are transparent to investors, they are no more or less than the deposits 
supporting them. If there is a decline in the value of the bank's assets then it will 
not be to the advantage of depositors to withdraw their money because their share 
would consequently decline. Also the welfare of a depositor does not depend on the 
actions of other depositors because each gets a share in the bank's value which is 
independent of whether some withdraw their shares while others do not. In fact 
there is a greater incentive to remain in the bank when it suffers a decline in the 
value of its assets because otherwise it will mean acceptance of a loss on initial 
deposit, whereas retaining shares in the bank will give hope for a revaluation of the 
bank's assets in the future"'. Perhaps the greatest advantage of such a system is that 
it not only resolves the bank's problem of panic among its clients but it also does 
not require the provision of deposit insurance and other government interventions 
surrounding banking institutions. 
4.7. Other Financial Instruments of Islamic Financing 
The Islamic banks are engaged in developing various instruments of financing 
which not only conform to the Islamic tenets of equity and fairness but will also 
stand the test of day to day business, corporate needs of the modern world and 
the sophisticated tools of scientific analysis. The Islamic banks have identified and 
developed a relatively broad range of business and banking contracts. These include: 
4.7.1. Ijara (Leasing) Definition and its Advantages 
Ijara means a lease contract as well as a hire contract. In the context of Islamic 
banking it is a lease contract under which the bank or financial institution leases 
equipment or a building to one of its clients against a fixed charge. 
The primary advantage of ijara over the conventional forms of borrowing to 
finance equipment is that the ownership of the asset remains with the lessor. The 
" Khan, W. M., Towards an Interest-Free Islamic Economic System, The Islamic Foundation, 
Leicester & International Association for Islamic Economics, Islamabad, 1985, p. 84. 
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financing is largely unrelated to the size of assets and the capital base of the lessee 
and depends principally on the ability of his cash flow to service payments of lease 
rentals. 
Ijara is probably the most suitable means to raise investment funds especially 
for industries where rapid technological innovation is either underway or desired and 
for top class firms which are quickly expanding their business or small and medium 
enterprises and firms which have normally insufficient assets and capital base to 
meet normal collateral requirements of most other forms of long term financing. 
The basic security under the ijara arrangement is the "ownership of the equipment". 
The title of ownership to the equipment remains with the leasing company and in 
case of serious default the equipment is repossessed. 
4.7.1.1. The Modern Concept of Ijara 
Leasing is the modern technique that can be compared with the Islamic tech- 
nique of ijara. Leasing is based on the same fundamental concept of ijara according 
to which one does not have to own an asset in order to enjoy the benefits of it. It is 
now being applied on a large scale to business activity. There are obvious examples 
of businesses which have benefitted from their investment in fixed assets over the 
years. Some businesses have made substantial capital profits from the sale of assets 
or have been able to improve the look of their balance sheets by the revaluation 
of assets. In the main, the profitability of a business lies in the use to which the 
resources are put. It is the use, not necessarily the ownership, which matters. Once 
a business decision for example the investment appraisal, has been made on some 
new venture, the choice of purchasing or leasing is partly a matter of arithmetic, 
partly a question of the availability of capital. 
A comparsion between leasing and other similar forms of transactions, such as 
rental, will give a clearer picture. "Rent" as is shown by the rent a car business, is 
a contract according to which the objects are leased to individuals or a number of 
users for a much shorter period than their actual useful life14. 
" Ghifari, N. M. & Muzaffar, M., Ijara and its Modern Applications, Paper presented at the 
Seminar on Islamic Financing Techniques, Islamabad, December 1984, p. 11-12. 
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In contract law, the "rental contract" specifies the lease and usage for an in- 
definite period. A typical example is IBM's computer sales system. This system 
was initiated by the company which has an over-whelming world market share to 
promote sales in an attempt to outstrip its competitors, in the belief that it could 
control the progress of technological innovation of computers. While the users of 
the equipment leased on a rental system are major enterprises and their usage is 
continuous, the rented equipment is usually used in a transient manner, whether 
the case is "rental" or "rent" the lessor is charged with the responsibility for main- 
tenance. Especially, in the case of "rental" the lessor is also charged with the 
responsibility for coping with the products obsolescence, so that it may be termed 
a service-oriented business. 
4.7.1.2. Economic Role of Ijara 
Lease financing because of its special features can supplement the existing con- 
ventional forms of financing and further accelerate investment in the private sector. 
There is a large requirement of balancing and modernization of the existing in- 
dustry. As a supplementary source of term credit, lease financing through balancing 
and modernization of the existing industry, will improve capacity utilization, qual- 
ity, production cost, profitability, internal generation of-cash for future investment 
and international competitive capability to increase exports. 
Lease financing is most suited to the programmes of balancing, modernization 
and replacement. It would involve a small dosage of investment which would carry 
relatively smaller investment risk but would result in a quick value added produc- 
tion. It would increase capacity utilization and thus contribute to the growth of the 
economy. 
4.7.2. Murabaha (Cost Plus Financing) 
Murabaha is generally defined as the sale of a commodity for the price at which 
the vendor has purchased it, with the addition of a stated profit known to both 
the vendor and the purchaser. It is a cost-plus-profit contract. Islamic financial 
institutions aim to make use of murabaha in circumstances where they will purchase 
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raw materials, goods or equipment etc. and sell them to a client at cost, plus 
a negotiated profit margin to be paid normally by instalments. With murabaha, 
Islamic financial institutions are no longer to share profits or losses, but instead 
assume the capacity of a classic financial intermediary. 
The legality of murabaha is not questioned by any of the schools of law. There 
are of course differences in the details. However, the use of murabaha as a credit 
vehicle by the Islamic financial institutions has been regarded with apprehension by 
some Muslim economists, for example M. Siddiqi, who contended that the simple 
fact that murabaha enables a buyer to finance his purchase with deferred payments, 
as against accepting a mark-up on the market prices of the commodity, means that 
the financier, in this case the Islamic bank, earns a predetermined profit without 
bearing any risk''. 
This form of contract is widely used for import finance. So the bank sells a 
commodity to the client for a predetermined amount or rate of profit over and 
above the total costs. Usually, goods or commodities are provided to the order of 
the client according to definite specification, but, following the rules of the Shariah 
Supervisory Board (SSB) (which is established in each bank under the bank's articles 
of association in order to make sure that each bank's transactions confirm to Islamic 
shariah), the client is not obliged to accept the goods or commodities, even if they 
are provided according to the given specification. 
4.7.3. Beneficence Loans (Qard al-Hasanah) 
Qard al-hasanah means an interest-free loan, which is the only loan permitted 
by shariah principles. Funds are advanced without any profit or charge for human- 
itarian and welfare purposes. Repayments are made over a period agreed by both 
parties. A levy of a modest service charge on such a loan is permissible provided it 
is based on the actual cost of administering the loan. 
One may wonder how lending could be a business proposition once interest is 
18 Saleh, N. A., Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law, Cambridge, London, 1986, 
pp. 94-95. 
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abolished. It seems that the Islamic financial institutions are advised to make use 
of qard al-hasanah in the following circumstances: 
(a) In the case of musharakah between the institution and the client, it often 
happens that not all of the institution's shares in the project can be earmarked 
for the right to participate in profits; otherwise no substantial share would be left 
to the other partner, namely the client. Therefore the institution's participation is 
split into two parts: one constitutes a share in the partnership capital and the other 
a share in the working capital provided through qard al-hasanah. 
(b) A qard al-hasanah can also be provided to a client of the institution who 
has cash-flow problems, either in order to protect the institution's investment, or, 
when the client is reliable, to boost the institution's image and reputation at no 
great risk. 
(c) A third use of qard al-hasanah may occur when a client who has with the fi- 
nancial institution a blocked savings account which generates no interest, encounters 
an urgent need for short-term finance, making recourse to the mudarabah concept 
useless. The necessary funds can be provided to him by the institution through qard 
al-hasanah. There are probably other circumstances where qard al-hasanah has its 
value for the lender; these circumstances will gradually develop with the day to day 
business of the Islamic financial institutions. 
4.7.4. Deferred Payment Sale (Bai Muajjal) 
This transaction allows the sale of a product on the basis of deferred payment 
in installments or in a lump-sum payment. The price of the product is agreed to 
between the buyer and the seller at the time of the sale and cannot include any 
charges for deferring payments. 
4.7.5. Purchase with Deferred Delivery (Bai Salam) 
In this transaction the buyer pays the seller the full negotiated price of a spe- 
cific product which the seller promises to deliver at a specified future date. This 
transaction is limited to products whose quality and quantity can be fully specified 
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at the time the contract is made. 
4.7.6. Tadamun or Takaful (Solidarity) 
Takaful literally means "mutual guarantee". In the context it is the Islamic 
answer to the modern concept of insurance, which is one of the most important 
subjects among scholars. This type of contract represents Islamic insurance based 
on a collective sharing of risk by a group of individuals whose payments are akin to 
premiums invested by the Islamic banking institution in a mudarabah for the benefit 
of the group. After a certain period, the group may expect to stop making further 
payments while remaining insured. The purpose of this solidarity mudarabah may 
be life assurance and it may also be risk insurance covering a property. If the assured 
person dies before the end of his covered time, or an insured risk on the property 
materializes, then payment is made out of the account of the insured person; if 
there is not enough money in that account, the outstanding balance is covered by 
the money of the other participants inside the same pool. This is what is meant here 
by solidarity; the participants in a solidarity mudarabah share the consequences of 
a mishap. In other words, the participants in a given solidarity mudarabah have the 
right to share the surplus profits generated by such a mudarabah but at the same 
time they are liable for contributing to amounts in addition to the premiums they 
have already disbursed, if their initial premiums paid in during a particular year 
are not sufficient to meet all the losses and risks incurred during that year. 
4.8. Conculsions 
In this chapter and the preceding one, we have argued that mudarabah 
and musharakah are the basic methods by which financial resources are mobilised 
and combined with entrepreneurial and managerial skills for purposes of expanding 
long-distance trade and supporting crafts and manufacture. They fulfill the needs 
of commerce and industry and enable them to thrive to the optimum level given 
the prevailing resource environment. These financial instruments along with oth- 
ers mentioned in this chapter constitute an important feature of both trade and 
industry and provide a framework for investment in a modern Islamic economy. 
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To sum up, an Islamic banking system is essentially an equity-based system in 
which depositors are treated as if they were shareholders of the bank. Consequently, 
depositors are not guaranteed the nominal value, or a predetermined rate of return, 
on their deposits. If the bank makes profits then the shareholder (depositor) would 
be entitled to receive a certain proportion of these profits. On the other hand, 
if the bank incurs losses the depositor is expected to share in these as well, and 
receive a negative rate of return. Thus, from the depositor's perspective an Islamic 
commercial bank is in many respects similar to a mutual fund or investment trust. 
Furthermore, to remain consistent with religious strictures, the bank cannot charge 
interest in its lending operations, but has to use special modes of investment and 
financing that are also based on the concept of profit and loss sharing system. 
No doubt unit trusts and investment trusts are different. The value of shares 
in an investment trust is determined in the stock market directly. In the case of a 
unit trust (e. g. the United States mutual fund) the value is based on a weighted 
basket of the underlying shares which are traded in the market. 
With Islamic deposits, it is not the market value which matters, there is none 
as they are not traded. Nor is it the underlying value of the assets which the bank 
has invested in unless there are deposits. What is important is the profitability of 
the investment. Values of shares do not always reflect profitability. Profit/earnings 
ratios can vary widely, and the market accepts this. 
Similarity with unit trusts relates to the uncertainty regarding both returns 
and the value of Islamic deposits. In practice however value seldom varies, which 
is not the case with unit trusts where it is determined by the market. In general 
Islamic deposits are less risky than unit trust holdings. Income oriented unit trusts 
are most easily compared to the Islamic deposits and not those which are growth 
oriented. In this regard there is much confusion in the Islamic literature on finance. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND FISCAL 
AND MONETARY POLICIES 
IN AN ISLAMIC ECONOMY 
Introduction 
The main feature of an Islamic financial system is the absolute prohibition of 
the payment and receipt of interest. Thus, countries that have chosen to bring their 
economic systems into closer accordance with the rules of the shariah have had to 
restructure their banking systems to conform with the restriction on interest-based 
financial transactions. In broad terms, an Islamic banking system is essentially an 
equity-based system in which depositors are treated as if they were shareholders 
of the bank. Consequently, depositors are not guaranteed the nominal value, or 
a predetermined rate of return, on their deposits. If the bank makes profits then 
shareholder (depositor) is entitled to receive a 'certain proportion of these profits. 
On the other hand, if the bank incurs losses the depositor is expected to share in 
these as well, and receive a negative rate of return. Thus, from the depositors' 
perspective an Islamic commercial bank is in many respects similar to a mutual 
fund or investment trust. 
There is no doubt that the implementation of an equity-based financial system 
in which any type of fixed rate of return on transactions is excluded raises a number 
of complex issues. First, it is necessary to develop alternative financial instruments 
that do not have a fixed nominal value and bear a predetermined rate of interest. 
There are in fact a number of such alternatives *proposed by Muslim economists 
that satisfy such requirements. Second, there is the question of how monetary and 
fiscal policies would be expected to operate in an interest-free economy. Clearly, 
instruments such as monetary policy that rely in any way on the rate of interest 
would be removed from the arsenal of the authorities, and suitable substitutes 
would have to be found if monetary policy is to continue to play an important role 
in Islamic economies. The important question which imposes itself here is: "What 
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is the conceptual foundation and basic source of guidance for fiscal policy in an 
Islamic framework"? 
The purpose of this chapter is to attempt an analysis of the financial system, 
fiscal and monetary policies in an Islamic economy. The chapter is divided into six 
sections. First, we examine how the Islamic banks operate by concentrating only on 
deposit accounts (savings and investment), we leave aside investment activities like 
musharakah, mudarabah, murabaha, bai salam etc. because these were discussed 
in the last two chapters. Second, the principal models of Islamic banks will be 
introduced. The first model relying on the concept of profit-sharing, integrates the 
assets and liability side based on a principle called the two-tier mudarabah. The 
second model divides the liability side of the bank balance sheet into two windows, 
one for demand deposits (transaction balances) and the other for investment. Third, 
the role of the stock market in the Islamic economic system will be highlighted. 
Fourth, fiscal policy in an Islamic framework will be discussed to show how the 
new system affects these policies. We will be examining the objectives of the fiscal 
policy, with zakat as a cornerstone of this policy, and the sources of finance for 
today's Islamic states. Fifth, we point out how the monetary policy can be made 
to play an effective role with central bank involvement in achieving the goals of an 
Islamic economy, and finally some conclusions will be drawn. 
5.1. How the Islamic Banks Operate 
The prime objective of Islamic banks, in general, is, to promote, foster and 
develop the application of Islamic principles, laws and traditions to the transac- 
tions of financial, banking and related business affairs and to promote investment 
companies, enterprises and concerns which shall themselves be engaged in business 
activities acceptable and consistent with the shariah. Such business should not be 
engaged in the alcoholic beverage trade, the receipt of interest which is forbidden 
by Islam, gambling or in any other un-Islamic activity. 
The Islamic Development Bank has similar objectives except that the Bank's 
activities are oriented more towards development projects of the member countries 
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rather than to commercial activities. 
Where the normal banking practices do not clash with Islamic principles, Islamic 
banks have adopted the current banking tools and procedures. Where any clash 
arises, the Islamic banks have devised their own tools and procedures to undertake 
their banking activities. Firstly it is appropraite to examine this in relation to 
deposit accounts only: 
Islamic banks receive two types of deposits: 
(a) deposits not committed for investment which take the form of current or 
saving accounts, and 
(b) deposits committed for investment which are called investment accounts. 
Whereas a current account is operated in the same way as it is operated in 
the conventional banking system, the savings accounts and investment accounts are 
operated differently as discussed below: 
1- Savings Accounts: 
This is an account where the customers can deposit their savings partly to earn 
income and partly to provide protection against unexpected future expenditures. 
Therefore, a savings account has to fulfill the functions of an investment account as 
well as a current account. Since, however, funds deposited in savings accounts will 
be invested on a profit and loss sharing basis like fixed deposits, they are viewed 
as part of the investment account. In Pakistan, for example, savings accounts (so- 
called savings bank accounts) are treated in the same way as fixed deposit accounts; 
both types of account work on the profit and loss sharing (PLS) principle, though 
there are differences in the conditions of savings deposits and fixed deposits. The 
minimum amount required to open a PLS account is, at PRs 100, less than that 
required for fixed-term deposits'. 
Though these depositors allow the banks to use their money, they get a guar- 
Karsten I., `Islam and Financial Intermediation', IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 29, Washington, 
1982, p. 115. 
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antee of getting their full amount back from the bank. In this case, the bank 
guarantees their savings but is not obliged to pay any rewards to the savers. How- 
ever, most of the banks are still paying either a cash reward from their profits at 
the end of their financial year or are giving some privileges to the holders of these 
accounts, e. g. providing financial support for small projects, loans for the purchase 
of consumer durables etc. These rewards are not obligatory and are paid only when 
the bank is earning sufficient profits. We are of the opinion that such practices are 
not fair. First the customers share in the profit without facing any risk of loss. 
Secondly the benefits and privileges which savings account holders are entitled to 
are determined by the bank in a somewhat arbitrary fashion, with no consistency 
over time or between banks. 
2- Investment accounts: can be of two types: 
(a) Accounts with authorisation, and 
(b) Accounts without authorisation. 
In the accounts with authorisation, the account holder authorises the bank to 
invest his money in any one of its projects. After the expiry of a specified period, 
the account holder will get the profit. In case of investment accounts without 
authorisation, the account holder may choose any particular project for investment 
of his deposited money'. The bank will give a share to the account holder from 
the profit of that particular project which has been chosen by him according to an 
agreed percentage. If the investment accounts are opened for a fixed period, the 
customer is not allowed to withdraw his money before the lapse of the specified 
period. If he does need to withdraw on demand,. the customer either is not entitled 
to the share in profit at all or may be entitled to receive some discounted profit 
depending upon the duration of the deposit with the bank. These deposit schemes 
of Islamic banks have been able to attract a substantial number of depositors. This 
may be so because they have not yet faced a shortage of deposits. But if they 
do not devise non-usurious tools of raising deposits, then these banks are likely to 
' Khan, M. F., `Islamic Banking as Practised Now in the World', in Money and Banking in 
Islam, Z. Ahmed et al (ed. ), Islamabad, 1983, pp. 259-284. 
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face problems in their growth particularly when they are working side by side with 
the modern banks. There has been a lot of discussion in the literature on Islamic 
banking as to how to save the depositors of investment accounts from the risk of 
the losses that the bank might incur. Islamic economists have suggested a number 
of schemes such as building reserves by the banks out of their earnings during good 
times to compensate for losses in bad times or to launch a deposit insurance with 
the backing of the central bank and the cooperation of all commercial banks and 
their depositors. 
5.2. Principal Models of Islamic Banking 
Muslim economists in their efforts to develop models of banking within the 
framework of Islamic requirements have come up with a variety of proposals that 
can be categorized into two principal models. The first model, relying on the concept 
of profit-sharing, integrates the assets and liabilities based on a principle called the 
two-tier mudarabah. This model envisages depositors entering into a contract with 
a banking firm to share the profits accruing to the bank's business. The bank, 
on its assets side, enters into another contract with an agent-entrepreneur who is 
searching for investable funds and who agrees to share his profit with the bank in 
accordance with a predetermined percentage stipulated in the contract. The bank's 
earnings from all its activities are pooled and are then shared with its depositors 
and shareholders according to the terms of their contract. Thus the profits earned 
by the depositors are then a percentage of the total banking profits. According to 
this model, the banks are allowed to accept demand deposits that earn no profit and 
may be subjected to a service charge. This model, though requiring that current 
deposits must be paid on the demand of the depositors, has no specific reserve 
requirement'. 
The second model divides the liability side of the banks' balance sheet into 
two windows, one for demand deposits (transaction balances) and the other for 
investment balances. The choice of the window would be left to the depositors. This 
Iqbal, Z. & Mirakhor, A., Islamic Banking, Occastional Paper No. 49, IMF, Washington. 
March 1987, p. 4. 
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model requires a 100% reserve for the demand deposits but stipulates no reserve 
requirement for the second window. This is based on the presumption that the 
money deposited as demand deposits are placed as amanah (safe keeping) and must 
be backed by 100% reserve, because these balances belonging to the depositors do 
not carry with them the innate right for the bank to use them as the basis for money 
creation through fractional reserves. Money deposited in investment accounts, on 
the other hand, is placed with the depositor's full knowledge that his deposits will 
be invested in risk-bearing projects, therefore no guarantee is justified. In this 
model, too, the depositors may be charged a service fee for the provision of the 
safe keeping services performed by the bank. On the question of 100% reserve 
requirement, there is a controversy regarding it in an interest-free banking system. 
We are of the opinion that such" a requirement may impose unnecessary rigidity 
which will cripple the entire system. Flexibility in this regard is essential. 
The second model corresponds closely to the understanding that the early Mus- 
lims had of banking and investment practices, and who by the mid-eighth century 
had developed a variety of credit institutions and instruments such as cheques, doc- 
uments of debt transfer (hawala), and bills of exchange (suftaja). Banking services, 
including currency exchange transactions, were performed by the merchant bankers 
and investment activities through profit-sharing were accomplished through direct 
finance. 
Both models consider the losses incurred as a result of investment activities 
by the banks as being reflected in the depreciation of the value of the depositor's 
wealth. However, both models see the probability of losses minimized through diver- 
sification of banks' investment portfolios and careful project selection, monitoring 
and control. Obviously, the risk to depositors is less in the second model than in 
the first and is only applicable to investment deposits. More importantly, what will 
mitigate against risks in the Islamic system is the fact that the banks have direct 
and indirect control over the behaviour of the agent-entrepeneur through both ex- 
plicit and implicit contracts. The banks can exert control through both the form 
of their contract and through an implicit reward-punishment system in the sense 
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of refusing further credit or the blacklisting of the agent-entrepreneur, and to the 
extent that the reputation of firms and that of its managers are important, this 
could be a strong deterrent to irresponsible behaviour. 
5.3. The Role of Stock Markets in the Islamic Economic System 
The most challenging issue facing the process of implementation of the Islamic 
financial system is the development of risk-return-bearing instruments that can pro- 
vide investors a sufficient degree of liquidity, security, and profitability to encourage 
their holding. Proposals along this line rely on the development of instruments cor- 
responding and parallel to the permissible forms of transactions. These include such 
instruments as mudarabah and musharakah certificates, short-term profit-sharing 
certificates and leasing certificates4. Furthermore, proposals are made for the de- 
velopment of specific instruments issued by the central bank as well as by the 
government, particularly relating to its specific investment projects. Clearly, any 
instrument representing a position in real assets and having risk-bearing character- 
istics whose rate of return is variable and tied to the performance of the asset is 
considered acceptable. 
The stock market has today come to occupy an important place in the economy 
of any country. It is a pool into which surplus funds flow for investment. Most large 
industries get some of their finances through the stock market. As a matter of fact, 
the stock market has become the financial nerve-centre of the modern world. 
The objective of course would be to establish an institution which would serve 
the same primary purpose as a modern stock exchange, that is, of providing a place 
where one may buy or sell shares, but which would be free from the present-day 
evils and malpractices. For this purpose, we have to evolve an automatic mechanism 
which will eliminate short term speculation while encouraging investment. The 
stock exchange, in other words, would have to be so regulated that speculators, in 
spite of finding the market open to them, would lose any incentive for indulging in 
Al-Jahri, M. A., `A Monetary and Financial Structure for an Interest-Free Economy: Insti- 
tutions, Mechanisms and Policy', in Money and Banking in Islam, Z. Ahmed & other (eds. ), 
International Centre for Research in Islamic Economics, Jeddah, 1983, pp. 120-131. 
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speculative activity. A tax on short term capital gains, but exemption for longer 
term gains may be one possibility. It is desirable to avoid any future crisis like 
the Kuwait "Souq Al-Manakh" crash. That crisis reached such a magnitude that it 
became impossible for any authority to find a solution that would have satisfied all 
the parties or remedy the injury'. 
Given this significance of the stock market in the modern world we have to 
determine precisely the role the stock market will play in the Islamic economic 
system. We will highlight the existing form and practices of the market which are 
consistent with the Islamic principles of finance and identify the changes which have 
to be brought in others to make them consistent with Islamic principles. 
5.3.1. Equity-based Securities 
The stock market is dominated by investment and trading in equity-based se- 
curities. These investments do not carry a prior return. Rather, such investments 
carry the chance of loss to the security holder. In order to truly reflect the Islamic 
spirit, equity investment should meet two other conditions. First, the business must 
fall in a field of activity prescribed as halal. Second, the entire capital structure of 
the firm must conform to Islamic principles. 
5.3.2. Debt-based Securities 
A sizeable portion of the capital market consists of debt-based securities in- 
cluding debentures, bonds, preferred stocks and commercial paper. The typical 
features of these securities are their redeemability, fixed return until maturity, con- 
version option and negotiability. There is no doubt that such instruments are not 
compatible with the requirements of shariah. Accordingly, a major challenge for 
the Islamic system is to design new instruments which can successfully replace the 
existing debt-based instruments. 
° Darwiche, F., The Gulf Stock Exchange Crash, The Rise and Fall of the Souq Al-Manakh, 
Croom Helm Ltd, Kent, 1986, p. 112. 
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5.3.3. Preferred Stocks 
Preferred stock is an instrument that combines features of pure debt and com- 
mon stock. The preference stock holders are accorded preference in dividend distri- 
bution and asset distribution in case of liquidation. Besides, at times, the preference 
stock also includes additional features such as sinking-fund provisions, call provi- 
sions, redemption and voting rights. 
It appears that the only way to bring the preferred stock within the Islamic fold 
will be through participation in both earnings, and liquidation proceeds. This will 
essentially turn such stocks into redeemable equity. A variety of arrangements for 
proportional distribution of profits and retirement of funds can be adopted to suit 
the needs of the market. 
It may be argued, that after exclusion of debt and preferred stocks the resultant 
market size will be quite restrictive. This is not true because the existing instru- 
ments will be replaced by Islamic instruments. Whether the size of the market will 
be affected in terms of resource mobilization is an open question. 
A class of fixed return contracts approved in the shariah is leasing (ijara). It 
is possible to raise leased funds through the stock market. Lease-stocks will offer 
ownership in the underlying equipment with a known flow of rental income to the 
holders. 
The problem in the case of Islamic banks is that such a market does not yet 
exist6. No one bank can create a market for itself. The creation of such a market 
needs a combined efforts of the Islamic banks, the monetary authorities of the 
Islamic countries and their central banks. 
5.3.4. Secondary Markets 
The development of a secondary market is important and essential to the devel- 
opment of a primary market. All savers, to some degree or other, have a liquidity 
e Homoud, S., Utilization of Funds Generated through Islamic Financial Instruments, Paper 
presented at the Seminar on Developing a System of Islamic Financial Instruments in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia, May 1986, p. 8. 
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preference. This liquidity preference, although perhaps to a different extent, can 
exist in an Islamic system as in any other system. To the extent that savers can, if 
necessary, sell securities quickly and at low cost they will be more willing to devote a 
higher portion of their savings to long-term instruments than they would otherwise. 
Since the probability is high that primary securities in -the Islamic system would 
be tied to the projects and management of particular enterprises, there are various 
risks that must enter into the portfolio decisions of the savers. The risks regarding 
the earning power of the firm and the risk of its default are examples. 
In an Islamic system, more than in any other, both the primary and secondary 
markets require the active support of the government and the central banks. This 
is true not only in their initial development and promotion but also in their super- 
vision and control, in order to assure their compliance with the rules of the shariah. 
Particularly in the case of secondary markets, the traders and the markets will 
need the support and supervision of central banks if these markets are to operate 
efficiently. 
Indeed, an efficient secondary stock market is the only meaningful solution to 
an all pervasive application of the PLS system. The elimination of a known cost of 
capital has to be replaced by mechanisms which continuously update the valuation 
of capital along with the adequate opportunities for risk transfer through trading 
of ownership interests. 
It is essentially needed to bring about rational behaviour into markets and to 
reduce the erratic movements in stock prices by minimizing speculation. Generally 
speaking, speculation consists in the forward purchase or sale of stocks on margin 
without the intention of taking or making actual delivery. Only about 1% of all 
futures contracts are settled by actual delivery, the rest, about 99%, are liquidated 
prior to the delivery month by offsetting transactions. In fact it is generally felt 
that trading in futures contracts is for purposes other than the exchange of titles. 
The speculator either sells short or buys long. The short seller, popularly called a 
bear, expects the price of the security sold short to decline and hopes to be able 
to "cover" his short-sale through an "offsetting" purchase at a lower price before 
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maturity date to secure a profit. The long buyer, known as a bull, buys stock which 
he does not want in the hope of making an "offsetting" sale at a higher price before 
the date of maturity. 
While forward purchases or sales of certain agricultural commodities perform an 
economic function by making an allowance for the time period it takes to produce the 
goods, thus providing producers as well as users with the assurance that they can sell 
or receive the goods when ready or needed, the forward market in shares performs 
no such function. On the other hand, spot purchases against cash payment and the 
reciprocal receipt of shares do not constitute speculation irrespective of when the 
purchaser decides to resell them. This is because the spot seller already owns the 
shares purchased against cash and his decision to resell them will be determined 
by changes in his economic circumstances or his perception of the market, both of 
which may, but not necessarily, change immediately. 
M. U. Chapra argues that stock market speculation combined with the avail- 
ability of credit through marginal purchases has in fact contributed to excessive 
price swings by promoting excessive buying, when prices are expected to rise, or 
selling, when prices are expected to fall'. The claim that speculation helps stabilize 
prices would be true only if the speculators operated in different random directions 
and their separate actions were mutually corrective. The claimed stabilizing effect 
would require that there be no marked disparity in the speculators' purchases and 
sales. But speculation involves judgement, or anticipation of a rise or fall in prices, 
and gets accentuated when something happens or some information is available on 
which judgement can be based. The same events or rumours are likely to result in 
the same judgements. 
In the real world, because of rumours, sometimes purposely spread by insiders 
and vested interests, there is a wave of speculative buying or selling concentrated 
in the same direction leading to abnormal and unhealthy fluctuation in prices. 
Chapra, M. U., Comments on the Paper of M. M. Metwally, `The Role of the Stock Exchange 
in an Islamic Economy', Journal for Research in Islamic Economics, Jeddah, 1985, Vo1.3, No. 
1. pp. 75-82. 
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However, counter productive as it is the speculative activity cannot be controlled 
effectively. Indeed, it is a natural outcome of the divorce between ownership and 
management and the ease with which such ownership can be traded. Almost every 
suggestion to curb the activity would involve costs in the form of a reduction in 
market efficiency. It is a dilemma that the lesser the degree of control the more 
efficient is the market, but the lesser the control the greater is the risk of market 
collapse. How then can we eliminate speculation from the stock market? This task 
cannot be accomplished unless all purchases are for a minimum period say one year. 
This would eliminate short-term speculating gains (and losses), but would have 
adverse consequences for liquidity and market depth. Also long term speculation 
would remain. The problem is that speculative activity can only be identified by 
examining the motives of the buyers and sellers themselves, not actual transactions 
in the market. 
To sum up there is no doubt that the stock market will play a pivotal role in 
the Islamic financial system. It will provide the much needed pricing mechanism for 
assets based on earnings potential. To ensure its smooth functioning, the market 
will have to be effectively insulated from major shocks or crash. The effects of a 
major shock would be more pervasive in the Islamic system as compared to the 
existing system, which is responsible primarily for valuation of equity and only 
indirectly influences debt valuation'. As against this, in the Islamic system entire 
capital resources, short-term and long-term, are equity based; hence a major shock 
will have an all pervasive effect on capital valuation. 
In fact an operational framework that insulates the market from major shocks 
is the key to the successful implementation of an Islamic financial system. To this 
end three areas of market need to be carefully reformed. These are, speculative 
behaviour in the market (including the prohibition on forward business)', informa- 
tion disclosure standards and the regulatory environment guiding the operations 
° Qureslhi, D. M., The Role of Stock Exchange in Islamic Financial System, Paper presented 
at the Islamic banking Conference on "Into the 1990's with Islamic Banking :A vision of the 
Future", London, June 1988, pp. 1-20. 
° Khan, M. A., `Stock Exchanges: Their Functions, and Need for Reform', The Criterion, Vol. 
7, No. 1, January 1972, p. 35. 
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and trading practices of the market. It is admitted that even if action is taken on 
all the three areas mentioned above, instability may remain. 
5.4. Fiscal Policy in an Islamic Framework 
Economists have recognized for some time that fiscal and monetary policies can 
be used together to promote balanced economic growth and price stability. Each 
operates by affecting the aggregate demand for goods and services. An increase 
in taxes and/or a cut in spending will tend to dampen such demand, as will a 
lightening of monetary policy. A cut in taxes and/or an increase in spending or an 
easing of monetary policy, will tend to stimulate aggregate demand. 
Thus the term "Policy mixture" refers to the relative emphasis at any one time 
on fiscal as compared with monetary policy for promoting the nation's goals of 
economic stabilization10. Therefore, monetary and fiscal policy are complementary 
as well as competitive methods of trying to accomplish some specific objectives in 
economic policy. 
The objectives of fiscal policy in contemporary economies are : 
1- Promotion of a sustained and balanced growth in the country; 
2- Efficient allocation of resources; 
3- Improvement in the distribution of income and wealth; 
4- Attainment of general economic stability, i. e. stability of the general price 
level as well as full employment". 
Those of monetary policy are : 
1) Promotion of an adequate rate of economic growth, 
2) Attainment of stable prices and full employment, 
3) Achievement of a reasonable equilibrium in the balance of payment. 
10 Walker, C. E., `Monetary Versus Fiscal Policy', in Mittra, S., Money and Banking, Random 
House, U. S. A., 1970, pp. 515-51. 
" Due, J. F., Government Finance, Third edit. Homewood IL: Richard D, Irwin, Inc., 1963, 
pp. 513-18. 
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In the case of the less developed countries, the monetary policy needs to be 
designed so as to make it attractive for the units in the household sector to hold 
their savings more in financial assets than in physical goods. In other words, if 
the development process is to acquire momentum, the ratio of fiscal assets to total 
savings of the household sector must be allowed to grow as fast as possible. 
Now it is possible to see the contours of monetary policy emerging. In the 
early stages of development, when the preference of the surplus-spending unit is 
to hold their saving predominantly in money, it is not only appropriate but also 
inevitable that the monetary authorities inject additional money into the system; 
money creation in such a situation contributes to the acceleration of investment12. 
At a later stage, when the preference pattern of the surplus-spending unit 
changes in favour of financial assets other than money, the role of money creation 
tends to decline relatively and a new dimension is added to the monetary policy. 
To the extent that varied types of financial asset are in demand, the authorities are 
called upon to initiate the setting up of new financial institutions. Such institutions 
help not only to satisfy this demand but, in the process of doing so, actually stim- 
ulate it even further. Once the financial institutions come into being, they begin to 
multiply their assets and liabilities at a rapid rate. 
However, the fiscal policy is implemented through budgeting(e. g. taxation, 
deficit financing, public debt, etc. ) while monetary policy is implemented through 
a banking system and a money market (i. e, an open market operation which controls 
the quantity of commercial bank reserves, the rediscounts, etc. ). 
In our approach we will analyse first the fiscal policy of an Islamic state due to 
its importance as a tool to achieve the goal of shariah which is the welfare of the 
people in this world and in the hereafter. 
" Khatkhate, D. R., `Analytic Basis of the Working of Monetary Policy in Less Developed 
Countries', IMF Staff Papers, Vol. XIX. 1972, pp. 533-557. 
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5.4.1. Objectives of Fiscal Policy in an Islamic Economy 
The fiscal policy of an Islamic state does not exclude the objectives of the fiscal 
policies of modern states but it further enlarges them to include the welfare of man 
and society in the world hereafter. It aims at bringing about a balance between the 
material, moral, and spiritual needs of man. Hence moral values of Islam have to be 
incorporated within its fiscal policy. In other words the fiscal policy of an Islamic 
state has to achieve its objectives within the constraints (limits) set by the shariah. 
We will examine the conceptual foundation of fiscal policy, as it is understood 
today, and its operational implications in an economy. One possible approach is to 
consider the modern objectives of fiscal policy as a starting point and to see whether 
or not they are in conformity with Islamic principles. This process of analysis 
can show the difference in conceptual approach between Islam and contemporary 
economies with respect to objectives and the means adopted to accomplish these 
objectives. The most important objectives of fiscal policy are : 
(1) Economic Growth and Development : 
Fiscal policy nowadays, is entrusted with promoting economic growth through 
mobilizing resources from non-essential consumption and channelizing those re- 
sources to investment through improving productivity and by providing incentives 
to save and invest. Fiscal policy should also create conditions that are conducive 
to economic growth by designing tax and expenditure policies that have least dis- 
incentive for the desire to save and invest and for work effort. Fiscal policy in an 
Islamic state should not be a retarding factor. Tax and expenditure policies should 
be geared to serve this purpose and any conflicts that may arise should be resolved. 
Most Muslim countries today may be considered as economically developing 
countries, but this may not always be true. Fiscal policy in case of countries which 
are still developing will have a primary role to play in raising capital formation. 
Capital formation encompasses all expenditure that increases productivity and in- 
cludes investment of the private sector as well as of the public sector. Capital 
formation in an Islamic state will include investments and development of human 
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and material resources as well as investment in the development of spiritual and 
moral values of the people. 
Fiscal policy in an Islamic state should aim at achieving full employment of all 
its resources. All persons who can work should be provided jobs that suit their 
abilities and in line with Islamic shariah. To achieve the goal of full employment 
of resources the state has to take fiscal and non-fiscal measures that penalize those 
who keep resources unutilized. Fiscal tools available to Islamic states today are 
many and may be used to achieve increased productivity. Some of the measures 
that may activate this goal are; 
(a) Shifting resources from non-essential consumption to capital formation. Fis- 
cal policy may achieve this via taxes on lavish consumption or progressive income 
taxes designed in such a way that they do not have a disincentive effect and do not 
lead to any distortions in the market system. 
(b) An Islamic state has to increase investment and ensure that it is directed to 
high priority areas. Public investment in particular has to be carefully evaluated and 
properly managed. The experience of most less developed countries has revealed 
that, government investment programmes are very often directed to low priority 
areas or non-viable sectors of the economy due to political reasons. No doubt, such 
an irrational policy is costly to economies with a limited financial resources. 
(c) Natural resources are finite. Their depletion deprives future generations of 
their use. An Islamic state should be active in conservation of natural resources. For 
instance the oil rich states should find alternative sources of financing their budgets 
apart from the oil revenue. The same principle of conservation applies to non oil 
producing countries and requires the efficient utilization of their natural resources. 
In case a state makes use of these resources as a source of revenue, then it should 
rationalize government expenditure and ensure equity with the future generation in 
mind. 
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(2) Income Distribution : 
Equity is a well-established principle in Islam. In distributing rewards the 
khulfai-rashedeen followed the practice of the Prophet by distributing those rewards 
evenly. This was a clear indication that Islam aims at an equitable distribution of 
income and wealth and abhors its accumulation in a few hands. Measures taken in 
the past to redistribute income and wealth in Islamic history are numerous. Most 
important was the decision taken by Umar not to distribute al-fay lands to the 
sahaba. This was done in order to prevent accumulation of wealth in a few hands". 
Recently many developing countries have sacrified the goal of equitable distribu- 
tion of income at the alter of economic growth. Many Islamic countries have joined 
this band-wagon. The maldistribution in incomes is found to be greater in these 
countries than in the economically developed countries. Also the system of taxation 
in these countries are lopsided. The salaried class is easily taxed as is consumption. 
This is coupled with inefficiency and inadequacy of the whole taxation machinery 
which makes it regressive and violates the equity criterion. Besides, many of these 
countries have adopted policies of development oriented towards import substitution 
and capital intensive techniques in the industrial sector. Development programmes 
concentrated in urban areas have continuously resorted to deficit financing thereby 
giving rise to inflation and hyper-inflation. 
We are of the opinion that in practice it would be necessary to examine what 
proportion of national output an Islamic state can raise by way of various taxes, 
rates, fees, etc., bearing in mind the average per capita income and the distribution 
of wealth and income in the country. Such an assessment would test the capabil- 
ity of the Islamic fiscal system in its ability or otherwise to bear the burden and 
responsibilities of the state in the present era. 
A salient feature of the Islamic fiscal system is the existence of zakat as a separate 
distributive mechanism. It is an earmarked levy with fixed rates and the budget 
13 Salama, A. A., `Fiscal Policy of an Islamic State' in Fiscal Policy and Resource Allocation in 
Islam, Z. Ahmed et al. (eds. ) International Centre for Research in Islamic Economics, Jeddah 
& Institute of Policy studies, Islamabad, 1983, pp. 103-105. 
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has no control over its rate or categories of recipients. If properly applied it should 
achieve an equitable distribution of income. Hence, the budget may concentrate on 
achieving the other sets of goals. 
The goals mentioned above for fiscal policy in an Islamic state need fiscal tools. 
In the past, Islamic states used zakat and kheraj plus other sources of revenue. These 
were used to provide for some public services such as defence, education, postal and 
many others. 
5.4.2. Zakat as a Cornerstone of Fiscal Policy in Islam 
The symbol of fiscal policy in Islam is zakat. In some places Quranic verses use 
the term sadaqat in place of zakat. 
Zakat is a compulsory levy and sadaqat is a voluntary charitable contribution. 
According to one Islamic scholar, zakat literally means purification, and it covers 
the moral, economic, and social spheres. Zakat washes away the greed and acquisi- 
tiveness of the wealthy, makes them alive to and responsible for solving the problem 
of poverty. The wealthy are made responsible through the state to ensure that the 
basic necessities of life are supplied to all the members of society. Zakat accordingly 
purifies wealth itself of its evil tendency towards more and more in fewer hands on 
account of unequal opportunities 14. 
In brief, zakat funds can be spent on two categories of individuals: first, on those 
who have need for the funds such as the poor, the slaves, the debtors for their own 
needs, and the wayfarers; and second, on administrators of the zakat fund, persons 
whose hearts need reconciliation, debtors who incurred the debts for the benefit of 
others, and for those who work for the cause of Allah. The objectives of zakat are 
many, and all can be related to social causes as well as to economic growth and 
development. 
" Abdeen, A. M. and Shook, D. N., The Saudi Financial System in the Context of Western £1 
Islamic Finance, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1984, p. 164. 
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The basic verse relating to zakat is the one which lays down specifically its eight 
items of expenditure. The verse says: 
"Alms are for the poor and the needy, and those 
employed to administer the (fund); for those whose hearts have 
been (recently) reconciled (to truth); for those in bondage and 
in debt, in the cause of Allah; and for the wayfarer (Thus is it) 
ordined by Allah, and Allah is full of knowledge and wisdom". 
(Quran 9: 60) 
Thus, the Quran has given the details of zakat in a manner which is in 
keeping with the precepts of fiscal policy and operations according to the science of 
economics. 
It should also be noted that the eight items of expenditure of proceeds 
of zakat can be sub-divided into three broad categories: 
a- Items usually known today as "social welfare" meant to improve the 
distribution of income and wealth (e. g. to the destitute and the needy and those 
burdened by indebtedness); 
b- Items meant for the propagation of Islam, including any expenditure 
required in the cause of Islam ; 
c- Items meant for administration expenditure in connection with col- 
lecting and distributing zakat. 
If these three categories are looked at, it- can be seen that the first cat- 
egory relates to an improvement in the distribution of income and wealth, which 
is one of the objectives of fiscal policy today. The second category seems to cover 
the promotion of harmony, economic cooperation, and consolidation of the Muslim 
ummah. In fact, the connotation of zakat in Islam is different from a "welfare" 
programme, and zakat is different from a "tax" as it is understood today. A tax 
in a modern society is an obligation of individuals and other entites towards the 
state, whereas zakat is an obligation of a Muslim not only to society and the state, 
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but also to Almighty Allah. Zakat, in other words, is not only a "contribution", but 
also a "due" or a "claim". Thus a person paying zakat is not doing a favour to the 
recipient or beneficiary of zakat, but is rather meeting a claim on himself". 
Other collections or taxes in the Islamic system are ushr (an agricultural 
tax), Mums (a tax at the rate of 20% imposed on what may be described as windfall 
income .. treasure-troves under the earth), ghanimah and fay (both obtained after 
a war in the cause of Islam). The distinction between ghanimah and fay is that 
the former is obtained by force, whereas the latter are items left over by enemies 
voluntarily. In the case of zakat which is levied on the surplus of normally hard- 
earned income, the rate is 2.5%. The rate of tax on agricultural income is 5 to 
10%, depending on whether it is an irrigated or non-irrigated farm. Then the rate 
is as high as twenty percent in case of treasure-troves, minerals, ghanimah or fay. 
Thus, a conceptual foundation of the principle of taxation in Islamic fiscal policies 
emerges clearly. 
It is clear that zakat works in an Islamic state as a means of providing 
social security, as a method of redistribution of income and wealth and as a remedy 
against the concentration of wealth in a smaller section of the society. Thus a broad 
based system of zakat combined with other fiscal tools seems to provide the Islamic 
state with sufficient means to enable it to bear its responsibilities. An empirical 
study of the feasibility of such a system in the Muslim countries of today is necessary 
to provide empirical evidence and support for the theortical framework. 
5.4.3. Sources of Finance for Modern Islamic States 
Sources of finance available to contemporary Islamic states are numerous 
ranging from land taxes, income taxes, indirect taxes, public enterprise user charges, 
and fees. Taxation does not pose any difficulty from the religious viewpoint. Modern 
taxes applied on income, wealth and domestic transactions such as sales may not 
be inconsistent with the Islamic shariah. 
18 EI-Gousi, A. M., `Biba, Islamic Law, and Interest', unpublished Ph. D dissertation, Temple 
University, 1982, U. S. A. pp. 251-55. 
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Taxation could play an important role in the contemporary Muslim so- 
cieties. Chapra, for example, states that "in view of the goals of social justice and 
equitable distribution of income a progressive tax system seems to be perfectly in 
harmony with the goals of Islam"". It is agreed that taxation may achieve the 
following goals: 
(1) Curtailing unnecessary consumption; this enhances resources avail- 
able for capital formation and reduces consumption of some goods which are harm- 
ful to health, or domestic industries or the habits and way of life in an Islamic 
society. 
(2) Reallocating resources from investments that have little beneficial 
effect upon development to those of greater benefit for growth. Cooperation taxes 
could play such a role; those investing in sectors needed by the nation could be 
subject to low taxes. Also, resources may be directed to poor regions by means of 
tax incentives. 
(3) Altering economic behaviour by creating incentives to save, to enter 
the market sector, to utilize resources, and to encourage private capital formation. 
(4) Stabilizing the economy by reducing aggregate demand in times of 
inflation. 
Taxation is not always without some adverse effects. If taxes go beyond 
a certain limit, they become a_factor for economic retardation rather than growth. 
The tax structure in the case of any country must meet equity, economic efficiency, 
revenue and administrative criteria. 
The economic structure in many Islamic countries poses some problems 
for the tax structure; such as the predominance of agriculture which may necessitate 
land taxes. It is well known that Japan relied on land tax for its development in 
1780. Designing a broad-based tax on the line of kheraj may be a break-through for 
countries endowed with fertile land resources. 
's Chapra, M. U., The Islamic Welfare State and its Role in the Economy, The Islamic Foun- 
dation, Leicester, 1979, p. 23. 
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Other problems are related to methods of assessment where presumptive 
methods are used when income taxes are applied in the absence of proper accounts. 
Such methods in many cases contradict the equity criterion, and in many cases, the 
economic criterion as well. Such methods encourage corruption and also discour- 
age the wide adoption of book-keeping especially where corruption prevails. Also 
departures from equity arise when personal income taxes effectively reach wage- 
income receivers compared to its inefficiency to reach business income and incomes 
generated from capital sources17. The evasion rate is found to be very high in many 
developing countries. It was found that one-third of the population of western 
Nigeria evades taxes. This may be reduced in an Islamic state by emphasising the 
holiness of the levies, rationalizing expenditure programmes, proper design of levies, 
and efficient administration of the imposed levies. 
The question we are raising is about the priorities to be attached to the 
various roles which the Islamic state is expected to perform and where savings can 
be made. It is in this specific area that the Islamic states have failed most. They 
tend to emphasise defence and this forms a substantial part of the expenditure of 
the Islamic countries at present. Although it may be possible to save a substantial 
amount through elimination of waste and corruption, it needs to be seen how much 
can be saved in this area. In other words what needs to be done is to coordinate all 
these factors together and to see really how much can be achieved. It is necessary 
to set up priorities for the functions of the Islamic state and then act according to 
these priorities. It is also necessary to make adjustment to the system and in the 
expenditure pattern so as to be able to avoid the inflationary pressures that the 
system might otherwise generate. 
To sum up, sources of finance in an Islamic state must be designed such 
that they will not impede economic growth. They should generate maximum rev- 
enue with least costs in administration and minimum adverse effects on incentives 
to work, to save and to invest. 
11 Salama, A. A. op. cit. pp. 112-113. 
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5.5. Monetary Policy and Central Banking 
The interest rate, being an important tool for implementing a monetary 
policy in contemporary western economies, led some Muslim economists to believe 
that a monetary policy in an Islamic economy will have a relatively limited role. 
Others believe that a monetary policy can be formulated, in the absence of an 
interest rate, which can play an important role in achieving different objectives. This 
can be done if the central bank of a Muslim country adopts means like changing the 
reserve ratio and directing the control of the supply of credit. These are also used 
in monetary policy today. Therefore, no discussion of central banking is complete 
without a reference to a monetary policy. It is the monetary policy formulated 
by the central bank which provides the basic framework for banking and financial 
operations in a country. 
It is obvious that monetary policy would have to play an important role 
to help realise the objectives of Islam. A question can be raised regarding the 
mechanism for equating the supply of money with its demand in the absence of 
interest as a regulator. 
The demand for money in an Islamic economy would arise from the trans- 
actions and precautionary needs, which are determined largely by the level of money 
income and its distribution. The speculative demand for money is essentially trig- 
gered by interest rate fluctuations in the capitalist economies. The abolition of 
interest and the levy of zakat would not only tend to minimise the speculative de- 
mand for money and reduce the "locking-in" effect of interest rates but also impart 
greater stability to the total demand for money. 
Therefore, liquidity preference arising from the speculative motive should 
be insignificant in an Islamic economy. The demand for funds for equity-oriented 
investments would constitute a part of the total transactions demand and would 
depend on economic conditions and the expected rate of profit which will not be 
predetermined. Since expectations about rates of profit, unlike those about the rate 
of interest, do not fluctuate daily or weekly, the aggregate demand for transactions 
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needs would tend to be relatively more stable. It will be determined primarily by 
the value of aggregate output, with appropriate weight given to the distribution 
of income, which will improve gradually in an Islamic economy depending on the 
extent of the government's commitment to this goal and the policies it adopts for 
this purpose18. 
Hence the variable in terms of which monetary policy should be formu- 
lated in an Islamic economy is the stock of money rather than the level of interest 
rates. The Islamic central bank should gear its monetary policy to the generation 
of a growth in money supply which is adequate to finance the potential growth in 
output over the medium and long-term within the framework of stable prices and 
the other socio-economic goals of Islam. 
While the above approach does recognise the importance of regulating 
the growth of money supply in the suceessful management of the economy, it does 
not necessarily imply a simple monetarist model. There is no presumption that 
market forces left to themselves will be able to generate sustained non-inflationary 
growth, remove unemployment, reduce external imbalances and help realise the 
other desired goals if the growth in money supply is appropriately regulated. 
We will be examining the main role of monetary policy and of central 
banking in an Islamic system. Their chief role would be to take the lead in evolv- 
ing financial institutions, instruments and yield structures that facilitate efficient 
mobilization of savings and allocation of resources consistent with the economic de- 
velopment objectives of the Islamic economy. A. R. Hamdi argues that the central 
banks can also help by adopting selective monetary policies which encourage capi- 
tal accumulation through Islamic banks (which could be directly related to project 
finance) by exempting investment deposits of Islamic banks from credit ceiling re- 
strictions10. In the Sudan for example, all Islamic banks have stopped accepting 
'" Chapra, M. U., Towards a Just Monetary System, The Islamic Foundation, Leicester, 1985, 
pp. 187-189. 
19 Hamdi, A. R., Trade and Project Finance, It's Strengths 8 Weakensses, Paper presented at 
the Islamic Banking Meeting on "Into the 1990's with Islamic Banking Seminar", June 1988, 
London, p. 12. 
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investment deposits since 1985 because of the credit restrictions. This is a pity as 
the Islamic banks were proving to be very successful as resource mobilisation agents. 
A similar case developed in Egypt where an estimated $12 billion of savings went 
to Islamic investment companies operating outside central bank jurisdiction rather 
than established Islamic banks because they were free to invest those funds without 
credit restrictions (there are also other reasons). 
It appears then that governments and central banks can make it feasible 
for Islamic banks to play an important role in project and development finance in the 
coming years. Furthermore, the central bank, in particular, must initiate and foster 
the development of primary, secondary and money markets. The positive relation- 
ship between expansion of financial markets and financial development on the one 
hand and between financial development and economic development on the other 
necessitates an active participation by the monetary authorities in the evolving fi- 
nancial infrastructure of the economy. For example, monetization of transactions in 
rural area requires a wider geographical and functional penetration by the banking 
system. Through the provision of facilities and the expansion of financial. markets 
the central bank can both lower the cost and increase the availability of credit in the 
economy. Moreover, monetary authorities, through the central bank, can take steps 
to foster competition between organized and unorganized markets on the basis of 
profit-sharing and the rate of return in order to enhance the process of integration. 
Extension and enforcement of Islamic regulations concerning contracts 
and property rights in financial and capital markets is needed in order to reduce 
uncertainties arising from the present structure of rights that tend to discourage pri- 
vate investments. Such enforcement tends to encourage lending of funds on the basis 
of viability and profitability of investment projects rather than the solvency, cred- 
itworthiness, or collateral strength of entrepreneurs. The reduction of uncertainty 
in the structure of contracts and property rights is desirable because prohibition 
of interest by itself creates a moral hazard embedded in principal-agent contracts; 
without a stronger legal framework, such contracts will involve an increase in the 
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cost of monitoring investments and reduction in overall investment itself". In fact, 
one may suggest that the risk in adoption of an Islamic financial system, particu- 
larly in the initial stages, is not lower savings but lower investments, if the Islamic 
rules regarding contracts and property rights are not enforced. 
The enforcement of Islamic rules regarding contracts and property rights 
would increase public confidence in capital markets, financial institutions, and in 
the process of financial intermediation. This is on the contrary to what is prevailing 
in the developing economies where we found that some of the regulatory measures 
in less developed capital markets unnecessarily constrain the scope of the market 
and also reduce its efficiency. In the Islamic financial system there is no doubt that 
the increase in efficiency will in turn increase profits and a higher rate of return to 
savers leading to a virtuous circle and economic development. 
Mobilization and financialization of personal savings and diversification 
of asset preferences of households will require a more variegated pattern of financial 
assets than that which exists in many Muslim countries today. It should be a 
function of monetary authorities, through the central bank, to initiate and evolve 
new financial institutions and instruments which could satisfy and further stimulate 
demand for assets in the economy. These should also expose investment and savings 
to the price mechanism via financial intermediation and thus increase the overall 
efficiency of the saving-investment process. 
Performance of the above functions by monetary authorities and the cen- 
tral bank should stress the need for policies to maintain stability in the value of 
currency. It may be argued that in the current world-wide inflationary climate in 
most Muslim countries the Islamic imperative of socio-economic justice could be 
satisfied by indexation, or monetary correction, of all incomes and monetary assets. 
211 Iqbal, Z. & Mirakhor, A., op. cit. p. 7. 
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Proper monetary correction would, however, require the indexation not 
of income or monetary assets but of purchasing power, which is determined by the 
consumption and investment pattern of individuals". This position was clearly 
stated by Ibn al Qayyim, an early Muslim jurist, who suggested that currencies 
were units of accounts whose value "must remain stable without going up or down 
because if they do like other objects there will be no prices with which to judge 
other objects". Hence, Muslim writers see monetary policy as playing an active 
role, not only in maintaining the stable value of the currency, but also in promoting 
full employment and growth. These objectives should be fostered by monetary and 
credit policies conducted by the central bank. 
Much of the effectiveness of monetary policy in an Islamic economy will 
depend on which scheme for Islamic banking is adopted. Under a fractional reserve 
system monetary policy would operate as under a conventional banking system. 
Such a model, it is argued by A. Mirakhor, would be more costly to maintain or to 
increase the existing stock of real balances as a result of changes in money supply 
arising from deposit creation or from substituting deposit and cash". In the model 
requiring a 100% reserve, the effectiveness of monetary policy would be weakened, as 
the central bank would be unable to alter the reserve requirements. To that extent, 
stabilization targets would have to be realized through control of the monetary base 
rather than credit. 
To achieve its policy objectives, the central bank has to have control 
over the supply of high-powered money, the reserve ratios on the different types 
of liabilities, and the maximum amounts of assets which the banks can allocate to 
their profit-sharing activities. A further opportunity for enhancement of the control 
over the banking system is available to the central bank through its purchases of 
equity shares of banks and other financial intermediaries. 
31 Chapra, M. U., 'Money and Banking in an Islamic Economy' in Monetary and and Fiscal Pol- 
icy of Islam, Ariff, M., (ed), International Centre for Research in Islamic Economics, Jeddah, 
1982, p. 148. 
32 Mirakhor, A., Some Theoretical Aspects of an Islamic Financial System, Paper presented at 
a Conference on Islamic Banking lield in Iran, June 1986, Iran, pp. 40-42. 
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If the central bank decides to purchase these shares, it can persuade their 
owners to supply them either at the market rate or it may offer a higher rate. These 
shareholders will receive the prices of their shares in cash from the central bank. 
Owing to the habits of the people that they generally deposit their capital in banks 
this cash will ultimately reach the banks. Hence a process of expansion in the supply 
of capital and its commercial use will ensure the surplus cash in their custody. If 
there is a demand for capital in the business community, the supply of capital can 
rise in the economy, due to the funds paid to the shareholder by the central bank 
when purchasing their commerical share'. The purchase of shares is an instrument 
for expansion in the supply of capital, because this has resulted in a supply of new 
cash to the banks. 
In the performance of its regulatory supervisory, and control functions, 
as well as a lender of last resort, the central bank can continue to exert a substantial 
influence on the financial system. Moreover, opportunities will exist for the central 
bank to invest directly in the real sector on a profit-sharing basis, as well as to 
take equity positions in joint ventures along with other banks. The ability to buy 
and sell securities in the financial market, that is open-market operations, will still 
be available to the central bank as long as these securities do not have par value 
features and non-zero coupon rate. 
Additionally, a suggestion has been made that the central bank can reg- 
ulate profit-sharing ratios between the banks and borrowers on the one hand, and 
the banks and depositors on the other. Variations in these ratios will change the 
rates of return and could have the same impact as interest rates on the overall and 
sectoral flows of financial resources. There is, however, a debate on whether such a 
policy is vaild, since it represents a limitation on the freedom of contract and may 
be inequitable. The issue of inequity would arise if the profit-sharing rules imposed 
by the central bank required, say a lower return from profits than the share in losses. 
23 Siddiqi, M. N., Banking Without Interest, Islamic Publications ltd, Lahore, Pakistan, 1980, 
p. 122. 
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5.6. Conclusions 
The establishment of an economic system based on Islamic values requires 
fundamental changes in the operations of financial institutions. Fiscal and monetary 
policy are the most important. The objectives of both policies are similar and 
overlapping, aiming mainly at the promotion of an adequate economic growth as 
well as an attainment of greater economic stability, i. e. stability of the general price 
level as well as full employment. 
The use of profit-sharing arrangements in place of interest rates makes 
commercial banks in an Islamic economy more akin to investment banks. Depositors 
receive a share of the profits made by the bank, rather than a predetermined rate 
of interest, and banks in turn receive a rate of return based on profits made by 
the borrower. Of course, this transformation requires the creation of a variety of 
financial institutions and instruments that have the profit-sharing characteristics, 
and some other changes in the system that have been analysed in this chapter. 
The stock market will play a pivotal role in the participative financing. 
The extension of its functions at a much broader level will be helpful in operational- 
izing the new system. However, there is a need to reform the nature of contracts 
currently traded, especially the feature of bonds and preferred stock pertaining to 
rate of return which do not conform to the requirement of shariah. 
Fiscal policy will be an important economic device in an Islamic state. 
past fiscal tools during the Islamic civilization were taxes on land kheraj, zakat as 
well as other sources of revenue, social welfare payment and government expenditure 
policies. Such tools must be used and they may be enhanced with taxes optimally 
designed to achieve the objectives outlined for fiscal policy in an Islamic state. 
Sources of finance in an Islamic state must be designed such that they do not 
impede economic growth. They should generate maximum revenue with least costs 
in administration and minimum adverse effects on incentives to work, to save and 
to invest. An equitable distribution of income and wealth is a goal an Islamic state 
must try to achieve using various distributive measures allowed by Islam. In very 
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broad terms, the area of fiscal policy in an Islamic state needs further exploration 
and effort in order to work out a detailed fiscal policy. 
The abolition of interest rates, which is an important tool for implement- 
ing a monetary policy in contemporary economies, has led some Islamic economists 
to believe that a monetary policy in an Islamic economy will have a limited role, 
while others believe that a monetary policy can be implemented as well through 
other means, such as changing the commercial banks' reserve ratios and directing 
the controls of the supply of credit. 
The central bank should play a vital role (through monetary policy) in 
the Islamic banking system, because only through its conscientious and creative 
effort can the Islamic money and banking system achieve its self- act ualisation. No 
doubt, Islamic banking is a new field and until sufficient experience is gained a 
reasonably cautious policy should be followed. The policy framework evolved for 
the control and supervision of Islamic banks should be kept under continuous review 
and changes in policies made as and when considered necessary. Like all central 
banks, the Islamic central bank should be responsible for the issue of currency and, 
in coordination with the government, for its internal and external stability. 
In conclusion, policyrnakers in Islamic countries face a number of diffi- 
cult problems as they move towards transforming their economies to accord with 
religious principles. There are many issues that are as yet unresolved. These in- 
clude, among others, the respective roles of montary and fiscal policies, exchange 
rate policies, and the effects of changes in the system on savings and investment, 
and thereby on growth and development. 
As to how an Islamic financial system will look like when it achieves all 
the objectives, suffice it to say that this should not be judged from the current 
practices of Islamic banking in certain countries. The fact still remains that much 
progress has been achieved already in implementing Islamic values in the economic 
sphere. This is a tribute to both scholars and policyrnakers. However, economists 
still have much to contribute on the directions of the new system. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE MAIN OBSTACLES TO ISLAMIC BANKING 
AND SOME POSSIBLE REMEDIES 
Introduction 
There has been a noticeable trend in recent years towards establishing Islamic 
banks and other Muslim financial institutions in Islamic and even non-Islamic coun- 
tries. These institutions have been carrying out their business activities on the basis 
of a profit and loss sharing system. Such a tremendous development is naturally 
accompanied by a number of problems. The Islamic banking movement should not 
however loose its momentum. The proper diagnosis of these problems is the first 
step towards ensuring this does not happen again. 
Furthermore, adherence to shariah by Islamic banks in the performance of their 
operations can give them more credibility with the Muslim masses, and strength in 
dealing with governments and central banks. 
In spite of the problems faced by Islamic banks and the difficult environment in 
which they work, they operate and have managed to make steady, and in certain 
cases, very fast progress. This is not only reflected in the increasing number of 
Islamic banks and financial institutions, but also by the size of their portfolios. 
The assets they manage amount to more than $12 billion. This relatively fast 
development was not so much due to the religious sentiment attached to these 
institutions as to the encouraging nature and results of their financial activities. 
This is in addition to the fact that they are still young and their roots, from 
the point of view of experience, do not as yet strike deep in the soil of economic 
and business practices. This situation is bound to restrict their role in medium and 
long term financing, which is commonly associated in the minds of the public with 
development. 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the main obstacles facing Islamic banks 
and the possible remedies. The chapter is divided into ten sections. First, reference 
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will be made to the recent trend towards establishing Islamic banks and the task 
and the burden confronting the management of Islamic banks will be highlighted. 
Second, we will focus on the worries of Islamic banks concerning long term financ- 
ing and follow up of projects. Third, we will be looking at the issues concerning 
the profitable placement of surplus liquid funds which some of the Islamic banks, 
particularly in the Gulf area are facing. Fourth, the moral hazard question and the 
risk of fraud will be assessed. This is essential because the successful functioning 
of profit and loss sharing will depend vitally on the existence of a high degree of 
business morality. Fifth, the central bank regulation with regard to monetary re- 
serves and liquidity requirements will be discussed. Sixth, the planning problems, 
particularly in developing countries, will be examined especially where government 
policies cannot be predicted. Seventh, we will examine the question of equity fi- 
nancing which is a highly complex and difficult operation in the third world and 
will suggest solutions to overcome some of the problems. Eighth, we shall look at 
the problem of delay in payment and insolvency which an Islamic banks faces and 
suggest ways to deal with cases of delay in payment. Ninth, Islamic banks in the 
West and the problems that face them will be examined. Finally some conclusions 
will be drawn. In each section these problems will be analysed and some possible 
solutions will also be suggested *. 
6.1. Extra Management Burdens 
It is generally agreed that management and not capital is the critical factor in 
the success or failure of projects. Some studies put this factor as responsible for 
the failure of nine out of every ten new projects in the advanced countries. In the 
underdeveloped world it is responsible for less failures only because there are other 
compelling elements like the lack of infrastructure. If banks with their superior 
resources could provide managerial and technical assistance (together with finance) 
the rate of project failure would definitely decrease. The banks (and depositors) 
would benefit, so would the clients and ultimately the society. 
The views expressed in this chapter and elsewhere in the thesis are entirely mine and should 
not be taken to represent any official views or policies of any organisation. The examples 
mentioned reflect my personal experience in this field. 
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There are however, two main tasks confronting the Islamic banks' management: 
(First) the protection against "too optimistic" expectations and resulting dam- 
ages in the banks' proceeds from profit-sharing financing, 
(Second) the opening up of new, innovative opportunities for highly profitable 
profit-sharing engagements. 
The traditional commercial bank often can standardize its credit investigations 
and confine itself to an examination of the securities for credit. But an Islamic bank 
must make an additional examination of the profit calculations, since its remunera- 
tion is not fixed and independent of the entrepreunerial profits but depend on them 
directly. The problem with these examinations is not so much one of calculation 
techniques, but one of well-founded knowledge in the huge variety of those mar- 
kets wherein the fund demanding entrepreneurs intend a future engagement after 
realizing their investment projects'. 
The prerequisite for meaningful examination of market chances is a very compre- 
hensive entrepreneurial quality in the bank management. The whole management 
of a general commercial Islamic bank should have qualities of a super entrepreneur 
acting in a great and ever changing number of markets. It seems however, to be a 
very obvious assumption that the Islamic banks will, sooner or later, specialize in 
the financing of investment projects in specified regions and/or in specified branches 
of the economy. 
This specialization probably will have some far reaching consequences. In the 
first instance) the banks may accumulate intimate knowledge of some markets in 
which they have concentrated. This may enable the banks to protect themselves 
more efficiently against "too optimistic" entrepreneurial calculations in these areas, 
although a perfect protection seems to be impossible. These factors have put the 
Islamic banks at a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the interest-based banks in 
Nienhaus, V., Why Islamic Banks Need Top Management: Basic Problems of Islamic Banking 
in a Capitalistic World and Some Implications, Paper presented at the First Advanced Course 
on Islamic Banks of the International Institute of Islamic Banking and Economics, Cairo, 
August 1981, P. 8. 
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that the Islamic banks have to supervise and in some cases manage the operation of 
the project that they are financing. This problem is serious in developing countries 
where the business enterprises, generally, do not maintain proper accounts or keep 
different sets of accounts for different purposes'. 
In Pakistan, where the Islamization of banking is taking place most of the 
enterprises do not maintain proper sets of accounts, or they maintain multiple sets 
of accounts to suit their various designs. Even the accounts of the firms in the 
corporate sector which are audited by chartered accountants, often fail to reveal 
their true working results because of the widespread malpractice of deflating profit, 
inflating losses and showing fictitious expenses. A. Darwish has recently revealed 
that the Islamic investment companies in Egypt have been announcing remarkable 
profits, at times amounting to a 20% return on investment. This raised fears that 
the figures were being inflated to attract new deposits, and that payments were 
being made from the new funds so attracted'. Some of the typical manipulations 
resorted to by entrepreneurs are: 
(1) Overvaluation of opening inventory and (2) overvaluation of assets to inflate 
depreciation in order to reduce or eliminate the element of profit. In case of lease or 
hire purchase a separate account will have to be opened for each article financed by 
a bank as a separate amortization plan will be devised for each article depending 
on its useful life and other variable factors. Each existing entry shall have to be 
adjusted and marked off separately. 
The presence of such malpractices will raise the cost of Islamic banking. Unless 
such fool-proof devices are developed that do not entail these extra costs for Is- 
lamic bankers, the growth of Islamic banking activities are likely to be constrained 
considerably. 
2 Khan, M. F., 'Islamic Banking as Practised Now in the World', in Money and Banking in 
Islam, Z. Ahmad et al (ed. ), Islamabad, 1983, pp. 271-72. 
3 Ghaffar, M. A., 'Interest Free Banking: Problems and Prospects', Journal of the Institute of 
Bankers in Pakistan, Karachi, March 1986, p. 33. 
Darwish, A.. 'Egypt Swoops on Islamic Banking', The Independent Neu)paper, London, 11 
November 1988, p. 13. 
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What the management of the Islamic Banks have to do now is decide how to 
harmonise the accounting policies as well as the reporting that all Islamic banks 
should follow so that not only the public at large will understand what they are 
doing but also, and more importantly the regulators, depositors and shareholders. 
It is not going to be an easy task. The European Community took years to come up 
with a directive for the banking community to follow and comply with'. It is only 
now that all the European banks are following this standardised system of reporting. 
Now the Islamic banks need to think about operating under a standardised system. 
The question can be raised here of the need for harmonisation of financial re- 
porting in Islamic banks. No doubt, the management of Islamic banks have a much 
greater responsibility because of the depositors. Those depositors have up to now, 
even if they were not depositing their funds with an Islamic bank, held onto them 
because they felt that the system around them was not really complying with their 
own beliefs, or faith. They are now very keen about putting their funds in Islamic 
banks. More and more it will be found that depositors are becoming increasingly 
sophisticated and will need to know what is happening with their funds. They will 
request banks to give more information about the projects in which their funds are 
used. Islamic banks will be required to give more information when they advertise 
new projects, and wish to receive funds. 
I 
Therefore) auditors of Islamic banks may soon also be requested to issue special 
reports to the depositors confirming that the profit distribution was prepared in 
accordance with the contractual terms and that the profit of a specific project is 
fairly stated. At the moment one of the methods of distribution is that the board 
of directors of the Islamic banks decides the percentage to be paid to the various 
types of depositors. As depositors become more sophisticated they will want to 
know if the distribution by the board is correct and if there are any problems with 
the management of the bank. 
Badawi, S. 9 'Accounting Policies & Procedures', in Islamic Banking & Finance, Butterworths Editorial Staff, Butterworth, London, 1986, p. 98. 
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6.2. Long Term Financing and Follow up of Projects 
Naturally, as investments under some economic environments arc expected to 
suffer to a more or less equal extent from the risks that affect the major investments 
in that environment, Islamic banks are directly and more severely hit by such risks 
which emanate from a change of economic policies by the government. This is not 
only because the nature of their finances leads them to direct involvement in the 
concerned projects, but also because of the nature of their finance. 
The Islamic bank usually takes the necessary steps to ensure that all factors 
essential for the successful implementation of the project are reasonably secured. 
However quite frequently, in countries with inherent economic difficulties, compli- 
cations crop up which increase the bank's involvement in the project technically, 
administratively, and financially. Such involvement sometimes compels a change in 
the mode of finance together with complex legal problems'. 
It is practically impossible to start executing all elements of the project at the 
same time. Here a certain degree of importance of coordination is very relevant. For 
example the devaluation of the Sudanese pound made it almost impossible for some 
projects, which were financed on a musharakah basis, to pay off the instalments due 
to foreign suppliers of the machinery. This delayed and reduced the level of income 
due to the bank and prolonged the period of repayment of the cost of the machines. 
The case might have been quite different with a traditional bank. It might have 
delayed payment, but not necessarily given a low rate of return. 
Unlike traditional banks, the anxieties of Islamic banks start after they give out 
funds for investments. The Islamic bank has to follow up the projects to which 
finance is provided to see that it has been spent in the proper way and that the 
project is well managed. This introduces the need for a very strong follow-up 
department. Its members should be well qualified to serve and deal with and advise 
different types of people and businesses. The follow-up does not only ensure efficient 
Mudawi, A. Y., 'The Placing of Medium and Long Term Finance by Islamic Financial Insti- 
tutions', in Islamic Banking V Finance, Butterworths Editorial Staff, Butterworths, London, 
1986, pp. 128-136. 
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utilization of finance and guarantees a sizeable return on the investment, but also 
looks after the efficient performance of the concerned business. The Faisal Islamic 
Bank of Sudan has unique experience in this area. At the start of its operations, 
the bank- used to provide working capital to certain industries in the form of cash 
without having supervision over the performance of the relevant factory. The rate 
of return was quite low. It was about 5 to 6%. The bank instituted the practice of 
follow-up and started sending out their staff to supervise the projects, to consult 
with the factory mangement on problems of purchasing the raw materials at the 
right time, providing proper storage for both raw material and the finished product, 
as well as discussing problems of marketing the products. The result was quite 
rewarding. The return has risen to between 15 and 18%, whereas the expenditure 
on supervision was only 1.5%'. 
Now since the initial viability has been established Islamic banking has really 
come of age. Its need is to come out of the safe pastures of "soft investment" and 
in socially desirable long-term projects. 
The financing of long term projects by Islamic banks has certain pre-requisites 
not required by interest-based banks. The Islamic banks will have to identify 
projects, carry out technical feasibility studies, estimate expected streams of profits 
and only then they shall be able to invest in a project. Moreover, they will have to 
develop a long term investment strategy. The interest-based banks usually are not 
concerned with macro-economic effects of their financing operations. The Islamic 
banks are expected to show more social responsibility in this regard by ensuring 
socially productive use of their resources. 
6.3. Profitable Placement of Surplus Liquid Funds 
A problem which some of the Islamic banks are facing, particularly those in the 
Gulf area, is the profitable disposal of surplus liquid funds. This problem results 
from the fact that the construction boom, in which some of the Islamic banks 
participated through murabaha operations and realized "quick" profits, is over, and 
Mudawi, A. Y., 'Islamic Banks Problems and Prospects', Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan Pub- 
lication, English Series, Khartoum, 1984 , pp. 7-8. 
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there are no more avenues for productive investment in the economy. The absence of 
any secondary markets for investment makes it difficult for the Islamic banks to take 
up any sizeable exposure in investments in the medium to long-term because the 
resource base of these banks is primarily short-term. The growth in the resources 
of Islamic banks and the reduction in the demand for credit due to recession in the 
Gulf region have been identified as the main reasons for excess liquidity problems 
in the Islamic banks'. 
One aspect which has to be kept in mind in discussing this problem is that 
most of the Islamic banks with surplus funds are located in the Gulf countries. 
These institutions would like to invest their funds in their own currencies, such as 
Kuwaiti or Bahraini dinars or UAE dirhams ect. Most of the other Muslim countries 
where Islamic banks exist would like to have their financing designated in other 
major currencies, mainly in U. S. dollars or the Islamic dinars (SDR). Furthermore, 
deposits in U. S dollars or Islamic dinars, mean an exchange conversion. Most of 
these countries like Sudan for example have exchange controls. Efforts would have 
to be made to either arrange denomination of investments in the currencies of the 
Islamic banks or to persuade the Islamic banks to denominate their transactions in 
U. S. dollars or Islamic dinars (SDR)9. 
The major problem facing Islamic banks concerning the above subject is the 
absence of a call money market (or a similiar arrangement) to deal with overnight 
loans, day loans, and loans of very short maturity. In such cases, it is not possible 
to have any profit sharing arrangement because of the difficulty of determining 
profit for such short periods. Definitely there will be conflict of interest between 
the borrower who would be happy to borrow an interest-free amount with a small 
service charge, and the lender, particularly the institutional lender, who would be 
reluctant to lend money, even for a very short period of maturity, to a borrower who 
he knows will profit from this loan even though it is difficult to determine the extent 
8 Ahmed, A., Development and Problems of Islamic Banks, Islamic Research and Training 
Institute, Islamic Development Bank, 1987, Jeddah, p. 65. 
9 Islamic Development Bank, Problem of Investment of Liquid Funds of the Islamic Banks, 
Working Paper for Consultative Meeting of Eminent Bankers, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, February 
1984, p. 9. 
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of the profit". No doubt, there is a short term surplus. We are of the opinion that 
the implementation of this type of arrangement would encounter some difficulties as 
Islamic banks are few and scattered. Furthermore, there is the currency risk factor. 
While institutions can usually cope with currency risk for the longer term, the costs 
and currency risk for short-term movement of funds may be a restraining factor. 
Therefore the major challenge has not been the short age of funds, but rather 
the difficulty in identifying sound financing opportunities. The supply side is less 
critical than demand, as there has been a notable lack of demand for virtually all 
of the facilities which the Islamic Development Bank has to offer". 
To overcome this problem the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) in 1980 intro- 
duced an Investment Deposit Scheme whose main purpose was to raise the resources 
of the Bank and to offer an investment scheme to attract prospective investors and 
provide them with reasonable returns. The proceeds of the investment deposit 
scheme are invested in foreign trade financing which is short term by its very na- 
ture. 
Two schemes were drawn up in 1987 to augment the funds of the IDB, the Is- 
lamic Bank's Portfolio and IDB Unit Trust. The first was immediately implemented, 
with a considerable degree of success, while the second is undergoing further refine- 
ment , as the 
details are crucial for the scheme's successful launch. Under the Islamic 
Bank's Portfolio scheme the leading Islamic commercial banks were invited to sub- 
scribe to a fund which was to be administered by the IDB. It was designed to be 
used for export and import finance of trade amongst Islamic countries, and between 
Islamic countries and the rest of the world. 
Chapra, M. U., 'Money and Banking in an Islamic Economy', in Monetary and Fiscal Eco- 
nomics of Islam, Ariff, M. (ed. ), International Centre for Research in Islamic Economics, 
Jeddah, 1982, pp. 158-159. 
Wilson, R., Islamic Development Assistance, Paper presented at the Project Planning Centre, 
University of Bradford, October 1988, pp. 20-21. 
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6.4. Moral Hazard and the Risk of Fraud 
The risk of fraud, which is especially worrisome to the regulators, seems to have 
two sources. One is the possibility of underreporting of profits earned by the firm via 
the maintenance of two sets of books which is in turn motivated by tax-avoidance. 
The other source of risk of fraud is the perception that since in risk-return sharing 
arrangements the banks will have to carry the burden of potential financial losses 
there is an element of moral hazard involved in these transactionS12. 
However, in the traditional banking system the bank need not have an interest 
in the income of the borrower beyond that necessary for the self- amortiz at ion of 
the loan. But in the Islamic banking system the determination of the exact amount 
of profit earned by the mudarib would be necessary to calculate the banks share. 
The Islamic bank would therefore face a dual risk: (a) the moral risk which arises 
from the mudarib declaring a loss, or a profit lower than the actual, because of 
lack of honesty and (b) the business risk which arises from the behaviour of market 
forces being different from that expected. The question arises here as to the extent 
possible for the Islamic banks to incur losses, and would these losses lead to a 
wholesale withdrawal of funds? 
Undoubtedly for the successful functioning of the profit and loss sharing system 
a high degree of business morality and acumen is vital. Unfortunately, the state 
of business ethics and moral fabric of the society leaves much to be desired at 
present in the Muslim countries. It therefore seems impractical to expect a smooth 
and successful transition to an interest free system in the immediate future. The 
interest bearing system is dominating the banking environment because of the moral 
hazards or dishonesty on the part of the borrowers. People are more concerned with 
their material rather than moral values and religion does not seem very important. 
One factor which may increase the degree of risk, according to an official of 
the Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan, is the lack of statistical data, such as profit dis- 
tribution ratios among the parties involved in various trade, industrial, or service 
Mirakhor, A., 'Analysis of Short-Term Asset Concentration in Islamic Banking, IMF Working 
Paper, Washington, October 1987, p. 10. 
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investment ventures. The contractual agreements do include a ratio for the distribu- 
tion of profit. However, as the parties lack experience in such investment schemes, 
one or the other may feel either deprived of a due share or taken advantage of, 
often after additional facts come to light. Consequently one of the parties may then 
resort to inequitable, illegal or immoral practices in order to retaliate". 
However, there are at least three possible ways in which this residual risk can 
be minimized. First is by implementing the Islamic law of contracts which requires 
that stipulations of agreements entered into must be faithfully observed, and which 
proposes well-defined retributive judicial measures to safeguard the terms of the 
contract. Second is the possibility of third-party insurance schemes with cost par- 
ticipation by the central bank and commercial banks. Third is maintenance of 
loss- compensating reserves by the banks. It must also be noted that hardly any 
bank can be expected to finance a risk return sharing project without sufficient 
information regarding the managerial ability, competence and character of the en- 
trepreneur. 
6.5. Central Bank Regulation 
Problems arise from the banking procedures applied by the central bank to 
all banks including Islamic banks with regard to monetary reserves and liquidity 
requirements. Although Islamic banks do not object to the principle of the central 
banks's control, they believe that because their operations are of a different nature, 
they should be exempted from liquidity control procedures". The argument is that 
these procedures are meant to protect depositors by preventing banks from over- 
using depositors' funds to the level of exposing depositors to the risk of not being 
able to withdraw their deposits because of the bank's poor liquidity. In Islamic 
banks, while this might apply to current deposits, it does not apply to investment 
deposit accounts. Investment deposits are kept for a specific period, from a few 
months to a few years, before which the depositor cannot withdraw his fund, either 
13 Abdeen, A. M. and Shook, D. N., The Saudi Financial System in the Context of Westem and 
Islamic Finance, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1984, p. 192. 
14 El-Ashker, A. A. F., The Islamic Business Enterprise, Croom Helm, Beckenham, Kent, 1987, 
p. 220. 
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partly or fully. Through scheduling these payments, the Islamic bank can plan its 
cash budget in a more reliable manner than the traditional bank. 
Furthermore, if we take into account the fact that the depositors (with respect 
to investment accounts) do not necessarily terminate their accounts at the end of 
the period, and many renew their accounts, we can conclude that the probability 
of fund withdrawal is even lower. 
I Moreover, Islamic banks do not accept interest, and hence they are in a dis- 
advantagous position vis-a-vis commerical banks which earn interest from these 
deposits. It is true that central banks in some Muslim countries do not pay interest 
on the compulsory reserves, but the reserve itself represents a restraint on Islamic 
banks and results in the decrease in funds which could have otherwise been used in 
viable ventures". 
It becomes necessary therefore, to institute a dialogue with officials in the central 
banks to convince them to design a separate and different set of rules and regulations 
for supervising Islamic banks. To do this, Islamic banks have to be quite well-versed 
in the operations of central banks in order to understand the targets which could be 
specified by the directives and rules issued from time to time by the central bank. 
Another important government organ which needs close attention from the Is- 
lamic bank is the taxation department. The department has, for instance, to un- 
derstand the similarities between the interest charged by traditional banks to their 
customers and the profits taken by Islamic banks from their partners. While the 
former is considered as a deductable cost by the taxation authorities, the latter is 
not. This practice if not corrected through the convincing approaches of Islamic 
banks could work to discriminate against the clients of the Islamic bank. 
Tax advisors have to look at questions on both the legal level and factual level 
to decide what pattern will work in each specific case". They have to look at 
Karatash, S. J. and El-Hennawi, M. S., Islamic Banks: A Challenge for Cooperation, Islamic 
Development Bank, Internal Paper, Jeddah, February 1984, p. 9. 
16 Carlson, T., 'Legal Issues & Negotiations', in Islamic Banking 8 Finance, Butterworths 
Editorial Staff, London, 1986, pp. 73-74. 
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the internal laws, not only of the country in which the borrower or the lender are 
incorporated, but the country in which the transaction takes place. Where does the 
transaction take place? Is it where the goods are located? Is it where the goods are 
coming from? Where the goods are going to? The tax authorities have to consider 
the internal tax laws of every country the transaction touches. 
Another disadvantage which the client of an Islamic bank is exposed to, is that 
his actual taxable profits could easily be ascertained from the books of the Islamic 
banks. For equitable treatment the taxation authorities need to be convinced that 
since the practice of traditional banks could not in any way enable them access to 
the actual profits of the bank's customers they should treat the clients of Islamic 
banks on an equal footing and should not take advantage of any information they 
might get from the books of the Islamic bank. 
Since an Islamic bank gives special priority to the social well being of the people, 
it has to develop a research programme in various areas to identify projects which 
will help the bank to achieve its goals. One example, is to identify projects which 
serve those who have the skills but do not have the money to finance the projects 
and hence make use of their skills. The Islamic bank by so doing would demonstrate 
one of the most important principles of Islamic economics; i. e. reward arises only 
when there is a combination of labour and capital. In Islam capital should have no 
return unless it is combined with labour. It is the effort of humans and not money 
that should deserve reward. 
Research in such areas should look for projects which may be small and could 
be executed with simple means and small amounts of finance. The Faisal Islamic 
Bank of Sudan has a unique experience in this regard. The Bank has set up a 
special branch to serve artisans and small investors. This branch provides machine 
tools and raw materials on easy terms for artisans to enable them to utilize their 
skills. It finances genuine small businessmen who have the know-how but cannot 
obtain finance. 
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6.6. Planning Problems 
Planning for future policies is a problem for institutions in developing coun- 
tries, particularly when government policies cannot be predicted with any degree of 
certainty. This problem is not particular to Islamic banks, but is shared by other 
traditional financial institutions and businessess. In the absence of good knoweledge 
about the intentions and policies of the government, it will be very difficult if not 
impossible to set annual or bi-annual targets and subsequently it will be difficult to 
prepare programmes that may fulfil those targets with any degree of precision. 
Successful planning is largely a result of an accummulation of statistics and in- 
formation drawn from past experience and matched by adequate knowledge of the 
present environment with the intention of setting certain parameters to indicate the 
future course. In view of their short history Islamic banks are at a disadvantage 
when compared with traditional banks regarding the wealth of accummulated past 
experience. All the Islamic banks can do is to benefit from the experience of tra- 
ditional financial institutions both locally and internationally. They are born in an 
environment where the laws, institutions, training and attitudes are set to serve an 
economy based on the principles of interest. As such Islamic banks are caught in a 
situation where all odds are against them. 
An Islamic bank does not only set financial targets to meet within a certain time- 
frame but it is essential that these financial targets be matched with the appropriate 
projects which meet its investment criteria. The lack of appropriate projects from 
the financial, economic, social and Islamic points of view may hamper the execution 
of the bank's programme. 
Traditional banks on the other hand, can set financial targets which they may 
easily achieve, since they may not worry very much about the follow-up of the 
projects. The built in system of liens make their worries about disbursing their 
finance as well as recovering it less intense than it is with Islamic banks. 
The policies which are implemented by monetary authorities have a more direct 
bearing on the activities and planning of Islamic financial institutions- For instance 
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once there is a credit squeeze this may automatically lead to a halt of their financial 
activities. It could catch an Islamic bank in the middle of a project in which it is 
participating. In Sudan for example, efforts are made to explain to the monetary 
authorities the differences between the impact created by Islamic banks finance as 
opposed to that of traditional banks. Financing by Islamic banks is less prone to 
create the same inflationary pressures as compared to financing through traditional 
banks. 
Planning of future policies of an Islamic bank can prove to be more capable 
of supporting initiatives intended to restore balance of payments equilibrium. An 
Islamic bank, as a partner in an export or import operation can have the means 
and the knowledge to provide or withhold finance from operations according to their 
compatibility with the national policies and objectives. The Faisal Islamic Bank of 
Sudan has helped the economy in many other ways, most remarkably in assisting 
exports. Before Islamic banking the export sector was beset with problems and very 
unprofitable". The Bank entered this field and participated with entrepreneurs with 
full responsibility in case of loss. This encouraged many who would have otherwise 
found the conditions of riba banks too severe in view of the high risk and the need 
for guarantees. Within a few years the Bank has been financing more than half of 
the country's exports. Islamic banks in Sudan have created new exports and new 
markets, especially for sorghum and oil seeds. Fifty percent of the foreign exchange 
the banks earn are turned over to the central bank. As a result, the foreign exchange 
profile of the country has greatly improved. 
To sum up this section, the Islamic banks found themselves placed and co- 
existing in a situation dominated by a non-Islamic financial system as well as a sec- 
ular social and political establishment. They found themselves facing a formidable 
lack of information and experience necessary to help their research. Yet this was 
badly needed for their introduction to a barely receptive environment because of its 
deep seated non-Islamic economic laws and practices. Naturally they were greatly 
Mudawi, A. Y., 'Revealing the Truth Behind FIBS'? Arabia, The Islamic World Review, 
London, February 1985. 
143 
influenced by the economic situation in their respective countries. The scarcity of 
relevant studies and publications posed difficulties in their way to reach the ideal 
organizational set up and beset their planning efforts. Added to that was the defi- 
ciency in trained staff so essential for the success of any venture. 
6.7. Equity Financing 
Generally, it is well recognized that equity financing is a highly complex and 
difficult operation. This is borne out by the fact that other commercial banks or 
international development banks have generally fought shy of getting involved in 
this operation. Considering the element of risk, difficult nature of the investment, 
the long gestation period in receiving a return and problems of involvement in 
management, some of the international development banks for example have been 
specifically prohibited from undertaking equity financing. Alternatively, in view of 
its complexity, equity financing has been assigned to a special subsidiary like the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC). It is well known that the IFC has not been 
able to make adequate headway in this field and by far the bulk of its operations 
are in the field of loans. There is another significant feature. The IFC, whenever 
subscribing to equity, also makes available a loan to the enterprise. As a matter 
of fact the IFC is able to safegaurds its interest in the borrowing enterprises like a 
lender. It does not do so by influencing the management through the board, where 
generally its policy is not represented. 
As far as the Islamic Development Bank (as an example) is concerned, the 
situation provides a sharp contrast. The Articles of Agreement clearly rule out loans 
to an enterprise in whose equity the bank has participated except in special cases. In 
other words) the bank cannot use the leverage which the IFC has as a lender. There 
are several other factors taken into account. For example, the opportunities for 
equity financing are not as abundant in most Muslim countries with the exception 
of a few. This is for two reasons: First, some Muslim countries are in the initial 
stages of development. Sudan is a good example where exclusive concentration 
is on infrastrcture development rather than commercial activity allowing for equity 
financing. Secondly, in the case of some other countires, largely as a reaction to their 
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colonial past, there is a deep rooted suspicion of foreign capital and shareholders. In 
certain countries there are legal prohibitions against foreign shareholders whereas 
in others it is discouraged by conscious government policies. The reluctance to issue 
equity already leads to a marked shortage of securities. Thus in the case of Malaysia, 
for example, where the Kuala Lumpur market has a relatively large capitalisation, 
the annual turnover of shares is very low. This is a consequence of the close family 
control over share holdings exercised by the chinese business community"'. 
Needless to say, closed ownership of shares results not only in a restricted sup- 
ply of new securities but also in high gearing on the part of business enterprises. 
One consequence of this pattern of financing is both a high volatility in share prices 
and fluctuations in profits over time. While high gearing can generate high returns 
to equity it also leads to a high degree of variation in those returns. These char- 
acteristics of capital markets produce a highly speculative and uncertain trading 
atmosphere, both for foreign and local share holders. Again, in the case of most of 
the Muslim countries, the capital markets are underdevelped or non existent, and 
there is also the difficulty already idcntified of liquidifying or selling an equity stake. 
The Islamic Development Bank's (IDB) experience of equity investment has not 
been satisfactory, due to a number of reasons, which can be identified as follows": 
(a) difficulties in the setting up of industrial enterprises in member countries of 
the bank; 
(b) inadequacy of the necessary machinery in these countries to cope with the 
problems related to the completion of industrial projects and implementation delays; 
(c) escalation in relation to the originally envisaged cost; 
(d) lack of essential infrastructure necessary for the successful realisation of 
industrial projects; and 
18 Snowden, P. N., 'International Equity Investment in Less Developed Countries Stockmarkets: 
The Replacement for Bank Lending'?, National Westminster Bank-, Quarterly Review, London, 
February 1987, p. 35. 
Islamic Development Bank, eighth annual report, 1982-1983, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, p. 51. 
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Other general problems such as the lack of professional, technical and managerial 
expertise have also resulted in the unsatisfactory performance of various companies 
in member countries of the Bank. 
In addition, there has been in recent years, a substantial depreciation in the cur- 
rencies of various member countries of the IDB, vis-a-vis the Islamic dinar in which 
foreign exchange loans extended by the bank were normally designated. Charles 
Harvey argues that even equity finance is not perfectly suited to the fluctuating 
foreign exchange earnings of poor countries, since it is possible for foreign-owned 
company earnings to vary in the opposite direction; however, a great deal of foreign 
investment in these countries is in export industries, especially mineral extraction, 
so that variations are at least quite likely to be in the same direction 20 . Moreover, 
the enterprises in which the IDB has been involved, have usually faced the problems 
of under-utilisation of capacity. Within these enterprises and the national devel- 
opment finance institutions, it has also become apparent that their capability for 
arranging timely funding, for cash flow purposes, is limited. 
Due to these difficulties it is worth emphasising that actual disbursements of 
equity finance have often lagged considerably after approval is given, partly due to 
slow project implementation, but also because of lax accounting standards on the 
part of the businessess being supported and delays over auditing. Less than 60 per 
cent of the, equity financing approved by the IDB during its first decade of operations 
was actually disbursed. Furthermore the equity investment tends to be illiquid, 
Wilson has recently pointed out in his paper that IDB itself recognises the need for 
disinvestment and rolling over of equity, as well as the development of criteria for the 
follow-up and post-evaluation of equity projects. In reality though the IDB has a 
substantial equity portfolio on its books, it has no idea how many of the projects are 
fairing, and in most cases it has never been paid a dividend on its investment. Given 
this experience it is not surprising that the IDB is becoming increasingly reluctant 
to become invloved in new equity ventures, as it may ultimately have much of its 
20 Harvey, C., On Reducing the Risk in Foreign Finance for Both Parties, Institute of Develop- 
ment Studies, Discussion Paper, DP 167, November 1981, University of Sussex, p. 2. 
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capital tied up in doubtful projects which are basically not performing2l. 
'V_ Fur the above reasons, the general tendency among the Islamic banks at the 
beginning of their experiences has been found to be investing in the projects with 
quick returns. This is perhaps because the banks have to pay a sizable profit every 
year on their deposit and they cannot afford to have no profit for some time if they 
are competing with the interest-based banks. If this is true then this is not only 
reducing the efficiency of the Islamic banks in the long run vis-a-vis other banks but 
will also affect the growth in developing countries if there are no banks to finance 
such projects. 
Having said that, Islamic banks do have a moral responsibility towards these 
countries and they should continue participating in financing equity projects. An 
Islamic bank being aware of the magnitude of risk to which its finance is exposed, 
not only studies the project with utmost care to the finest details, but also closely 
follows up the execution and renders all the necessary advice and expert service to 
its partners. Since efficient management in most developing countries is a rare com- 
modity, Islamic bank clients found th is practice quite rewarding. The developmental 
nature of an Islamic bank means that it has to exert persistent and continuous ef- 
forts to improve and diversify its investment in order to achieve satisfactory results 
for the society, the shareholders, the depositors and the partners. 
Towards this objective a clear investment criteria should be laid down in regard 
with the minimum return acceptable to the bank and this should be reviewed from 
time to time. In laying down a criteria for a minium level of profitability and 
dividend instead of looking in terms of internal rate of return (IRR) an Islamic 
bank should instead or in addition look at future anticipated profitability and yield 
in terms of dividends". 
it should be the policy of an Islamic bank to revolve their investment where they 
can do so profitably. This is also important from a resource mobilisation point of 
11 Wilson, R., op. cit. pp. 23-24. 
,2 Islamic Development Bank, Placement of Liquid Funds of the Islamic Development Bank in 
Conformity with Shariah, Internal Paper, Jeddah, 1983, pp. 35-40. 
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view to some of them. Once an investment has reached a mature level and has been 
providing a satisfactory return in relation to the period of the bank's investment 
of funds they can consider selling the investment to generate funds not only to 
continue but to expand their investment activity. 
Due attention should be given to identification and selection of suitable en- 
terprises for equity investment. The temptation of getting involved with difficult 
projects should be avoided. Possibilities of participation in equity of profitable 
enterprises undergoing expansion should be pursued. Investment in expansion of 
equity capital base of "sick" companies should be looked at very carefully. Very 
often in these companies the future prospects may be projected in a very optimistic 
fashion and should be subjected to a careful scrutiny. Another factor which Islamic 
banks should take into account in selection of enterprises for equity investments is 
the presence of a technical partner in the project. They should take into account 
the complexity of the project and the level of expertise available within the country 
and the enterprise. 
6.8. Problem of Delay in Payment and Insolvency 
One problem which an Islamic bank faces is how to deal with cases of delay in 
payment. In the interest-based banks, it is easier to handle this problem as interest is 
accumulating and at times the rates are increased if the debt is not paid promptly. 
Since Islamic banks do not charge interest, delay in due payments may cause a 
number of problems for them. There are threemain elements which are germane to 
the possibility of defaults viz., the nature of the party to whom finance is provided, 
the purpose for which finance is provided and the type of supervision exercised by 
the bank on the end-use of funds. These elements are essentially the same for an 
Islamic bank and a traditional bank, and if sufficient care is not exercised in regard 
to these elements, defaults would arise irrespective of whether the bank concerned 
follows the traditional banking practices or the principles of Islamic banking". One 
way to solve this problem is to sell the collateral against which finance is provided 
33 Ahmed, Z., 'Some Misgivings about Islamic Free Banking', Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan 
Publication, English Series 7, Sudan, 1985, pp. 17-19. 
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by the Islamic bank. However, it may not solve the problem completely. The main 
problem is that it should be done in such a way that it should not resemble the 
interest payment charged by traditional commercial banks in similar circumstances. 
Hence, it is suggested that Islamic banks may impose some penalty on defaulters 
for delay in payment in accordance with the stipulations of agreement in any one 
of the following ways": 
(i) claiming part of the profit which customers might have made during the 
period of default. 
(ii) claiming the profit which the banks could have made if the held up funds 
were returned promptly. 
It seems that the second course of action is more reasonable for an Islamic bank. 
In fact, the first course may involve a situation in which a customer might not have 
made a profit during the period of default. 
6.9. Islamic Banks in the West 
Islamic banks also face a number of problem in investing their funds interna- 
tionally. In many Muslim countries where the absorptive capacity for investment of 
funds locally is limited either due to a small population or other factors, the Islamic 
banks have found avenues of investment abroad. However, they cannot take advan- 
tage of the facilities of the Eurocurrency market and Eurobond market which offer 
ready investment outlets for traditional banks. The problem is even more complex 
for Islamic financial institutions operating on an international scale. Banking regu- 
lations in western countries stipulate detailed reserve and liquid asset requirements 
for all licensed banks and deposit takers. The Islamic financial institutions are still 
in their infancy and their further growth and development is beset by a number of 
problems. Based on this and other factors, the Governor of Bank of England, in 
an address to the Arab Banker's Association at London in 1984, pointed out that 
without developing an adequate supportive framework, no system can be expected 
to inspire the required level of confidence. Such remarks should be accepted as 
24 Ahmed, A., op. cit. p. 67. 
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useful advice and need to be considered seriously by all concerned". Since liquid 
asset requirements can be fulfilled only by holding cash or interest bearing securi- 
ties, Islamic banks face a big problem in gaining a foothold in western countries. 
For this reason, Islamic banks operating in the west are now functioning merely as 
investment companies. 
To overcome this problem, we are of the opinion that Islamic banks should 
establish'working schemes for the protection of their investment deposits. At least in 
theory, one feasible method would be a deposit insurance offered by an independent 
company. The problem will be to find such a deposit insurance company. 
The other main problem that faces Islamic banks is to decide on their profits? 
As ;ý matter of fact when operating in a western environment where the rate of 
interest is the only measure of -the cost of funds, those banks adopted the ruling 
rate as a "bench mark" for their cost of funds-and determined their profit element 
accordingly. As long -as this profit element is determined in advance and fixed 
for the duration of the period of the transaction it seems to meet basically the 
profit measurement criterion of the ideal murabaha contract of a fixed profit element 
known in advance. The sticking point however is the commitment on the part of 
the bank not to increase the profit element with the extension of the duration of the 
operation which might happen for a variety of reasons, i. e. its inability (by choice) 
not to charge an automatic levy in the nature of deferred interest. Notwithstanding 
this difficulty, Islamic banks find it practicable to finance local and international 
trade in the west. This is increasing and there is no reason to assume that it will 
not continue to do so in the future". 
To sum up this section, in the 1990s, because this is the decade we are inter- 
ested in, we shall not only witness more interdependent economic relations than in 
the 80's, but the concept of economic cooperation will take precedence over other 
economic factors. Therefore, the need for optimum utilization of scarce resources, 
21 Zaidi, N. A., 'Islamic Banking and Soft Landings, Letter, Banking World', The Journal of 
the Institute of Bankers and the Bankers Magazine, Pakistan, December 1984, p. 4. 
26 HaIndi, A. R., Trade and Project Finance, It's Strengths V Weaknesses, Paper presented at 
Into the 1990's with Islamic Banking Seminar, June 1988, London, p. 13. 
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be it finance, raw materials, technology or management, implies a need for greater 
cooperation between different systems and values. The concept of Islamic bank- 
ing at the international level requires new forms of cooperation and understanding 
which will help it to develop. 
6.10. Conclusions 
Islamic banking is presently in a nascent stage of development. Practical appli- 
cation of non-interest bearing modes of finance have demonstrated the feasibility of 
interest free banking. However, great circumspection has to be exercised to nurture 
it on truly Islamic lines and to consolidate it so as to meet any future challenges. 
The practical implementation of the concept of profit-loss- sharing to serve as 
the basis of Islamic banking has opened the way for economy-wide Islamisation of 
the banking and financial system in Muslim countries. Progress in this direction 
would, however, depend on the circumstances of individual countries. Islamic banks 
working in isolation in different countries are faced with a number of practical 
problems in the actual conduct of Islamic banking. In many countries where Islamic 
banks have been established, the legal framework is not suited for the growth of 
Islamic banking. Still, they have shown encouraging results. There is evidence that 
even in those Muslim countries where a decision to Islamise the entire banking and 
financial system has not yet been taken, awareness is growing for the need of taking 
suitable measures to provide support and assistance to the Islamic banks in order 
to nurture their growth and development. 
Islamic banks have to work hard to build up the wealth of experience which 
has been developed by the traditional banks over hundreds of years. They have to 
develop their instruments of finance and also the nature of their funding. The short 
term nature of their funds with short term private depositors' money does not easily 
lend itself to ventures into long term finance. Despite this and the difficulties faced 
by Islamic banks trying to expand their medium and long term activities, one finds 
that the results are not as bad as expected. On the contrary these results, when 
compared with Islamic banks' age and experience, are far better than predicted. 
151 
It is necessary to emphasize here that the top management of Islamic banks 
carries a very great responsibility for managing the affairs of these institutions so 
that all misgivings about the successful functioning of Islamic banks are removed 
and the virtues of Islamic banking are fully demonstrated in practice. Great care 
should therefore be exercised in the selection of top banking personnel for Islamic 
banks. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURE TO THE 
SUDANESE NATIONAL ECONOMY 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the contribution of agriculture to 
the Sudanese national economy. The chapter is divided into five sections. We 
introduce the chapter by giving some brief economic background on the Sudan. 
First, the role of agriculture sector being the most important sector in the economy 
is highlighted. Second, agriculture in Sudan is discussed with differentiation on 
the basis of production methods and the production relations associated with it. 
Third, the main crops grown in the agriculture sector are assessed. These are 
cotton, sugar, groundnut, dura, dukhun, sesame, wheat and gum arabic. Fourth, 
the economiý implications of an agricultural failure is critically examined. Finally, 
some conclusions are drawn. 
Sudan is the largest country in Africa and the Arab world, with an area of 
2.5 million square kilometers. The census of April 1973 gave a total population of 
14.82 million and in 1987 estimates indicated a total of 22.84 million people. Sudan 
is also one of the least densely populated countries in Africa'. Before the recent 
catastrophic drought and the subsequent famine, the av erage annual population 
growth rate was about 2.8%. In mid-1982 the average population density was 7.9 
per square kilometer, but there are substantial regional variations and half the 
population lives on just 15% of the land. There has been considerable rural to 
urban migration; the urban population increased from 8.3% to 17.6% of the total 
between 1956 and 1972, and probably totals over 30% today. It is estimated that 
over 2 million people, or almost- 10% of the population, may now live in the capital 
city's "Three Towns" of Khartoum, Omdurman and Khartoum North. The famine 
and the war in the south have brought around 2 million people to the area. The 
Sudan and The World Bank, Information and Public Affitirs Department, April 1985, Wash- 
ington, p. 4. 
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other major towns of Port Sudan, Wad Medana, El Obeid, Juba, Nyala and El 
Fasher have also experienced an influx of drought victims'. 
The Sudanese economy since independence in 1956 inherited various struc- 
tural characteristics which inhibited economic growth during the period of 1986/87. 
Certain long-term trends resulting from historical developments have constrained 
growth and development. These are to be distinguished from natural resources 
infrastructural and institutional factorS3. 
In the internal sector, excess aggregate demand compared with production has 
created inflationary pressures on the economy. This was fueled by the devastating 
effects of drought and the conflict in the south. In the external sector, disequilibrium 
in the balance of payments, which the government tried to solve through a series of 
devaluations suggested by the IMF and the World Bank, resulted in the mounting 
arrears of foreign debt and more dependence on commodity aid to finance the import 
bill. The aforementioned problems reflected themselves in negative GDP rates of 
growth. 
In view of the above, it becomes of vital importance to examine very carefully 
Sudan's agriculture, its problems and its future prospects and to assess the possibil- 
ities of getting out of the present crisis. Undoubtedly the question is of an economic 
nature but depends a great deal on political decisions in that it concerns policies 
adopted and practiced and relates to national security. 
The Role of the Agricultural Sector 
The agricultural sector is the largest and most important sector in the economy 
of the Sudan. It is clear that the agricultural sector in general, and irrigated agri- 
culture in particular, can play a vital role in the process of economic development 
in the Sudan. The contribution of the sector to export earnings and employment 
opportunities is all important. In addition, it is the largest sector in terms of its 
2 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Sudan, Country Profile, 1988-89, London, p. 11. 
3 Shaaeldin, E., 'The Role of the Agricultural Sector in the Economy' in The Agricultural 
Sector of Sudan, Policy and Systems Studies, Zahlan, A. B. & Magar, W. Y. (eds. ), The 
Abdul Haineed Shoman Foundation, Amman by Ithaca, London, 1986, p-9. 
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contribution to GDP and it makes a significant contribution to the provision of food 
for the population. 
The contribution of the agricultural sector to GDP can be seen from Table 
7.1. The table shows Sudan's GDP by economic sector for the period 1981/82 - 
1986/87 at constant 1981/82 prices. During this period, the growth of real GDP 
of Sudan, which had recorded a remarkable turn around from a negative rate of 
-11.5% in 1984/85 to a postive rate of 10.2% in 1985/86, and then slowed down to 
4.9% in 1986/87. The performance of the economy in both years was determined by 
agricultural production. The value added in the agricultural sector had improved 
from a negative rate of as much as -23.4% in 1984/85 to a positive rate of 26.4%, but 
recorded a growth of only 2.6% during 1986/87. The slower growth of agriculture 
as compared to the overall rate for the economy reduced its relative share from 35% 
in 1985/86 to 34% in 1986/87. 
Table 7.1. 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT CONSTANT 1981/82 PRICES 
(CONSTANT 1981/82 PRICES) 
(. CS. Millions) 
SECTOR 1981/2 1982/3 1983/4 1984/5 1985/6 1986/7 
Agriculture 2,396 2,214 2,159 1,654 2,090 2,143 
Commerce 927 958 1 887 805 837 912 
Manufacturing and Mining 369 407 402 405 420 443 
Transport and Communication 683 699 664 1 _615 
612 664 
Construction 378 450 386 351 331 341 
Electricity and Water Corp. 76 95 102 117 126 127 
Government Services 545 546 558 628 716 745 
Other Services 862 895 926 812 815 869 
G. D. P at Current Price 6,236 6,264 6,084 5,387 5,937 6,244 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning Statistics 87 
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In contrast, the rate of increase of value added in the manufacturing and mining 
sector improved from 3.7% in 1985/86 to 5.5% which helped maintain its relative 
share in total GDP at 7%. 
Commodity producing sectors as a whole i. e. agriculture, manufacturing and 
mining, which may be broadly identified as the tradables, thus witnessed an increase 
of only 3%. This was barely sufficient to meet the requirements of an increasing 
population. The increase in these sectors during 1985/86 had been as high as 21.9% 
up from a negative rate of -19.6% recorded in 1984/85. The relative contribution 
of these sectors to total GDP, which had gone up from 38.2% in 1984/85 to 42.3% 
in 1985/86, dropped to 41.4% in 1986/87. 
Table 7.2. shows the main items of export during 1985-1987. It has to be 
noticed that export proceeds during 1987 showed a remarkable increase of XS. 663.9 
million from XS. 833.2 million in 1986 to CS. 1447.1 million in 1987. The increase 
in export receipts was mainly due to the adjustment of the exchange rate of the 
Sudanese Pound, twice, during 1987, with a view- to encourage exports. On 1st 
April 1987, the exchange rate for dura, sesame, groundnuts, oil-and cak-e and meals, 
was adjusted upward from US $1= 'XS. 3.25 to US$1=. CS. 4.1 and later on October 
3, at rate of US $1= XSA. 5 was announced. 
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Table 7.2. 
EXPORTS DURING 1985-1987 
(CS. million) 
COMMODITY UNIT 1985 1986 1987 
Quan. Value Quan. Val. Quan. Val. 
Cotton Bales 529ý314 374.3 936,907 366.7 738; 788 455.2 
Groundnuts M. T. 13.260 23.1 1,090 2.5 7,283 10.1 
Sesame M. T. 17,546 97.8 29,051 58.9 60,587 134.8 
Gum Arabic M. T. 27,404 66.0 19,141 141.7 18,587 267.1 
Dura M. T. 30,490 13.9 534,249 L4: 81.8 
Livestock(*) Heads 580,7221 159.4 244,315 71.5 71,171 
1 
_ 
42.9 
Hides and Skins M. T. 81380 38.8 7,743 33.7 5,305 39.0 
Cake and Meal M. T. 10,235 3.5 41 1521 14.2 102,176 50.5 
Others Value - 81.8 130.1 - 284.7 
Total 
1 1 844.71 1 833.21 - 1,497.11 
(*) Excludes exports of camels to Egypt. 
Source: Bank of Sudan, Twenty Eighth Annual Report, 1987 
With the exception of livestock, all Other export items showed some increases. 
The ban on exports of livestock which was introduced in August 1986, was main- 
tained during 1987. The proceeds from livestock in 1987, represent execution of 
previous contracts. On the other hand, dura proceeds increased substantially, al- 
most seventeen fold. In 1986 the quantity of dura exports was 30490 metric tons 
which went up to 53249 metric tons in 1987 aided by the upward adjustment in the 
exchange rate. 
From above, and the key variables mentioned earlier it is clear that agriculture 
is and will remain the backbone of the Sudanese economy. Sudanese agriculture can 
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be divided into the modern, traditional and the cooperative sectors'. In addition 
to its very important contribution to GDP and export earnings, agriculture plays a 
very important role in: 
1- The provision of raw materials for other sectors which depend on agricul- 
tural products such as food processing industries and spinning and weaving fac- 
tories, apart from providing raw materials for the transport, communications and 
construction sectors. 
2- Provision of employment opportunities, for about 80% of the Sudanese pop- 
ulation is engaged in agriculture, the majority of whom are self-employed farmers. 
This is in addition to the large number of causal workers employed during high 
season in the cotton growing areas, and in rainfed areas to pick wheat and sesame . 
3- Providing food for the population. Although Sudan was in the past generally 
self-sufficient in the staple food crop (dura), recently, the sector has suffered from 
severe shortages in agricultural production which'have, been witnessed in many 
parts of the country. This problem has led many countries and financial institutions 
working in Sudan to direct their attention to agricultural investment. A large part 
of cultivatable fertile land remains unutilized at present. 
Furthermore, the Four Year Salvation, Recovery and Development Programme 
(1988/89 -1991/92) of the government seems to reflect the importancq of agriculture 
in the Sudanese economy which directly influences the level of activities of all other 
sectors. The severe drought during the three year period 1982/85, aggravated by 
the serious shortage of foreign exchange has led to negative rates of growth, - 7.6%, 
- 2.5% and - 23.6% respectively, in this sector'. 
4 Rehiman, A. A., 'Evaluation of the Agricultural Bank's Contribution to Different Agricultural 
Sub-Sectors, 1959-1977', unpublished M. Sc. dissertation, University of Khartoum, 1980, pp. 
29-30. 
The Four Year Salvation, Recovery and Development Programme, 1988/89-1991/92, Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Planning, Khartoum, 1988, p. 5. 
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However, better rainfall in the following two seasons and government efforts to 
provide necessary agricultural inputs, led to positive growth rates of 28% and 3.5% 
in 1985/86 and 1986/87 as shown the Table 7.3. 
Table 7.3. 
SECTORAL GROWTH RATES 
(Constant 1981/82 Prices) 
Sector 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 
Overall GDP -0.4 -2.9 -12.8 11.8 4.3 
Agriculture -7.6 -2.5 -23.6 28.0 3.5 
Manufacturing and Mining 10.3 -1.3 0.7 9.6 4.7 
Electricity and Water 26.6 7.4 14.7 7.7 0.8 
Construction 19.0 -14.3 12.2 -8.0 1.0 
Transport and Communications 2.3 -5.1 -7.4 -Q. 7 8.8 
Services 2.7- 
T 
-1.1 -8.2 6.8 4.5 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 
The Fourth Year Salvation, Recovery and Development 
Programme, 1988189 -1991192 
It appears that the long-term perspective plan (1977/78 -1994/5) was changed 
by the government to the Four Year Salvation, Recovery, and Development Pro- 
gramme (1988/89 -1991/92) due to the urgency of the crisis resulting from economic 
failure. 
To sum up, the implementation of the macro economic policies adopted by the 
government in ýhe agricultural sector and elsewhere in the economy has failed to 
reverse the general trend. Exports have continued to decline while imports have 
increased very rapidly, the trade gap has widened, inflation has soared leading to 
the recent food shortages and foreign debt accumulation. Although the government 
has effected some changes in certain policy areas, top priority should be attached to 
a complete restructuring of the economy. Only then can one hope for a continued 
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economic recovery. 
7.2. Types of Agriculture in Sudan 
On the basis of production methods and the production relations associated with 
it, Sudanese agriculture can be classified into three groups. These are: mechanized, 
irrigated and traditional. Table 7.4. shows area and production as percentages for 
the three sectors. 
Table 7.4. 
AREA AND PRODUCTION 
OF THE AGRICULTURAL SECTORS 
in Percentage Terms: 1977 
Production Sector Area Production 
Mechanized 37.2 35.4 
Irrigated 18.5 50.3 
Traditional 44.3 14.3 
Source: International Labour. Office, 1982. 
Later studies, indicate that despite lacking the government investment which 
the other sectors have received, the traditional sector accounted for as much as 40% 
of the country's export earnings at the end of 1984'. 
7.2.1. The Mechanized Sector 
Mechanization in Sudan rarely involves the use of agricultural machinery for 
all, or even the majority, of operations. Often the mechanization extends only 
to land preparation and sometimes threshing, with a consequent dependence on 
"traditional" techniques for other operations, leading to a high labour demand at 
key periods in the agricultural cycle. 
The total area under this group is about 10 million feddans, 80% of which was 
Elobeid Baseline Survey, Korag Credit Component, Report Presented to Agricultural Bank of 
Sudan and USAID by Technoserve, Khartourn, 1987, p. 29. 
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leased by the government to about 4; 000 investors. This means that 20% of the crop 
land was under the control of about 0.02% of the population. This group is almost 
exclusively devoted to sorghum production in large (1000-1500 feddan) schemes 
which are either privately owned, or are tenancies of the Mechanized Farming Cor- 
poration. These schemes are mainly located in the Eastern and Kordofan Regions. 
Rainfed cotton production in the Nuba Mountains also constitutes part of this 
group, in the form of tenancies under the Nuba Mountains Agricultural Production 
Corporation, which provides mechanized land preparation services. 
7.2.2. The Irrigated Sector 
The irrigated farms are either owned and managed exclusively by the govern- 
ment or the government has the largest share and power in the decision-making 
process. They occupy about 25% of the cultivated area in Sudan (i. e. about 4 
million feddans) and contribute about 60% to the GDP and over 50% of Sudan's 
total exports by valueT. This sector produces about 40% of the country's dura 
requirements (dura being the main food crop), and it employs about 25% of the 
agricultural labour force in the country (i. e. 40% of the labour force in the irrigated 
sector). 
They consist of 13 schemes, the largest of which are the Gezira scheme (with a 
total area of 2.1 million feddans), the Rahad scheme (with a total area of 200,000 
feddans) and the Khashm EI-Girba scheme. The Gezira and Rahad schemes will 
be discussed in detail below. The Khashm EI-Girba scheme occupies a total area 
of 390,000 feddans and is managed by the New Halfa Agricultural Corporation. 
The sc heme was established about 17 years ago. Cotton, wheat and groundnuts 
are the main crops grown. The scheme accommodates about 22100 tenants, about 
two-thirds of them were previously nomadic or semi-nomadic people. All tenancies 
are of 15 feddans, divided equally between the three major crops. 
Ati, H. A., The Problems of the Agricultural Sector in Sudan: An Account of Policy Gaps, 
Development Studies and Research Centre Seminar, Series No. 74. November 1986, University 
of Khartoum, p. 2. 
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Other small areas are allocated for horticultural products'. 
(a) The Gezira Scheme: 
The Gezira Scheme is situated on a flat plain about five million feddans in area, 
located between the White Nile and the Blue Nile, and accounts for 16% of the 
total cultivated area in Sudan. Two million feddans of the total available area are 
already irrigated and three millions feddans can be irrigated in the future. The 
scheme operates on a partnership basis between the tenant farmers, the Gezira 
Board, and the government. In the main Gezira area the size of each tenancy was 
until recently about 40 feddans and in the Managel Extension it is about 15, but 
due to the rapid increase in population the area of each tenancy in the main Gezira 
area has been reduced to 20 feddans. 
Cotton is the main crop, but because intensification and. diversification policies 
were undertaken many other crops and vegetables such as wheat, groundnuts and 
rice have been introduced. The source of finance for this scheme is the Bank of 
Sudan. 
In this scheme the Corporation provides irrigation water, maintenance of canals 
and marketing services for the main crop, cotton. The Agricultural Bank of Sudan 
(ABS) provides tractors on credit to three farmers' unions. 
Recently, it has been noticed that due to mismangement and lack of planning 
and follow up in the Gezira scheme, the government authorities are faced with many 
problems, mainly water for irrigation, maintenance of canals and spare parts for the 
farmers. Furthermore, due to lack of motivation and incentive, farmers have left 
their farms and are looking for job opportunities in the capital. Such a development 
will have an adverse effect on the whole agriculture sector, especially during harvest 
season when, the labour shortage is very severeO. 
El-Hassan, A. M., 'The State and the Development of Capitalism in Agriculture in Sudan: 
The Case of the Savannah Rainland', unpublished Ph. D thesis, University of East Anglia, 
1985, p. 17. 
9 Ibrahim, A. I., 'Save the Gezira Scheme from Watering Problems', At-Khartoum Newspaper, 
January 1989, p. 3. 
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(b) The Rahad Agricultural Scheme: 
Located on the eastern bank of the Rahad river, this scheme covers an area of 
140 kilometers by 15 to 25 kilometers, between Mafaza village to the south and 
Abu Haraz to the north. The total area of the scheme is about 820,000 feddans. 
The first stage of the project intends to transform 300,000 feddans from traditional 
farming to modern agriculture. 
The scheme is irrigated by the largest pump station in the country supplied by 
electricity from the Roseries dam. The total cost of the project is CS. 240 million 
financed from foreign sources represented by the IDA, the Kuwait Development 
Fund, the Saudi Development Fund and U. S Aid. 
The organisation of the Rahad Scheme is based on the principle of tenancies 
similiar to other irrigation projects in Sudan. The production area is subdivided 
into 12,800 tenancies of 22 feddan each, i. e. 9.24 hectare. In addition to these there 
are 4,000 smaller tenancies of 5 feddan, i. e. 2.1 hectare for the production of fruits 
and vegetables. 
Through its extension employees, the Rahad Corporation strictly supervises the 
tenants and their work. The individual farmer hardly has any freedom of decision 
with respect to problems of cultivation and cropping. Unlike the Gezira Scheme, 
there exists no shareholder system for cotton cropping. The yield is the property 
of the tenants, who in turn, are paying for land and water and all the services the 
Corporation provides". 
The cultivation plan is devised for only two crops. A medium staple cotton of 
the Acala type is grown on half of the area while the other half is cultivated with 
groundnuts of Ashford variety. The cropping is 100% intensive. This means that 
cotton is grown on half of each tenancy in alternate years. 
Production within the scheme is highly mechanised. Irrigation, weeding and 
10 Jansen, Heinz-Gerhard and Koch, W., 'The Rahad Scheme the Agricultural Sustem and 
its Problem', in Problems of Agricultural Development in the Sudan, Gunter Heinritz (Ed. ), 
Selected Papers of a Seminar, Gottingen, Germany, 1982, p. 25. 
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part of the harvest are done manually. The groundnut harvest is largely mechanised 
and only some additional manual work is needed. 
The Corporation grants loans to the tenant farmers to meet the expenses of 
watering, fertilizers, certified seeds and mechanization as well as supervising the 
scheme and giving information to the farmers on such matters as agricultural tech- 
niques. 
7.2.3. The Traditional Sector 
Traditional agriculture is defined as "production largely for consumption or 
subsistencep the use of capital equipment limited to a few tools, a low output per 
head in comparison with the modern sector, the production and consumption unit 
being the family, either of the external kind or structured in a village or tribal 
settings, and little opportunity or even disinclination to introduce innovations owing 
to the smallness of the farm and other reasons"". 
In the Sudan the term "traditional agriculture" is used to refer to rainfed un- 
mechanized agriculture (livestock included). These traditional rainfed areas amount 
to nearly 17 million feddans, representing about 63% of the total cultivated area. 
They are scattered in different remote places and consequently are very different in 
character. Those in the south have potentially highly fertile land producing coffee 
and tea; while others are situated in the semi-arid zone of the north-western part 
of the country. 
It is clear from the above that land and labour are not a limiting factor since 
they are not scarce. Capital is the major problem and this is apparent in many 
places where "harig" cultivation is a common practice because of the inability of 
the farmer to purchase implements or machinery. The main crops grown in the 
traditional sector are sesame, groundnuts, sorghum, millet and kerkadeh. In this 
subsistence economy, production for the market plays a very small part. Although 
at the same time the households growing subsistence crops are in need of cash to 
meet their daily requirements e. g. for the purchase of water in the western part of 
11 Rehiman, A. A., op. cit. p. 14. 
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the Sudan, or for essential food stuffs. 
In the absence of cash, most households are dependent on the shail system 
to provide inputs for domestic items and farming requirements and for credit and 
marketing services. The prevailance of the shail system intensifies money borrowing 
among the poor tenants. The poor tenants who are already suffering from shortages 
of cash andlow incomes, are in need of immediate cash to pay for the high loan 
charges. This forces them into heavy indebtness to the rich tenants and money 
lenders. 
In explaining this situation in Sudan, it is natural in any traditional society that 
borrowing from someone rather than from a financial institution is usually looked 
upon as "bad" practice, and people are usually "shy" in talking about their financial 
commitment to others. Moreover the fact that the bulk of the households in the 
small farm sector are indebted is another indicator of their involvement in "Shail". 
In what follows we have to analyse the implications of these usury relations in the 
form of "shail". Apart from the obvious exploitative relation expressed in the form 
of exorbitant interest rates, shail has a number of implications. If the farmer fails 
to repay all debts due to the merchant, an arrangement can be made to postpone 
payment until the following season. But, in return the merchant will compensate 
for this by charging high prices for the commodities he sells to the peasant or by 
further lowering the prices of the peasant's crop. So as a matter of fact the effect 
on the households who fail to repay debts is to pay more than the normal price 
charged by the merchant. Naturally, however, the price advanced by the merchant 
is normally far less than the prevailing 'price at the time of marketing the crop, 
thereby all the difference goes to the merchant. However, in the circumstances 
where the agreed upon price falls short of the actual farmer price at marketing, the 
is obliged to pay the difference in compensation to the merchant. Ultimately, the 
shail system can lead households into a chronic cycle of indebtedness , 
and this is 
the main shortcoming of debt financing in the agricultural sector and elsewhere in 
the economy. In case of crop failure due to an unforeseen disaster, debt will be 
accumulated, and there may be even a major decline in the market price of crops. 
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Households in the small farms are very vulnerable to such incidents. 
To sum up, it has been observed that the agricultral policies in Sudan for the last 
decade have mainly been financially expansionary. Agricultural development was 
dependent on foreign finance, and this has led to deficits in the balance of payments 
and dwindling national reserves. Furthermore, the government has misallocated the 
investment resources by favouring large scale, expensive projects at the expense of 
human investment. In addition the transport and construction sectors were given 
more weight than the productive sectors of agriculture or industry. Ultimately 
the outcome of such policies was a massive increase in the budgetary deficit, not 
accompanied by sufficient support from the national resources. Investment policies 
did not contribute to an expansion of the productive capacity of the country". 
7.3. Main Crops 
The main crops grown in Sudan are cotton, sugar, dura, groundnuts, dukhun, 
sesame, wheat and gum arabic 
7.3.1. Cotton 
This is the main foreign exchange earning crop and constitutes about 53% of 
the total value of Sudanese exports. Cotton production amounted to 865 thousand 
bales (1 bale= 4201b) in 1986/87. This was 21.1% higher than 772 thousand bales 
realized in 1985/86. The comparable figures for 1983/84 and 1984/85 were 1,182 
and 1,084 thousand bales respectively. The increase in 1986/87 was in long and 
medium staple cotton which increased over the year from 353 to 396 thousand 
bales, (a 13% increase) and from 402 to 456 thousand bales respectively. However 
production of other varieties declined slightly. 
Furthermore, it was found out that the area under cotton cultivation increased 
by about 5% from 788 thousand feddans in 1985/86 to 825 thousand feddans in 
1986/87. The increase of 852 thousand kantars in seed cotton production was 
brought about partly by the increase in area under production and partly by an 
11 Ati, H. A., op. cit. pp. 4-5. 
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increase of about 24% in the average yield per feddan". This increase in yield per 
feddan was attributed to the following reasons: 
(1) A higher standard of land preparation. 
(2) Improved farming practices. 
(3) Efficient use of herbicides. 
(4) Better use of fertilizer and pest control measures. 
With regard to the sales, it was found that the uncommitted stocks of cotton in 
the country at the beginning of 1987 amounted to 154 thousand bales, bringing total 
supply of cotton available for sale in 1987 to 1,019 thousand bales compared with 
1,605 and 1,240 thousand bales in 1986 and 1985 respectively. For the disposal of 
the stocks, sales to local users of cotton were lower from 112 thousand bales in 1986 
to 31 thousand bales in 1987, while exports were down to 665 thousand bales from 
1,344 thousand bales in the preceding year. In recent years, depressed world cotton 
prices and unsatisfactory market policies left Sud ' 
an with substantial quantities of 
unsold stock, estimated to be worth over XS 600 million, which eventually had to 
be sold off at very low prices in late 1986. Sales of 1987/88 crop have, however, 
14 been more successful 
Exports of long staple cotton declined from 475 to 350 thousand bales in 1987. 
The Sudan Cotton Company was able, to dispose of 79% of the total long staple 
supplies (357 thousand bales) and 60% of medium staple cotton (324 thousand 
bales). 
The government is currently facing many problems regarding the cotton crop. 
These arise due to a shortage of labourers during the harvesting season, even though 
the country as a whole has abundant supply of agricultural labourers. It is clear 
that there is still much to be done by the authorities in order to eliminate sea- 
sonal shortages of labour as far as the large irrigated schemes are concerned. Some 
measures are required to make the full use of the local landless residents and to 
13 Bank of Sudan, twenty eighth annual report, 1987, Khartoum, p. 12. 
11 The Economist Intelligence Unit, op. cit. pp. 22-23. 
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improve the general working conditions (housing, payment, etc. ) to attract migrant 
labour. Perhaps musharakah financing through which the agricultural labourers will 
be partners in the project with the owner of the funds, not a wage earner, might 
solve some of the problems. The experience of the Sudanese Islamic Bank in financ- 
ing small farmers through musharakah (partnership financing) might be a starting 
point in the right direction. This will be examined in the following chapters of this 
thesis. 
Other (steps) to reverse this situation can be taken through improvements to the 
physical stock of old cotton schemes, increasing the area under irrigated and rainfed 
cotton cultivation, and eliminating the factors that cause bias or disincentives to 
growing cotton. A rehabilitation programme financed by the World Bank for the 
old schemes is also underway. 
7.3.2. Sugar 
Another import-substitution crop is sugar. Sugar consumption has been increas- 
ing significantly in Sudan. Local production began at Gunied in 1962 and Khashm 
El Girba in 1965. These schemes produce over 100,000 metric tons annually. Three 
more factories have been established recently. Factories at Sennar and Assalaya 
are govern ment- owned and designed with an annual capacity of 110,000 metric tons 
each. Kenana is a joint venture between the Sudanese government, Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia and designed with a total capacity of 300,000 metric tons. The out- 
put is expected to rise to a maximum of 305,000 metric tons by 1990/91. 
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Table 7.5. 
PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF SUGAR, 
BY PLANT (tons) 
Design capacity 1981/2 1982/3 1983/4 1984/5 1985/6 1986/7 
Guneid 60,000 15,744 20,181 22,699 14,905 25,115 
New Halfa 75,000 35,863 38,018 47,886 59,932 53,710 
Sennar 100,000 22,326 40,601 57,700 68,900 37,569 
Kenana, 330,000 165,002 229,541 248,834 306,000 1292,838 
Hajar Assalaya 100,000 - 31,626 41,202 47,202 
70 42,2.9 
Total production 670,000 238,935 359,967 418,526 496,939 451,511 
Total consumption - 4001170 425,000 495,000 459,701 
of local consumption , -1 
60 85 93 100 
A 
98 
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
Country Profile 1988-89, p. 23. 
7.3.3. Dura 
Output of dura in the 1986/87 season was 3.3 million metric tons, recording a 
decrease of about 265 thousand metric tons over the previous seasons. The decrease 
was due to the reduction in the area under cultivation by about one million feddan. 
The production of dura, during 1987/88 season is expected to be lower as a result 
of a reduction in the area under cultivation from 11.8 million feddans in 1986/87 
to 7.8 million feddans. This sharp decrease in the area under dura was due to 
the low prices received by famers in 1986/87. According to recent information the 
production of dura. has been badly affected by the weather conditions, adding to 
the shortage of manpower. This has led to an increase in the cost of production". 
It has been estimated that area under dura cultivation during 1987/1988 could 
be 42% lower than that in 1986/87. This small area coupled with expected lower 
AL-Khartoum Newspaper, January 1989, Khartoum, p. 3. 
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yields, suggest that dura production will be substantially lower than the previous 
season. 
7.3.4. Groundnuts 
Sudan used to be the second largest producer of groundnuts in Africa after 
Senegal, but there have been wide fluctuations in the past decade. There was a 
substantial increase in the area under groundnuts in the mid-1970s. Yields were 
not, however, particularly highand the rehabilitation scheme returned large areas 
to cotton in the Gezira and other irrigated farming regions. 
The productivity of groundnuts has fluctuated considerably over the last decade. 
The volume of output has grown , consistently as a result of an expansion 
in the area 
under cultivation. In 1985/86 production rose to 400,000 tons and is reported to 
have risen further to 600,000 tons in 1986/87. Unfortunately, however, the fall in 
world groundnut prices shows little sign of ending. Since 1981 the price per ton has 
fallen from about $620 to an expected $320 in the 1986/87 season". The major 
constraint to groundnut cultivation is the availability of labour as harvesting is 
very labour-intensive. Attempts to mechanise have not been successful so far due 
to substantial waste losses. 
7.3.5 Dukhun 
Dukhun output decreased by 143 thousand metric tons in 1987 compared with 
the previous year. It decreased from 428 thousand metric tons to 285 thousand 
metric tons, about 33%. This noticeable decline was mostly due the decrease in the 
cultivated area. 
7.3.6. Sesame 
Sesame production and export volumes have also fluctuated considerably in 
recent years because of changes in rainfall, yields and the area under cultivation. 
The output has, however, increased by 133 thousand metric tons, and the main 
factors behind this increase include the rise of yield per feddan and better control 
16 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Sudan, Country Report, No. 1,1987, p. 18. 
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measures against pests and diseases. Between 1978/79 and 1985/86 revenues rose 
from XS 11 million to over XS 97 million. 
7.3.7. Wheat 
Wheat is considered to be a second crop rather than an alternative to cotton. 
Due to the climatic unsuitability for wheat the results have not been very encour- 
aging. In contrast dura, is an indigenous crop and the climate suits its cultivation. 
The expansion in the area of wheat has given rise to controversy. Several studies 
have pointed out that the production of wheat is not justifiable in Sudan because 
of low yields. A World Bank mission recommended "replacing much of the wheat 
in the rotations at Gezira and New Halfa with cotton or groundnuts"". Moreover, 
a UNDP/IBRD study found that wheat is not a competitive crop given the present 
levels of yield. Yet, it can be urged that: 
1- Wheat is an important part of human diet in the central and norther Sudan 
and its domestic production affords a certain measure of security for the country as 
well as for individual producers. 
2- Although a financial cost analysis of yields shows wheat in a poor light, 
an economic analysis using opportunity costs rather than financial cost of certain 
inputs like machinery and water would show the wheat crop to be quite competitive. 
3- The alternative to local production is import from abroad which would put 
an additional burden on the already strained transport capacity from Port Sudan 
to up-country points. 
However, wheat production in 1986/87 fell to 157 thousand metric tons. This 
was primarily due to a reduction in the area under cultivation from 360 thousand 
feddans in 1985/86 to 282 thousand feddans in 1986/87. In 1987/88 wheat and 
wheat flour were the single most important foodstuff import of the country". 
World Bank, Sudan Agricultural Sector Survey, Vol. III, Annexes 1-4,1979 
Bank of Sudan, op. cit. p. 16. 
171 
7.3.8. Gum Arabic 
Sudan was considered the world's largest producer of gum arabic, which is 
collected from a variety of the acacia tree which grows naturally throughout the 
savanna belt of central Sudan. 
During the last decade the volume of gum production has declined due to a 
reduction in the number of acacia senegal trees from which gum is produced, and 
the lack of incentives to producers. Acacia senegal grows wild in the savanna belt 
extending from central to western Sudan. 
However, its production continued an upward trend, increasing further by 8.7 
thousand tons in 1986/87 season compared with an increase of 6.4 thousand met- 
ric tons in 1985/86 season. The increase was mainly due to the upsurge in the 
production of both gum types (Hashab) and (Talh). 
It has been estimated that the gum arabic production during 1987/88 season 
has risen to 34 thousand metric tons. The favourable conditions and high local 
purchase prices, are the main factors behind the expected increase in production. 
7.4. Economic Implications of the Agricultural Failure 
(a) Shortage in the supply of basic necessities, a high rate of inflation and 
the accompanying rising cost of living created push factors in the country at large 
resulting in a very serious situation. Sudan witnessed massive emigration, mainly 
to the oil-producing Arab countries. 
Thus around 84% of the Sudanese migrants is formed by the skilled and unskilled 
workers. The trend is actually increasing and it is intimately associated with the 
general deterioration in the country's economic conditions. Thus in 1982 the total 
number of migrants was estimated to be around 900,000. This is a significant figure 
in relation to the economically active population of 7 million according to the 1973 
population census. Thus the total number of Sudanese working abroad constitute 
about 14% of the labour force. The state actually encourages this migration in so 
far as it eases the internal problems. 
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(b) Decline in production 
The Sudanese economy is fully dependent on agriculture, which contributes 
around 40% to GDP and 95% to the country's total exports and supports about 
80% of the population. Since cotton is the major cash crop and the main source of 
foreign exchange for the country, a decline in its production provides an indication 
of the general economic crisis. 
The decline in productivity may be attributed to some technical and institu- 
tional factors. Cotton is no longer the most profitable crop as far as the tenants 
are concerned and this has clear implications for productivity. Moreover the other 
major agricultural crops such as groundunts, sesame and arabic gum have suffered 
stagnant production. 
(c) The balance of payments crisis 
Surprisingly, the crisis in the balance of payments has led to an increasing 
foreign capital inflow despite the inability of the country to repay its due accounts 
of foreign debts. The solution perceived is further flow of foreign capital. The 
immediate effect of which is to reinforce the hegemony of international capital. 
The package of policies recommended by the IMF, instead of solving the economic 
problems, actually aggravated the situation. M. N. Hussain has argued that "there 
is no evidence to suggest that devaluation made any difference to the incentive 
to produce more exportables. Production of all exportables declined after 1978 
(devaluation year)"". 
Policies such as the removal of subsidies from basic consumer commodities, de- 
preciation of currency, and the curtailment of state expenditure for essential services 
are usually accompanied by widespread mass opposition. 
The growing deficit in the current account led to increasing reliance on external 
borrowings. The outstanding debt has been growing rapidly resulting in greater 
reliance on borrowing from commercial banks whose lending is characterised by 
19 Hussain, M. N., 'Studies in the Theory and Practice of IMF Conditionality and Devaluation 
in Developing Countries', unpublished Ph. D thesis, University of Kent, 1983, p. 286. 
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relatively harder terms than official loans. According to the World Bank, "the debt 
service problems facing the country in the early eighties is largely a result of this 
unfavorable debt profile in the mid seventies"". The average interest rate on loans 
has been 7.2% and the average maturity is 9.2 years including 3.0 years grace. 
7.5. Conclusions 
It is clear from the above analysis that an accumulation of problems over the 
last two decades has significantly retarded agricultural production in Sudan and 
these problems were strongly connected with the strategies and development poli- 
cies pursued since independence. These problems can be grouped into two major 
categories; the first set of problems are those affecting the forces of production (hu- 
man factors-which is the main problem in LDCs in general and Africa in partiqular 
and means of production) and the second are those concerning production and how 
revenues are distributed. 
However, if there is any attempt to rectify the critical situation, the government 
should start with a strategy different from the one pursued in the past. Such an 
attempt should start with correcting the policies and practices within the public 
sector, and of a paramount importance here is the reorganization of production 
relations in a way that would serve the actual producers. This can be achieved 
through a number of specific short and long term policy measures. 
With regard to short-term policy, the main emphasis should be to reduce the 
agricultural operation costs and the cost of inputs. This can be done by updating 
information on agricultural machinery and ensuring spare parts availability. The 
rehabilitation funds, which are allocated for import of spare parts and machinery, 
can then be redistributed according to need of the different schemes. 
Long term policy should be in line with the short term measures and the gov- 
ernment should set priorities by ensuring an even distribution of funds between 
regions, sectors and subsectors according to these priorities. It should consolidate 
the traditional sector and promote its development through various ways and means 
20 World Bank, Sudan, Investing for Economic Stabilization and Structural Change, 1982a. 
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like: 
(a) transfering the existing rural development schemes into agricultural or agro- 
industrial cooperatives aimed at developing production forces in those areas. 
(b) building training centres in rural areas to create more opportunities for jobs 
and livelihood other than agriculture. To produce and market necessary consumer 
goods and to strengthen the service sector in those areas. 
(c) applying new mode of financing like profit sharing schemes, musharakah in 
agriculture whereby the incentive elements will be introduced not only to the owner 
of the land but also to the new partner who will be the farmer to enable him to 
settle down in the rural area. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE SUDANESE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine analytically the financial institutions 
in Sudan. The chapter will be divided into nine sections. First, we discuss the 
banking system in general. Second, the government credit policy is examined and 
consideration given to priority sectors for financing. Third, the role of commercial 
banks is analysed and fourth, an explanation is given concerning the special purpose 
banks, which include the Sudanese Real Estate Bank and the Industrial Bank of 
Sudan. Fifth, we also deal with the savings institutions in Sudan. A subsection 
assesses the role of the Sudanese Savings Bank, the Post Office Savings Banký and 
Premium Savings Bonds Project. Sixth, other local financial institutions, namely 
the Sudanese Rural Development Bank, the National Development Bank and the 
Islamic banks are examined. Seventh, since our interest in this thesis is on equity 
financing, we examine very throughly the current economic activities of Islamic 
banks in medium and long-term financing to see how far these institutions have 
succeeded in achieving their development objectives. Eighth, the importance of the 
informal credit financing is assessed since this sector still plays an important role 
in the rural areas of Sudan. Finally some conclusions are drawn. 
8.1. The Banking System in Sudan 
The banking system in Sudan has experienced a dramatic development since 
the attainment of political independence in 1956. Prior to independence the Sudan 
banking system possessed all the earmarks of colonial banking. The commercial 
banks were branches of foreign institutions, there was no central bank and local 
currency (Egyptian banknotes and British coins circulated side by side as legal ten- 
der). Within this environment there existed a banking and credit system, consisting 
mainly of expatriate banks, to serve the needs of both export and import trade and 
also serve as deposit takers for the expatriate and indigenous firms operating within 
the country. 
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After independence the Sudan Currency Board was established in 1957 to issue 
the new Sudanese currency. In 1959 the Bank of Sudan Act was passed and in the 
following year the central bank became one of the first operational central banking 
institutions in independent Africa. The Bank of Sudan assumed responsibility for 
administration of foreign exchange and related currency matters including regula- 
tion of the issue of notes and coins, development of a sound credit and banking 
system, and serving as the banking and financial adviser to the government. 
In May 1970, a fundamental change took place in the banking arrangements 
in Sudan. The government decided to nationalise the banking system and other 
Sudanese and foreign financial enterprises. The objectives of this act were: 
(1) To develop and improve the banking facilities available to various sectors 
specially the traditional sector and the rural areas which desperately needed banking 
facilities. 
(2) To give the Bank of Sudan and the government firm control over the mone- 
tary policy and to implement this policy as part of a coordinated national economic 
policy designed to benefit the Sudanese people'. 
(3) To use the banking system as an instrument of control over capital invest- 
ment and other units of public sector. 
Presently, the formal financial system in Sudan includes the Bank of Sudan 
(the central bank), 12 commercial banks (five national, five foreign and two joint 
venture) with 144 branches and offices, three Savings Institutions (the Sudanese 
Saving Bank, the Post Office Saving Bank and the Premium Saving Bonds Project), 
three specialised banks and some local financing institutions. The Agricultural Bank 
of Sudan (ABS), the Industrial Bank of Sudan (IBS) and The Real Estate Bank 
of Sudan (REBS) are specialised banký- Local financing institutions include the 
Sudanese Rural Development Corporation and the National Development Bank as 
Ali, S. A., 'Sudanese Financial Institutions and Their Functioning', in Growth Employment 
and Equity, Ali Mohamed El-Hassan, (ed. ) The International Labour Office ill Collaboration 
with the Economic and Social Research Council, Khartoum University Press, 1977, p. 6. 
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shown in the following Figure 8.1'. 
Table 8.1 shows the assets and liabilities of the Bank of Sudan for the period of 
31st. December 1986 and 1987. 
Table 8.1. 
ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF THE BANK OF SUDAN 
(. CS 0001s) 
31.12.1986 31.12.1987 
LIABILITIES 
Notes and Coins in Circulation 2,879.332 3,855.039 
Sight liabilities 
Central Government (2,474,966) (4,275,192) 
Banks : Commercial 2,013167 2,649,272 
: Specialized 86: 049 195,953 
Boards 7,732 17,458 
Payments Agreements - 369,473 Others 3669,348 5,433,983 
Time liabilities 1: 097,526 1,662,007 
Capital and Reserves 33,813 59,005 
Other Accounts 626,109 778,828 
TOTAL LIABILITIES 7,938,110 10,745,826 
ASSETS 
External Assets Eligible under section 32 of the 
Bank of Sudan Act. 
Foreign Notes, cheques and Bank Balances 116,956 26,022 
Foreign Securities 37969 37,661 
Other External Assets 1: 783 3,484 
Payments Agreements 220,240 - 
Loans and Advances: Commercial Banks 111,374 111,089 
S ecialized Banks 
r 
Femporary Advances - 
Long term loans to the Government 1730,300 1,730,300 
Advances 1: 656,179 2,283,179 
Participation in Banks 112,155 136,455 
Other participations 
Non - Transferable Treasury Bills 
10,351 
2,912,978 
10,351 
3,122,058 
Other Accounts 1,028,098 3,285,227 
TOTAL ASSETS 7,938,110 10,745,826 
Source: Bank of Sudan, Twenty Eighth Annual Report, 1987 
Ali. A. H., 'Finance and Credit', in The Agricultural Sector of Sudan, Policy and Systems 
Studies, Zahlan, A. B. (ed. ), Ithaca Press, London, 1986, p. 332. 
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FIGURE 8.1 The Formal Agricultural Sector Financial Systems 
Insignificant loans from the Sudanese 
Savina Bank 
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The economic and financial deterioration is apparent. The central government 
deposits with Bank of Sudan decreased by CS 1800.2 million during 1987. The 
government borrowing from the Bank of Sudan, on the other hand, increased by 
XS 209.1 million. As a result, the central government's net position with Bank 
of Sudan deteriorated by CS 2009.3 million during 1987 compared with a small 
deterioration of XS 1249.0 million in the preceding year. Furthermore, the net 
position of the specialized banks with the Bank of Sudan showed an increase of CS 
105.6 million. This resulted from an increase in their deposits of XS 109.9 million 
which was offset slightly by an increase in Bank of Sudan's participation in their 
capital of CS 4.3 million 3. 
Commercial banks deposits with Bank of Sudan showed a remarkable increase 
of CS 636.1 million whereas their temporary borrowing decreased by XS 0.3 niillion 
and the central bank's participation in their capital increased by XS 20.0 million. 
Thus, the net position of commercial banks with Bank of Sudan improved by XS 
616.4 million. 
8.2. Credit Policy and Priority Sectors for Finance 
The objective of government's monetary and credit policy in 1987 continued 
to be the containment of unwarranted growth of domestic liquidity with a view 
to relieving inflationery pressures, while ensuring availability of adequate finance 
for productive economic activities. As a result, commercial bank's free reserves 
were still restricted through an obligatory cash deposit in the Bank of Sudan, and 
ceilings continued to be prescribed on commercial bank's lending to their customers. 
Certain measures were introduced in an attempt to motivate savers. These included 
the following: 
(A) The reserve ratio of cash deposits of commercial banks to be kept in the 
Bank of Sudan remained at the previously prescribed 20% level. 
(B) Foreign banks were not allowed to accept deposits in local currency except 
for customers engaged in foreign trade, financing development projects, and for 
Bank of Sudan, twenty eighth annual report 1987, Khartoum, p. 59. 
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Sudanese nationals working abroad dealing with the same bank. 
(C) The prohibition of interbank lending has been maintainted, nor can com- 
mercial banks hold investment deposits on behalf of each other except in case of 
developmental purposes approved by the Bank of Sudan. 
(D) Banks are to keep all arrears due to foreign suppliers with the Bank of Sudan 
in a blocked account not to be drawn down except for the purpose of repayment of 
those arrears and after duly providing the foreign currency equivalent. 
With regard to the priority sectors for financing, the government was allotted 
a unified share of 80% of total bank credit as against 90% in the year 1986 for 
exports, working capital for industry and agriculture, handicrafts and medium and 
long-term development projects. 
For oil mill processing requirements, banks were instructed to make sure that the 
financing purchases of raw material should strictly be for genuine industrial purposes 
and not for trade. On the other hand financing of agricultural products for local 
trade, for example sesame, banks have to make sure that finance is provided only 
to either Sudan Oil Seeds Company directly or to those traders who have contracts 
with the Company. 
With respect to credit policy in the sphere of import financing, government pol- 
icy continues to have the objective of limiting the imports of non-basic commodities 
and the restricting of the hoarding of necessary goods. Furthermore, refinancing of 
local trade is not allowed, and the credit is to be liquidated within three month. 
Banks are directed to give great attention to requiring the customers to generally 
ensure a minimum of 25% finance by themselves and to have goods stored with the 
financing bank. A Bank decree has also prohibited financing the purchase and stor- 
age of certain essential consumers goods, speculative activities, personal loans, real 
estate and refinance of goods imported through own resources of foreign exchange 
except for essential inputs. 
Due to this critical situation the authorities have decided to limit financing 
through overdrafts to explicity specified purposes. Payments have to be made 
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against sufficient guarantees, and direct to the ultimate beneficiary. 
8.3. Commercial Banks 
Table 8.2 highlights the position of commercial banks at the end of December 
1987 through a consolidated balance sheet. 
Table 8.2. 
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET OF COMMERCIAL BANKS 
(. CS 000's) 
31.12.1986 31.12.1987 
LIABILITIES 
Deposits: 
Central & Regional Government 688,066 1,120,507 
Public Entities 2051151 261,089 
Private Sector 4,234,712 5,786,160 
Balance Due to Banks: 
Bank of Sudan 11,644 9,663 
Local Commercial Banks 18,022 11,474 
Foreign Correspondents 414,822 535,935 
Capital Accounts 722,879 847,332 
Other Liabilities 1,019,335 1,311,356 
ASSETS 
Reserves 2,694,741 3,282,758 
Domestic Cash (119,095 ý (230,245 ý 
Balance with Bank of Sudan (2,575,646 (3,052,513 
Due from local Commercial Banks 42,876 15,87,; 
Foreign Correspondents 1,234,812 1,595,294 
Treasury Bills & Govt. Securities 601157 61,014 
Advances to Private Sector 2,637,597 3,792,623 
Other Assets 703,448 1,135,962 
TOTAL ASSETS= TOTAL LIABILITIES 7,373,631 9,883,525 
Source: Bank of Sudan, Twenty Eighth Annual Report, 1987 
It is apparent that the total deposits held with the commercial banks increased 
by about 40% during 1987 compared with a slightly higher rate of growth of 42% 
recorded in the previous year. In absolute terms, total deposits rose by rS 2031 
million at the end of December 1987 compared with XS 1514 million at the end of 
the previous year. But if we take inflation into consideration then the total deposits 
decrease. 
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Also the breakdown of total deposits shows that the increase of XS 2031 mil- 
lion in the total deposits during 1987 was mainly concentrated in current account 
deposits which went up sharply by XS 1454 million or 44% and constituted about 
72% of the total increase in deposits held with commercial banks during 1987'. 
8.4. Special Purpose Banks 
I 
Three special-purpose banks play an important role in the Sudan in providing 
loans to credit sectors where there is an absence of alternative sources of funds. 
The Sudanese Real Estate Bank was estblished in 1966 and commenced oper- 
ations in the following year. The objectives of this bank are to provide financial 
assistance in the housing sector by means of extending long-term loans to individu- 
als for the purpose of constructing urban dwellings. No doubt, a housing shoitage 
in the rapidly growing urban centres of the Sudan provided the stimulus for estab- 
lishing the Real Estate Bank. The Bank is further charged with the responsibility 
of undertaking research designed to improve building standards and to promote the 
use of local materials in the construction industry. The total paid up capital of the 
Bank in 1973 was XS 3.6 million. With subsequent development the paid up capital 
of the Real Estate Bank equalled the subscribed capital of XS 15 million by the 
end of 1983. Since then the management of the Bank has attempted to increase the 
capital but has failed. The reason being the liquidity problem which has had a bad 
effect on advances. The advances made by the Bank during 1987 were at 54.9% and 
68% of the loans provided in 1985 and 1986 respectively. Since then the problem of 
liquidity has led the bank management to decide terminating commercial credit to 
the public'. 
The Industrial Bank of Sudan (IBS) was established in 1961 to assist and pro- 
mote the establishment and modernisation of private industrial enterprises in the 
Sudan, and to encourage the participation of both internal and external private 
capital in Sudanese enterprises. On 30 May, 1973 the Industrial Bank's paid-up 
Bank of Sudan, op. cit. p. Go. 
The Public Institute for Economic Research, Economic Scene for 198711988, Ministry of 
Economy and Foreign Trade, Khartoum, July 1988, p. 158. 
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capital was XS 2.8 million, all of which was owned by the Bank of Sudan. The 
Industrial Bank can finance public sector as well as private sector enterprises in the 
form of equity and loan investments. The Industrial Bank is authorised to obtain 
additional funds over and above its paid up capital by borrowing. However, bor- 
rowing is limited to three times its own net worth. The Industrial Bank may be 
expected to play an important role in the Sudan's financial development. 
The Industrial Bank of Sudan is the only specialised financial institution in the 
Sudan catering for the long-term credit requirements of the industrial sector. During 
periods of economic and financial austerity ceilings on commercial bank credits 
fixed by the central bank at the insistence of the International Monetary Fund 
leave the banking sector little opportunity to expand credit, even when the banks 
possess sufficient liquidity. The Industrial Bank is limited in that its maximurn'loan 
exposure to any single enterprise cannot exceed 20% of its net worth in the case of 
a public sector corporation, 15% of its net worth in the case of a partnership, and 
10% of its net worth in other cases. Industrial Bank's maximum exposure in the 
equity of an enterprise cannot exceed 10% of its net worth. And finally, IBS can 
lend up to a maximum of two-thirds of the total cost of a project. 
According to the Bank of Sudan report of 1987, the IBS extended loans totalling 
XS 25.6 million compared with a smaller amount of XS 3.6 million during 1986. 
Fixed assets financing amounted to 53.6% of the total and working capital 46.4% 
as against 63% and 37% respectively for 1986', as shown in Table 8.3. 
Bank of Sudan, op. cit. p. 63 
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Table 8.3. 
DISTRIBUTION OF LOANS EXTENDED BY THE 
INDUSTRIAL BANK, DUIUNG 1987 
(. CS. 000) 
REGION FINANCE OF WORKING 
CAPITAL 
FINANCE OF FIXED 
CAPITAL 
TOTAL % 
Khartoum 7,059.6 4,812.0 11,871.6 46.3 
Central 4,837.2 4,361.9 9,199.1 35.0 
Eastern - 3,580.6 3,580.6 14.0 
Western - 83.0 83.0 0.3 
Sothern - - - 
Northern - 905.0 905,0 3.5 
TOTAL 11,896.8 13,742.5 25,639.3 1100.0 1 
Source: Bank of Sudan) Twenty Eight Annual Report, 1987 
Significantly it was found that Khartoum received a large portion of the loans 
along with the Central region whereas other regions received only small sums. This 
is the position in most LDCs where most of the finance is deployed in the capital 
of the country. 
8.5. Savings Institutions 
8.5.1. The Sudanese Savings Bank (SSB) 
The Sudanese Savings Bank was established in 1974 and began functioning in 
December of that year. The Bank now has a number of branches and mobile bank 
units in major towns of the Central Region. Its objectives are the "propagation 
and encouragement of the habit of saving among the local population and collec- 
tion and investment of the savings mobilised for the development of economic and 
social aspects in the Sudan". The specific objectives were to encourage voluntary 
savings, large and small, in local regions for locally oriented investment and to ex- 
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tend banking services to locations not served by commercial banks. The authorised 
capital of the Bank, XS 0.5 million at its inception, rose to XS 3 million by 1978. 
This capital was obtained interest free from the Bank of Sudan 7. 
The SSB runs three types of accounts but with greater flexibility than the 
commercial banks. Service charges are collected on current accounts. The savings 
account carries an 8% annual interest rate. The investment account, which requires 
savers to invest for a certain period of time, carries a 9% interest. 
It has been noticed that the total credit facilities extended by the Bank during 
1987, amounted to XS 114.0 million compared with XS 96.6 million during 1986. 
The greatest share of these advances amounting to 43.8%, was provided to the 
commercial sector. Table 8.4 gives a breakdown of the advances made by the Bank. 
Table 8.4. 
THE SUDANESE SAVINGS BANK CREDIT 
(. CS. 000 9s) 
DECEMBER 1986 DECEMBER 1987 
SECTOR 
Amount of Total Amount of Total 
Private & Professional Loans 896 0.9 1,394 1.2 
Industrial Finance 6,718 7.0 6,775 5.9 
Agricultural Finance 21,250 22.0 21,053 18.5 
Commercial Finance 42,593 44.1 49,946 43.8 
Services 8,197 8.5 11,805 10.4 
Handicrafts 1,731 1.8 2,066 1.8 
Housing 11010 1.0 1,963 1.7 
Transport 1,021 1.1 10,434 9.1 
Staff Loans 2,914 3.0 4,549 4.0 
Others 10,280 10.6 4,050 3.6 
TOTAL 96,610 100.0 114,035 100.0 
Source: Bank of Sudan, Twenty, Eighth Annual Report, 1987 
I Ali, A. H. op. cit. p. 340. 
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8.5.2. The Post Office Savings Bank (POSB) and Premium Savings Bonds 
(PSB) Project 
The POSB and the PSB were inititated as convenient ways of mobilising small 
savings. Both are handled by post offices in areas not served by commercial banks. 
While no interest is paid on premium savings bonds, savings deposit carries an 8% 
annual interest rate. Premium bonds were first issued in 1974. The value of each 
bond is one Sudanese pound. Three times each month, 134 prizes valued at a total 
of XS 5000 are drawn and the awarding of these prizes is used to encourage people 
to buy these bonds. Between 1977 and 1981 the number of bonds sold was 22,892 
million whereas 20,407 million were redeemed. The total nominal amount of savings 
deposits with the POSB increased from XS 15 million in 1977 to XS 21 million in 
1981. 
The money mobilised by the sale of premium bonds and through post office sav- 
ings deposits is invested in development projects in accordance with the directives 
of the Minister of Finance and National Economy. 
I 
8.6. Other Local Financial Institutions 
The Sudanese Rural Development Corporation (SRDC) and the National De- 
velopment Bank(NDB) are two examples of rural development corporations set up 
to look after the needs of rural areas. SRDC and NDB are not directly involved in 
financing agricultural production but cater to the service sector and related off-farm 
activities. They also contribute to the capital of other institutions working in the 
area. 
A number of Islamic banks and their branches are now in operation and provide 
interest free loans and work on the basis of profit-sharing. The Faisal Islamic Bank 
of Sudan(FIBS) is one and was incorporated in 1974 as a public company under the 
Companies Act (1925) with its, headquarters in Khartoum. The bank endeavours 
to stimulate social and economic development through the provision of banking ser- 
vices, financial transactions, commercial operations and other investment activities 
while conforming with the economic principles of the Islamic shariah Code. 
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It is our view that the emergence of these new jointly owned private commer- 
cial banks and the immediate success of the first, the FIBS, is perhaps the most 
significant of all policies and developments in Sudanese banking which we have wit- 
nessed over the last two or three decades. It reflects the gradual emergence of a 
new source for financing capital formation. Until the late 1970's, despite nation- 
alisation, there was very little change in the overall pattern of commercial bank 
lending. By far the largest proportion 80 to 90% of total commercial bank credit 
was made up of short term loans. More than 40% of all advances were extended to 
import-export merchants, with increasing proportion for industrial (trade) credit. 
Loans to agricultural and industrial producers for investment purposes were, until 
the late seventies, negligible, and even in the latest year for which data is available, 
accounted for less than 20% of total advances. 
An important factor in the code of behaviour of the Bank is that interest charges 
are completely eliminated from its activities. This prohibits any charges or bank 
returns fixed in advance on money lent (or borrowed) by the Bank. The FIBS 
currently uses four types of contracts, mainly musharakah, mudarabah, murabaha 
and qard al-hasanah. 
In the first three contracts, the risk element justifies the taking of profit un- 
der Islamic shariah; the Bank shares losses and gains. The first type of con- 
i tract (musharakah) is by far the most popular. However, the extent of the investi- 
gation and supervision undertaken by the Bank on such loans constitutes a heavy 
burden on its resources. 
It is clear that a very few agricultural loans have been provided by most Islamic 
banks in Sudan as agriculture is considered a high risk area (thought it has the 
potential, as we will examine when we analyse the experience of Sudanese Islamic 
Bank in musharakah financing). By excluding the agricultural sector which is the 
heart of the Sudanese economy, the FIBS serves only special segments of the market, 
mainly concerned with trade activities and short-term investments. 
The experience of the FIBS as Sudan's first Islamic bank, in spite of its com- 
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mercial success in the last decade, has been met with criticism from the bankers 
working in this area, on the basis that the largest proportion of its total credit was 
made up of short term investment in murabaha and mudarabah. There has been 
little praise from academics, planners, policy-makers and others concerned with 
current developments in Sudan's political economy. While we agree that these are 
important issues that need to be considered in any analysis of Islamic banking, we 
are of the opinion that we should not lose sight of the potentially far-reaching im- 
plications that the current commercial success and expansion of the Islamic banks 
could have for economic and Political developments in Sudan's medium and longer 
term future. 
Due to its success, other Islamic banks were established and the Sudanese au- 
thorities have supported the Islamic banks movement. In consequence, three other 
banks opened in 1983; El-Tadamon Islamic Bank, the Sudanese Islamic Bank and 
the Islamic Co-operative Development Bank owned by co-operative unions. In 1984, 
two Islamic banks started operations; the Al-Baraka Bank (Sudan), and the Islamic 
Bank for Western Sudan. On the other hand, due to the economic and financial en- 
vironment which is not encouraging, various foreign and joint-venture banks carry 
out their normal banking activities, but they make no direct contribution to the 
financing of agricultural production. 
The former regime in Sudan enacted Islamic laws in September 1983. As a result 
of this, non- Islamic commercial banks were asked to change their business activities 
to be consistent with-the Islamic shariah, and in September 1984 the banking system 
was 'Islamised. It has been noticed recently that a number of Islamic companies 
like the Islamic Investment Company and the Islamic Development Company were 
licenced under the Companies Act (1925) to work in Sudan with Sudanese and other 
Arab subscribed capital. But the experiences of these companies in agricultural 
production is not encouraging, and they are not expected to contribute significantly 
to actual investment in this vital sector. 
Shaaeldin, E. and Brown, R., 'Towards an Understanding of Islamic Banking in Sudan: The 
Case of the Faisal Islamic Bank', in Sudan State, Capital and Transformation, T. Barnett and 
A, Abdelkarim (eds. ), Croom Helm, London, 1988, p. 135. 
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8.7. Evaluation of Current Economic Activities of Islamic Banks in Medium 
and Long-term Financing 
There is no doubt that one of the main development objectives which Islamic 
banks (IBs) have adopted in Sudan since their inception, is to support large seg- 
ments of the society through their financing of medium and long term projects in 
order to alleviate the problem of development faced by the country. The small farm- 
. 
ers, businesses and handicraft workers, who in the past had no chance to receive any 
credit from the conventional banks because they were not deemed creditworthy, have 
realised that their hopes might be achieved through Islamic financial institutions. 
If we analyse the IB's priorities from the perspective which the policy makers 
have put forward to achieve the development objectives, we will realise that during 
the last decade or so very little has been accomplished to help the poor in Sudan. 
In spite of the Islamic banks success during the last ten years, in terms of 
financial achievement these were mainly concentrated in short-term financing, which 
was more or less similar to the commercial conventional banks. The ratio of short- 
I term 
financing by all IBs in Sudan up to the end of 1986 was approximatly 82% of 
the total loan and credit extended by these banks. This ratio was even higher for 
some of the banks, and reached 96%. Table 8.5 gives a breakdown for the various 
Islamic banks. 
The financing of medium and long-term investment extended by these banks 
was less than 18% of the total financing extended by the end of 1986. A large share 
was extended to companies and other financial institutions or subsidiaries of these 
companies through equity particiption. 
If we examined Table 8.6 throughly, we will realise that the development ac- 
tivities which medium and long term investment involve are indeed very limited. 
In the case of Faisal Islamic Bank, the contribution towards financing development 
activities like in the handicraft sector is not more than 2% of the total financing. 
The total amount extended by the Bank to small business and small handicraft 
was XS 18 million during the period of 1980-1986. Such financing, however, can be 
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Table 8.5. 
CREDIT FACILITIES IN ISLAMIC BANKS IN 1986 
(XS. Million) 
Bank Short term % Medium & 
Long term 
% total 
Sudanese Islamic Bank 49,74 89 5,94 11 55,68 
Al-Baraka Bank (Sudan) 44,44 88 5,92 12 50,36 
Islamic Bank for Western Sudan 16,56 96 0,63 4 17,19 
Faisal Islamic Bank 99,41 78 27,94 22 127,35 
Tadamon Islamic Bank 12,64 53 11,34 47 23,98 
Islamic Cooperative Deve. B ank 36,11 91 3,42 9 
TOTAL 258,90 82 55,19 1 18 1314,09 
Source: Abdul Kadar, M. "Strategy of Sudanese Islamic 
Bank in medium and long-term financing", 
Al-Sayasa Newspaper, Khartoum, February 1989. 
considered as commercially oriented rather than for develoPment. 
To sum up this section, the development effects of Islamic bank financing in 
Sudan were limited though the commercial success was very obvious during the last 
decade. In other words, the initial period during which IBs aimed at setting up a 
proper foundation has been accomplished, and it is time that IBs entered the field 
of medium and long-term development financing. Some of IBs have argued that 
they are avoiding such investment due to an unhealthy environment prevailing in 
the country and the risk involved is very high. 
One might argue that the IBs objectives are real. Islamic banks have a respon- 
sibility towards their depositors as well. If they do not get adequate returns, then 
they will withdraw their funds. The difficulty is to get adequate long term returns 
in real terms when inflation is high, as in Sudan. This is a problem at the macro 
level. At the micro level the problem is risk of default and uncertainty over project 
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Table 8.6. 
INVESTMENT DISTRIBUTION OF MEDIUM AND LONG-TERM 
FINANCING OF ISLAMIC BANKS FOR 1986 
(. CS. 000) 
Bank A % B % C % total 
Sudanese Islamic Bank 900 15 4,950 83 90 2 5,940 
Al-Baraka Bank (Sudan) - 4,379 74 1,542 , 26 5,921 
Islamic Bank for Western Sudan - 0,300 48 0,330 52 630 
Faisal Islamic Bank 14,920, 53 10,600 38 2,420 9 27,940, 
Tadamon Islamic Bank 5,343 47 6)000 53 - - 11,343 
Islamic Cooperative Deve. Bank - - 500 15 2,924 85 3,424 
TOTAL 21,1631 38 26,729 48 7,306 14 55,1981 
Source: Abdul Kadar, M, same as above 
A: Contribution in Banks and Financial Institutions. 
B: Contribution in Subsidary Companies. 
C. Others contribution. 
returns. 
We are of the opinion, that such an argument is baseless. Most of the IBs have 
gained the experience and should have learned from past mistakes. Islamic banks 
in Sudan have the capacity and the resources to achieve the development target 
with some of the risks invloved. No doubt, investment in medium and long-term 
musharakah financing project requires a clear cut strategy, and setting up of units 
for follow up and monitoring by the concerned bank in order to achieve some success 
on the micro level. 
8.8. Informal Credit Financing 
In the past, as in the case of most LDCs, informal credit was the only source 
of farm credit known in Sudan and the informal rural financial markets still remain 
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dominant in the provision of credit and other services for agricultural activities. 
They have been categorised into professional money lenders, traders and shopkeep- 
ers, landlords, relatives and friends in addition to informal versions of the shail 
system. 
Although formal sources of credit carry low nominal rates of interest of 7 to 
12%, informal lenders who charge high interest rates continue to exist in many 
countries. In recent studies, the volume of credit provided by these informal markets 
in developing countries was found to be high; 66% in Mexico, 68% in Nigeria, 75% 
in the Philippines, 90% in Pakistan and 71% in the Gezira Scheme in Sudan. 
In Sudan, as in many developing countries, the greatest proportion of agricul- 
tural credit is supplied through moneylenders. One such system of agricultural 
credit known as "Shail" is prevalent in the Sudan among the poor tenants who rep- 
resent a large segment of the society. The poor tenants who are already suffering 
from shortages of cash and low incomes, are in need of immediate cash. This forces 
them into heavy indebtness to the rich tenants and money lenders. A part from 
the obvious exploitative relation expressed in the form of exorbitant interest rates, 
shail has a number of implications which are examined elsewhere in this thesis'. 
8.9. Conclusions 
The financia. 1 institutions in general play a major role in securing scarce foreign 
reserves and can participate in economic development. The chapter has critically 
analysed the formal and informal financial and credit system in Sudan. 
As to the use of credit, it was clear that its characteristic feature of "short- 
term" has not changed since independence in 1956. Financing of foreign trade also 
remains a feature of bank credit. In 1987 the government was allotted a unified 
share of 80% of total bank credit for exports, working capital for industry and for 
agriculture, handicrafts and medium and long-term development projects. 
Medani, A. I., '11isk and Uncertainty in Sudan Agriculture', Sudan Journal of Administration 
and Development, Vol. VIII, 1972, p. 39. 
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As a formal financial institution, the Agricultural Bank of Sudan was found to 
be the only organization that provides a significant amount of funds to private agri- 
cultural producers. The Bank of Sudan provides seasonal loans and working capital 
for the Public Agricultural Production Corporations through budgetary allocations. 
Commercial Banks and other rural financial institutions only serve the import and 
export trade with very little direct investment in agricultural production which is 
considered a high risk area. 
There is little doubt that the Islamic banks in Sudan have been very successful 
in the last decade in short-term financing like mudarabah and murabaha, in spite of 
its new experience in this field. But the real challenge to them at the present time 
and in the future is the extent to which they are willing to enter the medium and 
long-term financing through equity participation in order to bring about economic 
development. The later should be one of the main objectives of Islamic banks 
rather than the short term aim of profit maximization. The sacrifice of short term 
profit may be necessary in the interests of longer term reward. Persuading private 
depositors of the necessity of sacrifice for the sake of a future generation may be 
difficult, but on the other hand governments, which usually take only a short term 
view in developing countries, seem incapable of performing this task. The task of 
economic development will encounter many problems in Sudan because its success 
or failure does not necessarily depend on the management of the banks, but it quite 
often depends on the rules and regulations imposed by the Bank of Sudan and the 
, economic 
environment prevailing. However, some success has been achieved (as we 
will be examining in the forthcoming chapter) by some of Islamic banks like the 
Sudanese Islamic bank in financing small farmers through musharakah participation. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
THE AGRICULTURAL BANK OF SUDAN: 
ITS ROLE AND SIGNIFICANCE IN 
RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the role of the Agricultural Bank of 
Sudan (henceforth the ABS) and its significance in rural development. The chapter 
will be divided into eleven sections. First, we will discuss the bank's main objec- 
tives, including a subsection which examines the bank's activities, sources of capital, 
investment operations and its loans procedures. Second, the co-operative s9ciety 
and third farm'structure within the bank's organisational framework will be identi- 
fied. Fourth, methodology for the case study and its scope will be identified. Fifth, 
we will highlight the main characteristics of the sampled areas of Kamelen and Jaili 
where the ABS operates. Here a subsection is included where topics such as land, 
labour, farm activities, capital requirement of farms within those schemes served 
by the Bank and other general characteristics (e. g. marketing, transportation and 
securities) are discussed. Sixth, we will examine the type of farming activity within 
the schemes, family structure, crop production and its importance for the farmers 
and their cash crops. Seventh, farmers' incomes in the Sudanese context will be 
discussed and a subsection assesses the difference between the formal and informal 
lending sectors, as well as the disadvantages of informal lending within the agricul- 
tural sector. Eighth, we will examine agricultural credit. Ninth, the relation of the 
farmer with financial institutions will be dealt with and a subsection assesses the 
problems facing farmers. Tenth, credit and facilities will be highlighted and com- 
ments by the farmers will be examined. Finally, certain conclusions will be drawn 
and a number of suggestions for farm improvements in the rural areas made. 
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9.1. The Bank's Objectives 
The Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS) was established by the government to 
supervise an area neglected by other financial institutions and is the only specialised 
agricultural lending institution. The Bank operates through 24 branches and sub- 
branches (called offices) which cover a limited area. The Agricultural Bank Act was 
passed in 1957. The Bank became active in 1959 as an independent corporation 
with a Board of Directors who were fully entrusted with policy making and man- 
agement. The objectives were to support agriculture and other incidental, ancillary 
and subsidiary activities by offering assistance in cash, kind, goods or services to 
approved persons who are primarily engaged in agriculture or associated industries. 
The following points were stressed in the Act: 
(a) Preference was to be given to small and medium loans to farmers and coop- 
eratives. 
(b) The Bank was to help in increasing productivity by supplying improved 
seeds, insecticides, fertiliser and extension services. 
(c) The Bank was to assist producers in the handling, storage and marketing 
of crops and provide expert knowledge and information regarding marketing condi- 
tions'. 
9.1.1. The Bank's Activities 
The main activity of the ABS is the granting of three types of loans, short-term 
or seasonal loans, medium, and long-term loans to both private farms and to coop- 
eratives. At present the share of long-term loans is insignificant and the Bank has 
concentrated on short-term lending intended to meet costs incurred in production 
and marketing. A small number of medium-term loans have been issued for the pur- 
chase of agricultural implements, cattle and the improvement of irrigation systems 
and farm buildings. Some long-term loans have been granted to establish new agri- 
cultural projects and for major improvements in projects already established. The 
Lees, F. A. and Brooks, H. C., The Economic and Political Development of the Sudan, The Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 1977, p. 93. 
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maximum repayment period is 15 months, immediately after harvest for short-term 
lending, and the rate of interest charged is 8%. Five years is usual for medium-term 
lending, with an annual interest rate of 9%, and 10 years for long-term lending at 
the same annual rate of 9%. 
'V_ For short-term lending the Bank accepts collateral including land, buildings, 
crops to be harvested or in store, implements, bonds and shares, and guarantees by 
the government, public institutions, autonomous agencies or cooperatives. 
For medium and long-term lending the Bank requires securities of registered 
land or buildings, letters of credit from commercial banks, shares and bonds and 
guarantees from government, public corporations and unions. The value of the 
security has to be 30% more than the amount of the approved loan. 
Figure 9.1 reveals that the loans approved by the Bank during 1980-1986. have 
lately been concentrated on short-term credit for which there is a great demand in 
the modern rainfed sector. Medium and long-term credit have been at a lower level, 
which indicates that the Bank is more commercially rather than developmentally 
motivated in its assistance to small farmers. 
9.1.2. Sources of Capital 
In 1982 the paid up capital of the ABS was XS 25 million. Prior to 1964 the 
paid up capital was only CS 3 million out of the CS 5 million authorised by the 
government. The governments' share was 40% while the rest was made up by the 
Bank of Sudan. This CS 3 million included about CS 0.75 million in uncollected 
loans made to individuals and cooperatives which were transferred to the Bank by 
the Ministry of Finance and National Economy. In 1964 the Bank of Sudan paid in 
full its share of CS 2 million bringing the ABS capital up to CS 5 million. In 1969 
the Bank of Sudan bought out the government's share and provided the revised 
authorised capital of XS 7 million. The paid up capital was raised to CS 9 million 
in 1980 and to CS 13.1 million in 1981. In addition to this the ABS was authorised 
to borrow up to CS 3 million from the Bank of Sudan, at an interest rate of 6.5% 
annually. This rate was raised to 14.5% 1983, and since the ABS is authorised to 
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charge its borrowers a maximum of 12% only at present, this source of liquidity is 
no longer used. 
Apart from the capital provided by the Bank of Sudan, the main financial 
sources of the ABS have been the profit obtained in the course of its trading ac- 
tivities, the rent earned from the storage of crops and the interest on agricultural 
loans and commercial commissions. The ABS has also accepted deposits from the 
public at its commercial branches in Dongola and Zalingi. 
In recent years the Bank has been granted loan facilities by international or- 
ganisations such as the International Development Association (IDA), the African 
Development Bank and in addition. certain facilities under the French Protocol2. 
The IDA is at present financing an Agricultural Service Project which will b. e ex- 
ecuted at farm level. The objectives of this project are to modernise traditional 
cultivation in Um Ruwaba and Rubatab; to improve production and marketing in 
the Kassala and Selairn Basin and to provide agricultural services through twelve 
of its branches, besides strengthening the bank's headquarters. The total cost of 
the project is estimated at XS 35.6 million. Of this, XS 18 million will be derived 
from non-Sudanese sources. 
9.1.3. Investment Activities 
Although it was established in order to serve the needs of small and medium- 
sized farmers, one of the first activities of the ABS was to finance large private 
cotton schemes in the White Nile and Blue Nile Provinces. Minor activities included 
financing mechanised sorghum harvesting schemes and machinery purchases. The 
indebtedness of the private cotton schemes reached a maximum of XS 5.7 million 
during 1967- 68. At the end of 1968 the ABS curtailed the financing of schemes 
which had failed to make repayments. However, since these schemes were important 
in providing a livelihood for the region's population (being the main source of cash, 
staple foods, fodder and water for animals), the government decided to take over 
2 Ibrahim, K. M., The Experience of the Banks and other Sudanese Institutions in Financing 
Agricultural Projects, Paper presented to the National Session on Administrating Agricultural 
Credit, Khartoum, December 1987, p. 12. 
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the running of these schemes and set up an Agrarian Reform Corporation for this 
purpose. 
9.1.4. Loans Procedures 
In order to qualify for loans, the following procedures have to be followed and 
conditions fulfilled: 
(a) The applicant should apply for the loan on the prescribed form(s). 
(b) Documents, invoices and other certificates required have to be attached. e. g. 
estate search certificates, the licence of the scheme, a budget showing the estimated 
cost of the different operations, the amount of the required loan should be shown 
and the application's contribution should be stated clearly. 
(c) The agricultural inspector of the Bank has to visit the scheme and write a 
comprehensive report about the scheme. 
(d) Based on the above detailed information, the branch manager and the loan 
inspector will study the loan application to find out whether the project is viable 
or not. 
(e) Loans which come under the financial powers of the branch manager shall 
be approved locally, otherwise the application is sent to headquarters to be studied 
and evaluated by the loan section who submit a note for final approval by the 
management. 
As for the authorization, it should be noted that the branch manager has the ca- 
pacity to approve short-term loans for up to CS 1000 for any single scheme according 
to the budget approved by headquarters for different crops. Also the management 
of the ABS are authorized to approve loans of short and medium term up to XS 
3000 for one project. Finally, the authority for approving loans above XS 3000 is 
vested in the board of directors. 
With regard to the repayment of loans, every loan provided by the ABS must 
have a repayment programme satisfactory to the Bank, but a borrower will be at 
liberty, on giving notice of not less than one month in the case of short-term loans, 
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two months in the case of medium-term loans, and three months in the case of long 
term loans, to make full repayment in respect of any loan before it becomes due 
and to pay interest only up to that date. 
To sum up this section, it is clear that the conditions and policies adopted by 
the ABS, in common with the land policy, can only be met by a limited group, 
namely the merchants and commercial bourgeoisie. Only the merchants with large 
resources can afford to meet the Bank's requirements for getting loans. Thus one can 
argue that the government through its own Agricultural Bank is adopting policies 
that exclude the majority of the small farmers from any credit subsidies. This is 
in fact the case since the farmers lack the resources needed to satisfy the Bank's 
conditions for credit. 
9.2. The Co-operative Societies 
According to the ordinance of 1948, which came into force in September 1949, 
a co-operative society can be defined as "a society of ten or more members whose 
object is the promotion of the economic interests of its members in accordance 
with co-operative principles: provided that when one of its members is a registered 
society the number of members may be less than ten. " 
As in the case of most agricultural co-operatives, according to the ABS policy, 
the society should fulfill the following conditions: 
(a) It should be registered. 
(b) The general assembly of the society should approve the request for the loan; 
(c) The registrar of societies should approve and recommend the request for the 
loan; 
(d) The last balance sheet should be attached; 
(e) A list showing the property of the co-operative society and its market value 
should be attached and certified by the representative of the co-operative depart- 
ment in the region. 
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9.3. Farm Structure and Organization 
The ABS distinguishes between three types of farms as far as the organization of 
production is concerned. This can be identified according to ownership and sources 
of finance. These include the following: 
(i) State farms; 
(ii) Private farms: managed and financed by private operators; 
(iii) Supervised farms: financed by the World Bank but owned and managed by 
private operators; 
Initially the state mechanized farms were established to meet the following ob- 
jectives as outlined in the five year plan 1970/71 - 1971-74: 
(1) to contribute to national income by raising output; 
(2) to strengthen the public sector; 
(3) to stabilize the prices of food grain i. e. dura; 
(4) to increase foreign exchange through exports; 
(5) to provide an example to be followed by the private sector. 
The World Bank used its financial influence and weight to affect state policies 
and managed to subordinate the state farms to the interest of private capital ac- 
cumulation. Instead of expanding production to contribute to the national food 
requirements the state farms were involved in improved varieties research and ex- 
periments for the benefit of private capital. Thus the role of the state farms in 
increasing production and productivity was ignored if not suppressed. Dura pro- 
duction on state farms has fluctuated sharply and in most cases has experienced a 
declining trend. 
These financial losses were used by the World Bank as proof of the inefficiency of 
state farms and to press for the state's withdrawal from production. In fact the state 
farms were deliberately frustrated in mechanized production to prove the superiority 
of the private ventures in contrast to the public enterprises. Consequently, as a result 
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of the World Bank pressure, the state started to withdraw from production. As a 
result the state farms were reduced to a very small area of 800 feddans to conduct 
experimental research. 
9.4. Methodology for the Case Study 
9.4.1. Purpose of Study 
The field work reported in this study is analysed in two seperate parts. The 
part presented here concerns the role of Agricultural Bank of Sudan in rural de- 
velopment and the other, in Chapter Eleven, is concerned with the participation 
of the Sudanese Islamic Bank, in financing small farmers in rural areas. The main 
concern of this chapter is to analyse the field work on the role of ABS. It provides 
a survey of one of the main traditional financial development institution (ABS) in 
the country with the major aims: 
(1) To investigate the role of the Agricultural Bank of Sudan and its significance 
in rural areas through the loans extended to the small farmers in the traditional 
sector. 
(2) To analyse the economic and financial competence of the Agricultural Bank 
of Sudan (based on debt financing) and how far has it succeeded in achieving its 
objectives. 
(3) To identify the environmental elements within which the Bank operates, 
which may influence its policies and the fact that small loans are costly to administer 
and have a comparatively higher risk. 
9.4.2. Method of Study 
The study is based on a case study approach. The data were collected during the 
months of Feburary and March 1989 from three main sources. First, a questionnaire 
survey was undertaken on a random sample of 100 small farmers, concentrating on 
detailed agro-economic information including the size of farms, the kind of crops, 
annual income and the main source of income. Details of other financial inputs 
into agriculture and the agriculture credit were also collected. Secondly, informal 
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interviews were conducted with small farmers, discussing mainly their problems, 
opinions and attitudes to agriculture and to the whole process of development. 
Finally, interviews with many officials yielded a considerable amount of background 
information, and practical experience in the field provided useful insights about the 
nature of the problems. 
9.4.3. Scope of Study 
At the outset, the questionnaires were distributed among small farmers who 
deal either with the Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS), as a traditional develop- 
ment institution, or the Sudanese Islamic Bank (SIB), as an Islamic development 
organisation which has developed its main operation on a profit-sharing system. 
Fifty out of the hundred questionnaire were given to the farmers who deal with 
the ABS in two areas: principally in Kamelen, the capital of thb Gezira-Bahri, as 
well as Jaili. The remaining fifty were distributed to the small farmers who deal with 
the Sudanese Islamic Bank in two main areas, mainly Shehenab and Gezira-Islang. 
It has to be emphasised that the main reason behind distributing this ques- 
tionnaire in terms of two institution is to examine to what extent the concept of 
musharakah financing in agriculture (which has been iniatiated by the SIB) has 
succeeded, relatively speaking, in overcoming the problems of rural development in 
the Sudan. 
9.5. Characteristics of the Sampled Areas 
9.5.1. Land 
The agricultural lands in the Kamelen and Jaili schemes are irrigated by gravity 
from river Nile. In addition to this, private land and leaseholds are also cultivated 
by some of the farmers. These private lands and leaseholds include the basins along 
the Blue Nile, irrigated by pumps or'flood water and devoted to vegetables, fruit 
and fodder crops. 
The main agricultural area is that which is under the scheme itself. In addition 
to crop production, some of the land is alloted for fruit and fodder production. 
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Some of the farmers, particularly the wealthy, were alloted holdings for permanent 
orchards basically to provide their localities with fruit. 
Surprisingly, records on the quality of land in the scheme are not available, but 
it is the common belief in Sudan that the land in the north and north western areas 
is less fertile than that in the south. Reasons for this variation include soil erosion 
in the north due to grazing by the cattle of Arab tribes from the eastern bank of 
the Blue Nile and western bank of the White Nile and the nitrogen provided by the 
acacia trees in high rain areas in the south. 
The majority of the farmers cultivate vegetables for their subsistence. Other 
crops which require a considerable effort, such as fruit and fodder and much atten- 
tion like dura, wheat and forestry are cultivated by fewer farmers than those who 
cultivate dukhun and groundnuts. 
9.5.2. Labour 
The structure of the labour force in the Kamelen and Jaili schemes can be 
divided, according to source, into two broad categories: 
a. family labour; 
b. local hired labour; 
Family labour in the scheme can be defined to include all members of the house- 
hold such as the farmer, mother, father, wife or wives and children and other de- 
pendents all of whom contribute to the work of farming and depend primarily on 
the farm for their living. The average size of the family was relatively large. 
In spite of its large size, the family labour contribution to agricultural produc- 
tion was very low. On average, less than 4% of the total labour force was provided 
by the family. The reasons for this low contribution included: 
(a) the low farm returns and the hard terms under which credit can be obtained 
compelled the poor farmers to look for off-farm work to supplement their farm 
earnings. 
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(b) the marked tendency among the richer farmers to use hired labour rather 
than family labour. It was found out that only 4% of the total labour used was 
provided by family labQur in the case of the richer farmers. In addition to its effect 
on the overall family labour used, the tendency among the more affluent to use 
more hired labour had an adverse effect on the poor families in the sense that the 
children of the latter made as minimal a contribution as the children of the richer 
farmers; 
(c) certain agricultural operations are considered to be women's jobs. These 
include thinning, vegetable picking and the processing and collection of roots. Even 
for these jobs, women and children are called upon only when the farmers have 
insufficient cash to hire labour. 
b. Local Labour 
This includes the casual labour living within the scheme area and constitutes 
by far the most important source of labour. Local labour includes different types 
of people like the tenant farmers, their families and other landless members of the 
household. Some of the tenant farmers and their families work as casual hired 
labour on other people's farms particularly for fruit cutting and vegetable picking, 
while the landless may be casually employed while performing some other jobs in 
the village such as lorry drivers, tractor drivers and domestic jobs performed during 
the slack period. 
9.5.3. Farming Activities 
The farmers in the scheme cultivate crops such as vegetables, fruit, and fodder. 
Production is concentrated in the area of the Nilien project -and the Matrat, project 
close to the River Nile. This land is very rich and the farmers cultivate fruits 
including oranges, lemons, grapefruit and mango. Vegetables include onions, leafy 
crops, okra$ tomatoes, cucumbers and aubergines. In an experiement imported 
potatoes from Holland were planted in the scheme and the result was promising. 
However, agricultural practices in almost all the projects in the area are sim- 
3 Abdu, H., Agricultural Bank of Sudan, Khartoum, 1974, pp. 15-20. 
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ilar to the Gezira scheme and based on the share cropping concept. The system 
of shares among the partners was originated by the Sudan Government Inspector 
of Agriculture in the Tayiba Project in 1911. The system was based on the tradi- 
tional system, followed along the Nile, of the division of crops among the landowner, 
the farmer, the waterwheel owner and the ox-owner. In the traditional system the 
farmer gets two-fifths of the crop for his labour. The rest consists of the reward to 
the suppliers of the other resources. The same proportion of 40% to the tenants was 
used from 1913 to 1950. This share covers the cost of labour, seeds, agricultural im- 
plements, use of tillage animals and the tenants' profits. Out of the remaining 60% 
the government takes 35% for paying the interest on loans used in the development 
of the Gezira scheme, for amortization, maintenance of irrigation works, canals and 
rents to the natives for the lease of land. The rest, i. e. 25%, is the syndicate share 
to cover the cost of roads, drainage, subsidiary canalization, clearing and levelling, 
agricultural supervisory staff, accounting staff and profits. 
Share cropping was practiced in the scheme by many tenants particularly in 
vegetable production. The terms of share cropping vary between localities. The 
dominant system is of the tenant providing all the material, and paying for the 
contract work. Some tenant farmers share in the cost of hired labour for lifting 
and threshing, others deduct their share in the cost of hired labour from the other 
partner's share and some provide only the land. In all these systems, the final yield 
is divided equally between the two partners. Crop sharing in vegetables often occurs 
between the local people and the other partner who may be a tenant farmer himself 
or a landless member of the community. This could be due to the high returns from 
vegetables and to the fact that West African fallata settlers are not used to the crop 
and the problems of its marketing4. 
When the scheme was established, the crops cultivated were limited to vegeta- 
bles. This pattern remained the same for several years, during which time other 
crops were introduced. At present, the crops cultivated in the scheme include: veg- 
Al-Ani, K. S., 'The Gezira Scheme in the Sudan', unpublished Ph. D dissertation, Columbia 
University, U. S. A. 1959, pp. 212-222. 
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etables, fruit, dura, forestry and fodder crops. Wheat is also cultivated on a very 
limited scale. The rotation itself has changed over time as a result of the advance- 
ment of agricultural research and the need to put more of the fallow land under 
arable crops. Two rotations are now followed in the scheme. 
9.5.4. Capital Requirement for Each Main Crop 
(a) Vegetables: 
Cash returns per feddan are highest for vegetable crops. Working capital is 
needed for vegetable production through long periods and is offset by the almost 
continuous returns. Seed bed preparation continues for nearly two months and 
the land is ploughed many times between July and September to prepare a fine 
seed bed. Seeds are also purchased in July and planted in shades. Transplariting 
occurs in September and November. The high expenses incurred after November, 
in the cultivation of land for onions, are masked by the other vegetables' continuous 
returns. For this reason, the working capital requirement of vegetables are far higher 
than other crops. 
(b) Livestock and Fodder Production: 
The remaining farming activities consisted mainly of livestock rearing. These 
were owned by almost every farmer in the scheme to satisfy the family needs. The 
number and value of livestock owned vary considerably between poor and rich farm- 
ers. Livestock trials have been few and not very successful, and animal production 
is still regarded as part of the subsistence sector. The relative neglect of livestock 
is partly due to the complex technology involved in fodder preservation and partly 
due to the radical change in attitude required in transferring from traditional to 
commercial production, with its greater emphasis on quality rather than quantity. 
Fodder is also cultivated by the farmers. The farmers are allowed to cultivate 
lubia as a fodder for their animals and land is prepared for this purpose in the 
rotation but the actual area cultivated diminishes with time. At present, very few 
farmers cultivate lubia for grazing their animals. Apart from dura straw (Gassab) 
which is stacked in the field, fodder conservation is not practiced in the scheme. 
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Livestock production in the scheme is characterised by communal grazing partic- 
ularly during the rainy season, as well as by the widespread use of herdsmen. During 
the rainy season, from July until the end of August, livestock mainly depend on 
grazing the fallow for their food. Thereafter a few of the farmers, particularly the 
rich, purchase other feeds such as cakes and dura straw. Sales of milk are rare and 
characterised by low quantities if they occur. The main reason for low sales is the 
low milk yield. In some tribes, social customs also prevent milk sales. The receipts 
gained by the farmer are very low and result in positive periodical cash balances 
only in the case of the poor farmers who spend very little on the upkeep of their 
livestock. Among the rich farmers sharp decreases, at particular periods, in the 
cash balance can be observed due to purchases of cakes and dura straw. 
From the above analysis the basic feature of farms in the scheme that emerges 
is heavy and continuous expenses incurred in growing the vegetable crop. With 
the other crops such as fruit, heavy expenses are limited to periods of planting 
and harvest. The manner and time period in which capital is needed by the farm 
was, generally speaking, uniform due to the prescribed rotation and the seasonality 
of the cash expenses associated with each crop. However, the amount of working 
capital required varies considerably. 
9.5.5. Other General Characteristics 
The Bank, as a formal financial institution in the country (in the two schemes 
under study as well as in other areas) is faced with considerable problems. Some of 
these might be mitigated with difficulty, while other cannot be eliminated. However, 
efforts are being made to try at least partial solutions. These problems are of a 
general nature and might be justifiably said to apply not only to the two schemes 
but to many alternative situations. 
9.5.5.1. Storage and Marketing 
Marketing of crops such as vegetables and fruits is a problem of considerable 
importance. The price which a crop fetches at harvest time is lowest in the area 
of production. Thus the problem is related to storage and transportation. Storage, 
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which is an important part of the marketing process, is still a difficulty though it 
is receiving a good degree of consideration and promising improvements have been 
planned and are being put into operation. These are seen as partially offsetting the 
transportation bottlenecks. However in the case of perishables, particularly fruit 
and vegetables, there are many problems. Their seasonal nature and perishability 
calls for careful handling, particularly in tropical countries. There is a need for 
refrigerated trucks and vehicles and air-conditioned stores if the bank is to attempt 
to balance supply and demand. 
The bank must therefore bear in mind that efficient marketing and prosperity 
go together. Although underdeveloped marketing may be more an effect of under- 
development than a cause, increased marketing efficiency must be sought at the 
same time and with the same intensity as increased and more efficient productivity. 
9.5.5.2. Transportation 
In a vast and scantly populated country like the Sudan transport facilities are of 
paramount importance. One of the main difficulties facing the farmer is his inability 
to find relatively easy transportation of the crops he sells from the village to the 
urban centres. 
The transportation of the agricultural produce from production areas to con- 
sumption centres is a considerable problem confronting the bank. Transportation 
is one of the basic cornerstones of marketing. It has a direct effect on both inter- 
nal and foreign trade because of the distance between production and consumption 
centres. 
Bad roads and the small number of vehicles and lorries add to the problem. 
Most of the roads are not asphalted, thus causing rapid damage and depreciation 
of vehicles and lorries. They are also closed throughout the rainy season. Thus 
it is not uncommon to find an accumulation of crops in production centres await- 
ing transportation. This bottleneck occasionally materialises due to the fact that 
transportation costs rise very steeply forcing producers to sell at low prices to those 
merchants who have vehicles to transport the crops to the markets. 
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Among the factors that contribute to this problem are the undeveloped and 
unutilized river routes. If these were well utilized they could provide a smooth and 
efficient means of transportation. 
9.5.5.3. Securities 
A reasonable and satisfactory form of security is one of the key pre-requisites 
of a successful credit system at the Bank. It constitutes the sole guarantee for 
the smooth circulation of funds, for financing agriculture efficiently and effectively. 
When credit institutions extend their loans they usually lend on the basis of the 
security offered so that payment incapabilities do not paralyse their functions. 
A substantial majority of farmers in Sudan cannot offer the types of securities 
required by the Bank. Unregistered lands cannot be taken as security because 
the question of ownership-has not been clearly defined. This case is usually a 
characteristic of the western regions of the country. However, land fragmentation, 
a characteristic dominant in the northern parts of the Sudan, is another handicap 
to taking land as security. Here, as was pointed out earlier, the land is fragmented 
into such small farms that a unit by itself does not constitute a satisfactory security 
for adequate loans. Although it is tilled by one person, the ownership is shared 
by many due to the inheritance distribution according to Islamic law. The Bank's 
experience in this respect shows that if a customer falls to repay the loan and the 
mortgaged land has to be sold, his fellow villagers shrink from buying it because, 
as relatives, they resent such a measure. 
9.6. Type of Activity 
The farmers surveyed produce vegetables, fruit, fodder and other crops. Veg- 
etables accounted for 70% of farm output and fruit production accounted for 22%. 
They also produce fodder which accounted for 6% and other crops accounting for 
2% (as shown in Table 9.1. ). 
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Table. 9.1. 
TYPE OF ACTIVITY 
Crops Percentage 
Vegetables 70.0 
Fruits 22.0 
Fodders 6.0 
Others 2.0 
TOTAL 100.0 
Source: Survey finding 
This is indicative of the fact that the farmers are experienced in agricultural 
practices. Although fodder is important it has been consistently neglected by the 
agricultural authorities running the scheme. On the other hand, forestry is a vital 
and integral part of the farming system and can increase crop yields and provide 
the dry weather feed for goats, camels and sheep. Despite this fact forestry too has 
been seriously neglected. 
The data collected shows that over 36% of the farmers in question have started 
farming since 1950.24% started farming between 1960 and 1970, while 40% of the 
farmers have started since 1975. These last 40%. entered agriculture after realising 
that the employment opportunities and prospects for growth are still greater in 
agriculture than in the other sectors of the economy. Presumably the other main 
factor affecting exactly when they started farming is their age. Therefore, age seems 
to be a key factor in determining the level of employment in agriculture. The older 
farmers started farming since 1950, whereas the young have started since 1975. 
However, since the mid-1970s the Sudan government has been involved in huge 
agricultural development programmes. There was a call for Arab surplus capital to 
be invested in the Sudan. Thus, the Arab Authority for Agricultural Development 
was set up in the country with considerable funds. Their efforts were augmented by 
the ILO and other international specialist financial institutions, which recommended 
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that the potential for development in the Sudan still lies in agriculture. Therefore 
one finds the concentration on agriculture in general is relatively high. This could 
be taken as additional evidence for the reasonably high percentage of farmers who 
started working in the mid 1970's (i. e. 40%). 
9.6.1. Family Structure 
Generally speaking, the family structure in Sudan is an extended one, and family 
ties are strong, as those in employment support those without income. The family 
as a unit, or its head, selects one or two members of the family to seek employment 
outside its traditional area. The family continues to support those members until 
they find employment or become convinced that there is no hope and return home. 
If employment is found by those who leave, earnings are shared with thosewho 
remain in the agriculture activities. Within this social set up, individuals in need 
of resources were provided for by those members of the extended family who were 
in a position to assist. Natural cooperation is widespread among people in most 
aspects of life, both social and economic, and there is an obligation among the kin, 
neighbours and friends to help the needy. Borrowing money in the case of illness, 
funerals and other unexpected disasters, as well as small interest-free loans in the 
case of weddings and other similar occasions, is fairly common. 
In this way the risks associated with seeking new employment are shared be- 
tween all members of the family. This procedure permits a more satisfactory re- 
sponse to employment and income difficulties than would be possible on an indi- 
vidual basis. But this affects the standard of living of the group and always keeps 
the farmer in a state of struggle to provide basic needs rather than being able to 
save. Therefore the accumulation of capital is slow and the chance for the farmer 
to renew his agricultural inputs is consequently low. 
The data revealed that 44% of the farm families had more than 10 persons which 
indicates that the family size in rural area in Sudan is very high. 40% of the farm 
families have between 6-10 persons, which is still a relatively large family size. 12% 
of the farmers have no family either because they have not married yet, or because 
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they cannot afford to get married. The remaining 4% are married, but have small 
size families ranging between 1-5 persons as shown in Table 9.2. 
Table. 9.2. 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF FARMERS 
ACCORDING TO FAMILY SIZE 
No. of members per household No. of farmers No. of farmers as a% 
of total number 
None 6 12 
1-5 persons 2 4 
6-10 persons 20 40 
More than 10 22 44 
TOTAL 50 100 
The farmers in the two schemes under study can be divided into two main 
groups. Firstly large farmers who cultivate between 10-20 feddans through large 
pump schemes are usually well-off and can finance their own cultivation. Secondly 
there are the small farmers who work their own land, in some cases with the help 
of seasonal labour. 
The negative attitude of the farmers and their family labour towards agricul- 
tural work in the scheme has significantly reduced the role of this important source 
of labour supply and increased the demand for labour from other sources. This 
strong aversion of farmers and their families to engage in agricultural work has 
been repeated in other schemes of the Sudanese Islamic Bank to one extent or an- 
other. Several social and economic reasons for this attitude were noted on these 
schemes and may be discussed briefly here: 
(1) For social and Islamic reasons, female work is regarded as a loss of face and 
the general feeling is that a women's place is at home. This restricts the female side 
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of the potential family labour. 
(2) There are also problems regarding the commitment of farmers themselves 
to their farms. For example from the very beginning tenants in the Gezira scheme 
objected to being called tenants at all. This objection was largely connected to 
their social feeling that they are "employers" not "employees". Manual work is 
considered degrading and tenants prefer to engage in more "honourable" activities 
and leave the bulk of the manual work to hired labour. Many tenants and/or their 
families tend to engage in some form of off-tenancy economic activity for the dual 
purpose of satisfying this social feeling and of supporting family income. In this 
way they can meet the high expenses of maintaining a socially desirable standard 
of living as well as financing hired labour. Other factors which have encouraged 
the tenants to engage in such activities include the low and uncertain income from 
agriculture, the desire to avoid going into debt, and the fact that incomes from such 
activities are likely to be stable throughout the year. 
The amount of labour used depends on the size of the farm (as shown in Figure 
9.2). On average it is found that landowners with large farms hired more than 10 
workers (which accounted for 32%) and those with small size farms hired between 
1-10 workers (which accounted for 68%). The distribution of external labourers 
used is shown in Figure 9.3 . But both small and large farms are labour-intensive, 
and can absorb employment from outside the agricultural areas; those idle crowds 
in shanty towns who desperately need food, could be employed and turned into a 
productive force instead of a purely consuming group. 
9.6.2. Farming Size and Cultivation Patterns 
It might be said that farm size is relatively important because those whose farm 
size is between 11-25 feddans represent 30% of the total and those whose farms' size 
is small, ie 0-5 feddans represent 20%. 
The average farm size in the sample under study varies between 11-25 feddans, 
which accounted for 30% of the total. Those with small farms (1-10 feddans) ac- 
counted for 28% and those with larger farm size (10-51 feddans) accounted for 42% 
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Figure: 9.2. Correlation Between Farm Size and Labour Used 
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Figure: 9.3. External Labour Used 
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(as shown in Figure 9.4. ). This means that the farm sizes on average are relatively 
large. In fact, this could be attributed first to the fact that the Sudan has, as is 
well known, the largest arable land area in Africa, and that there is in general no 
restriction on land ownership. Secondly, it was only recently that land tenure has 
been regulated by laws and government regulations. 
44% of the farmer's hired labour from outside to cultivate their farms, while on 
the remaining 56% of farms the work was carried out by the farmers themselves. 
This provides further proof to justify the argument above that this farming area 
could secure employment opportunities for the unemployed from other sectors. 
The farmers who cultivate land twice per year represent 52% of the sample, 
and 40% use land more than twice a year. This indicates that land is used to 
the maximum. This might be at the expense of soil quality which may deteriorate 
rapidly. Thus, the role of the Bank is expected to be crucial in this respect, providing 
fertilizers, and other necessary agricultural inputs, including advice on avoiding 
over- cultivation. 
9.6.3. Crop Production and its Importance to the Farmers 
As far as the types of crop are concerned, farmers were asked about each kind 
they grow. The survey shows that most farmers cultivate more than one crop. The 
results are as follows: 
Vegetables: 
Vegetables are dominant, and all farmers produce them because their turnover 
is high and they are marketable. The farmers grew 98% of their vegetables for sub- 
sistence and cash sale. There is a marked increase in the consumption of vegetables 
particularly in the urban areas. Owing to an increase in real incomes and an in- 
creased awareness of the nutritional value of vegetables, their cultivation is quickly 
developing into a commercial enterprise. 
218 
Figure: 9.4. Farm Size Distribution 
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Fruit: 
Fruit crops also occupy an important position. 24% of farmers cultivate them 
because of their marketability. In addition, the high increase in cultivation may be 
attributed to the change in the dietary habits of the farmers which also explains 
why their consumption almost doubled. 
Fodder: 
In recent years farmers have been more concerned with fodder cultivation es- 
pecially after the disappointing rainy seasons and the droughts in the Sudan which 
have occurred since 1984. Lubia is the main fodder crop and provides valuable 
feeding for working bulls and other livestock on the scheme. It is often used by 
the farmers to attract local labour from adjacent areas by offering them 161a as 
grazing food for their own animals. Under good management one to three heavy 
crops can often be obtained, and this is then followed by a yield of beans. It is 
generally much neglected, however, and careful practices could multiply the crop as 
much as fivefold, since it responds more readily to good treatment than dura. It 
is essential to add here that the Bank has an important role to play in providing 
insecticides and fertilizers to farmers to increase their gains from this crop. 
Dura: 
Dura is comparatively easy to grow as it requires only about 90 days to get 
ripe. Yet its production in the scheme accounts for only 2% of the total output. 
The production of dura can be increased due to its central position in the main diet 
of the Sudanese people. The Bank, through extension services, is now in a position 
to encourage dura production. Especially as in the last five years, when the rains 
had failed, shortages of foodstuffs, in general, are increasingly encountered. 
Forestry: 
It has been noted that only 2% of the farms contained trees. At least half of 
Sudan is either desert or semi-desert with rather poor forestry potential yet the 
country has about 270 million feddans of forest and these represent 36% of the 
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total cultivated area. 
. Forest cultivation appears to be limited due to the adverse weather conditions. 
Generally, some of these forests are important to the local rural population in 
providing raw materials for industries, including clothing and edible fruit, while 
others have a high market value. 
So far, only the productive potential of forestry resources in Sudan has been 
highlighted but there is an increasingly important conservation potential. In most 
cases this is not unquantifiable in a country where half the area is desert and the rest 
is comprised of mostly sandy soils highly vulnerable to erosion. The protective role 
of forests in the conservation of soils, the improvement of pasture, increasing agri- 
cultural production, the containment of desertification and amelioration of climate 
are untapped potentials that may have an important bearing on future agricultural 
developments. Thus, the Bank could enhance such efforts if it were serious in its 
determination to play a significant role in development. 
Sugar: 
A further import-substitution crop is sugar. Sugar consumption has been in- 
creasing significantly in Sudan, yet the farmers do not produce sugar at all. It is 
cultivated in large-scale irrigated schemes in Central Sudan and every project is 
owned by the government. Taking into account their limited resources of land and 
capital, farmers are not in a position to cultivate sugar cane at present. 
Wheat: 
Wheat is an important part of many diets, yet its production by the farmers 
surveyed accounts for only 4% of the total. According to a UNDP/IBRD study it 
was found that wheat is not a competitive crop given the present levels of yield. 
Yet, there is a strong case for wheat on the following grounds': 
(a) although the financial cost analysis of yields shows wheat in a poor light, 
an economic analysis using opportunity costs rather than financial costs of certain 
(UNDP/IBRD), Planning Project, Study of Cost of Production and Comparative Advantage 
of Crops in Sudan, Khartoum, May, 1982, pp. 24-27. 
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inputs like machinery and water show the wheat crop to be quite competitive; 
(b) the alternative to local production is import from abroad which would put 
an additional burden on the balance of trade; 
(c) the domestic production of wheat affords a certain measure of security for 
the country as well as for individual producers. 
Therefore, the Bank may encourage the farmer to grow wheat because its pro- 
duction is vital not only as human diet but as a measure of security for the country. 
Thus, here again, the Bank could demonstrate its concern in funding this strategic 
commodity and help in relieving some of the pressures on the balance of payment 
and thus reduce national deficits. 
The survey reveals that the farmers consume more than one crop from abroad 
including sugar and wheat among others. This puts additional burden on the Bank 
and its extension service, in convincing the farmers to change their consumption 
pattern or to encourage cultivating these crops if their production is economically 
feasible. 
The farmers were asked to indicate the relative importance, in their view, of the 
dura, dukhun, groundnuts, sesame, sugar crops. It was revealed that all farmers 
consider more than one crop as of relative importance. Therefore for the five crops 
mentioned above, every one is to be taken independently of the other four. 
(a) Dura: 
89% of the farmers have stressed clearly that dura is considered a very important 
crop. Thus the farmer is heavily dependent on this crop for food. Dura is the main 
staple foodstuff of Sudan and is popularly known as "sorghum". Sudan has to meet 
a shortage of dura through imports, despite being a country with plentiful cultivable 
lands, and an amount of rainfall that suits dura cultivation. The shortage seems 
unjustifiable. 
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(b) Dukhun: 
In contrast to dura, 48% of the farmers consider dukhun as an unimportant 
crop whereas 14% of them regard the crop as very important. Moreover, 16% of the 
farmer considered dukhun as important while 22% regard the crop as less important. 
(c) Groundnuts: 
Groundnuts are widely grown and are often planted after maize at the beginning 
of the rains (March/April). The crop is interplanted with dura and cassava. 38% of 
the farmers consider the crop as important, whereas 24% of them regard it as very 
important. 28% of farmýrs think that it is less important whereas 10% regarded 
it not important at all. Hence, the majority of farmers favour the growing of 
groundnuts, a finding which indicates the necessity of adopting a certain strategy 
for crop cultivation in the country. 
(d) Sesame: 
Although sesame is considered to be a major oil seed crop, more than 56% of the 
farmers felt that it is not important. For the whole country, sesame will remain an 
important crop as it is used to extract oil from the fodder not needed for animals. 
However, the fact that farmers showed less concern about this crop IS not surprising. 
Firstly, it is water-absorbant, and farmers might not have the adequate pumps to 
shift water from the Nile for sesame irrigation. Secondly, its production is labour 
intensive and there is an acute shortage of labour. 
(e) Sugar: 
The importance of sugar has been increasing significantly in Sudan. 92% of the 
farmers consider sugar as a very important crop. The demand is far in excess of the 
supply and the government is still importing sugar in large quantities in order to 
satisfy the total demand. New factories are subject to many problems resulting in 
under-utilised capacity. Nevertheless, some studies seem to conclude that "Sudan 
seems to have a potential comparative advantage in the production of sugar"'. 
World Bank, Sudan Export Development Study, Report No. 4263, Main Report, V61.1,1979, 
pp. 74-85. 
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9.6.4. Farmer Cash Crops 
The orthodox definition of cash crops is "those crops that farmers produce for 
cash sale, they are most likely not consumed at the farm level and are either pro- 
cessed within the country or exported". It is argued, however, that this definition 
no longer fits the emerging economic conditions and population distribution struc- 
ture in most independent Third NV6rld countries, (including Sudan) where there is 
a growing demand for the traditional foodstuffs in the urban areas. Thus, the crops 
discussed below should not be taken to be only "cash crops" in the orthodox sense. 
The farmers were asked to indicate which cash crops they cultivate and were 
given four specified types (cotton, sugar, groundnuts and other crops). It is apparent 
that a farmer may cultivate more than one type of produce. The results folloNy: 
(a) Cotton: 
Though in the past cotton was considered to be the main cash crop for the 
farmers in Sudan, it has been noted that this situation has changed and only 4% of 
the farmers grew cotton as a cash crop. The major factor attributed to the rapid 
decline in cotton production was the absence of incentives for the farmers to produce 
the crop due to falling prices. Cotton farmer's net incomes have actually declined 
as costs increased. There are problems in obtaining fuel, spare parts and inputs of 
good quality. Taking into account these problems and due to limited resources of 
land and capital farmers are not in a position to cultivate cotton as a cash crop. 
(b) Sugar: 
Sugar consumption has increased very rapidly due to a rising population as 
well as consumption per capita growth in recent years, which put the government 
under heavy pressures to import large quantities of sugar for domestic consumption. 
However, it was noticed that all the farmers did not grow sugar as a cash crop 
because they lacked the finances to invest in its cultivation. 
224 
(c) Groundnuts: 
The production of groundnuts has been steadily increasing since the Second 
World War. This rising trend is attributed to the world shortage of edible oils, the 
high stable prices of groundnuts compared to other crops and the ever increasing 
demand for oils as a result of a rising standard of living. Unfortunately, only 4% 
of the farmers grow groundnuts. The Bank can encourage the farmers to cultivate 
this crop due to its central position in providing for local consumption as well as 
for export. 
(d) Other crops: 
Vegetables are the main cash crop and 94% of the farmers cultivate them. The 
crop provides a valuable source of income to the farmers in the scheme. 
9.7. Farmer Income 
78% of the farmers have indicated that their annual income, on average, is 
more than CS 3000. This group can be regarded as richer farmers in the Sudanese 
context. 22% replied that their earnings from agriculture varied from XS 2000 - 
3000. These farmers can be considered as poor in the Sudanese context (Table 9.3). 
Table. 9.3. 
ANNUAL INCOME OF THE FARMER 
Income Percentage 
. CS 1000 or less 2.0 
XS 1000 - XS 2000 2.0 
XS 2000 - XS 3000 18.0 
More than XS 3000 78.0 
TOTAL 100.0 
Source: Survey finding 
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Generally, it has been noticed that the majority of the farmers are relatively 
well off financially and their annual earnings are more than CS 3000. This is due to 
the fact that these richer farmers have been in farming since the 1950's during which 
some savings were possible. Therefore, the older are richer whereas the younger are 
poorer. Age seems to be a key factor in determining the level of savings. Only the 
older, and more established farmers, are able to save. This might be attributed to 
the following: 
Older farmers have, wider experience in managing farm production in general. 
They might have had good opportunities in getting cheap agricultural inputs in the 
past, and have had more access to credit from banks. Moreover they have more 
expertise in dealing with hired labour; because they are financially better off, they 
can transport these labourers and maintain their living and pay them throughout 
the cultivation period. However, these possibilities may not be available to small 
farmers as they are financially weak and cannot pay or maintain Iabourers for 
long during the cultivation period. In addition, they have less access to financial 
institutions, and less experience in farm management in general. However they are 
likely to welcome dealing with Islamic banks especially on the basis of equity capital. 
Therefore, it is natural that older farmers may be more resistant to new innovations 
such as Islamic banking than the young. This is a problem for the Islamic banks. 
The younger family heads may need funds, but they have no savings to put in the 
banks. 
Due to inflation and the economic deterioration in the country by and large, the 
income from farming is not sufficient to support farmers families. 60% of the farmers 
have indicated that their annual income from agriculture is insufficient, whereas 
40% of them pointed out that their income earning is adequate. The major factor 
attributed to this is the family pattern of expenditure in the rural areas where food 
consumption constituted the most important item of family expenditure. Although 
more uniform throughout the year, increases in consumption occur at certain period 
depending upon the availability of surplus funds and the incidence of ceremonies. 
For each farmer, heavy expenses were incurred during payment of the first profit 
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from certain crop sales. At this period most of the farmers purchased certain food 
items in large quantities to satisfy their family needs for long periods; and they 
also purchased meat and clothes. The importance of this period for the higher 
asset owners was less as they had enough cash to purchase their food consumption 
requirements at any time. 
During the cultivation period, called masor, spending on agricultural inputs is 
very high for poor farmers, and constituted no less than 80% of the farmers' total 
spending. This implies that poor farmers are likely to be under pressure to maintain 
their normal consumption spending, and are therefore liable to exceed their normal 
income level, and are thus subject to debt. However, heavy expenses coincided with 
the two Eid ceremonies and with the pilgrimage period. 
Most of the farmers in the scheme, supplement their farm income by off-farm 
earnings. The sources of this are briefly outlined: 
earnings from activities allied to farming. These include the poor farmer's work 
for hire and wages gained by working as Khafir guardians; 
2. earnings from business which can be subdivided as follows: 
a. earnings from small businesses such as handicrafts, wood collection, labouring 
on building sites, roads, etc. and lorry driving, among others. 
b. earnings from big businesses such as; shopkeeping, trading in crops and livestock, 
lending, hire of machinery and transport facilities and earnings from flour mills, etc. 
3. Earnings from social transfers like remittances from absent members of the 
household, gifts for the farmer's ceremonies, other gifts and the like. Recently, re- 
mittances from Sudanese living abroad have become a source of additional liquidity 
for farmers. Individuals from the Northern Region were the first to travel abroad 
looking for better work opportunities. They send back to their families and rela- 
tives a considerable amount of hard currency which can either be consumed, kept 
or invested. 
The farmers as can be seen from the above, varied widely in their earnings from 
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each source and in their total off-farm income. The richer farmers earn predom- 
inantly from outside business activities. They drive tractors, combine harvesters, 
lorries and run shops. Their earnings from shops were more or less uniform through- 
out the year. Earnings from other ventures depend upon the agriculture calender. 
For the richer farmers, their main off-farm earnings come from shops and the rent- 
ing of both their buses and lorries in the transportation of farm crops. For these 
reasons, their off-farm earnings are more uniform throughout the year. 
Most of the crop production expenses and other expenses of the farmers were 
covered by borrowing. 42% of the farmers are either borrowing from relatives or 
from private sources outside the family. Moreover, 8% of the farmers received credit 
from the banking sector while 50% of them borrowed from other sources mainly shail 
merchants, as shown in Table 9.4. 
Table. 9.4. 
BRIDGING THE FARMER'S FINANCIAL GAP 
Type of lending Percentage 
Borrowing from relatives 22.0 
Private sources outside the family 20.0 
Banking sector 8.0 
Other sources 50.0 
TOTAL 100.0 
Source: Survey Finding 
The credit requirements of the poor farmers for production and consumption are 
greater than the requirements of the rich farmers. Moreover, the farmers with a low 
income need more consumption credit than credit for production. As a consequence 
the poor farmers enter into shail transactions early in the crop season, while the 
other group resorts to shail late in the season. The poor farmer is therefore more 
prone to shail and his shail market-price ratio is lower relative to the ratio of the 
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other group. However, for both these groups shail reduces net returns. 
From the figures it seems that the role of the Bank in supporting agricultural 
producers is very weak or even negligible. The farmers who borrow from the Bank 
is only about 8%. This implies that 92% of the financing is met from other sources, 
either from the shail system* (which is very effective particularly in rural areas) or 
by borrowing from relatives and private sources outside the family. Therefore, the 
shail and other non-institutional sources of agricultural credit will continue to be 
important to the farmers in the scheme for sometime to come'. Solutions to the 
problem of shail will need gradual introduction to lessen the stresses that will result 
from changing an established custom and way of life. 
One of the ways to combat shail is to increase farmers' net returns. Farmer 
income could be increased through (a) increasing the supply of labour, (b) reducing 
the cost of input factors for the farmer, and (c) actively supporting the production 
and marketing of the farmers' other crops. 
The supply of labour could be increased in two ways: more use of family labour, 
and by bringing in a greater number of workers from outside the farm at the time of 
heavy work schedules. Use of family labour would make the farmer devote a greater 
portion of his borrowings to food consumption rather than to paying hired labour. 
Increasing the supply of labour could theoretically be expected to bring down wage 
rates. In such a case, farmers would need to borrow less from the shail system. 
The cost of input factors, if reasonably low, could lead to increase in farmers net 
returns. The higher the net returns the farmer has, the less he could be expected 
to resort to shaiL 
Thirdly, the incidence of shail could be lessened by the erection of grain storage 
facilities. This is not to suggest sophisticated silos. Stores could be constructed 
from local materials either in the villages or the block headquarters. Farmers would 
keep their surplus grain in these stores from which they could draw for family 
Adam, F. H. and Apaya, W. A., 6Agricultural Credit in the Gezira', Sudan Notes and Records, 
V611111, Khartoum, 1972, pp. 113-114. 
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consumption at times of need or for cash sale. An alternative arrangement would 
be for all farmers in the village or block to deposit a minimum quantity. Should 
a farmer withdraw his whole amount and yet require more, he could either buy in 
cash from the store or be supplied on credit to be repaid in cash or in kind. 
The farmers were asked about their main source of income. The majority of 
the farmers (94%) stated that their main source of income is agriculture. However, 
this trend has been changing in recent years due to the deteriorting situation in the 
rural areas.. 26% of the farmers supplement their farm income by off-farm earning. 
We may illustrate the situation of income for the poor farmer or tenant from a 
single example. For the poor farmer or tenant, income earning is coming from, for 
instance: 
(a) While all household members are engaged in. -the production of crops, after 
the harvest period, three sons work in the mechanised farming schemes; 
(b) two sons migrate for work in Khartoum, sending remittances from time to 
time. The remaining members of the family cultivate the land. 
The farmers were asked about how they financed their seed input. Three options 
were available for their response; from themselves, bank loans and other means. The 
results show the following: 
Alternative one: 
Self-financing: The majority of the farmers (58%) indicated that 100% of the 
financing of seed inputs were met by themselves. As was mentioned earlier the 
farmers are relatively rich, well-established and a large number have been in farming 
since the 1950's. During the years certain savings were made. Some of the savings 
are allocated for buying seed inputs. Farmers tend to depend on themselves rather 
than the formal institution or other means in financing their seed inputs. 
Alternative two: 
Bank loans: The Bank's role as a formal source of credit to the farmer in the 
rural areas is virtually non-existent. Only 4% of farmers stated that all their seed 
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inputs are met by a loan from the bank. This will support the argument that 
the Bank's role is very limited, whereas the informal sources are more effective in 
financing the agricultural inputs as shown in Table 9.5. 
Table. 9.5. 
FARMER MODE OF FINANCING SEED INPUTS 
Source of 
Finance 
Percentage 
25% 50%175% 100%. 
The farmer 12 16 
1 14 58 
From a bank loan 72 16 8 4 
Other means - - - 100 
Source: Survey Finding 
Alternative three: 
Other sources: All farmers (100%) resort to traditional borrowing from other 
sources, mainly the shail system. W. Y. Magar, for example, has estimated that 
60-90% of tenants practice shail for dura, 45% for wheat, and 40% for groundnuts. 
It is likely that debts in the informal sector are increasing. With low yields, and the 
rising cost of labour and inputs, the buying power of the tenant has been reduced 
and he has been forced further into debt. Exorbitant interest rates leave no margin 
for any investment in the holding, and productivity remains low". The Bank can 
relieve certain pressures on the farmers if it is serious in its desire for agricultural 
development. 
It thus appears that the shail system as a informal sector in Sudan is very 
powerful in extending loans to small farmers in comparison with the formal sector. 
However, this phenomenon has been analysed below in order to throw light on the 
Magar, W. Y., 'Farms in the Gezira, in the Agricultural Sector of Sudan, Policy and Systems 
Studies, Zahlan A. B. and Others (eds. ), Ithaca Press, London 1986, p. 152. 
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reasoning behind the weakness of the formal sector of thq government institutional 
lending in Sudan. It will also attempt to explain why the informal sector through the 
shail system has played a very vital role in financing agriculture credit in the country, 
and why this will remain the case for many years to come, although institutional 
credit (through ABS) for agriculture has been increasing as in Sudan. 
9.7.1. Lender Characteristics of the Formal and Informal Sectors 
Generally speaking, the informal capital markets in developing countries con- - 
sist of two segments, the non-commercial and the commercial. Loans extended by 
friends or relatives, mostly without interest, constitute the non-commercial seg- 
ment. In the commercial segment a range of people like crop buyers, landlords 
and professional money lenders, etc. operate. These agencies function outside the 
banking systems, and are neither regulated nor effectively monitored by any central 
authority'. In most developing countries informal sources still meet 50-80% of the 
credit needs of rural people. Governments have been hostile to informal lenders and 
have viewed them as exploiters of helpless peasants. Despite this, money lenders 
have survived almost everywhere, implying their financial viability, adaptability to 
rural conditions, and most of all acceptance by their rural clients. Ironically, rural 
people attach more importance to securing a good credit rating with money lenders 
than with formal lenders. 
The informal rural credit market is still playing a vital role in Sudan. The 
differences between the two sectors of the dualistic rural capital market should 
be examined in order to see why the informal sector (such as local merchants, 
larger farmers- in cludin g landlords lending to tenants and full-time moneylenders) 
is preceived as superior than the formal sector and why the small farmers still prefer 
to deal with the informal credit sector. 
The formal or institutional lenders supply capital to agriculture from urban 
sources (public, like the ABS, or private) while informal lenders provide capital 
which is often rural in origin. The methods by which credit is made available to 
Padmanabhan, K. P., Rural Credit, Lessons for Rural Bankers and Policy Makers, Interme- 
diate Technology Publications Ltd, 1988, p. 88. 
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farmers in these two types of market offers a number of contrasts: 
(1) In institutional lending, like that of the ABS, we find that most loans re- 
quire that the farmer sign a promissory note that often demands a co-signatory. 
Many such loans (especially medium and long term) also require a mortgage or 
real collateral; collateral values may exceed the amount to be loaned. Application 
procedures are very often complicated and the farmer has to go to an office and 
answer questions, and finally talk to a loan officer or the manager. The farmer must 
present a series of forms, all properly stamped. These forms will vary depending on 
whether this is the first loan being requested from the institution, whether he is a 
large or small farmer, and whether he has friends and/ or influence in the lending 
institution. In many cases the borrower is asked to come back in a few days, a few 
weeks, or even a month, or more to be informed of the preliminary decision on his 
loan application. 
In the case of the Agricultural Bank of Sudan even if the loan has been approved 
the farmer does not receive the funding at one time. There are certain steps and 
measures according to which the Bank grants its loan in different stages, related to 
the type of loan. Such a long procedure however, has also discouraged small farmers 
who need financing in order to cover the cost of following up each agricultural 
stagelo. 
(2) The informal credit market consists of relatively localized transactions of 
money, real goods and services among frien ds, neighbours, relatives, landlords and 
moneylenders. The'shail merchant in a village knows virtually all the shail mer- 
chants in the neighbouring villages. Territorial boundaries of the area, within which 
each merchant operates, are well observed with no merchant entering the territory 
of another. Many loans in the informal market carry no conventional collateral; here 
the guarantee for repayment is the verbal promise of the borrower. In other cases, 
however, there may be an'informal mortgage on land or an agreement that the 
Rehiman, A. A., 'Evaluation of the Agricultural Bank's Contribution to Different Agricultural 
Sub-Sectors, 1959-1977', unpublished M. Sc. dissertation, University of Khartoum, 1980, P. 
121. 
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farmer's crop will be sold to the lender. Loans extended are characterised by their 
short duration which ranged between a month, to slightly less than seven months, 
or even one year. 
Despite the higher interest rates and the potential for exploitation, many ru- 
ral farmers prefer to borrow from informal lenders. Some of the reasons for this 
preference pattern are in the words of the farmers: 
(a) "The informal lenders do not require so much, if any, paper work". 
(b) "He does not delay payment, he just says sign this note and provides the 
money all in the same day". 
(c) "Even though I must pay more interest he (the informal lender) gives me 
more time to pay". 
(d) "Informýd lenders are not as difficult to deal with, they speak the same 
language as the client". 
(e) "Loans from informal lenders can be obtained more quickly and with less 
red tape". 
"The bank is a full day's trip from my farm while he (the moneylender) is 
just down the road". 
(g) "He (the village merchant) will also buy my crop at harvest time but the 
bank won't". 
(h) "The banks are just for the rich". 
The application procedure for credit from commercial lenders in the informal 
market in Sudan and elsewhere in most LDCs is quite simple. The borrower talks 
directly to the lender about his financial needs. There are usually no forms to fill 
out, no references to submit, no land titles to present, no taxes to pay or stamps to 
buy. Since the lenders and borrowers know each other, the borrowers ask for credit 
directly without preliminaries and the lender usually accepts or rejects the request 
immediately. 
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In addition to their credit services, the shail merchants in the scheme provide 
certain social services. However, a charge ought not to be made for these social 
services when calculating the interest rate that would cover the shail merchants' 
costs of lending. The same applies to the shail merchants' marketing activities. It 
is not only the shail merchant but all members of the community who participate 
in social occasions and the shail merchants, as members of the community benefit 
from other people's help in emergencies and from other gifts that take the form of 
reciprocal credit in their happier events. 
Quantification of these forms of assistance, is socially unacceptable. The poor 
farmers, whose farm income is not sufficient to cover their needs, supplement such 
income by their off farm earnings and particularly by receiving social transfers. 
Transfers are made by members of the family working in town or having permanent 
jobs and such members are socially obliged to help their parents and other members 
of their extended family who need help. The very poor tenant farmers also benefit 
from donations associated with religious obligations like zakat. 
9.7.2. Disadvantages of Informal Lending in Agriculture 
It has been suggested by many development bankers that one of the main disad- 
vantages of informal lending is that once credit is granted there is no further contact 
between the informal lender and borrower until the time of repayment. This can 
also be the case with the formal lending by the ABS. What the borrower does with 
the funds or goods is of no concern to the lender, so there is an absence of supervi- 
sion. This was confirmed during the field work. To support this arguement, there 
are many cases of misuse of the credit facilities given by the Bank in some areas, 
but it is rather difficult to obtain accurate data. This misuse of credit facilities 
creates many repayment problems for the Bank (it is also one of the shortcomings 
of traditional financing) due to the lack of supervision and an adequate monitoring 
system". 
The shail merchants, as an informal credit market, use their monopolistic power 
" Rehinian, A. A., Op. cit. p. 217. 
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to put more barriers for other financiers in the field. Competition from outside the 
village is ruled out because of the very many barriers to entry. Such obstacles 
include tradition, trading relations, family ties, indebtedness and lack of knowledge 
by outsiders, of the villagers. For these reasons, neither the shail merchants nor 
the villagers would be ready to provide the outsider with such information. A 
similar case has been noted in Malaysia where the Chinese community form the 
main middlemen moneylenders. The main obstacles to entry by the local members 
of the village include lack of skill and managerial ability in addition to borrowers' 
debt. But some of the villagers, particularly woman, did enter the market on a 
very limited scale. However, the funds available to women are small and represent 
only their few ornaments. They sell these to jewellers at the beginning of the Shad 
season and use the money received to raise their living standard and purchase new 
ornaments. 
Since the relationship between the lender and borrower is based on exploitation 
through the predominantly higher interest rates charged by lenders, there is no 
explicit development goal which necessarily favours the economic improvement of 
the client. In most cases the informal lender might actually risk promoting the 
decline of his client so that he could acquire real assets, or accumulate labour services 
and other personal contributions. In contrast, government lending institutions like 
the ABS have no reason for any such negative intentions; indeed, the economic 
improvement of the farmer in general (though the perference is always towards the 
large farmer) is the rationale for the establishment of this institution. 
During interviews with many of the farmers it was discovered that when the 
farmer is indebted to the merchant for two or more seasons, this will result in him 
falling under the merchant's control. First of all he cannot have access to further 
credit through shail from other merchants, since whatever he produces will be taken 
by the original merchant creditor. Thus, in effect, the farmer is tied to only one 
merchant dictating his own conditions over farm production. Under such circum- 
stances of indebtedness, the merchant continues to supply consumer commodities 
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at prices higher than the market price, allowing debts to accumulate further". 
Through these means the farmer's dependence on the merchant is strengthened. 
So the farmer is forced to sell his product at low prices and the debt accumulates 
leading to a cycle of indebtedness and increasing the control of the shail merchant 
over the small farmer. 
9.8. Agricultural Credit 
The farmers were asked if they had opened a deposit account with a bank. 48% 
of the farmers indicated that they had a deposit account with a bank whereas 52% of 
them did not. This is indicative of the fact that the present formal financial system 
in Sudan is new and ha-s arisen through a process of evolution, a most notable 
feature of which was the establishment of the Bank of Sudan in 1960. Before that, 
in 1930, informal credit was the only source of farm credit known in Sudan and 
informal rural financial markets still remain dominant in the provision of credit and 
other services for agricultural activities. 
The farmers were given four possible reasons to explain their decision to open 
an account with the bank. 32% of the farmers stated that savings are safer in the 
bank whereas 68% of them did not reply either because they had not opened an 
account with the bank for financial or religious reasonsl or had other reasons in 
doing so. 
Only 2% of the farmers responded that they had opened an account because 
they get a return on savings in the bank. The farmers who had opened an account 
in the belief that the Bank offers a loan to account holders formed 8% of the total. 
This fact will support the argument that there is very little confidence in the 
institution among the farmers. Confidence is the basis of any financial transaction. 
This is more so in the case of rural people, who are cautious in letting others have 
their money. Safety, continuity, and secrecy are some of the factors that foster 
confidence. 
Awad, M. H., 'Dilemmas in Economic Independence Lesson from Sudan', in Economic Inde- 
pendence in Aftica, Gliai, D. (ed), East Africa Literature Bureau, Nairobi, 1973, p. 50. 
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The answers analysed above have raised certain doubts regarding the Bank's 
role as a formal development financial institution in the country as its contribution 
is almost negligible. It was also found that its role in mobilising the resources of the 
farmers is insignifiant. The accessibility to the financial institution is an important 
factor in the promotion of savings. When bank branches are opened near market 
centres and operate at convenient hours, rural people opt to institutionalize their 
surpluses. When they are confident as to its liquidity, they would prefer to earn 
something on the surplus rather keeping it idle. Provision of financial services, like 
money transfers from one centre to another, can encourage depositors. Similarly, 
non-financial services like payment for the purchase of crops, payment of bills, etc., 
can increase deposits. When there is a linkage between savings and lending, rural 
households will be prompted to hold deposits with a view to availing themselves of 
loans when needed. 
9.9. The Relation of the Farmer with Financial Institutions 
The farmers were asked if they have dealt with banks before. 56% of them 
indicated that they had not dealt with a bank, whereas 44% of the farmers had 
done so. This result indicates the fact that the Bank's dealing with the farmers is 
weak and that it has failed to mobilize resources in the rural areas. 
As we mentioned above the majority of the farmers (56%) have clearly pointed 
out that they had not dealt with a bank before. Moreover, 10% of the farmers 
started in 1960 and 6% of them have approached the bank between 1970-1974. The 
remaining (28%) of farmers started dealing with the bank after 1975. These facts 
prove that the Bank's penetration in the area is weak, whereas, the shail system 
would appear to continue to be powerful for many years to come. The general 
feeling among the farmers is that they would prefer to deal with the shail system 
rather than the bank, at least because of straightforward and simple procedure of 
dealing with informal money markets. 
The farmers relation with the bank is weak in the rural areas of Sudan and based 
on this fact 82% of them did not approach more than one bank, in comparison to 
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the small fraction (whomake up 18%) who have done so. 
The farmers were asked to identify from amongst the following institutions the 
one they had dealt with: 
(a) The Agricultural Bank. 
(b) A government credit agency. 
(c) An Islamic bank. 
(d) Others. 
(a) The Agricultural Bank: 
A small number of farmers (18%) have dealt with the Bank, whereas th. e ma- 
jority (82%) hayp not. This supports the earlier point that the role Of the Bank is 
insignificant in the rural areas. 
A government credit agency: 
The data has revealed that the role of the other development or commercial 
credit institutions in the rural areas of the country is almost non-existent although 
the potential in agriculture is still'greater than in other sectors of the economy. 
However, these government credit agencies appear to continue in the belief that 
investment in agriculture is a risky venture and should be avoided by concentrating 
their investment exclusively in urban areas. 
(c) An Islamic Bank: 
The data indicated as well that the role of Islamic banks in the rural areas is 
very limited as only 4% of those surveyed had dealt with them. This will however, 
put more pressure on the management of these institutions to invest in the agri- 
cultural sector through musharakah financing in order to assist the farmer in their 
development efforts. The remaining 96% of the farmers stated that they had not 
heard about Islamic bank financing. This is one of the weaknesses in the new system 
and a great deal of publicity is required. Unfortunately, Islamic banks in the recent 
past have dealt only with the people in the urban areas and neglected the rural 
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areas completely. However, to break these barriers, the Sudanese Islamic Bank has 
recently started to penetrate the rural areas through musharakah financing which is 
considered to be a good sign of a move in the right direction but such contribution 
is far beyond the expectation of those poor farmers and a considerable amount of 
work needs to be done in this area. 
9.9.1. Problems Facing the Farmers 
Unfortunately, the data has revealed that the majority of the farmers, i. e. 94% 
of the total feel that the bank did not help in marketing and storing their crops, 
whereas only 6% state that the bank did help them. In general storing and market- 
ing are vital for the farmer and the Bank's role here can be considered unsatisfactory. 
However, the marketing of agricultural products in Sudan presents a host of 
problems. Since most of the farmers have small and often fragmented holdings 
and their farm production is characterised by their heavy dependence on the cul- 
tivation of vegetables and fruit crops, the extent of marketable surpluses of these 
commodities depends largely on the immediate needs of the farming community. 
Since most farmers have hardly any stand-by capacity, owing to the lack of 
credit and storage facilities, the bargaining position of the farmers vis-a-vis the 
intermediaries is further weakened by the inadequate transport and communication 
facilities. Thus this reflects in general the weaknesses of the marketing system 
in Sudan. The important point is that the Bank should play a more active role 
in providing finance for storing and transport facilities to the farmers within the 
scheme. 
The farmers were asked to give their opinion about facilities provided by the 
Bank. Three major problem areas were identified: 
(a) Irrigation problems. 
(b) Marketing problems. 
(C) Storage problems. 
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(a) Irrigation problems: 
The Bank's role in providing irrigation facilities to the farmers is relatively satis- 
factory. According to the data collected within the scheme 46% of the total number 
of farmers were satisfied. However, 54% of those interviewed thought that irrigation 
was still a problem that had to be resolved by the Bank. 
Many of the valuable crops like vegetables and fruits require supplementary irri- 
gation if they are to be marketed successfully. A lack of irrigation equipment is a 
limiting factor. During the fieldwork it was noticed that most of the pumps were 
old and spare parts were not easily available. 
(b) Marketing problems: 
Marketing is considered to be the major problem that faces the farmers in the 
field. 36% of them stated that the Bank has helped them in marketing their crops 
wherease 64% of them indicated that the Bank did not help them. In addition, due 
to shortages or a lack of transportation, storage and institutional credit facilities, 
farmers usually have to dispose of their products, as soon as they are harvested, 
and sell to middlemen. 
The marketing of vegetables is either performed by the producer or a commission 
agent on behalf of the producer. A small proportion of vegetables is marketed 
locally by either the farmer and/or his children or through other vegetable sellers 
in the village. Both dispose of the crop in their own villages, and in neighbouring 
villages. The bulk of the vegetables is transported to the urban centres such as 
Medani and Khartoum. 
Mangoes and citrus fruit (which are produced by the rich farmers) are mainly 
taken to distant urban markets such as Khartoum. The most common marketing 
channel is that between farmer and local trader when the farmer sells all the or- 
chard's produce to the latter just before harvest. The price is determined by direct 
negotiation. The buyer has to harvest the produce himself, usually during a speci- 
fied time period which is agreed to by both parties when negotiating the deal. It is 
in the interest of the seller to harvest the crop before the trees flower for the new 
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season as this would prevent damaging the flowers. However the buyer usually tries 
to schedule the harvesting operation according to supply and demand conditions 
in the market. After harvest the trader sends the produce, using his own truck or 
one rented for this purpose, to a fruit wholesaler at Khartoum whom he considers 
a regular customer. The merchant in Khartoum determines the value of the con- 
signment according to prevailing market prices at the time of receipt and remits 
the money to the local trader. Therefore, the government should be encouraged 
to take a strong initiative to regulate the markets, whereby not only the practices 
in the market could be rationalised according to certain rules, but better market 
information could also be provided to all the parties involved. 
(c) Storage problem: 
11 78% of the farmers stated that storage is another major problem which they are 
facing in the scheme whereas 22% indicated that the Bank has provided them with 
storage facilities and this is therefore not considered to be a problem. The storage 
facilities which most farmers have are often poor and inadequate, and until there 
is a large quantity of produce the cultivators do not consider it worthwhile to store 
it. The storage of foodgrains is thus the only common practice at farm level; the 
other products (both perishable and non-perishable) are sold immediately at the 
door-step, or carried to the nearest market. 
9.10. Type of Bank's Credit and Facilities 
The farmers were asked about the kind of incentives the Bank provides. Three 
specific types were identified: 
(a) Purchases of agricultural inputs: 
Over 74% of the farmers have stated that the Bank has assisted them in providing 
agricultural inputs such as seeds and fertilizer to be used in their farms. However, it 
has to be noted that the FAO fertilizer programme in the Sudan is very effective in 
helping the Bank as well as the Ministry of Agricultural and Irrigation to eliminate 
certain obstacles in the way of wide and efficient use of fertilizer by the farmers. 
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Some of the main objectives of FAO programme are as follows": 
(1) to conduct a large number of fertilizer demonstrations of farming fields; 
(2) to establish, where no research recommendation are available, simple trials to 
determine the most efficient fertilizer rates; 
(3) to improve and strengthen existing marketing channels for fertilizers; 
(4) to improve and strengthen, in cooperation with the Agricultural Bank, the ex- 
isting credit facilities for large numbers of small farmers by executing pilot fertilizer 
schemes. 
(b) Marketing the crops: 
The farmers have also pointed out that the Bank did not provide them with any 
incentives for a better marketing of their crops. The Bank's role in this area is thus 
almost non-existent and, the credit available for marketing purposes, accounts for 
only 2% of the total credits extended. To overcome this problem, the farmers have 
adopted a number of methods by which they can sell their product. Immediately 
after harvest the crops are put into bags and transported by lorry from the fields 
to the town. In the case of vegetables and fruits the crop is sold immediately. 
If the farmers are pressed for cash and have to sell their produce immediately after 
harvest they normally take it to the central market where it is sold to the major 
merchants. Each farmer delivers his produce to a certa in lot in the market. The 
Bank's involvement in marketing of the farm produce is crucial. Without marketing 
systems there is a limited market restricted to that which can consume products 
within a short time and at a short distance from where it is produced. Consequently 
the farmer may be underpaid and lose any incentive to produce the same product. 
(c) Storing the crops: 
The same can be applied to storing of the crop. The Bank's role in providing 
credits for storage, as an incentive to the farmers is almost non-existent and the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Fertilizer Programme in the Sudan, Khartoum, 
June 1983, pp. 1-2 . 
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amounts account, for only 2% of the total credits made available. If the Bank 
provides storage facilities to the farmers at village level, or in the nearest small 
rural towns, this 'will act as an incentive to the farmers concerned. Otherwise, 
the farmers will continue to be vulnerable and more interested in looking for work 
outside the agricultural sector. 
Table 9.6. reveals some interesting results. As many as 74% of the farmers 
have not dealt with the Bank either because its credit terms and conditions are not 
attractive or because the farmers concerned think that dealing with the shail system 
is more simple and straightforward. 26% of them indicated that they have received 
credit from the Bank for no more than a period of one year. This is indicative of 
the fact that the Bank's credit is available to farmers in the form of short-term 
loaýs for one season or at most for one to two years. Short-term loans are used to 
finance the purchase of such farm inputs as seeds, fertilizers and pesticides to plant 
the seed. Longer term loans are given for the purchase of such longer lasting inputs 
as irrigation motors and pumps, tractors and other farm implements. But the bulk 
of the credit goes to provide short-term loans for poorer farmers. 
Table. 9.6. 
CREDIT TERMS EXTENDED BY THE BANK 
Credit Term Percentage 
None 70.0 
Under Six months 2.0 
Six months-one year 2.0 
Over one year 26.0 
TOTAL - 100.0 
Source: Survey Finding 
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The farmers were asked if they required more credit facilities. Almost 90% of 
them responded positively. This implies that the demand for credit is very high but 
on the other hand the role of the Bank is insignificant. In rural areas the farmers are 
always in need of capital to increase their farm production. The Bank can extend 
credit to the farmers also in order to alleviate the monopoly enjoyed by the Shad 
merchant which forces the interest rates to excessively high levels, often beyond 
what an average farmer and his family can afford. 
The farmers were I given four possible reasons to justify their need for more credit. 
These were, 
(a) to introduce new crops. 
(b) to undertake farm improvements (e. g. new irrigation work) 
(c) for family reasons. 
(d) to pay off previous debt. 
V- Fur the first option, it seems that the farmers are so far satisfied with their agri- 
cultural practices and only 12% of them are interested in introducing new crops in 
their farm. This supports the argument that the farmers are very conservative even 
when the introduction of new varieties would ultimately increase the agricultural 
productivity on the farm. 
For the second option, the majority of the farmers, 86% responded positively. In 
fact their main requirement is water pumps used to raise irrigation water from the 
rivers, as well as pumps used for sprinkler irrigation. 
None of the farmers chose the third or fourth possibility. This indicates that 
the farmers did not mix their family set of priorities (such as to pay off previous 
debt) with their farm priorities. If they receive a loan without any conditions on its 
utilisation they will spend the money, most likely, on their scheme priorities which 
in this case is farm improvement in new irrigation equipment. This is a promising 
sign for banks to make available more credit without undue fears about the farmers 
misallocating these loans. 
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The farmers were asked whether the existing marketing facilities were satisfactory. 
The majority of the farmers (82%) responded negatively whereas 18% of them 
indicated that the marketing facilities were satisfactory. This is understandable in 
view of the fact that most of their products (like fruits and vegetables) are highly 
perishable commodities. Their quality begins to deteriorate from the moment of 
harvest and continues throughout the marketing process. There is an urgency to 
process and market these products as quickly as possible to maintain their farm- 
fresh value. The Bank can provide new marketing facilities and enhance the existing 
ones. 
Due to the lack of marketing facilities and owing to the pressing need for cash, 
a large number of the farmers have little option but to sell all, or a sizable part 
of their crop immediately after harvest, at which time prices are usually at their 
all-year lowest level. 
The farmers were asked if there are any advantages in receiving Agricultural Bank 
of Sudan credit facilities. 62% of the farmers responded negatively whereas 38% 
of them replied positively. Apparently most farmers see no advantage in receiving 
credit from the Bank. They have been prevented from using the Bank's facilities 
due to its own procedural complications. Therefore, the role of the Bank in the 
rural area is very limited as mentioned earlier. Meanwhile, the Bank prefers to deal 
with the rich farmers rather than the poor farmers because they are considered 
creditworthy and can provide the Bank with security against any loans provided to 
them. 
The farmers were given the following three possible reasons to justify making use 
of the Bank's credit facilities. These were: 
(a) cheaper than loans; 
(b) no collateral needed; 
(c) sharing of risk. 
Almost all the farmers who thought it advantageous to receive a credit from the 
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Bank (34%) argued that these were cheaper than loans from the shail merchant. 
The farmers were also asked if there were any disadvantages in receiving the 
Agricultural Bank of Sudan credit facilities and were offered three possible reasons. 
Specifically the disadvantages were identified as being due to: 
(a) more expensive than loans; 
(b) procedure complicated to understand; 
(c) payment by installment. 
Most of the farmers prefer to deal with shail system rather than the bank because 
of its simplicity. Only 2% of farmers responded by indicating that the Bank's 
loans are more expensive as compared tb those from the shail merchant. The same 
proportion (2%) agreed with the statements about the procedure being complicated 
and the payment being in instalments. 
9.10.1. Comments by Farmers 
Finally the farmers were invited to add any further comments about any problems 
they faced. From the data collected the following problems come to the fore: 
(1) lack of agricultural inputs; 
(2) inadequate agricultural implements; 
loan procedures complicated to understand; 
(4) agricultural extension; 
(5) irrigation; 
(6) setting up of a canning factory for tomatoes; 
(7) financing is not sufficient; 
(8) marketing. 
In our discussion we concentrate on the first two major problems (dominant in 
the mind of the farmer) facing the farmer, namely the unavailability of agricultural 
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inputs (like seed, fertilizer and pesticides) and inadequate agricultural implements. 
(1) Lack of Agricultural Inputs 
The majority of the farmers (80%) revealed that -the 
Bank did not provide them 
with the agricultural inputs (like fertilizer and pesticides). Undoubtedly, the role 
of fertilizers in increasing crop yield has increased over the years and fiow tops the 
list of agricultural inputs. 
All crops continually remove from the soil the nutrients which are essential to 
their healthy growth. The most important elements of plant growth in the soil are 
nitrogen, phosphorous and potassium. In order to maintain soil fertility, and so 
provide a sound basis for continued plant growth, these nutrients must be replaced 
in the soil. Thus, unless the plant nutrient balance in the soil is adequate for 
the optimum growth of crops, other factors conducive to increasing agricultural 
production, such as better seeds, water and improved land'preparation, can hardly 
be of any avail in bringing about the desired results. Therefore, organic manures 
and artificial fertilizers may be regarded as prime factors for better crop production. 
While there is an obvious need to increase the consumption of fertilizers in the 
schemes and the positive'response of the farmers towards fertilizers in recent years 
has been very encouraging, there are several problems which face the farmers and 
the Bank. There are three major factors which influence the use of fertilizers by' the 
farmers, namely: (a) cost consideration and credit facilities, (b) the distribution of 
fertilizers, (c) the lack of adequate knowledge of the amount of each fertilizer, or 
a combination of more than one, needed for a particular crop and the methods of 
application. 
From the Bank's point of view, the problems include: the expansion of extension 
services for practical demonstrations of -the application of fertilizers, and the pro- 
duction and distribution of cheap and most appropriate fertilizers. It is important 
to note that, the positive response of the farmers, has led the government through 
the banks, to subsidise the sale of fertilizers to the extent of 50% of the total cost. 
The farmers have also pointed out that the Bank did not provide them with 
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pesticides. ' It was observed'that in some cases the farmers lost their crops due 
to the damage caused by various plant diseases and pests. What is even more 
distressing is that the incidence of plant diseases is not restricted to the crops when 
they are standing in the field, but that many of these are carried through the seasons 
or even damage the stored ýgrains. 
Most farmers have neither the knowledge to detect the disease organisms and the 
damage caused by them, nor do they possess adequate means to prevent and combat 
them. Some of the diseases are transferred to the soil im mediately after the sowing 
of infected seeds; the farmers hardly ever treat them. During the various stages 
of plant growth, the attack of insects and micro-organisms further aggravates the 
healthy growth of the crops. Thus, at harvest time, the farmers have to be content 
with whatever produce is left from these enemies". 
In such circumstances, the need for an effort, on part of the Bank, to save the 
crops cannot be over-emphasised. Thus, at the behest of the government, plant 
protection measures have been more widely applied in recent years in order to 
overcome this formidable problem. 
It need hardly be emphasised that in countries where crop production has attained 
a high level, it is largely due to the use of go od quality seed, _ 
manures and above 
all artifical fertilizers. The use of improved crop seeds means essentially the use 
of superior varieties of crops, especially well-adapted to particular soil and climate 
conditions. 
(2) Inadequate Agricultural Implements 
50% of the farmers stressed that the second major problem they face was the 
inadequate use of appropriate farm implement's for various farm operations and the 
wasteful methods of crop cultivation. The techniques of cultivation when defined, 
include the, preparation of land for seed, sowing and the harvesting of crops. 
Proper preparatory treatment of land is an essential factor in crop production, and 
Khan, M. H., The Role of Agriculture in Economic Development, A Case Study for Pakistan, 
Centre for Agricultural Publications and Documentation, Wageningen, 1966, pp. 103-113. 
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improved tillage assumes increased importance if new varieties of crops, improved 
soil fertility treatment and water management are to produce the maximum effect 
on the yields of crops. Timely ploughing and sowing are the two basic factors 
conducive to good yields; late sowing reduces the yield of all crops. While every 
cultivator in the scheme is aware of the rationale of these elements) he is very often 
handicapped in carrying them out in time due to inadequate equipment with the 
required power and accessories. 
In Sudan, almost all draft power on the farm is either derived from, animals, or 
dependent upon the manual labour of the farmers themselves. The success or failure 
of a crop may thus often depend upon the plough, the way it is operated and the 
power with which it is pulled. 
In the rural areas the problem has become very, acute and it has forced the rich 
farmer to compensate for the shortages by using a machine to do the work of a 
number of men more efficiently and in shorter time. Many agricultural operations 
have usually to be done in a short time and if weather conditions do not permit, 
then use of machinery enables these operations to be completed within a'suitable 
time. 
The type of mechanized tools required by the farmers are not complex such as 
tools for land preparation operations. Land preparation requires mobile power 
sources such as animals, tractors or power tillers (hand tractors). Of all land prepa- 
ration operations, primary tillage (the breaking of the soils, often combined with the 
turning of the top layer), is the most power-intensive operation. In the move from 
hand labour to animals, and later in the move to steam and to tractors, primary 
tillage is usually the first land preparation operation'to use the new power source. 
The farmers also argued that mechanized tools are needed for seeding and plant- 
ing. These are among the few agricultural operations where animal and tractor- 
drawn machines appear to be capable of greater precision than hand methods. 
Mechanical means thus may lead to modest direct yield effects. Line sowing is more 
precise than hand spreading, making inter-row cultivation and hand tools, animals, 
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or tractors easier to work with and saving on seed. Mechancial seed and fertilizer 
placement may thus be attractive in intensive cultivation systems. 
But the question to be asked is whether it is desirable to introduce more mecha- 
nization in the scheme and what the difficulties are? 
It is only possible to look at a small number of implications of mechanization of the 
three main activities of water management, cultivation and harvesting. In order to 
discuss the problem further it is helpful again to simplify the position by generalizing 
and arguing that most management of water and preparation of the land for crops 
is undertaken by hired labour. Harvesting, however, is the period of maximum 
labour demand, and it is during these periods that hired labour is able to work 
and earn a supply of food for the coming months. There are, therefore, important 
differences between the economic and social side-effects of the mechanization of 
irrigation, cultivation and harvesting. It can be argued that while there is an obvious 
case for mechanization of water management and cultivation, the mechanization of 
harvesting must be approached with caution. The existing structure of society and 
the method of renumerating the poorest element of the rural community makes the 
mechanization of harvesting both an economically and a socially disruptive process, 
because such mechanization would jeopardize the employment of this poor labour 
section of society. 
However, if an efficient mechanization is to be performed within the scheme then 
the present irrigation lay-out has to be modified by introducing long furrow irriga- 
tion systems. For example, under long furrows more land levelling and well shaped 
furrows are essential. Thus mechanization requires a complete review of the present 
practice of seed bed preparation and irrigation layout. 
9.11. Conclusions 
Agriculure in Sudan is in a stage of crisis and credit can be a powerful instru- 
ment in bringing about changes in agricultural practices and in farm productivity. 
The small farmers' experience with the Agricultural Bank of Sudan shows that the 
Bank's role is limited in the rural areas and the growing demand for credit cannot 
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be met by the institution alone due, to its inadequate financial resources. According 
to the survey the farmers require more credit for the purchase of non-traditional 
farm inputs such as fertilizers, insecticides, improved seed varieties and implements 
of cultivation and processing such as tractors. 
The farmers interviewed during the field work pointed out that when they get a 
loan from the Bank, they must provide the Bank with adequate collateral security 
against any default. Moreover, the Bank has strict rules in its policy and procedure 
for the repaying of the loan. According to one of these rules, "a penal interest must 
be charged on all delinquent loans. But if due to a major agricultural disaster, 
natural phenomena, bad weather, pests, diseases, or for any other reason a borrower 
becomes unable to meet his loan obligations', this must be immediately established 
to the satisfaction of the Inspector of Agriculture and application for revision of 
repayment must be prepared before the next instalement becomes due". Such strict 
rules by themselves clearly explain why the small farmer prefers to deal with the 
informal sector through the shail system. 
There is no doubt that the operation of the two credit sources have retarded 
agricultural development: the scheme by confining its activities to certain crops, 
and the informal sources by exýloiting the farmer and absorbing the majority of 
his remaining marketable surplus through charging exorbitant rates of interest. In 
addition to the rigid structure of the scheme, the operations of both credit sources 
have reduced the farmers' interest in' farming and deprived them of incentives to 
adopt proven innovations. 
With the attractive opportunities available, government policy should be directed 
towards establishing institutional terms which would encourage the provision of cap- 
ital, required for the adoption of these opportunities. It should satisfy the effective 
demand for credit by facilitating capital transactions and encouraging capital move- 
ment. 
The most appropriate channel to provide the small farmers with the necessary 
credit for development and to assure repayment of institutional fund has preoccu- 
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pied the government of less developed countries and other regional and international 
organisations since the early 1950s. As far as the new institutional channels includ- 
ing the Agricultural Bank of Sudan and the co-operative societies are concerned, 
it must be said that their performance is very disappointing. Moreover, excessive 
centralization of these institutions has often resulted in an inability to adjust pro- 
grammes to local conditions and in an increase in the cost of administration. With 
these drawbacks, most of the institutional credit sources tended to favour the most 
wealthy farmers, although their original purpose was often directed more towards 
the small farmers. This has led to the development of a private rural credit market 
dominated by the shail merchants. 
To overcome the problem of excessive centralization and to promote the integra- 
tion of the credit markets in the agricultural sector, many of the less developed 
countries have looked to the establishment of co-operative societies. Conceptually, 
co-operatives for final credit delivery represent a form of organization which embod- 
ies decentralization of control and decision-making and incorporates local knowledge 
and responsibilities. Group responsibility for repayment reduces default while such 
a grouping raises the size of loans and thus reduces administrative cost. Unfortu- 
nately, this idealistic picture of co-operative societies has proved to be unworkable 
in most of the less developed countries. 
The effective use of credit as a lever in raising agricultural output in rural areas in 
Sudan requires a broadly conceived, well informed, close follow-up and monitoring 
system and carefully executed lending policy. 
Our research finding has shown that the role of the Agricultural Bank of Sudan in 
rural development is indeed very weak and the Bank should finds ways and means 
of modifying its credit policy. This requires that the Bank pay greater attention to 
the needs of the small farmers in the rural areas. The extension services are very 
vital in the rural areas since a large number of the farmers are illiterate and need 
more attention and demonstration of how, for example, they can use fertilizer in 
order to increase their productivity. Therefore, incentives should be provided to 
the extension workers in order to keep them in the rural areas. They could act 
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as advisory agents for the Bank aimed at increasing the credit utilization by the 
farmers". 
The Bank should introduce the concept of musharakah financing in agriculture in 
which the small farmers would be a partner (in the project with the Bank) rather 
than a wage earner. If such an attempt was made the farmer will become aware that 
he is in partnership with the bank. This will encourage him to avoid dealing with 
the shail system. The bank, however, will succeed, relatively speaking, in narrowing 
the gap between the informal and formal sector. 
The Bank should also improve the marketing and storing facilities for the farmers 
since most of their produce is perishable. A modification in the lending policy of the 
Bank is necessary. A higher allocation of its budget may be earmarked to medium 
and long-term credit which will enable the farmer to increase land productivity and 
improve his living conditions. It would alleviate the problem of poverty in the rural 
areas of Sudan. 
Integrated Agricultural Credit with other Agricultural Services, Paper presented to the National Session on Administrating Agricultural Credit, Khartoum, December 1987, p, 2. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
THE SUDANESE ISLAMIC BANK: ITS ROLE 
AND IMPORTANCE IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
The agricultural sector constitutes the greatest percentage of the total value 
added in Sudan. Small farmers in this country are in a poor state. They suffer 
liquidity problems which greatly reduce the efficiency of their farms. They have no 
access to organized credit markets and the usual source of borrowing is the shail 
merchant who charges exorbitant interest rates. 
In the early seventies, experiments in Islamic banking were initiated and Sudan 
has played a major role in its promotion. In 1977 the Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan 
was established. The early success of this first Islamic bank led to a proliferation of 
Islamic banks in the country. At present, interest-based banking is prohibited, and 
all banks in the country operate on the basis of Islamic financing. In the Sudan, 
as elsewhere, the main financing instruments adopted by the Islamic banks are 
murabaha, mudarabah and musharakah. 
In the last two decades the practice of the majority of Islamic banks in Sudan 
and elsewhere suggests a widespread preference for murabaha, and to a lesser degree 
mudarabah, financing on the part of development bankers. In contrast, musharakah 
financing generally has been avoided on the assumption that it is an economically 
non-viable (high risk) instrument. But the experience of the Sudanese Islamic 
Bank not only disproves that assumption, but also corroborates the relevance of 
musharakah as a tool for rural development among the poorer sections of the pop- 
ulation. This chapter considers aspects of the musharakah operations of the Bank, 
with special reference to its application in agricultural financing for small farmers. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the role and importance of the Su- 
danese Islamic Bank (SIB) in rural development in the Sudan. The chapter is 
divided into ten sections. The first will assess the concept of rural development 
0 
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and the second its objectives, including an examination of its short and medium 
term goals. The third deals with the establishment of SIB while the fourth deals 
with the Bank's concept of rural development and its strategy. The fifth highlights 
the Bank's philosophy in financial transactions. In the sixth Musharakah models 
are identified and a subsection focusses on the Bank's agricultural financing model 
and its family poultry production scheme. In the seventh section we analyse the 
balance sheet, development and profit and loss accounts. The Bank's investment is 
examined in the eighth section. The ninth focusses on its operations, a subsection 
discusses musharakah in trade and industrial investment. Finally, some conclusions 
will be drawn on the role of the Bank in rural development. 
10.1. Concept of Rural Development 
Rural development is a complex subject and has been defined as a process by 
which the rural population of a nation improves its level of living on a continuing 
basis'. In this process, government efforts need to be focused primarily on involv- 
ing the poor majority of the rural population. Effective rural development has five 
fundamental characteristics: (1) rising level of output and living standards, (2) a 
degree of organized, disciplined participation by the rural poor in planning, imple- 
mentation and evaluation, (3) A national policy focus on the small, labour-intensive 
producer as the economic engine of development, (4) Systematic provision of im- 
proved technology plus appropriate physical infrastructure and (5) Organized links 
between farms, villages, market towns, and provincial centres. 
The above fundamental characerteristics of rural development raise many ques- 
tions as to how it works, the shape it takes, and how it is determined and influenced 
by the many factors in rural areas of the country. Factors such as the stage of eco- 
nomic development of the country, the humanitarian attitudes of its people; the 
sincerity, skill, wisdom and all-round knowledge of its planners, administrators, and 
implementors at all levels; the relevant educational institutions; the extent to which 
its citizens are informed, consulted and encouraged to participate; and other fac- 
Butterfield, S. H., 'Rural Development: Why it is Hard for Developing Country Leadership 
to Get Started', International Development Review, Vol. XIX, part 1,1977, pp. 8-12. 
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tors of varying importance at the local, village, area, regional and national levels, 
all affect its direction, its magnitude, its success and failure. 
During the last decades of international and national rural development efforts 
at different stages a significant amount of data, information, knowledge, documen- 
tation and experience has been accumulated. Also enough studies have been done, 
sufficient experience gained and observations made to validate certain assumptions 
and to provide insight into the basic and fundamental requirements for successful 
planning, operation and functioning of rural development programmes. Yet many 
questions raised during these decades of rural development work remain unanswered 
and we will summarize some of them: 
(1) How to improve the living conditions of the rural poor who live in various 
stages of relative poverty? 
(2) How to provide rural poor with employment opportunities and the infras- 
tructure for the farmers to accept and carry out practices which increase agricultural 
productivity? 
(3) How to encourage the development of socially and economically viable, rural- 
urban communities which offer alternatives to the migration of rural poor into cities 
for employment and social services? 
(4) Provision of a structural framework for rural people to be fully involved in 
contributing to their own development, and channel technical help and financial 
resources to rural people to serve their needs and increase their capacity to use such 
resources 
2. 
10.2. Objectives of Rural Development 
The main objectives of rural development are necessarily dictated by the salient 
features of the rural economy of the society concerned. Long term development 
objectives are usually related to national values and aspirations of national gov- 
ernment. These are usually broad, general and relatively few in number. More 
Poostchi, R., Rural Development and Development Countries, The Alger Press Ltd, Canada, 1986, p. 1. 
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specific short-run instrumental objectives are validated by the primary objectives 
to which they relate: increase in per capita output and income; modernization of 
agriculture and industrialization; health and nutrition; education and welfare and 
more equitable distribution of national wealth. We will concentrate our analysis on 
the short and medium-term objectives as these are much more well defined, as it 
would be premature to discuss the long-term objectives of rural development due 
to the current economic and financial situation in Sudan. 
10.2.1. Short and Medium-term Objectives 
Short and medium-term objectives may be taken to cover five-year periods, that 
is the duration of a five-year development plan. During such a period, an attempt 
might be made to achieve three main goals3-. 
First goal: 
An increased per capita income for the economically active population, and 
hence for the entire population. This aim is justified by the fact that there is a wide 
gap between the income of workers in the rural sector, particularly in agriculture, 
and the income of workers in other sectors. The income differential between these 
groups is apt to foster frustration among certain social classes vis-a-vis other citizens 
in the same country. This constitutes a major reason for the rural exodus of youth 
to the urban centres. 
Increased income for the rural farmer requires an increase in his productivity 
as well as guaranteed stable prices. The improved productivity of the farmer will 
demand technological progress and hence give a better yield for the production 
factors. As regards price stabilization, it can come from a rational storage and 
marketing policy conducted at both local and national levels. 
On the other hand, increased wages for the rural farmer may come either from 
an increase in his output or from higher prices, or the combined effect of both. 
Abdel-Khalik, A. R. Z., The Production and Distribution of Milk and Dairy Productions in 
Egypt. Towards a Co-operative System, Department of Business Administration, University 
of Stockholm, 1981, pp. 7-15. 
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A wage policy based on high prices is not realistic, for it brings about inflation 
within the country, which may have the effect of decreasing the actual purchasing 
power of any additional income. Furthermore, such a policy may reduce export 
opportunities and make products less competitive. Conversely, a drop in prices 
may have an adverse effect on production. It may tend to cancel out the profits 
expected as a result of the efforts made to 'increase the volume of production. 
Second goal: 
To reduce the rural exodus and underemployment in the countryside. African 
agriculture is stagnant and the continent threatened with hunger because, among 
other reasons, the economically active population actually engaged in farming is 
finding it increasingly difficult to support their families on meagre incomes. A 
consequence is the population explosion in the the major towns. In Sudan, especially 
Khartoum, this influx has caused several and severe social problems. The problem 
of vagrancy indicates the scale of change and the gravity of the situation in the 
migrant- receiving centres'. In fact these settlements hindered the implementation 
of the housing plans and their destruction led recently to riots in which a number of 
lives were lost. Further the increasing numbers put severe pressures on the already 
minuscule health services as hospitals started to serve a population far beyond their 
planned capacity. 
Third goal: 
To increase exports and reduce imports, thereby augmenting the availability of 
foreign currency. Most African countries are in urgent and increasing need of for- 
eign currency for buying equipment and, in some cases, for the import of foodstuffs 
that they cannot produce in the immediate future. For some of these countries, the 
problem of the balance of trade and the balance of payments is becoming increas- 
ingly acute. Increased export of agricultural forestry and fishery produce usually 
offers an immediate solution to these problems. 
Abdel Ati, H. A., 'The Process of Famine: Causes and Consequences in Sudan, Development 
and Change, Vol. 19, No. 2, April 1988, p. 292. 
259 
This chapter Will deal with the small farmer (rural poor) as a single target group 
for rural development efforts to see how far they have benefitted from musharakah 
financing introduced by the Sudanese Islamic Bank. 
In spite of all the agricultural potential in Sudan only a small percentage of the 
land utilized in the irrigated and mechanized rainfed sectors received some attention 
from the government. The traditional agricuture sector (which is the heart of any 
economic development in the country), where about 75% of the population are 
involved, has received little or no attention from the authorities. The small farmers 
need only inputs and some running expenses. However, services of the Agricultural 
Bank of Sudan (ABS), which is the only government agency assigned to provide 
credits to the farmers, are neither adequate nor satisfactory for the small farmers. 
The main weakness is that the ABS does not provide comprehensive financing. It 
requires guarantees which small farmers cannot provide and charges a high rate of 
interest on loans. Since the ABS has failed to satisfy his needs the small farmer 
remains bound to the shail system where he borrows money from the merchant for 
agricultural inputs at the beginning of the season in return for an undertaking to 
sell the produce to the lender (at very low prices) on harvest. 
There is no doubt that the small farm sector in the rural areas plays, and will 
continue to do so for many decades to come, an important role in the overall agricul- 
tural production in the country. Yet this sector, though it encompasses the poorest 
sector of the society, has received very little attention from both credit institutions 
and input supplying agencies. The basic needs of the small farmer, beside his land 
resources base, are inputs like parts, water pumps, land preparation equipment and 
tools, transport and storing, extension services and financing. To overcome the 
problems which face the small farmers in obtaining finance and in order to achieve 
economic and social justice for the welfare of the community through rural devel- 
opment, was one motive behind the establishment of the Sudanese Islamic Bank. 
260 
10.3. The Bank Establishment 
The Sudanese Islamic Bank (SIB) is a Public Limited Company, established in 
1982 with an authorised capital of US$20 million (comprising 200,000 shares of one 
hundred dollars each) and it commenced its operations in May 1983. 
Table 10.1. 
DISTRJBUTION OF THE BANK CAPITAL IN 1407H 
Shareholders in Sudan No. of Percentage 
Shares 
National Capital 104,069 48.0 
Eastern Region 18,525 8.5 
Central Region 13,743 6.3 
Northern Region 4,292 2.0 
Kordofan Region 5,316 2.5 
Southern Region 0,494 0.2 
Sudanese Working Abroad 1 QLqj 4.7 
Sub-total 156,636 72.2% 
Shareholders outside Sudan 60,240 27.8% 
Total 216,876 100% 
No. No. of Percentage 
Shares 
Promoters 410 199,296 91.9% 
Other Shareholders 1080 17.580 8,1% 
TOTAL 14A 216,876 100% 
Source: Bank's Annual Report, July 1985 
The SIB is engaged in rendering all banking, financial and trading services in 
addition to investments and operates in accordance with the Islamic shariah Laws 
and under supervision of the shariah Supervision Board in the Bank. By the end of 
1407H. (1986-87), paid-up capital reached 85% of authorised capital, which is the 
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highest percentage for all banks in the country. The majority of shareholders (72%) 
are Sudanese nationals. It has fifteen operating branches in five different regions as 
shown in Table 10.1., and five proposed branches are under establishment. 
In addition to acquisition of shares valued at XS 5,940,000 in 1406H in seven 
companies and banks, the SIB has established four affiliated companies. Of these 
two are already operating in the fields of trade and construction. The other two 
companies are to commence operations in the near future and will be involved in 
the fields of agricultural services and insurance. 
Table 10.2. shows the percentage of shares subscribed to by the SIB in different 
companies and banks. 
Table 10.2. 
SUDANESES ISLAMIC BANK SHARES 
SUBSCRIBED IN COMPANIES AND BANKS 
Company No of Shares 
subscribed 
Amount paid in 
Sud. Pounds 
% of 
Shares 
Islamic Development Co. 300,000 304,200.00 75.0% 
Al-Baraka Bank (Sudan) 120,000 195,000.00 12.5% 
The North Islamic Bank 1 po 36,400.00 25.0% 
The Arab Authority for 
Agricultural Inv. & Dev. 100 13,032.50 100% 
Islamic Bank for Western Sudan 10; 000 136,500.00 100% 
Information and Management 
System Company 50 12,500.00 25.0% 
TOTAL 431,150 697,632.50 
Source: Bank's Annual Report, July 1985 
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10.4. Sudanese Islamic Bank: Concept of Rural Development 
The Sudanese Islamic Bank (SIB) does not look at development in a pure mate- 
rialistic manner, as achieving growth in the per capita income (GNP), in the context 
of secular theories. More than that it includes in development the question of moral 
values in banking transactions which should be based on fairness and justice. Its 
aim is a visible improvement in the behaviour of the individual and the society. 
Economic and social development cannot be achieved unless attention is directed 
to the human being and to an improvement in his spiritual and moral instincts as 
well as providing him with opportunities of employment and freedom of choice. 
To achieve the desired development, the Bank has focussed on small farmers 
and producers in Sudan's various regions. Neccessary financing was made available 
to enable them to raise their production and improve their levels of income in order 
to meet their daily necessities. 
This unique idea goes back to the conception of Islam that views wealth, in fact 
the whole universe and whatever it contains of wealth, as belonging to Allah the 
Almighty. The basis of personal ownership of wealth is that man is the vice-regent 
of the Almighty and that Allah will see what a man does with what he is granted. 
On the other hand, Islam encourages work and devises various incentives for that 
purpose and forbids idleness and begging'. 
Not only does Islam advocate work, it encourages cooperation and participation 
between those who have the wealth and those who can exert an effort so that the 
whole community prospers and the economic cycle is completed in coordination and 
harmony. 
Since such Islamic ideas necessitate a positive move, the Sudanese Islamic Bank 
took the initiative and invited citizens, institutions, consulting houses, research 
centres, universities and public entities through the public media, requesting them 
to present their readily studied projects for, the necessary financing. Thus the 
Taha, A., 'The Role of Sudanese Islamic Bank in Rural Development', Journal of Islamic 
Banking, The International Institute of Islamic Banking, Cairo, No. 54, June 1987, pp. 8-12. 
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Banks' efforts are in line with the efforts of the people to achieve plentifulness 
in production and food. The SIB had adopted this initiative in order to move and 
exploit unutilised capacities and their rationalisation so as to have rural development 
covering all parts of the Sudan. 
10.4.1. Bank's Strategy in Rural Development 
The main objectives of the Bank are based on the spirit and economic philosophy 
of Islam which is related to individual and group behaviour in utilizing available 
funds in addition to other resources, in such a manner, so as to achieve a society of 
justice and welfare. 
In order to establish a balanced and comprehensive rural development pro- 
gramme, the Bank chose to finance small farmers basing its strategy on the follow- 
ing: 
(1) Religious awarenesS'and the desire of small producers for serious work if 
they are provided with financial resources and the means for economic and social 
advancement. 
(2) Availability of resources, their diversity and importance in various regions. 
(3) Increased demand for agricultural products to achieve food security. 
(4) Improving the investment environment, solving the problems and adopting 
policy incentives for the sake of comprehensive national development. 
The strategy of the Bank is based on financing agricultural activities and de- 
veloping rural industries through small farmers and producers in accordance with 
the plan. 
10.5. Bank's Philosophy in Financial Iýansactions 
The Sudanese Islamic Bank bases all financial transactions on the principles 
of the shariah. The shariah has laid down some basic principles which guide and 
control any type of transaction. To be valid under Islam, any transaction should 
simultaneously meet three basic conditions and qualifications. 
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(i) Mutual agreement 
(fi) Fairness 
(iii) Clarity 
(i) Mutual agreement 
In the Islamic framework no individual is allowed to benefit at the cost of loss 
to others. Mutual agreement is a necessary condition for any transaction to be 
legitimate. Allah Says: 
"Ye who believe eat not up your property among 
yourselves in vanity. But let there be amongst you traffic and 
trade by mutual good will". (4: 2) 
To meet the condition of mutual agreement, free will, equal status and 
open choice are the pre-requisites. There is no natural distinction between the 
owner and tenant. Both have equal status before law. Neither of them is superior 
to the other. The landowner, no matter how powerful he may be, cannot force the 
tenant to submit to any excessive conditions imposed on him. 
(ii) Fairness 
The principle of fairness implies due shares to everyone who has a right 
and no individual should be harmed. As the Prophet (Peace be upon him) said. 
"Do no harm nor take it" 
To ensure fairness in mutual transactions the shaTiah establishd the fol- 
lowing principles'. 
(a) Principle of rights and obligations. , 
(b) No speculative transactions. 
(c) No excessive conditions. 
Masood, H. M., Land Tenure System in Islamic Ramework, International Islamic University, 
Islamabad, Pakistan, May 1985, pp, 18-20. 
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(iii) Clarity 
The terms and conditions of the transaction have to be specified in detail 
and written precisely so that there remains no confusion or doubt on either side. 
Islam has popularised the tradition of written agreements. The Holy Quran says: 
"Disdain not to writing (your contract) for a further 
period, whether it be a small or big: It is juster in the sight 
of Allah, more suitable as evidence and more convenient to 
prevent doubts among yourself". (281: 2) 
It is also desirable to make some righteous people witness to the agree- 
ment. The institution of witness is significantly important. 
10.6. Musharakah Models 
The new methodology of Sudanese Islamic Bank (SIB)/farmer partner- 
ship is divided into different models according to the type of production adopted. 
Models are: 
10.6.1. Agricultural Financing Model 
The Bank provides fixed assets such as tractors, ploughs, harrows, water 
pumps, and inputs e. g. seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, fuel, jute sacks and co-mana- 
gement, marketing, storing and extension. The farmer on the other hand contributes 
with his land, labour, part of the running expenses and management. 
From the net profit the farmer gets 30% for management. The remaining 
profit (70%) is divided between the Bank and the farmer according to their equity 
share as shown in Figure (10.1). 
This model is modified according to the method of irrigation e. g. canal 
irrigated schemes, pump and rainfed scheme: 
10.6.2. Canal Irrigation 
Besides his land, labour and management, the farmer has to contribute 
part of the capital. The SIB prepares the land, provides inputs, transportation, 
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Figure: 
Agricultural Financing Model 
SIB Contribution Farmers' Contribution 
r---------------------I (a) Fixed Assets: Land 
1. Tractors, ploughs 2. Iabour 
2. Water pumps 3. Managcment 
3. Sprayers L 
Variable inputs 
(b) 
1. Fuel, oilt'grease 
2. Improved seeds 
3. Pesticides 
4. Fertilizer 
5. Jute sacks 
6. Co-management 
7. Marketing and 
storage 
No guarantee or 
collateral I 
Agricultural Production 
by small farmers 
Gross Revenue 
L 
r- 
1. Zakat 
2. Running expenses 
L 
30% of NP. to farmer 
NET PROFIT 
IL for management 
TO SIB ON To farimer on 
Remaining profit I- 
equity sh -------- -1 his equity share 
Note: The model explained above varies according to: 
(a) Method of irrigation, (b) Type of land tenure, 
(C) Cropping pattern and types of crops, and (d) Locality. 
We, therefore, have 3 more sub models explained in 
Figure: (10.1)a, (10.1)b, and (10.1)c. 
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storing and part of the capital. 
From the net profit the farmer gets 25-40% for management. The re- 
maining profit is divided between the farmer and SIB according to their capital 
contribution as shown in Figure (10.1)a. 
10.6.3. Pump Irrigation 
The contribution of SIB and the farmer are the same as in the above 
figure, but no running expenses are paid by either. In addition SIB has to provide 
water pumps with running expenses and maintenance. 
The farmer gets 70% of the net profit, while the Bank gets 30%. In case 
of crop failure the farmer bears no losses as shown in Figure (10.1)b. 
10.6.4. Rainfed Scheme 
The farmer has to clean the land from trees and bushes. Ile sows and 
harvests the crop. Besides management he bears some of the running expenses. 
The Bank prepares the land for sowing at cost, provides transport, storing, co- 
management and part of the capital. 
The farmer gets 30% of the net profit for management. The remain- 
ing profit is divided between the farmer and the Bank according to their capital 
contribution as shown in Figure (10.1)c. 
10.6.5. The Family Poultry Production Project 
The Bank also provides finance for poultry production projects involving 
poor families. The projects are executed in close collaboration with the Ministry 
of Social Welfare, the Ministry of Animal Wealth and the Ministry of Finance and 
National Planning and consist of supplying battery cages of 95 layer capacity with 
hens at the start of laying to each family. SIB provides feeds, veterinary care 
and drugs at cost price in addition to management advice through its staff who 
undertake regular visits to these families. Inputs are provided on the basis of bai 
muaial (deferred payment system) and families are required to repay in fourteen 
monthly installments. SIB undertakes to replace pullets in the event of an epidemic 
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Figure: (10.1)a 
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Figure: (10.1)b 
Pump Irrigated Schemes 
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Figure: (10.1)c 
Rain Irrigated Schemes 
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resulting in high mortality rates. 
10.7. Balance Sheet, Development & Profit and Loss Accounts 
Table 10.3., shows the balance sheet of the Bank as on 30.12.1407H. 
10.7.1. Fixed Assests 
Fixed assests' totalled CS 10.3 million by the end of 1407H, compared 
with XS 8.3 million at the end of 1406H, an increase of XS 2 million (24.1%). This 
increase was due to the expansionary policy adopted by the Bank which dictated 
the increase in fixed assets. 
10.7.2. Assets and Liabilities 
Total assets and liabilities of the Bank increased at the end of 1407H to 
XS 270 million as compared to CS, 177.2 million at the end of 1406H, an increase 
of XS 92.8 million which is percentage increase of 52.4%. 
10.7.3. Growth of Deposits 
The data available suggests that the Sudanese Islamic Bank has been 
successful in attracting customers at a reasonable rate. The number of current 
accounts, investment and savings accounts reached 14306 by the end of 1407H 
compared to 11565 accounts at the end of 1406H. This stands as real evidence of 
the expansion of the basis of the Bank's dealing by 23.7%. 
Total deposits increased from XS 117 million at the end of 1406H to 
. CS 181.9 million by the end of 1407H, an increase of XS 64.9 million (55.5%). 
An examination of the average amount held in a deposit account does indicate a 
growth as shown in Figure 10.2 . The increase 
in the number of account holders, 
particularly those with a savings or investment, may be taken to reflect growing 
confidence in the institution. 
There was also significant increase in the number and value of current 
deposits in local currency which reached CS 190.3 million by the end of 1407H, 
compared with XS 95.7 million at the end of 1406H, an increase of XS 64.6 million 
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Table 10.3. 
BALANCE SHEET OF THE BANK AS AT 30.12.1407H 
ASSETS 30.12.1407H 30.12.1406H 
Cash in Hands and Banks 167,522,316 93,245,784 
Bills Receivable 4,238,083 21117,965 
171,760,399 95,363,749 
Current Investment Operations 63,084,524 55,679,090 
Other Debit balance 10,677,456 10,469,418 
Other Financing 5,944,209 - 
251,466,588 161,512,257 
Long Term Investments 7,065,133 5,940,132 
Other Assets 1,197,089 1,381,672 
Fixed Assets 10,307,435 81327,562 
270,036,245 177jq1,623 
LIABILITIES AND SHAREHOLDERS EQUITY ------- 
Customer Deposits 181,941,029 117,004,642 
Payable to Banks 643,435 324,950 
Bills Payable & Certified 
Cheques 5,666,023 7,541,647 
Margins on Documentary Credits 1111001001 6,502,030 Other Credit Balances 14,533,524 12,655,253 
Cover of Cheques and Transfers 23,425,450 - 
237,309,462 144,028,522 
Paid Uý Capital l 23,910,681 23,535,275 Gene Reserve 1,563,846 1,342,380 
Other Reserves 6,593,583 6,149,025 
Accumulated Profits 658,673 2,106,421 
32,726,783 23,133,101 
MEMORANDOM ACCOUNTS 
Total 270,036,245 177,161,623 
Documentary Credits 18,738,612 8,243,779 
Letters of Guarantee 36,247,726 9,779,223 
Banks (Bills Under Collection) 207,98 471,760 
Cheques (Under Collection) 417,733 11,181,02 
Travellers Cheques Stocks 362,550 85,431 
TOTAL 55,787,419 20,467,177 
Source: Bank's Annual Report March 1988 
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Figure: 10.2. Average Value of a Deposit Account 
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(67.5%). Savings deposits increased by XS 3.7 million, a growth of 100% over the 
volume of 1406H. Investment deposits declinced from XS 12.1 million at the end 
of 1406H, to XS 10.4 million by the end of 1407H, a loss of -CS 1.7 million (14%). 
The Bank's reluctance to accept new investment deposits was due to the narrow 
lending ceiling'imposed by the Bank of Sudan. Such a ceiling does not allow a 
proper investment of deposits, held by individual banks. 
On November 1986 the Credit Ceiling Policy of the Bank of Sudan laid 
down the following regulations'. 
(1) Each bank must operate within a definite credit ceiling as defined by 
the Bank of Sudan. 
(2) Finance for export must not be less than 30% of the total 'credit 
ceiling of any bank. 
(3) Finance for the working capital of the manufacturing industry must 
not be less than 25% of the total credit ceiling of any bank. 
(4) Medium and long term advances and participation in productive un- 
dertakings and companies must not be less than 35% of the total credit ceiling of 
any private sector bank (non-state owned banks). However, these advances must 
not exceed 20% of the total credit ceiling of any public sector bank (state owned 
banks). 
(5) Short term advances must not exceed 65% of the credit ceiling of any 
bank. 
(6) The co-nation al- foreign banks' advances to the domestic trade and 
for other purposes must not exceed 10% of their credit ceiling. 
(7) The state-owned bank's advances to development projects, domestic 
trade and other purposes must not exceed 45% of their credit ceiling. 
(8) The foreign bank's advances for import and other purposes must not 
Bank of Sudan, The Credit Ceiling Policy, Khartoum, November 1986: 
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exceed 10% of their credit ceiling. 
(9) The legal reserves must not be less than 20% of the total deposits. 
(10) If a customer wishes to imPort goods which are not allowed to be 
imported (the Bank of Sudan defines the important goods which are permitted), 
he must finance them from his own funds and banks are under no circumstances 
allowed to give him a loan for such a purpose. However, if he wishes to import an 
important commodity, he must pay 40% of its cost in advance and such a percentage 
could be decreased to 10% for inputs to agricultural and manufacturing industries. 
Consequently, the government seeks further participation from the bank- 
ing sector in the productive sectors. Moreover, it requires the banking sector to 
diminish its facilities for imports with the aim of reducing the deficit in the balance 
of payments. Nevertheless, the banking sector concentrates on short term advances, 
particularly imports and domestic trade. 
Deposits in foreign currency declined from XS 5.5 million at the end 
of 1406H to XS 3.8 million by the end of 1407H. This represents a drop XS 1.7 
million (21%). The Bank did not encourage new deposits because of the difficulty 
in utilizing them as the Bank of Sudan (the Central Bank) strictly regulates the 
utilization of foreign currency. 
Table 10.4., shows the statement of profit and loss of the bank accumu- 
lated for the period from 30/12/1406H to 30/12/1407H. 
10.7.4. Profit and Loss (Revenue) 
The revenue of the bank for the 1407H, totalled CS 11.2 million compared 
with XS 13.6 million in the year 1406H, with a decrease of XS 2.4 million (17.5%). 
The regulations of the Bank of Sudan regarding the financing of imports, c 
has had a bad affect on the bank's (SIB) balance of its investment revenue which 
totalled XS 7.7 million in 1407H, compared with XS 8.5 million in 1406H. 
The revenue of banking services decreased to XS 3.1 million in 1407H, 
compared with XS 3.2 million in 1406H, representing a decrease of CS 0.1 million 
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Table 10.4. 
STATEMENT OF PROFIT AND LOSS ACCUMULATED 
FOR THE PERIOD FROM 30/12/1406H. TO 30/12/1407H 
30.12.1407H 30.12.1406H 
Investment Revenue Received 7,692,417 8,530,580 
Banking Services Revenue Received 3,226,990 3,113,409 
Exchange Received 144,478 786,167 
Other Revenues Received 175,209 1,196,963 
Total 11,239,094 13,627,119 
General & Administration Expenses 8,812,405 7,926,198 
Net Profit Before Zakat & Tax 2,426,689 5,700,921 
Zakat & Tax 1,548,016 2,234,337 
Net Profit for the Period 878,673 3,466,584 
Accumulated Profits at the 
beginning of the Period 2,106,421 1,427,202 
2,985,094 4,893,786 
General Reserve(25% of net 
Diyidend for the period) 220,000 866,846 
Dividend Paid 2,106,421 1,427,202 
Proposed Dividend 493,517 
Accumulated Profit at the end 
of the period 658,673 2,106,421 
Source: Bank's Annual Report, March 1988 
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(3.2%). This was due to the restrictions on imports which negatively affected the 
performance of the documentary credit department (import L/Cs), the main source 
of banking services revenue. 
10.7.5. Profit Distribution 
The net profits of the Bank for the year 140711, before taxation and zakat, 
reached XS 2,426,689 million. CS 500,000 was allocated for zakat and CS 1,048,016 
for taxation in addition to CS 200,000 kept as a legal Reserve. The remaining 
XS 658,673 can be distributed as dividend at a rate of 2.75% approximately. This 
represents the average percentage of dividend achieved by the banks in the year 
1407H. This low rate can be traced to the hardships faced by the banks in their 
activities and the increase in the rate of taxation. 
10.7.6. Zakat 
Total amounts paid by the Bank in fulfillment of zakat and distributed 
to its lawful channels through the Zakat Committee reached XS 1,206,561 as shown 
in Table 10.5. 
Table 10.5. 
PAYMENT OF ZAKAT BY THE BANK 
Year Amount in XS. Pound 
30-10.1405H 165,000 
30.12.1406H 541,561 
30.12.1407H 500,000 
TOTAL 1,206, 
Source: Bank's Annual Report, March 1988 
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10.8. Bank's Investment 
Unlike other Islamic banks, SIB musharakah operations dominate the 
financing operation and its significance has increased rapidly over time. Investment 
operations concluded during 1407H amounted to CS 146 million as shown in Table 
10.6. 
Table 10.6. 
INVESTMENT DURING 1406-1407H 
(XS. 0009s) 
Type of Investment Total 
1406 
% Total 
1407 
% 
Murabaha 63,77 52.4 56,609 38.8 
Musharakah 56,47 46.4 89,020 60.9 
Muclarabah 1,460 1.2 00,398 0.3 
TOTAL 
1 121,700 1 
100.0 
1 
146.027, 100.0 
Source: Bank's Annual Report, March 1987-88 
The figures indicate that the Bank's operations based on musharakah 
financing increased during 1407H. Musharakah represent 60.9% of total investment 
concluded compared with 46.4% in the year 1406H. Through musharakah financing 
the Sudanese Islamic Bank has given a high priority to agriculture which is at the 
heart of the economy. On the other hand, in 140711, more than 38% of financial 
operations of SIB were based on murabaha. However, its proportion has decreased 
from 52% in 1406H. 
Finance provided by the SIB to any sector depends on two facts, the 
mode of finance and the terms of finance. Evidence from the data suggests that 
finance to the strategic commodities sector is provided by the Bank on the basis of 
murabaha since the financial needs of trade are of a short-term nature. However, it 
seems that SIB has to diversify its financing operations sectorally and satisfy the 
needs of the agricultural and other sectors. 
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The Bank has also paid special attention to socio-economic development, 
widening the scope of its finance to cover development based on a strategy of rural 
development, financing small farmers, producers, and artisans. 
Despite the changes in its credit policy, the Bank has been successful 
in creating an equilibrium in its investment amongst the different sectors and its 
sources represented in owners equity and client's deposits, savings and current ac- 
counts. 
The Bank was able to increase the magnitude of its investment from CS 
50.3 million at the end of 1405H, to XS 141.6 million at the end of 1406H with 
an increase of XS 91.3 million (35.5%). At the end of 1407H the Bank's operation 
amounted to XS 146.027 million where musharakah represented 61% of the. total 
investment concluded. The Bank committed itself to operate in a wide base of 
small investors and to distribute its investment operations among the main sectors 
of strategic commodities, the agricultural sector, the industrial sector, consumer 
goods, building materials and the transportation sector. Total Bank investment in 
these sectors amounted to 98.6% of its total investment as shown in Table 10.7. 
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Table 10.7. 
BANK'S INVESTMENT IN 
VARIOUS SECTORS DURING 1407H 
Sector 1406H 140711 
000's % 000's % 
Agricultural Sector 48,266 29.4 48,817 33.5 
Industrial Sector 15,489 9.4 37,701 25.8 
Strategic Commodities Sec. 34,162 20.8 25,997 17.8 
Transport Sector 29,602 18.1 21.497 14.7 
Consumer Goods Sector 15,681 9.6 7,922 5.4 
Construction Sector 17,475 10.7 17990 1.4 
Artisan Sector 1,450 0.9 1,372 0.9 
Other 1,804 1.1 0,731 0.5 
TOTAL 
1 
163,9271 
__100.0 1 
146,027 10 
Source: Bank's Annual Report, March 1988 
10.9. Bank's Operations 
The Sudanese Islamic Bank conducts normal banking operations like 
most other Islamic banks. The Bank modifies its operations if some banking prac- 
tices do not conform to the shariah. Its banking practices include: accepting cash 
deposits for safe custody and investment; giving credits and loans in conformity with 
the shaHah; purchase and sale of foreign exchange, issuing letter of credit, collecting 
the value of drafts, cheques, promisary notes, bills of lading etc., on commission. 
Most of th 
' 
ese functions are also performed by traditional commerical banks but 
Islamic banks perform these in such a way so as not ' 
to violate any shaHah rules. 
For example an Islamic bank buys and sells foreign exchange and gold bullion etc., 
only at the spot rate. 
Ahmed, A., Development and Problems of Islamic Banks, Islamic Research and Training Institute, Islamic Development Bank, Jeddah, 1987, pp. 33-34. 
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Musharakah seems to be more popular at this time amongst the Su- 
danese Islamic Bank operations. However, data for three years 1405-140711 show 
a more diversified use of the three main techniques. In 140511, it undertook 703 
murabaha operations which accounted for 66% of the total and the rest were dis- 
tributed between musharakah which claimed 32% and mudarabah which accounted 
for 2%. In 1406H, the Sudanese Islamic Bank undertook 1115 Murabaha opera- 
tions which constituted approximately 52% of the total number. The significance 
of musharakah increased to 48% and mudarabah came down to 0.76%. The Bank 
undertook murabaha operations which accounted for 46.7% of the total finance in 
1407H. The remaining was distributed between musharakah which accounted for 
52.9% of finance and mudarabah which claimed 0.4%. If one averages over the three 
year period the evidence suggests that murabaha is the most popular and domi- 
nant technique of financing in the Sudanese Islamic Bank operations followed by 
musharakah. 
For musharakah, as for the two other financing instruments, the Bank 
would evaluate the project presented by clients in order to assess its viability. Upon 
approval of an application, a musharakah contract is signed between the Bank and 
the client (who becomes a partner). The contract specifies all the details relating 
to the contribution of each partner in capital, management and profits as well as 
the controls regulating relations between the two partners. As soon as the contract 
is signed, a joint-account in the name of the partnership is opened, and withdrawal 
of the deposited amounts would be controlled by the pre-agreed plan of operations 
contained in the contract. Goods purchased from partnership funds are normally 
kept under dual custody of both partners, thus serving as a collateral. To ensure 
compliance with the contract, the Bank undertakes general supervision and mon- 
itoring of the progress of operations. The musharakah contracts concluded by the 
Bank cover three main fields. These are trade, industrial investment and agricul- 
tural investment. 
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10.9.1. Musharakah in Trade 
The Bank realized the importance of short term financing for trade. How- 
ever, trading musharakah operations cover three spheres; domestic, export and im- 
port trade. For the conclusion of contracts on trading operations, the Bank under- 
takes an evaluation of the feasibility of the project and will focus on cost, returns 
and rate of turnover for the commodity in question. In the process of evaluation, 
SIB takes into consideration the compliance of the project with the investment pol- 
icy adopted by SIB and the credit policy announced by the Bank of Sudan. It has 
to be emphasised here that in Islamic financing, the viability of the commercial 
transaction itself rather than the credit worthiness of the client, is the vitally im- 
portant issue which the banks take into consideration. This is a basic difference 
between debt financing of the conventional banking sector and equity financing of 
the Islamic banking. 
As for all types of musharakah contracts, trading partnerships concluded 
by the Bank are guided by a manual embodying the shariah, administrative and ac- 
counting regulations governing the contract. In this regard, SIB adopts the shaHah 
principle conceding allocation of disproportional shares in profits to the partners 
(an additional share is granted to client-partners for management, for example), 
and adheres to the principle of bearing losses in proportion to the contribution. In 
addition to the joint management of the bank account, trading musharakah con- 
tracts stipulate joint storing and Islamic insurance of the commodity. Table 10.8., 
given as an example, concerns a commodity with an invoice value of CS 1,602,000 
millions in an operation extending for four months, typifies liquidation of trading 
musharakah undertaken by the Bank. 
In cases of import trade, SIB sometimes enters into musharakah for the 
clearance of commodities through customs only (i. e. musharakah in services). In 
such instances, the partner would have provided the foreign exchange component, 
and SIB would contribute the local component to cover clearance and customs. The 
cost of the service provided would be calculated as a proportion of the capital. In 
a similar manner to the example stated above, the same procedures are followed 
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Table No. 10.8. 
MUSHARAKAH IN TRADING TRANSACTION FOR THE 
PURCHASE AND SALE OF SESAME SEED. 
ESTIMATED PERIOD FOR LIQUIDATING 
TRANSACTION OF FOUR MONTHS 
Quantity 1000 millions 
Cost 
Pounds Sudanese 
Purchase Price CS. 1602 Per Metric Tan 
Total Purchase Price 1000xI602 1,602,000 
Other Expenses 1000x333 333,000 
Storage and Dues 
Total Capital 1,935,000 
Equity shares 
Bank's Share 75% 1,451,250 
Client's Share 25% 483,750 1,935,000 
Proceeds of sales 
1000 TansX2337 2,337,000 
Total Costs 1,935,000 
Profit 402,000 
Distribution of Profits 
According to contract 
Client Bank 
402,000 25% for Management 100,500 
-100,500 
307,500 75% for Bank 226,125 
25% for Client 75,375 
Profit Accruing to Partners 175,875 226,125 
Equity 483,750 1,451,250 
Total Amount Accruing to Partners 659,625 1,677,375 
Profit Percentage 36% 15% 
Annualized Percentage 108% 45% 
Source: Islamic Banking: Experience in Sudan, 
paper'presented to the seminar on Islamic Banking 
at Loughborough University of Technology, 
July 1988, England, p. 9. 
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for the determination of the respective shares of partners and the percentage to be 
allocated in return for management. 
10.9.2. Musharakah in Industrial Investment 
Industrial invstment has been given a steadily growing share in SIB's 
investment operations and it takes one of two forms: 
(1) Musharakah in fixed assets. 
(2) Musharakah in working capital. 
Musharakah in fixed assets utilizes a formula of "diminishing partnership" 
whereby at the time of liquidation the partner-client would become the sole owner 
of assets. Upon approval of application, SIB negotiates the basis of partnership, de- 
termines the respective contributions of partners and the industrial establishment's 
mode of operation. The SIB will normally be involved in musharakah in working 
capital as well. A contract is subsequently signed specifying the details of the part- 
nership, the respective contributions and'shares of partners and the responsibility 
for management". In contracts stipulating diminishing partnership, the partner- 
client would undertake to allocate a portion of his annual profits for the purchase of 
a certain pre-agreed percentage, (say for example 20%), of SIB's contribution to the 
partnership. In effect, the respective contributions of the partners do not remain 
the same for the whole duration of the partnership. At the end of the first year, 
the partner-client would come to increase his contribution by buying part of SIB's. 
If the part bought each year is 20%, then at the end of the fifth year, the whole 
remaining portion of the SIB would have been taken over by the partner-client. 
(2) Musharakah in Working Capital: 
This second form of industrial partnership is characterized by being short 
in duration, typically extending for one working season, normally six months. Under 
such partnerships, the contribution of the partner-client is usually provided in the 
Klialeefa, M. U., and Ibrahim, S. E. A., The Experience of SID in Musharakah Financing, 
Paper presented at the Seminar on Islamic Banking, Joinly Organised by International Associ- 
ation for Islamic Economics, Islamic Foundation and Loughborough University of Technology, 
July 1988, p. 11. 
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form of depreciation of fixed assets, whereas the SIB would contribute operational 
costs and expenses. The contract specifies a percentage of profits for management 
(usually 25%), to be given to the client-partner, and the remaining profits are 
divided in proportion to the respective contribution of each party. 
10.10. Conclusions 
The rural society and economy of Sudan form a vital component of the 
national structure. Not only does a substantial proportion of the population live 
in rural areas, but the national economy is itself dependent on rural activities, in 
particular agriculture. Within rural Sudan, however, there is obviously a wide range 
of problems and difficulties to be faced. These range from basic services, to the more 
complex problems that have been posed by the process of development itself, such 
as rising aspirations of an increasingly educated populace. 
The Sudanese Islamic Bank has been conscious of the problems of the 
rural sector since its inception and various attempts have been made to tackle them. 
Much of the effort has, however, been fragmented, with little attempt to solve the 
root causes of the difficulties. This is in part due to the fact that problems of the 
rural areas axe indeed complex and extremely difficult to isolate. 
The rural development programme of the Bank has thus gained consid- 
erable momentum since its initiation in 1985. A detailed organisation has been set 
in place, centred on the Rural Development Department (RDD). This department 
provides the foundation for the rural development programme which is mobilised 
with the support of the Bank's Board of Directors. The overall strategy is focused 
on financing small farmers in order to improve their living standards and increased 
demand for agricultural products to achieve food security. 
The major criticism of the overall programme, however, concerns the 
allocation of priorities to various activities. While the overall framework appears to 
be satisfactory, there is a need for reconsideration of both the allocation of priorities 
and resources. This applies not only to financial, but also to physical and human 
resources. 
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Nevertheless, the foregoing analysis, suggests that the rural development 
programme is established along the right lines and, given its current structure, offers 
considerable scope for the successful development of the rural sector. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
THE EXPERIENCE 6F THE SUDANESE ISLAMIC 
BANK IN MUSHARAKAH FINANCING 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the experience of the Sudanese Islamic 
Bank in musharakah financing. The chapter is divided into eleven sections. The 
first will highlight the scope of the study. The second will assess the type of farm 
activity within the schemes, family structure, farm size, cultivation patterns, crop 
production, and its importance to the farmers. In the third, we will discuss the ma- 
jor cash crops for the farmers and in the fourth their income. Fifth, we will examine 
the state of agricultural credit. The relation of the farmer with financial institutions 
will be highlighted in the sixth section. The seventh will assess the problems facing 
the farmers and the eighth the various types of bank's credit facilities. The advan- 
tages of the Sudanese Islamic Bank credit schemes will be analysed in the ninth 
section and comments by the farmers will be assessed in the tenth. Finally, some 
conclusion will be drawn on the experience of the bank in musharakah financing. 
11.1. The Scope of the Study 
The questionnaire was distributed among fifty small farmers (who deal with the 
Sudanese Islamic Bank) in two schemes mainly Shehenab (North Omdurman)'and 
Islang-Island. 
The agricultural project in Shehenab, lies about 50 kilometres north of Omdur- 
man and encloses an approximate area of 53 feddans. The Islang-Island project is 
about 17 kilometres from Khartoum, the capital of Sudan. Both of the schemes are 
irrigated by pumping water from the river Nile. The main crops in the two areas 
are potatoes in the winter and tomatoes and onions during summer. 
The majority of schemes in Khartoum province (where the two projects are 
located) are devoted to vegetable and fruit production for the high-income market 
of the three towns. -There are even larger areas earmarked for cereals and fod- 
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der. The use of machinery in these schemes, as in the Northern province, is less 
common than in the cotton growing areas. It is more or less restricted to larger 
schemes in the Northern province although there is widespread use of contracted 
machine services in Khartoum province. Bulls are still widely used for ploughing 
and, where practised, ridging. Most crops are grown in borders which are made up 
by hand. Cropping is intensive and generally the use of fertilizer is more widespread 
in schemes relating to fruit and vegetable production. In Khartoum province fruit 
ranges in importance from citrus to mango, banana and guava in that order. Thus 
land holdings should be limited to a manageable size. This is especially so because 
the labour intensive nature of agriculture implies that a larger land holding requires 
a much greater amount of assistance. 
The two projects in Shehenab and Islang-Island areas are based on partnership 
financing musharakah where the Sudaneses Islamic Bank (SIB) provides most of the 
agricultural inputs e. g. seeds, fertilizer and part of the running expenses without 
collateral and/ or guarantee. The Bank also owns fixed assets and provides the 
services of the machinery to farmers at actual cost price. The farmers contribute 
with their land, labour, management and part of the running expenses. 
11.2. Type of Farm Activity 
The farmers surveyed produce vegetables, fruits and fodder for grazing their 
animals. Vegetables account for 94% of farm output and fodder production accounts 
for 4%. They also produce fruit which account for 2% (as shown in Table 11.1. ). 
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Table 11.1. 
TYPE OF ACTIVITY 
Crops Percentage 
Vegetables 94.0 
Fodders 4.0 
Fruits 2.0 
TOTAL 100.0 
Source: Survey finding 
Other farming activities in the schemes are livestock rearing. Livestock is owned 
by every farmer. It is one of the main sources of livelihood for the people and 
provides the means through which increased income could be achieved. 
As the above figures indicate the farmers dedicate a large part of their land 
to vegetable production. The reason may be that prior to the Bank's establish- 
ment all agricultural activity was limited to vegetable production for subsistance. 
A continued dependency on almost one crop will undoubtedly make the farmers 
more vulnerable to environmental hazards, natural calamaties and price fluctua- 
tions. Therefore the Bank should attempt to convince the farmers that it will be 
rational and beneficial to diversify their crops. 
It was observed that the farmers who deal with the Bank are young and inexpe- 
rienced. As much as 60% of them started farming in 1950,1960 and 1970 whereas 
40% of them have started since 1975 either having come of age then or after realis- 
ing that the potential for growth in agriculture is still greater than in other sectors 
of the economy. Perhaps one can argue that musharakah financing introduced by 
the Bank through its incentive elements has given more hopes to young and poor 
farmers to work hard and cultivate their land. They became a partner through the 
new system, sharing the risk and profit with the Bank. If this system is well man- 
aged and proves to be successful, the number of young farmers will increase in the 
rural areas. These farmers, because of incentives provided under the musharakah 
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financing system, will stay in the rural areas cultivating their land instead of mi- 
grating to the big cities in search of a job. The big cities are already suffering from 
an increasing rate of unemployment resulting from economic deterioration. 
11.2.1. Family Structure 
In the rural areas of Sudan a family generally comprises of a farmer's immediate 
family, that is his wife and children, and aged dependents, such as his parents and 
unmarried sisters. It is usual for younger brother(s) of the farmer to help his elder 
and thus also be a part of the family. Occasionally, a brother breaks away to be 
a farmer in his own right. The data revealed that 22% of the farm families have 
more than 10 persons which indicates that the average family size tends to be large. 
Farmers who have to care for 6 to 10 persons form 52% of the total. This may 
be attributed to economic and financial factors as a relatively small family reduces 
the pressure on small farmers. As many as 26% of the farmers have no immediate 
family either because they are not married yet or because they cannot afford to get 
married. Some are married but have restricted their dependents to between 1 to 5 
persons (see Table 11.2. ). 
Table. 11.2. 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF FARMERS 
ACCORDING TO FAMILY SIZE 
No. of members per household No. of farmers No. of farmers as a% 
of total number 
None 1 2 
1-5 persons 12 24 
6-10 persons 26 52 
More than 10 persons 11 22 
TOTAL 50 100 
291 
Any reduction in family size is indeed a promising sign for the government in 
its attempt to alleviate the food and nutrition problems. More so because the 
government can not enforce a birth control programme in view of opposition from 
religious quarters. It is obvious, however, that in many developing countries the 
population growth exceeds the growth in food production. This results in their 
transformation from net grain exporters to net grain importers. 
Further it was noticed that young boys were generally not interested in agricul- 
ture. Abdelkarim refers to the "wrong" eductional policies which put little emphasis 
on agriculture, the result of which is "once a son acquired a little education, he would 
look for employment outside the scheme or loaf". 
It was also noted that prior to the introduction of musharakah the household 
had been especially deprived of using a significant part of its potential labour force; 
the women. While earlier it was usual for women to work alongside family men, it 
was considered improper for women to work in the fields in the recent past. It was 
felt during the survey that the Bank should encourage the participation of women 
in agricultural activity. 
11.2.2. Farm Size and Cultivation Patterns 
Before the Bank initiated its schemes in the Shehenab and Islang-Island areas 
the agricultural activity among the farmers with small land holdings was marginal. 
On the other hand those with a large land holding did not cultivate their land by 
themselves. These large land owners depended on outside labour, provided by the 
poor farmers in the region as well as wage labourers settled in the area. 
Share cropping arrangements were and are generally practised by farmers with 
large holdings. This kind of arrangement involves already "free" wage labourers who 
depend on selling their labour to secure subsistence. It is an unofficial agreement 
between the farmer and the wage labourer where the farmer agrees to temporarily 
abandon his right to use the land. This right is offered to the wage worker who in 
Abdelkarim, A., Social Forms of Organization of labour in the Sudan Gezira, Discussion paper 
No. 171, November 1984, School of Development Studies, Norwich, p. 12. 
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turn is responsible for harvesting the land. The farmer remains the legal producer 
and the wage worker gets a small share of the produce. 
Not surprisingly the amount of labour used in the farm depends on the size 
of the farm. It was found that landowners with low farm sizes hired between 1- 
5 workers (which accounted for 74%) and those with large farm sizes hired more 
than 6 workers (which accounted for 26%). Therefore, the small farmers are more 
active as a labour force and depend on themselves to cultivate the land. This could 
be attributed to the introduction of musharakah financing in agriculture where the 
relationship between the Bank and the farmer has changed. The farmer became 
a partner with the Bank (sharing the risk and gaining the profit ) in the new 
arrangement. He also became more active in farming, depending on himself rather 
than outside labour. Even when they required outside labour they tend to hire 
limited numbers, usually between 1-5 workers as shown in Table 11.3. 
Table. 11.3. 
NUMBER OF OUTSIDE LABOURERS 
IN SHEHENAB AND ISLANG-ISLAND SCHEMES 
No. of outside labourers Percentage 
1-5 74.0 
6- 10 20.0 
More than 10 6.0 
TOTAL 100.0 
Source: Survey finding 
Age seems to be an important factor in determining the level of employment. 
The farmers are in a more favourable position to do the manual work as they are 
generally young. On the average each farmer has about 1-5 workers engaged in farm 
activities. This makes it possible to depend mainly on their own labour (provided 
that the household forms one production unit, which is apparently the case with 
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most of the households) and more than half of the farmers do not require extra 
workers at any stage, while the others need it-only very occasionally. It may be 
important to note that the average size of the farm will probably be smaller than the 
average holding that a farmer may have. On the occasions when extra household 
labour is required, it is for weeding and harvesting. Extra household labour is 
normally provided by wage labourers who are required to prepare the land, to sow 
seeds and to spray the chemicals. 
The Bank in implementing its schemes targeted the small and poor farmers. The 
average farm size in the sample under study varied between 11-25 feddans which 
accounts for 20% of the total. Those with small farms (1-10 feddans) accounted for 
70% and those with large farm sizes (11-51 feddans) accounted for 30% as shown 
in Table 11.4. 
Table. 11.4. 
FARMING SIZE IN SHEHENAB 
AND ISLANG-ISLAND SCHEMES 
Area cultivated (feddans) Percentage 
0 to 5 46.0 
5-10 24.0 
11-25 20.0 
26-50 6.0 
More than 51 feddans 4.0 
TOTAL 100.0 
Source: Survey finding 
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The data suggests that the farm sizes on average are small. Thus on such 
small holdings there is very little scope for mechanized farming, and each unit of 
labour has a small area of land to work with. Hence agricultural production is 
labour-intensive. Therefore, owners of small farms are numerous, but they own and 
cultivate only a small proportion of all the land. 
An overwhelming 90% of the farmers cultivate their farms on their own land 
and the remaining 10% hire labour from outside to cultivate the farm. 
It is clear from the above figure that the incentive system introduced by the 
bank through the musharakah financing has played a vital role in encouraging the 
poor farmers to cultivate their farm by themselves rather than depending on outside 
labour. Such a tendency will undoubtedly alleviate the labour shortage in the rural 
area of Sudan and will be a big relief to the government. 
The farmers who cultivate their land more than twice per year represented 62% 
of the sample and 38% used the land either once or twice a year. Thus the introduc- 
tion of "musharakah! ' has brought many changes. Whereas before its introduction 
land was only cultivated once a year, now the time for which the land is under cul- 
tivation has increased. The farmer has become more active in improving his farm 
and utilizing his land to the maximum. The Bank, through its Rural Development 
Department (RDD) provides agricultural inputs such as fertilizers. Consequently 
it is important that the Bank discourage excessive use of phosphates as it damages 
the soil. 
11.2.3. Crop Production and its Importance to the Farmers 
The farmers were asked about the nature of crops grown - The data indicates 
that the farmers cultivate more than one product. The results reveal the following: 
Vegetables 
Vegetables are the main crop which all farmers grow. This is due to their high 
marketability and turnover. These are grown in a large number of schemes in the 
area. Vegetable production contributes to both subsistence needs and to cash sales. 
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Although the vegetable gardens were originally intended to improve the diets of the 
farmers, the greater proportion, of vegetables is in fact sold in local markets. 
Fodder 
The second important crop grown by the farmers is fodder which accounts for 8% 
of the cultivated area. However, there is still considerable scope for irrigated fodder 
production in the scheme. At present this is practised on a relatively small-scale. 
The Bank has a role to play in encouraging the farmer to cultivate fodder due to its 
importance as the main feed for their animals. The expansion of fodder production 
will play a major part in developing specialized lines of livestock enterprises in the 
scheme. 
Also, the production of fodder can be increased through the control of disease, 
pests, etc. It is possible to reduce animal mortalities, hence increasing animal 
numbers. The crucial point is that the development of pasture resources coincide 
with increases in animal numbers without damaging and causing deterioration of 
the grazing lands. There is a danger involved in following this line of development 
if a completely controlled grazing use is not achieved. 
Fruits 
Fruits are the third important crop that the farmers grow in the scheme. Unfor- 
tunately, only 2% of the farmers cultivate them in spite of their high marketability. 
The Bank should encourage the farmers to increase their fruit production. Fruits 
can supplement the dietary and nutritional needs and there is a great potential 
for growth resulting from the changing dietary habits of the people. Bananas, 
grapefruit, mango and strawberries might develop to become commodities for local 
consumption. 
Dura 
Dura is regarded primarily as a staple food of the vast majority of the popula- 
tion. Sudan was one of the largest African producers of dura (sorghum) and it was 
the country's second most important export after cotton in normal years. There 
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were very wide fluctuations in production, with ranges of between 2 and 3 million 
tons in successive years. The fluctuations were largely due to the fact that over 90% 
of1the crop was grown in the rainfed areas rather than areas served by irrigation. 
Recently the farmers have stopped growing dura, and the government has to import 
it, thus worsening the balance of payments. It was found that none of the small 
farmers in the scheme were cultivating dura. Since dura is one of the main diet 
items in Sudan, the Bank should encourage the farmer to cultivate the crop. 
In the past the tenants, at the Gezira scheme for example, were discouraged from 
cultivating dura and many of the agricultural operations necessary for the crop were 
not practiced. It has been reported by many of the tenants that not enough water is 
provided for their dura crops. There are also many diseases and'insects that affect 
crop yields and it has been reported that bird damage is particularly severe. In fact 
birds in many cases reduce the crop to bare straws'. 
Wheat 
Consumption of wheat has been increasing year after year as a result of the 
increase in population, income and urbanization, combined with a change in dietary 
preferences. Unfortunately, it was found that the farmers do not grow wheat at all. 
Groundnuts 
Sudan is the second largest producer of groundnuts in Africa after Senegal, 
but there have been wide fluctuations in production in the past decade. There 
was a substantial increase in the area under groundnuts in the mid-1970. Yields 
were not, however, particularly high in recent years. Nevertheless the cultivation of 
groundnuts has become unattractive because of the different technological difficul- 
ties involved, taking into consideration the limited financial resources of the farmers 
in the scheme, they are not in a position to cultivate groundnuts at present. 
EI-Hadari, A. E., The Economics of Agricultural Production in the Private Pump Schemes, 
Part II, Research Bulletin No. 15, April 1968, University of Khartoum, p. 17. 
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Sugar 
Sugar products constitute an important item of the Sudanese diet. At present 
sugar is mainly an imported commodity although suitable ecological conditions 
exist in the Sudan for growing sugar cane. In the recent past sugar was one of the 
cornerstones of the "breadbasket" programme introduced by the Arab Authority for 
Agricultural Development with the objective of expanding sugar cane production. 
Yet, it has been discovered that none of the farmers grow sugar due to limited 
financial resources. 
'v- furestry 
Sudanese forest products can be divided into two: gum arabic and other woods. 
The country is the world's major producer of gum arabic, accounting for over 80% 
of the total. In 1983 gum arabic was the fourth most important export, bringing 
in $64.3 million, or 9.4% of total exports. It was discovered that none of the farms 
surveyed had 
, 
trees. The Bank should encourage them to grow forests in order to 
protect the soil of the farm from erosion. 
The survey shows that the farmers consume more than one crop from outside 
their farms such as sugar, wheat and other crops. Sugar in many forms is an 
increasing part of the diet but it is mostly imported. While wheat is also brought 
from outside its consumption is lower than that of sugar. This may be attributed 
to the shortage of wheat in the market which may lead the farmers to replace it 
by dura as the main staple food in the area. The Bank can convince the farmers 
to change their consumption pattern. They should be more of a producer rather 
than a consumer. If wheat or dura proves to be economically feasible they would 
be better off if they cultivate these crops in order to satisfy their local demand. 
In order to plan properly for the future it is essential that the Bank undertakes 
an exercise to find out the preferences of the farmer as to the relative importance 
of the various crops. Such an analysis will undoubtedly help the Bank management 
in economic forecasting. Keeping this in view the farmers were asked to indicate 
the relative importance, in their view, of the dura, dukhun, groundnuts, sesame 
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and sugar crops. The data reveals that a farmer considers more than one crop as 
relatively important. 
(a) Dura 
92% of the farmers have indicated that they consider dura to be a very important 
crop. This is due to the fact that dura is the staple food of the vast majority of the 
farmers. The government should try to encourage the expansion of the area sown 
to dura to meet the increasing local demand for this cereal. 
Considering that dura is a item of diet in Sudan, and that todate it was mostly 
grown in rainfed areas with consequent fluctuations in production, it would be 
worthwhile to encourage the growth of dura at the expense of dukhun. The farmers 
can make vast economic gains by developing their area as a dependable source of 
dura, in contrast to the rainfed areas. 
(b) Dukhun 
In contrast to dura only 14% of the farmers consider dukhun to be a very 
important crop. An equal number (14%) regard it as unimportant while 34% think 
that it is important. A large number (38%) attach minimal importance to the 
dukhun crop. 
(c) Groundnuts 
Of the farmers surveyed 26% think that groundnut production is very important. 
A small 4% regard it as being important while 28% attach minimal importance to 
it. A large number (42%) consider groundnut production to be unimportant. In 
view of the above figures it would be unwise to push for an increase in groundnut 
cultivation. 
(d) Sesame 
Although the seeds and oil are consumed locally, it is surprising to find that 
48% of the farmers indicate that sesame is not important. However, sesame seed is 
the second crop of importance in the central rainlands. Rapid expansion took place 
in its acreage, particularly when the price of dura declined considerably due to the 
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heavy overall production. Also People realized the profitability of sesame in spite of 
the difficulties encountered in its cultivation. There are, however, wide fluctuations 
in its acreage. These have been caused by market conditions as well as by climatic 
conditions, particularly annual precipitations'. Based on these facts the farmers 
should be informed of the risks involved in sesame production including the market 
forces at work. 
(e) Sugar- 
Sugar imports, have been steadily increasing although suitable ecological condi- 
tions exist in the Sudan for growing sugar cane. 88% of the farmers regard sugar 
as a very important crop. The sugar import bill reached its highest level in recent 
years. Therefore, in line with the import substitution strategy, the proposal is to 
expand sugar cane cultivation in the large irrigated schemes to satisfy the increasing 
local demand. 
11.3. Major Cash Crops 
The farmers were also asked to identify which cash crops they cultivate and 
were given four categories (cotton, sugar, groundnuts and other crops). The results 
follow: 
(a) Cotton 
Cotton occupies an extremely important position in the determination of na 
tional income and Sudan depends largely on the export receipts from the crop. It 
has been noted that the average yield for cotton has fluctuated from year to year 
but recently has shown a consistent trend of decline. Taking into account this factor 
and limited resources, the farmers are by no means in a position to cultivate cotton 
as a cash crop. 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Crop Production, Perspective Study of Agricultural 
Development for the Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Rome, April 1973, pp. 9-13. 
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(b) Sugar 
There has been an increase in per capita consumption of sugar in Sudan in 
recent years much in excess of the supply and the deficit is covered by imports. 
This is explained by the increase in population, income and the development of 
food industries depending on sugar. However, it was found that due to financial 
reasons none of the farmers in the scheme cultivate sugar as a cash crop. 
(c) Groundnuts 
The cultivation of groundnuts under irrigation is not very attractive because of 
the different technological difficulties involved. An expansion of rainfed groundnuts 
could be feasible if the high oil prices continue and on the condition that planting 
and harvesting can be mechanized, otherwise labour shortage would be a bottle-neck. 
Due to this factor, and the limited resources, none of the farmers are in a position 
to cultivate the crop. 
(d) Other crops 
Vegetables are the main cash crop which 66% of the farmers cultivate. This is 
because of their marketability and high turnover. 
11.4. Farmer Income 
86% of the farmers have stated that their average annual income is more than 
. CS 3000. This group can be considered as the main beneficiaries of the musharakah 
financing. 14% of the farmers said that their earnings from agriculture varied from 
XS 2000-3000. These farmers can be regarded as lesser beneficiaries from the new 
system as shown in Table 11.5. 
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Table. 11.5. 
ANNUAL INCOME OF THE FARMER 
Income Percentage 
XS 1000 - XS 2000 2.0 
XS 2000 - -CS 3000 12.0 
More than CS 3000 86.0 
TOTAL 100.0 
Source: Survey finding 
The annual income given above does not include any income from livestock 
or any wages earned outside the farm. There is no information on the latter two 
sources of income, although they are believed to be very small. 
If we consider farmers with an average annual income of more than CS 3000 
and compare their ratio among clients of the traditional bank (Agricultural Bank 
of Sudan) and those with the Islamic bank (Sudanese Islamic Bank) in the area 
surveyed, we find that the percentage is higher (86%) under the latter than the 
former (78%). It can be argued either that the introduction of musharakah financing 
has increased the annual income of the farmers, or that the richer farmers are more 
likely to do business with the Islamic banks. The second assertion is contradicted by 
the conditions of the farmers in the two schemes before the Bank's establishment. 
The farmer has apparently gained becoming a partner with the Bank and sharing 
the profits of the crop with the Bank. 
Income from vegetables constitutes almost 94% of a farmer's income from all 
crops. Moreover, the Bank in order to provide additional income to a rural family, 
has initiated a new scheme to help the farmers. The family poultry production 
schemewas introduced, the objective being to assist 31 families in 7 villages. Each 
family received one battery cage and 96 laying hens from the Bank. The cages 
and 2944 hens worth a total of XS 137,993, were given to the families without any 
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guarantee or collateral'. The amount was to be paid back in 14 monthly instalments. 
The Bank also provided feed and drugs to the families at cost. The families pay 
back CS 113,905 in instalments and towards the cost of feed and drugs as shown in 
Table 11.6. 
Average production per family was 100 dozen eggs per month, with an average 
income of CS 476.7 per month. Average expenses including instalments, feed and 
drugs were XS 305.9. So an average profit of CS 170.8 per month per family was 
achieved. For a poor rural family this profit is reasonable additional income as 
shown in the Table 11.6.1. At the same time the family paid the cost of the hens 
and the 14 instalments for the cages from their monthly income. 
The deterioration in the economic condition in the rural areas have made 72% 
of the farmers claim that income from agriculture is not sufficient. Only 28% of 
them state that income from agriculture is enough to support their families. This 
is indicative of the fact that poor farmers in the scheme were hit harder than the 
relatively rich farmers. This phenomenon has forced many farmers to look for off- 
farm income opportunities to support their families. 
An analysis of off-farm income further reveals that, in economic terms, access 
to an off-farm income does not necessarily reduce the person's involvement in agri- 
culture. On the contrary, in many cases it helps to meet input costs, particularly 
of hired labour. 
Off-farm income derives from a number of sources, especially: 
(a) Farm-labour in the farmer's own village, generally undertaken at the same 
time as work in his own fields. Farmers involved in this activity have a clear need 
for cash, both to meet consumption needs and to finance their own agricultural 
activities. The latter is unlikely to involve labour hire as such, but may include 
costs such as sacks, transport and the cash requirement which, though generally a 
Khaleefa, M. U. and Ibrahim, S. A., The Experience of SIB in Musharaakah Financing, Paper 
presented at the Seminar on Islamic Banking, Joinly Organised by International Association 
for Islamic Economics, Islamic Foundation and Loughborough University of Technology, July 
1988, pp. 32-34. 
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Table. No. 11.6.1. 
THE FAMILY POULTRY PRODUCTION SCHEME 
IN KHARTOUM NORTH FOR THIRTY ONE FAMILIES 
PROFIT & LOSS ACCOUNTS (XS) 
Family Number 
of 
Birds 
Monthly Monthly Total 
Production Income Income 
(Dozen eggs) (. CS) 14 Month 
Total 
Exp. (XS) 
(1) 
Net Profit 
or Loss 
(XS) 
1. 96, 120.00 522.00 6,600.00 4,466.00 2,134.00 
2. 961 122.00 549.00 7,000.00 4,500.00 2,500-00 
3. 961 124.00 558-00 7,100-00 4,5 00.00 2,600.00 
4. 96 119-00 536.00 6,670.00 4,500.00 2,170.00 
5. 96 121.00 545.00 6,950.00 4,500.00 2,450.00 
6. 96 124.00 558.00 7,100.00 4,500-00 2,600.00 
7. 961 120.00 530.00 7,420.00 4,520.00 2,900.00 
8. 96 122.00 542.00 7,588.00 4,530-00 3,058.00 
9. 96 120.00 525.00 7,350.00 4,540.00 2,810.00 
10. 96 121.00 510.00 7,140.00 4,535.00 2, G05.00 
11. 96. 118.00 490.00 6,860.00 4,540.00 2,320.00 
12. 96 125.00 600.00 8,400.00 4,600.00 3,800.00 
13. 96 123.00 570.00 7,980.00 4,600.00 3,380.00 
14. 96 118.00 545.00 7,630.00 4,600.00 3,030.00 
15. 96, 120.00 560.00 7,840.00 4,600.00 3,240.00 
16. 961 120.00 560.00 7,840.00 4,600.00 3,240.00 
17. 96 110.00 550.00 3,300.00 4,450.00 (1.150-00) 
18. 96 125.00 625.00 3,750.00 4,450.00 (750.00) 
19. 96 100.00 500.00 4,500.00 4,450.00 50.00 
20. 96 110-00 550.00 4,400.00 4,450.00 (50.00) 
21. 9G 80-00 400.00 3,200.00 4,450.00 (1,750.00) 
22. 96 120.00 600.00 4,800-00 4.450.00 350.00 
23. 9G 120.00 600.00 4,800.00 4,450.00 350.00 
24. 96 140.00 700.00 5,600.00 4,450.00 1,500.00 
25. 96 125-00 625.00 5,000.00 4,450.00 300.00 
26. 96 30.00 150.00 450.00 
" 
4,450.00 (4,000.00) 
27. 95 3,000.00 (3.000.00) 
28. 9G 5.00 250.00 750.00 3,200.00 (2,450.00) 
29. 96 2,450.00 (2.450.00) 
30. 96 10.00 50.00 -100.00 2,700.00 (2400.00) 
(A) 
[TOTAL 
L- 
2880 3,012.00 14,300.00 158,118.00 128,481.00 
N. D. Total Expenses (])= 
(1) Instalment per mont4 for Birds and Cages. 
(2) Feed Cost. (3) Vet. Drugs Cost. 
N All figurcs between brackets indicate loss. 
(A) Family No. 31 paid in cash. 
Information on her returns not available. 
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Table. No. 11.6.1. 
THE FAMILY POULTRY PRODUCTION SCHEME 
IN KHARTOUM NORTH FOR THIRTY ONE FAMILIES 
PROFIT & LOSS ACCOUNTS (-CS) 
Remarks: 
1. Families (1-16) production continued for the whole productive months (14' 
months) satisfying 60% from the total cost which must be paid in thirty six months. 
2. Families (17-18) normal production continued for 6-8 months. After that 
production stopped due to death of all birds resulting from newcastle disease attack. 
3. Family (19) production continued for the whole period but newcastle disease 
attack lead to 75% loss of birds. 
4. Families (20-21) production continued for 6 months from the production period 
due to newcastle disease resulting in death of all the birds. 
Families (22-25) production continued for the whole production period but at 
low output due to feed scarcity. 
6. Families (26-30) low or nil production due to birds starvation families' negli- 
gence and death of all birds due to newcastle disease attack. 
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reciprocal activity, represents a cash outlay requirement. 
(b) Local commodity collection/ production and sale. Small scale income- 
generating activities, both skilled and unskilled. This category includes the manu- 
facture and sale of rusk-work, such as mats and rope, furniture, other woodwork, 
and metalwork. It also covers the collection for sale of wood for construction, fire- 
wood, and straw, which is used in roofing and fencing. These activities generally 
represent "extraý' income which does not detract substantially from agricultural 
labour. Women in particular may carry out weaving of mats and other rusk prod- 
ucts while waiting for grain to be milled, and activities such as rope or furniture 
making may be undertaken after the day's main agricultural work. Furthermore, 
most of these activities do not occupy the entire year, and in fact may be practiced 
predominantly outside of the main cultivation cycle. 
(c) Local employment and entrepreneurial activities. This category constitutes 
both the largest and the most widespread source of off-farm income. Shopkeep- 
ing, working as a guard, tea vending and charcoal making were amongst the most 
common occupations. The most remunerative activities, shopkeeping and motor 
transport, are restricted to those with sufficient capital for the initial investment. 
(d) Remittances from relatives in urban or overseas employment provide a sig- 
nificant source of income for farming households in this area. The trend towards 
overseas migration, particularly to the Gulf States, increased sharply during the 
1970's, with the expansion and diversification of the oil-rich economies. Earnings 
are frequently substantial, and remittance income sometimes provides the capital 
base upon which both local enterprise and larger-scale, wage-labour oriented farm- 
ing is based. Livestock, particularly cattle, are also occasionally purchased from 
remittance income. 
The data has revealed one very interesting result. In the past farmers relied on 
informal sources of credit for the most part but the researcher found that reliance 
on informal sources, especially the shail merchant, has reduced tremendously. 
The farmers were asked how they bridge the financing gap. In response 58% 
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indicated that they are borrowing from their relatives. This implies that the family 
ties in Sudan are strong and are based on Islamic values of cooperation. The 
relatively richer farmers will support their poorer brethren by providing them with 
credit. 
In Sudanese society the family is an important unit of social organization. Fam- 
ily connections and obligations regulate many social activities that in Western coun- 
tries are the function of other institution. Family members have a strong sense of 
belonging to the family group and feel obliged to defend the family honour, and 
to be worthy of the family name. These feelings are not limited to the immediate 
family, but extend to the joint family and the kinship group. While the immediate 
family is relatively limited in its function and significance, the joint family plays 
an important role in the life of the individual and the community. Its influence is 
manifested clearly in all social and economic matters, such as marriages, illnesses, 
funerals, agricultural activities and mutual aid'. However, in recent years, large 
numbers of the farmers' relatives have immigrated to the Gulf states looking for a 
job. The savings made abroad resulted in remittances back to the country and were 
utilised as either a source of investment funds or as lending to the relatives for the 
agricultural sector. 
Moreover, the sources of private fund§ are the savings of the people. 14% of 
the farmers revealed that they borrowed from private sources to satisfy their credit 
requirement. In the underdeveloped countries the main problem is to devise institu- 
tional agencies and procedures, both public and private, which promote savings and 
the smooth flow of funds to where they can do most good, as cheaply and efficiently 
as possible under conditions suited to the needs of agriculture. 
The particular concern here is with the responsibilities of the government in 
promoting institutional agricultural credit and encouraging the flow of private funds 
into agriculture. This long-term objective requires the establishment of a suitable 
economic climate, an appropriate body of law, and suitable specific provisions to 
Gadalla, S. M., Land Reform in Relation to Social Development in Egypt, University of Mis- 
souri Press, Columbia, U. S. A. 1962, pp. 46-69. 
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promote the flow of private funds into agricultural credit. 
The first question with which the private lender or investor is concerned is the 
rate of reward which he will get in return for transferring the control of his savings to 
someone else. He will require a return at least as good as that which he could obtain 
in using the money himself, or if he lent it for other than agricultural investment 
or credit. The aim should be to make loans or investment in agricultural credit as 
attractive as in other areas so that funds can be obtained on comparable terms, and 
to reduce the margin between these terms and those on which loans arc offered to 
farmers as far as practicable by increased efficiency in management. 
Furthermore, only 2% of the surveyed farmers indicated that they borrowed from 
the banking sector for non- agri cultural purposes. This implies that a bank's role 
is limited and insignificant. Since the Bank under review is an Islamic institution, 
it needs to inform and educate the farmers about musharakah as a new mode of 
financing. 
Surprisingly, it was found that the role of the shail system is limited and only 
18% of the farmers approached the shail merchant for credit. This is indicative of 
the fact that the farmers, although illiterate, are more aware about the exploita- 
tive nature of the old system. In order to further curtail the shail system in the 
rural areas other Islamic banks working in Sudan need to finance more agricultural 
projects based on musharakah. 
The farmers were asked about their main source of income. The majority of 
them (92%) indicated that their main source of income is agriculture. Since we are 
dealing with the agricultural sector the major source of income would naturally be 
agricultural activities undertaken by the farmers. 
As mentioned earlier, vegetables are a highly marketable product and have 
been grown in small-holdings in the scheme. The Bank in order to increase farmers' 
income and their standard of living, has introduced potato production through 
musharakah financing. This was tried in the Shehenab scheme (where the survey 
was undertaken) and found to be most successful both in respect of production and 
309 
of profit. 
The incentives applied are those of cost and profit. In respect of the fixed cost 
incentive, the Bank provided tractors, harrows and water pumps (without these 
facilities it will be beyond the farmers' resources to embark on potato cultivation 
since the capital outlay is high) of a total value of CS 241,770. All agriculture 
inputs (seeds, fertilizer, fuel) and part of the running expenses were provided by the 
Bank amounting to sum of CS 74,786. No guarantees or collaterals were required 
from the farmers. The farmer's contribution is land and labour and part of the 
expenses amounting to CS 30,231. The Bank's and farmerscont ri but ions in costs 
of production were 71% and 29%, respectively as shown in Table 11.7. 
Total potato production was 4645 50-kg. sacks, with an average of 87.6 sacks/- 
feddan which is a very high yield. Total proceeds of the produce were XS 263,255 
as shown in Table 11.7.1. 
Net profit was XS 158,237 of which 75% (-CS 118,776 ) went to the farmers and 
25% to the Bank (XS 39,592). The farmers percentage profit calculated from their 
contributions ranged from 93% up to 1239%, and that of the Bank ranged from 
2% to 410% as shown in Table 11.7.2.. The average net profit per feddan was XS 
2,988 from which the farmer got XS 2,241 and the Bank CS 747. This profit per 
feddan is very high compared to any profit obtained from any other crop. This is a 
clear indication that both the Bank and the farmer, as a result of this partnership, 
achieved a very high and significant profit from the project. 
One question put to the farmers was about the means they used to finance their 
seed input. They were given three alternatives in response. The first alternative 
was that they financed the purchase of seeds by themselves, the second was that 
they made use of Bank loans, and third that they had utilised other sources. There 
responses can be categorised as: 
Alternative One 
Self-Financing: A large number of farmers (50%) stated that all of the financing 
for seed inputs was met by themselves. It can be argued that through the intro- 
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Thble No. 11.7.2. 
POTATO PRODUCTION IN SHEHENAB SCHEME 
FOR FOURTEEN FARMERS 
Revenue Returns (, CS. ) 
Area 
in 
Fed. 
Total 
Production Production Sale Total Proceeds 
50 Kg 50 Kg Price/Sac of Produce 
Sac/Feddan Sac/Feddan (XS) (. CS) 
5 100 Soo 60.5 30,250-00 
5 100 500 55.0 27,500-00 
5 99 496 55.0 27,280.00 
5 110 550 55.0 30,250-00 
6 100 600 55.0 33,000-00 
4 96 386 55.0 21,230-00 
3 53 160 51.0 8,160.00 
2 75 150 63.0 9,450.00 
3 73 220 51.0 11,220-00 
3 66 200 55.0 11,000-00 
3 95 287 53.0 15,211.00 
3 43 129 55.0 7,095-00 
3 91 275 55.0 15,125.00 
3 97 292 55.0 16,060-00 
TOTAL 53 
, 
1,198 4,745 774 262,831.00 
Ave/Fedd 4 
1 
86 339 55 18,773-64 
Source: Role of SID in Rural Development in Sudan, 
paper presented at the seminar on Islamic Banking, 
Loughborough, July 1988, p. 15. 
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duction of musharakah financing, in which the farmer has become a new partner 
with the Bank, a profit was made. Some of it was allocated to finance the farmers' 
family expenses while some was used to finance seed inputs. It is a good sign that 
the new mode of financing has changed the attitude of the farmer. The Bank can 
encourage the farmers to save more. For this to occur there arc three related re- 
quirements: education and financial awareness, the provision of suitable incentives, 
and also the provision of facilities which conform to the needs and convenience of 
rural people. An increase in income affects the position not only because there is 
more from which to save, but also because it reduces the risk of default if new farm 
practices fail. 
The educational aspect is both negative and positive. Negatively, education may 
be directed to drawing attention to the serious disadvantages of excessive ceremonial 
expenditure, and changing the social sanctions which now demand such expenditure. 
This has been attempted in India and Pakistan through co-operative Better Living 
Societies, the purposes of which have been described as to: 
(a) improve the moral condition of members; 
(b) provide educational assistance to children; 
(c) check extravagance and inculcate habits of thrift; 
(d) reform undesirable social customs; 
Such societies have successfully reduced extravagant expenditure, but their cov- 
erage has not been sufficient to modify the social pressure towards it to any degree. 
The experience of Better Living Societies, however, suggests the importance of giv- 
ing special attention to the matter. The goal can hardly be achieved by compulsion, 
but it does require conscious effort to promote agreement among groups of people so 
that there is moral support for establishing limits, through co-operative education 
and persuasion, and embodying the objective of reduced ceremonial expenditure. 
Positive educational measures to bring home the advantages of thrift must be 
Belshaw, H., Agricultural Credit in Economically Underdeveloped Countries, FAO Agricultural 
Studies, No. 46, Rome 1959, pp. 70-95. 
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related to specific objectives likely to appeal to the farmers. Very often it is the 
first which is difficult. Units of saving are so small in the rural area that it may not 
seem worthwhile to save them but, after they havc'been going on for a while and a 
sum is accumulated, there is a certain sense of achievement and a realization of the 
possibilities which savings may open up. 
Alternative two 
Bank loans: 20% of the farmers revealed that 100% of their seed inputs are 
financed by loans from the Bank. The reason for the low percentage is justifiable due 
to the fact that the mode of financing has changed from loan to equity, musharakah, 
whereby the farmer gets all his seed inputs from the Bank through partnership 
arrangement. For example, the Sudanese Islamic Bank owns its own mac4inery 
(tractors, water pumps etc. ) and presents its contribution to the partnership in 
the form of a comprehensive package of inputs and services provided on a real cost 
basis. The package covers the following' : 
(a) provision of ploughing and irrigation services; 
(b) provision of production inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, bags, etc. at cost 
price and at farm-gate; 
(c) provision of working capital requirements; 
(d) provision of agricultural extension; 
(e) contribution to provision of storage and marketing and; 
(f) marketing partnership. 
' Khaleefa, M. U. and Ibrahim, S. A., op. cit. pp. 16-18- 
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In return, farmers are expected to contribute the following: 
(i) arable land; 
(ii) part of the working capital requirements (if available); 
(iii) labour for agricultural operations and; 
(iv) management (jointly with the bank). 
The farmers howeverare not obliged to receive all components of the package, 
but are free to request those inputs and/or services which they require. In effect, 
SIB has divided its comprehensive musharakah package into a number of financing 
instruments providing smaller packages, which could be combined when farmers 
wish to do so. 
Alternative three 
Other sources: The farmers indicated that only 14% of them depend on other 
sources mainly the shail system to finance their seed inputs. This will support the 
argument that the role of shail as, an informal source of finance is limited whereas 
the musharakah financing has started to gain momentum. 
Until recently, small farmers depended almost exclusively on informal sources 
of finance. The village trader practicing shail (pre-harvest sale of crop), in effect 
charging exorbitant rates of interest, was the most prominent source. 
In 1977-78, the state-owned Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS) initiated the first 
experiment of financing small farmers. It organized agricultural credit and market- 
ing cooperatives, in Um Ruwaba (Kordofan Region)$ and subsequently attempted 
to extend the experiment to three other districts. In spite of (high level) pressures 
to generalize the experiment, ABS has faced serious problems in maintaining the 
continuity and viability of its operations among small farmers. The factors behind 
these problems are several and complex, but basically relate to the fact that ABS, 
in the tradition of conventional banks) extends production credit to farmers and 
expects a fixed rate of interest irrespective of whether or not crops were a success. 
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11.5. Agricultural Credit 
F. A. Lees and Brooks have noted that organised banking has a poor record in 
penetrating the economic hinterland of developing countries, in serving rural areas, 
and in serving small agricultural borrowers in particular'. In the Sudan agricultural 
credit suffers from deficiencies often encountered in developing countries. These 
include a lack of modern sector financial institutions to mobilise and channel credit 
to individual farmers and tenants, the consequent high cost of a predominantly 
t radition- oriented credit mechanism, and the inability of farmers and tenants to 
extricate themselves from an inefficient and costly credit system. 
As mentioned in the Chapter Nine, agricultural credit in the Sudan falls into 
two broad categories, the traditional system of shail and the non-traditional or 
modern credit system. The modern credit system is made up of the commercial 
banks, the Agricultural Bank of Sudan, and quasi-public bodies such as the Sudan 
Gezira Board. Many farmers and farmer tenants do not actively seek or have ready 
access to sources of credit from the modern sector due to a lack of suitable assets 
to serve as collateral for loans, low risk-bearing capacity and managerial ability, 
inability to establish effective contact with lending institutions, latent fear of other 
(modern) credit systems which they have no familiarity with and a simple defence 
of traditional methods and value systems. 
The farmers were asked if they had opened a deposit account with a bank. 38% 
of the farmers stated that they had opened a deposit account with an Islamic bank 
whereas 62% of them did not. This can be attributed to the fact that the farmers 
are less aware about an Islamic bank's mode of financing in agriculture. On the 
other hand, their capital formation is low and difficult to estimate. It can be done 
either by family budget studies in which all receipts and expenditures arc recorded, 
or alternatively, by asking about expenditure on capital goods. The latter method is 
usually more successful as major items of expenditure are more easily remembered. 
This method has been used by Habibullah in estimating private capital formation in 
Lees, F. A. and Brooks, H. C., The Economic and Political Development of the Sudan, The Macnifflan Press Ltd, London, 1977, pp. 84-95. 
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rural areas of what is now Bangladesh, in the monetized sector". In this study the 
rural capital formation in tw 'o of 
the five unions surveyed was negative and in the 
rest it was negligible. The main reasons were the absence of institutional facilities 
for credit, high rates of interest charged by private lenders and the low income level 
of the rural masses. Lack of savings appeared to be the main cause of low capital 
formation. Habibullah found that 80% of the farm families surveyed had no surplus 
for the period covered by the survey. 
The lack of savings is due, on the one hand, to low income levels and on the other, 
to the absence of institutional facilities for savings. The Bank has to encourage the 
farmer to increase their production and income so that additional savings can in 
fact be possible. 
It is generally acknowledged that improved credit, agricultural extension, and 
other development measures must be antecedent to any significant increase in rural 
savings. But there are two other requirements both in respect of current savings 
and of the increased amounts made possible by successful development programmes. 
The first is to encourage farmers to put savings to productive use, either on their 
own farms or by lending to otherslo. The second is to mobilize such financial savings 
as are made into larger aggregates so that they can be used more effectively. Under 
the best of conditions the units of savings will be so small and scattered that they 
contribute little to productive power; but if aggregated in financial institutions by 
way of deposits or other types of financial investment, a sizeable volume of credit 
becomes possible which can be directed to further agricultural programmes. 
The farmers were given three reasons to explain their decision to open an account 
with the Sudanese Islamic Bank. 36% of the farmers indicated that savings are safer 
in the Bank whereas 64% of them did not reply. 
The second given reason was that they get a return on savings held with the 
Bank. Surprisingly none of the farmers surveyed gave this as their reason for opening 
Habibullah, M., Some Aspects of Rural Capital Formation in East-Pak-istan, Bureau of Eco- 
nomic Research, Dacca University, 19G3, pp. 90-95. 
Belshaw, H. op. cit. p. 50. 
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an account. 
The third reason identified was that they had opened the account because the 
Bank offers a loan to its account holders. 90% (overwhelming majority) did not 
respond but 18% stated that the Bank has offered them a loan because they had 
opened an account. In fact the main reason for the low percentage of respondents 
is due to the fact that the Bank's operations, in the two schemes under study, 
are based on musharakah financing. The success of SIB in musharakah financing 
operations has prompted the management of the Bank to increase the respective 
shares of musharakah instruments in the Bank's portfolio from 42.70% in 140611 to 
60.90% in 1407H. 
11.6. The Relation of the Farmer with Financial Institutions 
The farmers were asked if they had dealt with banks before. 58% of them 
indicated that they had not dealt with a bank, whereas 42% of the farmers had 
done so. This suggests that the banking system is a new development in Sudan. 
The majority of the farmers indicated that they had not dealt with a bank 
before and they represent 52% of the sample, the remaining had. Moreover, 2% 
had started to deal with the Bank between 1970-1974., The remaining (46%) of 
farmers have approached the Islamic bank after 1975. 
These figures suggest- that the Sudanese Islamic Bank has succeeded in pene- 
trating the rural areas whereas in the recent past the Agricultural Bank of Sudan 
had failed to do so. The behaviour of the ABS had encouraged the small farmers 
to deal with the informal sector through the shail merchant for a number of rea- 
sons. The most important one was that it belongs to afid has been part of the rural 
economy for centuries. 
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Through long experience, informal lenders have adapted their systems to rural 
conditions and culture and are still doing so. In keeping with the environment, they 
operate without costly buildings, staff, and paperwork". Because of proximity, they 
have knowledge of the creditworthiness of borrowers, which minimizes the cost of 
assembling information. They are accessible at all times and keep procedures simple 
to accommodate and reduce transaction costs of their customers. They survive by 
combining lending with shopkeeping, trade, grain milling and processing, taking 
profits from and distributing risks over each activity. 
The demand for funds, in relation to the supply, is larger because the average 
borrower in the informal money market has a very low income and therefore has - 
no surplus funds to finance his business operations. The majority of the cultivating 
tenants - one of the most important groups of potential borrowers - have to bo*rrow 
money not only for investment in land, cattle, etc., and for working capital to make 
purchases of seeds and fertilizers, but also for their minimum basic necessities of 
food, shelter, and clothing". 
On the supply side, there is a general shortage of capital in underdeveloped 
countries and an inadequate level of domestic savings. Also, the small amount 
of domestic savings is not channeled effectively into the informal money market 
because of the absence of proper financial and credit institutions which not only 
would integrate the formal and informal money markets, but also would facilitate 
the mobilization of savings in the rual areas. 
The difference in the levels of interest rates between the formal and informal 
money markets stems partly from the basic difference between the sources of supply 
of funds in the two markets. In the formal money market, facilities for the expansion 
of credit are open to the commercial banks, which have the use of funds belonging 
to depositors. These banks are therefore able to charge relatively low rates of 
Bournan, F. J. A. and Houtman, R., 'Pawnbrokingas an Instrument of Rural Banking in the 
Third World', Economic Development and Cultural Change, The University of Chicago Press, 
Vol. 37, No. 1, October'1988, pp. 69-89. 
Wai, T., 'Interest Rates Outside the Organized Money Markets of Underdeveloped Countries', 
IMF Staff Papers, Vol. VI, 1957-58, pp. 105-109. 
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interest and yet make satisfactory profits for the shareholders. On the other hand, 
moneylenders in an informal money market have little influence on the supply of 
funds at their disposal and, furthermore, their supply price tends to be influenced 
by the alternative uses to which their funds can be put. 
Bankers, officials of cooperatives, rural development planners, and project de- 
signers have often voiced the opinion that informal lenders should be eliminated 
from the rural scence and replaced by formal financial institutions. Most critics, 
however, tend to be against interest and base their arguments on moral and religious 
grounds. 
In order for the Sudanese Islamic Bank to build a good relationship with its new 
customers (small farmers), certain incentives have to be created for the extension 
officer of the Bank to enable him to convey the message to the rural communities 
on the role of the Bank in musharakah financing of small farmers. 
As the extension officer of the RDD has a unique task, the Bank's management 
should consider applying musharakah financing not only to the small farmer, but 
also to their staff who work with the farmers in the fields, in order to give them 
more incentives to stay on in the rural area and with the Bank as well. This 
requires that more financial rewards (in terms of payment and allowances) be given 
to the extension worker designated to live and work in rural areas. Their chances 
of promotion should be increased, their services, if successful, should be recognized 
and acknowledged. 
It was indeed, quite clear that the available knowledge about the human and 
physical resources in the rural areas of Sudan had always fallen short of what was 
needed to carry any sound extension programme very far. The increasing com- 
plexity of rural agriculture and the problems which arose in adapting it to modern 
technology have brought forward the need for incorporating in the centre of any 
extension programme area proper facilities of adaptive research and training. The 
availability of extension workers knowledgeable both in farmers' ways of cultiva- 
tion and in efficient extension teaching methods is a basic requirement to sound 
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extension work in rural communities. 
The farmers' relation with the Bank is weak if not non-existent and the majority 
of them (100%) responded that they did not approach more than one bank for 
credit. The Sudanese Islamic Bank has to promote literacy and formal education 
among the farmer. This task is obviously of major importance in providing means 
of communication and promoting the spread of knowledge on the new mode of 
Islamic financing and in increasing general receptivity to social change. It is not a 
coincidence, for example, that Japan is foremost among countries in Asia both in 
formal education and literacy in rural areas, and in farm techniques and the success 
of co-operative societies. 
Experience with agricultural and rural development, especially since the Spcond 
World NVar, has revealed that the extent to which farmers possess the knowledge, 
skills and favourable attitudes toward technological advances that can increase pro- 
duction, is one of the most important factors accounting for success or failure of 
many development programmes. Therefore, agricultural development requires many 
inputs. 
Some of these inputs must be regulated by law, hence the need for institutions 
to perform certain regulatory functions for agricultural development. Other in- 
puts require making service provisions, public or private, that would ensure their 
proper distribution; while others are investigatory in nature and require research 
institutions for their solution". One of the inputs for agricultural development is 
educational orientation. It has to do with helping rural people learn about new 
things related to agriculture and rural life. Agricultural extension, if it is to be 
effective, must deal with this aspect only. Extension workers must not assume any 
regulatory duties, nor should they be made directly responsible for service func- 
tions. They are agents of change and one of the most essential prerequisites for 
the effective execution of this role is the prevalence of mutual trust and confidence 
Douglah, M. A., 'Agricultural Extension: Principles and Constraints', Agriculture 8 De- 
velopment in Western Asia, Joint Publication of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and the Food and Agriculture Organization, December 1986, No. 9, pp. 31-35. 
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between the agent (extension worker) and the client system (rural families). Being 
responsible for regulatory and/or direct service functions tends to put the extension 
worker in a position where rural people look upon him with doubt and suspicion. 
Consequently, he will not be able to affect the desired changes of behaviour. There- 
fore, it is best to delegate the regulatory and service functions (which are necessary 
and important) to other agencies and leave the extension programme to assume 
only the educational task so that its workers can develop the reputation of being 
informal rural "teachers" whose relationship with the entire community is based on 
mutual trust and confidence. 
11.7. Problems Facing the Farmers 
The Sudanese Islamic Bank provides finance for marketing services to * small 
farmers by paying half of the price of the crop at harvest time. Thus it becomes a 
partner with the farmer in crop production. Both parties jointly control the shared 
crop. When the crop is eventually sold profits are shared according to a fixed ratio, 
after a management fee is paid to the farmer. This contract avoids selling at low 
prices at the time of harvest. These services, however, are not sufficient to satisfy 
the farmer needs. The majority of the farmers (80%) complained that the Bank 
did not help them in marketing and storing their crops, whereas only 20% of them 
said that the Bank had helped them. 
The farmers complaint is justifiable due to the fact that vegetables and fruit are 
highly perishable crops. Most of them can only be stored for a very short period of 
time and to do so they require special types of storage facilities, of which there are 
not enough at present in the scheme area. Moreover, they require high investment 
per unit area both in capital and labour. 
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The farmers were asked to give their opinions as regards the following problems 
faced by them: 
(a) Irrigation problems. 
(b) Marketing problems. 
(c) Storing problems. 
(a) Irrigation problems: 
The Bank got involved as a partner in providing a comprehensive package of in- 
puts and services. A major feature of the scheme is to vary the package to match 
the requirements of the farmer. The Bank provides irrigation services, land devel- 
opment, inputs, working capital requirements and marketing facilities. Therefore, 
the role of the Bank in providing irrigation facilities to the farmer is relatively sat- 
isfactory as pointed out by 42% of the total. However, 58% of those surveyed state 
that irrigation is still a problem and the Bank has to reslove it. 
(b) Marketing problems: 
Marketing is an essential service for the viability of the agricultural sector. It 
provides the channels whereby agricultural products are distributed from producers 
to consumers, and it regulates the flow of these products in order to avoid both 
temporary shortages and surpluses which can only be disposed of by a sharp fall in 
prices. The rapid growth, over the last ten years, in Sudan's production of vegetables 
ha-s brought marketing to the forefront of the problems facing both farmers and 
agricultural development bodies. 
Farmers produce farm products for their families and for community use. The 
surplus (if any) must be sold to produce cash and earnings for the farmers. It is the 
marketing system that provides channels for the sale of the surplus farm products. 
46% of the farmers indicated that the Bank has helped them in marketing their 
crops whereas 54% of them stated that the Bank did not help them. 
The Sudanese Islamic Bank gives more emphasis in its operations on crop mar- 
keting realizing its importance to small farmers. Being in dire need of cash, small 
324 
farmers in Sudan have largely tended to sell their produce immediately after harvest. 
Prices fetched by crops at harvest time, however, are normally very low compared 
to prices which prevail a few months later. The poverty of small farmers thus tends 
to be a kind of a vicious circle that constrains the producers from waiting until 
prices improve. For this reason the Bank seeks to help small farmers by continuing 
in a partnership through the marketing stages as well. Instead of selling crops at 
harvest, the Bank pays the farmers 50% of the price prevailing at harvest time, 
thereby becoming a partner in the crop. The crop is stored under joint control by 
both the farmer and the Bank. When prices improve, the crop is sold. Of the prof- 
its made (i. e. amounts additional to harvest price and incurred storage expenses), 
50% would accrue to the farmer in return for management while the other 50% is 
divided equally between the two partners according to their equity shares". - For 
example, if the harvest price is XS 100, storing costs SS 10, and sale price is XS 
160, the farmer would end up receiving a total of XS 137.5 instead of the harvest 
price of XS 100 and the Bank would receive XS 12.5 as its share in the profits. 
In general, the role of the Bank in marketing the farmer crops is relatively good 
(though more help is needed) and it is a good sign that the new institution has 
started to realize the important factor of marketing to the small farmer, not only 
for him to generate income to support his family, but also to the national economy. 
It may be noted that the marketing problem has been one of the main bottleneck 
hindering agricultural progress in Sudan. 
Marketing services are very vital for the Bank as well as the farmers and the main 
problem confronting the Bank is the lack of basic infrastructure and support facil- 
ities, making its opertions more time-consuming, expensive and risky. Transport 
costs double and triple when truck movements are over unpredictable earth roads as 
against reliable tarmac. When means of information and communication are lack- 
ing, the prices offered for produce will be lower to allow for uncertain conditions of 
resale. 
There are many areas where the government can support the Bank, as well as 
11 Khaleefa, M. U. and Ibrahim, S. E. A., op. cit. pp. 19-20. 
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other indigenous private enterprises, and enable them to contribute more effectively 
to the growth of the economy. 
Provision of the basic infrastructure: 
Without the provision of basic infrastructure and stable conditions of sale the 
marketing service is continually handicapped in moving goods from where they 
are produced to where they are most wanted for consumption. Help from the 
government begins with the construction of roads, railways for general use; and 
maintaining them in good working order. A legal framework of protection to buyers 
and sellers against fraud and for enforcement of contracts is a general requirement 
of ongoing marketing operations. Access to motor transport is also crucial for the 
agricultural marketing service as is priority in the allocation of foreign exchange to 
imports of commercial transport vehicles, and their spare parts. 
Access to finance: 
Without some working capital or credit, marketing will be restricted to the Bank 
selling farmers'own production to consumers. Access to capital has been so strategic 
in West Africa, for example, that many farmers have used the proceeds of cocoa 
sales to buy some other seasonal produce and benefit from the returns from holding 
it to sell again". 
A favourable and consistent policy position of government: 
This responsibility is essential. In some socialist economies private wholesaling 
is officially illegal. If it happens at all it is because local authorities close their 
eyes where it provides a useful service not available through the official system. 
In various mixed economies private traders incur unnecessary costs to overcome 
harassment by local officials; they face the risks of arbitrary seizures of stocks and 
unrealistic price fixing. 
A clear government recognition of the important role of the Bank and other 
private enterprises in the overall marketing system is needed. A dialogue between 
Abbott, J. C., Agricultural Marketing Enterprises for the Developing World, Cambridge Uni- 
versity Press 1987, pp. 60-62. 
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the government and the traders also needs to be initiated to discuss relevant policies 
and organizing specific programmes of assistance. 
(c) Storing Problem: 
Storage is essential to conserve agricultural commodities, particularly those which 
are perishable. Crop prices have unusually wide seasonal fluctuations, with the low 
point at harvest time. Credit institutions, like the Agricultural Bank of Sudan, 
usually require repayment of their loans at harvest time since the farmer then has 
the most cash. This is also the farmer's custom when he intends repayment; both he 
and the lenders know that it is easier for him at this time. But it is often possible for 
a farmer to get 20 or 30% more value for the same quantity by waiting two or three 
months after harvest to sell his crop, and still more later on. Such increments to 
a small farmer's income would frequently exceed the probable gains from available 
technical innovations, and may be less demanding of skill. So if credits extended 
by the Bank are intended to augment the small farmer's income, why should they 
not encourage rather than inhibit him from holding his crop for a price increase? 
And would not loans to provide him with storage capacity, where a loan is needed, 
present an easy way for the bank to show quick results from its endeavours? 
To overcome the storage problem, the Sudanese Islamic Bank has realized that 
farmers selling their crops at harvest always get low prices. Therefore, the Bank 
(through its musharakah financing arrangement) in its efforts to maximize farmer's 
income has given the farmer 50% of the prevailing prices at harvest. The crops 
are stored under dual control. Then the crop is sold later when prices are high. 
From the net profit the farmer gets 50% for management and the remaining profit 
is divided equally between the bank and the farmer. 
50% of the farmers indicated that the Bank has provided them with cold storage 
facilities for their perishable crops and it is therefore not considered to be a problem. 
The remaining (50%) stated that the storage is a problem and has to be tackled. 
On the balance the Bank has relatively succeeded in providing storage facilities. 
A positive attribute has been the high utilization by the local market which acts 
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as an incentive to the farmer to produce more for family consumption and for sale. 
The farmer in return gains bargaining power which may contribute to increased 
prices of his products. 
The above facts clearly indicate that the Sudanese Islamic Bank through its 
musharakah financing has devoted more time and effort to help the small farmer 
through storing and marketing his crops. Such incentive has prevented the farmer 
from being exploited by the shail system which in the case of a traditional bank (the 
Agricultural Bank of Sudan) can not be avoided. Efficiency in the marketing of the 
crops has resulted in higher income among small farmers, low costs to consumers 
and a continuous improvement in the volume of local markets. Bank intervention 
in marketing has also created the necessary climate for market expansion. An 
improvement in storage facilities and the availability of storage credit would afford 
greater flexibility in the movement of produce. This has led to more price stability 
and resulted in increased returns to farmers. 
In Chapter Nine the analysis attempted to demonstrate how the traditional banks 
(which base its operations on debt financing like the ABS) have indirectly encour. 
aged the farmer to deal with the exploitative shail system. The reason is that under 
debt financing schemes the bank fails to provide the farmer with credit facilities, 
not only for production, but also for marketing. Thus the traditional banks have 
driven more farmers deeper in debt to the shail system. It may be worthwhile here 
to attempt an understanding of how the system works. 
The shail is a powerful system of pledging a growing crop in return for a loan. The 
farmer loses the power to bargain while the traders buy the crop at prices even lower 
than the lowest seasonal price which prevails at harvest time. The loan is disbursed 
in the form of cash or commodities which are invariably grossly overcharged. 
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The farmers are often compelled to accept such terms and conditions because of 
seasonal deficiencies of foodstuff ". 
The traders try to get a firm grip on the farmer. This is achieved when the future 
harvest has been pledged completely leaving the farmer no residues to engage in 
another debt relation. In this case the oligopoly which preexisted by virtue of the 
prevailing market structures, develops into a monopoly of the trader. The farmer 
is hardly able to escape the debt trap and thus is obliged to pay back the loan 
several times without getting rid of the duties. The trader/moneylender can pocket 
a double monopoly rent acting as sole supplier and market outlet for his dependent 
farmers. He reaps interest at the rate of 300 to 400% p. a. out of the shaiL This profit 
does not include the'money gained by overcharging for much needed commodities. 
0 The Sudanese Islamic Bank has helped the small farmers in marketing and storing 
their crops through partnership financing. However there is still a demand for a 
complete marketing system in which a farmer can sell his crops at reasonable price. 
11.8. Type of Bank's Credit and Facilities 
The farmers were asked about incentives the Bank provides. Three items were 
identified to which the farmers responded: 
(a) Purchases of agricultural inputs: 
44% of the farmers indicated that the Bank has provided them with agricultural 
inputs such as seeds, insecticides and fertilizer to be used in their farms whereas 56% 
of them stated that the Bank did not assist them enough in providing agricultural 
inputs. 
The majority of the farmers grow vegetables which are high-value crops and 
require productive, well-drained, level soils. High rates of commercial fertilizer, 
insecticides and weed control measures are also required. Harvesting, handling, 
distributing, and marketing costs are high because the crops are perishable and 
WohImuth, K. and Oesterdiekhoff, P. (eds. ), The Development Perspectives of the Democratic 
Republic of Sudan, The Limits of the Breadbasket Strategy, WeItforurn Verlag, West Germany, 
1983, p. 145. 
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labour requirements are usually large. An adequate water supply is one of the 
prime requirements for growing vegetable crops successfully. Vegetable production 
demands a large outlay of capital, and, if water is not available at the right time, 
farmers will face many problems. It seems that the Bank has so far no problems of 
watering the two schemes. The Bank through RDD should find out why farmers are 
complaining about insufficient agricultural inputs. The Bank can and should invite 
s6me representatives of the farmers to discuss this problem and others in order to 
find a solution. 
(b) Marketing of crops: 
It is clear that there are several difficulties facing the small farmers in marketing 
their crops. Though the Bank has started to market their crops through musharakah 
financing, it seems that its impact is still limited and the farmers think that the 
incentives provided are inadequate. This fact was underlined by the majority of 
farmers (88%) who indicated that the Bank did not provide them with enough 
incentives to enter into a marketing musharakah. The remaining (12%) of them 
stated that the Banks' arrangement for marketing are adequate. The Bank should 
play a more active role to find ways and means to resolve this problem. 
The farmers were also asked about the existing marketing facilities. The ma- 
jority of the farmers (78%) thought that these were satisfactory whereas 22% of 
them asserted that marketing facilities were not satisfactory. The figures indicate 
that generally the marketing of crops by the Bank under the musharakah financing 
system is beneficial to the farmer. It improves the income of the small farmer and 
prevents their exploitation by the shail merchant. There remains however some 
room for improvement. 
(c) Storing the crops: 
Although the Bank prepares the land for the farmers, (by supplying tractor 
services at cost) and provides inputs, transportation, storage and part of capital 
(thrqugh musharakah financing arrangement), its impact in providing storage facil- 
ities is still limited according to the farmers point of view. 
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86% of the farmers complained that the Bank did not provide them with the 
storage facilities as an incentive whereas only 14% of them indicated that the Bank 
provided them with such facilities. The Bank should focus more attention to the 
importance of storage as the majority of farmers produce vegetables which arc 
perishable. 
As stated earlier and shown in Table 11.8. as many as 54% of the farmers had 
not dealt with the Bank for their credit needs. These farmers thought either that 
the terms of Bank's credit were not attractive enough or that borrowing from other 
sources such as relatives is much simpler and straightforward. 4% of the farmers 
had received credit for a period of less than six months. Almost 34% had had credit 
terms extending over one year and a small 8% had credit extended over a larger 
period. ,I 
Table 11.8. 
CREDIT TERMS EXTENDED BY THE BANK 
Credit Term Percentage 
None 54.0 
Under six months 4.0 
Six months - one year 34.0 
Over one year 8.0 
TOTAL 100.0 
Source: Survey Finding 
The overall picture implies that the Bank's credit policy is concentrated on fi- 
nancing projects of a short-term nature rather than focussing on the medium or 
long-term. It is a reasonable assumption that in most countries primary impor- 
tance, in terms of both the amount and its proportion of the total, is attached to a 
better provision of short-term credit extending over a crop season. The labour of the 
farmer and his family is usually the main element in the improvement of individual 
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farms, so that much of the credit needed for this purpose may be indistinguishable 
from that needed for working expenses. However when materials are required the 
credit may have to be extended for longer periods. 
The farmers were asked if they required more credit facilities. 94% responded 
positively. This is indicative of the fact that the demand for credit is very high 
because it is an essential input into the farming system. 
There are two types of farmers who may need credit: (1) those who have started 
developing their farms without credit but no longer find their savings adequate to 
defray rising development costs; and (2) those who have had little chance to acquire 
for themselves the resources required to escape from the bind of subsistence farming 
but have the opportunities and will to do so provided credit is made available: The 
first are likely to make the most productive use of credit provided their incentive to 
save is not impaired. The latter can be helped only at considerable risk because the 
potential for higher output is likely, to be less certain and capacity for repayment 
correspondingly lesSIT . Extension of credit to this type of farmer must be undertaken 
if the fruits of development are to be widely shared, but it will need to be done in a 
more cautious and tentative way if serious losses are to be avoided. Therefore, the 
Bank should strive for an intimate link between agricultural extension and credit. 
The degree to which the extension service should get involved in the administration 
of credit will differ with the circumstances. 
De Wilde, I C., Experience With Agricultural Development in Tropical Africa, Vol. 1, Tile 
Synthesis, Published for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development by The 
Johns Hopkins Press, Maryland, U. S. A., 196T, p. 200. 
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The farmers were asked whether they agreed with following four possible reasons 
for more credit: 
(a) to introduce new crops. 
(b) to undertake farm improvement (e. g. new irrigation work); 
(c) for family reasons; 
(d) to pay off previous debt. 
54% of the farmers were interested in introducing new crops. Probably they have 
realized the inherent danger in relying on a single crop. They have to be told about 
crops which are adaptable to the physical environment and also offer good prospects 
of a return on the investment made. 
72% of the farmers were positive about the need for credit for farm development. 
In this area the Bank already provides irrigation facilities through the Musagah 
financing arrangement. The Bank undertakes the provision of irrigation pumps and 
accessories, installs them in the farm and authorizes their operation by the farmer. 
The farmer pays a proportion of his produce and the SIB is solely responsible for 
maintenance". The musagah instrument has options of additional financing (over 
and above irrigation) for other inputs such as seeds, fertilizers and pesticides. 
Only 2% of the farmers agreed with the fourth reason. It may be argued that 
the musharakah system has reduced debt financing and that the farmer is relatively 
well off as compared to the traditional informal system. 
10% of the farmers said that they needed further credit for family reasons. It 
may be noted that the Bank does give consumption loans through its qard hasanah 
scheme. These 10% were asked to justify their need for credit on the basis of the 
foHowing options: 
(a) to finance education. 
to cover marriage expenses. 
" Khaleefa, M. U. and Ibrahim, S E. A., op. cit. p. 18. 
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(c) to pay hospital (health) bills. 
Although 6% of the total number of farmers surveyed have identified the need to 
finance education the medium to long term economic rewards are enormous. Expe- 
rience and research show that educated farmers are more productive and receptive 
to new ideas and improved technology. The Bank can institute a programme of 
rural education which combines theory and practice. 
Only 2% of the farmers said that they needed further credit to cover expenses of 
marriage. This number is encouragingly low, however it has to be recognised that 
each farmer is bound by a series of socio-economic obligations to fellow farmers and 
close relatives. Both gifts and hospitality are obligatory if his status in the village 
hierarchy is to be maintained". 
With the third reason again 2% of the farmers agreed. In general, all basic services 
(including health care) are provided free by the government. However often such 
services are not enough and need to be supplemented. 
The above results clearly indicate that the learning process among the farmers 
is underway. A farmer is much more highly motivated under the new musharakah 
system than he was under the traditional system. He also has begun to realize the 
benefits in diversifying the production to more than one crop. 
These positive developments require a close monitoring and continuing evaluation 
by the Bank which should be a task for its rural development department. Mon- 
itoring and evaluation (M&E) is basically seen as a tool of project management 
for effective implementation and better planning and is indeed vital for a young 
institution like the Bank. Therefore RDD should have a measure of independence 
and enhanced responsibility so that it can conduct its daily business more efficiently 
and effectively. 
The primary reasons for monitoring rural development projects (like the one 
under review) are: 
Hill, L. G., 'Hababin Village Economy, Sudan Notes and Records, Vol. XLIX, Khartoum, 
1968, pp. 58-70. 
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(1) to keep track of project progress; 
(2) to provide a feedback to project management on the achievement of project 
objectives; 
(3) to serve as a "warning" mechanism for project management; and 
(4) to help prevent or solve problems encountered during project implementa- 
tion". 
Furthermore, the Rural Development Department should, through monitoring 
and evaluation (M&E) of-these projects, emphasise the effects (such as increases in 
fertilizer use, ' yield increase, improved credit supply) and impacts (income increase, 
improved nutritional status), which are distinct from project inputs (capital,. man- 
power, equipment) and outputs (area irrigated, tubewells installed), on the small 
farmerS21. Under an adequate ME system of musharakah financing, one must un- 
dertake periodic analysis of project outputs and effects, as well as of the impact on 
the socio-economic conditions of the small farmer. This is necessary to ensure that 
the project is on the right track and has optimally achieved its essential objectives. 
The Bank should thus set up a procedure of mid-term evaluation (MTE) in order 
to establish the basis for assessing the impact of musharakah financing and draw 
lessons for (i) project design and implementation; (ii) design of M&E systems as 
an effective tool for project management and beneficiary participation and (iii) 
developing practical and cost-effective methods for impact assessment. 
According to the IFAD annual report, the MTEs have found that the monitor- 
ing and evaluation arrangements at various levels have been slow in developing 
and demonstrating their usefulness to project management. This situation can be 
attributed to a number of reasons, such as a lack of trained monitoring and evalua- 
tion staff, lack of training facilities for new staff, and difficulties in retaining trained 
staff in the absence of good career development prospects. Therefore, the Bank 
20 World Bank Staff Working paper No. 439, Monitoring Rural Development in East Asia, 
October 1980, pp. 5-8. 
21 International Fund For Agricultural Development, annual report, Rome, 1984, pp. 38-39. 
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should pay more attention through its RDD to the supervision of monitoring and 
evaluation of musharakah financing during implementation. 
Since the Bank is a newly established institution it may be beneficial for it to col- 
laborate with other institutions like the Agricultural Bank of Sudan in undertaking 
monitoring and evaluation and in developing a training programme for its staff in 
order to build up a good cadre for the future. 
11.9. The Advantages of Sudanese Islamic Bank Credit 
The farmers were asked if there were advantages in receiving Sudanese Islamic 
Bank credit facilities. 82% of the farmers responded positively whereas 18% dis- 
agreed. This supports the argument that the farmer thinks that the new system is 
fair and just. 
G. Standing has demonstrated that under the traditional system of financing, the 
farmers have had to pay rent for use of a landlord's mill, or buy provisions from the 
landlord's "company store" at monopolistic prices, or having been forced into debt 
have been obliged to sell crops to the landlord at harvest times when prices were 
relatively low and buy back some proportion later when prices had risen 22 . 
In the informal system the farmer has to provide different types of collateral 
security. For example, as noted by K. Sarap, in his study of rural credit in India, it 
is easy to get a loan in case of marketable collateral (such as gold, land, etc. ). In 
the absence of such assets, borrowers either would borrow less or resort to inferior 
collaterals such as utensils, standing crops, or future labour services". The lender 
may accept these items (especially the latter) as collateral security on the condition 
that the security will be sold to the lender at his call. Alternatively the borrower 
may also attempt to move to collateral substitutes. One such substitute is a third 
party guarantee. The third party may have a relationship with the lender other 
than that of a borrowing transaction. In such triangular relationships the lender 
Standing, G., 'Migration and Modes of Exploitation: Social Origins of Immobility and Mo- bility', The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2. January 1981, p. 179. 
13 Sarap, K., 'Transactions in Rural Credit Markets in Western Orissa, India', The Journal of 
Peasant Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1, October 1987, p. 93. 
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can minimise default on loans. 
Another collateral substitute is the threat of loss of future borrowing opportunity 
for the poorer households or loss of social status in the case of others. In a small 
and immobile rural community the news of wilful default by borrowers can be 
quickly transmitted to most of the potential lenders". Furthermore, the lender 
and borrowers may have a variety of social relationships among themselves through 
which the lender can exercise some indirect control over the borrowers. Lastly, the 
current lender may be the only reliable and dependable source of credit for the 
borrower so that he may not like to forego this source of loans. 
The partnership financing will have an effect on morale and quality of work that 
is generated by a'more positive perception of the workplace and a greater feeling of 
responsibility by workers as well as by their material motivation to enhance earnings 
which are linked directly to performance. Since the traditional adversarial relation- 
ship between farmer and the bank is replaced by a more cooperative atmosphere of 
joint welfare and benefit, the existing pressure is towards better work rather than 
towards shirking. Another advantage of the new system is the superior commu- 
nication channels resulting from a more participatory environment which can help 
eliminiate organizational inefficiences that farmers have no incentive to disclose in 
a fixed-wage system. 
F. Fitzroy and K. Kraft found in their study quite strong evidence that profit- 
sharing and worker's capital-ownership are associated with greater profitability and 
productivity". Other broad findings were that (a) profit-sharing usually has a 
positive productivity effect, (b) the effect of participation is usually positive or 
insignificant, and (c) the effect of capital ownership is usually insignificant but 
occasionally positive". Consequently, if higher productivity is the goal, producer 
14 Binswanger, Hans and P. Rosenzweig, 'Behaviourial and Material Determinants of Production 
Relations in Agriculture', The Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3, April 1086, pp. 
501-539. 
31 Fitzroy, F. R. and K. Kraft, 'Profitability and Profit-Sharing', The Journal of Industrial 
Economics, Vol. XXXV, December 1986, No. 2, pp. 113-130. 
36 Jones, D. and J. Svejnar, 'Participation, Profit Sharing, Worker Ownership and Efficiency in 
Italian Producer Cooperatives', Economica, Vol. 52, Novemer 1985, pp. 449-4G5. 
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cooperatives ought to provide for substantial participation by workers in surplus, 
in decision-making and in individual ownership. 
The farmers were asked to consider the following three advantages in receiving 
the Sudanese Islamic Bank credit facilities. These were: 
(a) Cheaper than loans. 
(b) No collateral needed. 
(c) Sharing of risk. 
72% of the farmers agreed with the first statement. The remaining (28%) thought 
that the credit extended by the bank is still expensive. 
76% of the farmers agreed that the absence of collateral is an advantage. One 
cannot assess the merits of Islamic banking without analysing the nature of security 
which the farmer has to provide to a traditional bank in order to get a credit. 
Generally, apart from land, the farmers' tangible assets are few. He may possess 
collateral in the form of treasures, an ox, and a few implements. The assets of 
tenants are usually even fewer. 
Certain other conditions affect the position from the point of view of the lender. 
Productive capacity is dependent on the ability and integrity of the borrower as 
well as on the size and fertility of the holding and access to markets. A loan may 
be designed for production but used for some other purpose. The large number of 
small farmer holdings scattered over wide areas, and their remoteness, may make 
it difficult to assess individual productive potential and the fertility of the soil, or 
supervise the use of loans. The problem is enhanced for the borrower, especially 
if he is illiterate, because he has difficulty in preparing his case. Since repayment 
capacity is dependent on the returns from cash crops, an important factor in the 
situation is the proportion of production devoted to subsistence. But an increase 
in production may go into subsistence rather than into cash crops, and there will 
be the temptation to spend additional cash income 
IT Belshaw, H. Op-cit. pp. 30-32. 
338 
The use of land for security is often beset with other difficulties. The importance 
which the farmer attaches to economic security and the perpetuation of the family 
may make him reluctant to pledge it except under duress such as may result from 
personal misfortune, or social pressure to incur ceremonial expenditure. But, in 
addition, the title to land may not be clear, or there may be a number of owners 
of fragmented pieces. For land to be a satisfactory form of security it may be 
necessary to undertake surveys to determine boundaries, provide for simple forms 
of registration of ownership and transfer, consolidate fragmented holdings, and even 
revise the laws relating to inheritance to prevent fragmentation from recurring. 
The implications for agricultural credit and of problems of security go very far. It 
is natural for a traditional credit institution to attach great importance to "credit 
worthiness" in the sense of the existence of tangible assets which can be sold without 
much trouble or risk of loss. If, however, there is insistence on tangible assets, 
the large farmer who has more assets of all sorts, more cash income, and usually 
greater ability in presenting his case, will be at a great advantage. Credit then 
tends to be rationed not in terms of needs or of the prospective net increments to 
production, but of existing wealth and income. The smaller farmer then has to 
rely on the moneylender or shail merchant who is less particular about security and 
more concerned with the economic power which can be obtained, and who has a 
more intimate knowledge of the borrower. 
Whereas in musharakah financing, the Banks' participation on the project fi- 
nanced starts at the early stages of the project, that is when the project is initially 
studied, and at the implementation and follow up levels. The Bank has to know 
every detail concerning the project it finances and has to be sure that it is a prof- 
itable venture. Because there is no collateral, the Bank must vigilently monitor the 
investment for the success of musharakah financing. 
70% of the farmers thought that the Islamic Bank is sharing the risk with them 
whereas only 30% of them disagreed. The higher percentage (70%) of positive 
response by the small and poor farmers is a good indication that the profit-loss- 
sharing system is here to stay. It has proved to be workable and successful even 
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in the agricultural sector, which many development bankers think is risky and any 
investment should be minimised. Moreover, the sharing system has extended a 
sense of responsibility not only to the Bank but also to its new customer who are 
the small farmers and in the eyes of traditional banks are not credit worthy. 
The farmers were asked if there are any disadvantages in receiving the Sudanese 
Islamic Bank credit facilities. The majority of the farmers (94%) responded neg- 
atively. This indicates that the farmers feel the musharakah financing to be fair. 
Through the new system the farmer is sure of equitable sharing of business risk 
between the Bank and himself. Thus the new system has created a healthy envi- 
ronment for the farmers to work hard and not to sit idle. Idleness is discouraged in 
Islam. The Prophet Mohammed is reported to have said that Allah hates persons 
of sound body and mind who sit idle. 
11.10. Comments by Farmers 
Finally the farmers were asked to add further comments and facts about any 
problems are facing. Their comments can be broadly categorised as follows: 
(1) Lack of agricultural inputs; 
(2) Musharakah financing has helped the farmer to improve his standard of living; 
(3) Bank's relations with the farmers are satisfactory; 
(4) Problem of farmer unions; 
(5) Need for agricultural tractors; 
(6) Credit is not sufficient. 
We will analyse the first three problems, since these dominate the mind of the 
farmer. 
(1) Lack of agricultural inputs 
Agricultural production and efficiency largely depend upon the inputs applied 
and the method adopted. An important factor that has contributed to the increase 
in agricultural production in the United States and the continent of Europe is 
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the introduction of synthetic fertilizers. In the LDCs the consumption of fertilizer 
has increased significantly over the last three decades. Per capita consumption 
is, however, relatively low compared to the developed countries, thus indicating a 
potential for increased consumption in the future. 
66% of the farmers complained that the Bank did not provide them with sufficient 
agricultural inputs such as fertilizer. One of the major weaknesses of placing too 
much emphasis on adoption of improved seed varieties and fertilizers is that timely 
distribution of those inputs to a large number of farmers requires a well-organized 
marketing infrastructure, adequate storage and transport facilities. This will put 
the RDD of the bank under heavy pressure to improve the situation. 
Many of the farmers are illiterate and, cannot be expected to follow the constantly 
changing instructions necessary for effective use of fertilizers and new seed varieties. 
When price incentives and the requisite literacy are lacking, recurrent expenditures 
on fertilizer and new seed varieties can easily be viewed by poor farmers as unnec- 
essary. Examples can be drawn from Kenya in the field of fertilizers. One study 
conducted in Kenya's Central Province revealed that 59% of those interviewed did 
not use fertilizers at all, mainly because they could not afford to do so. Of those 
who did use them, 68% applied inadequate or suboptimal amounts at the prevailing 
prices2'. 
Therefore the Bank should critically evaluate the role of extension service (con- 
ducted by RDD) in the development and supply of improved or appropriate vari- 
eties of seeds and the design of recommendations that take into account resource 
constraints. Many poor farmers living on low potential and very small holdings 
often fail to get access to input loans, or, when they do, the inputs are invariably 
misallocated due to misleading advice from the extension network. 
21, Ogutu, A. C. A., 'A New Approach to Fertilizer Use and Food Production in Less Developed 
Countries', in AgTicultural and Economic Instability, M. Bellamy & B. Creenshields (eds. ), 
International Association of Agricultural Economists 1987, pp. 17-20. 
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(2) Musharakah financing has helped the farmer to improve his standard 
of living 
44% of the farmers accepted that musharakah financing is beneficial in helping the 
small farmers who in the recent past had no guarantee to provide to a bank in order 
to get a credit. No doubt, the new system has opened the door widely for those 
talented people, who may not necessarily be rich, to present projects that suit their 
abilities. If such projects are feasible they may be financed in some cases without 
lien. Their chances in the interest based system will be slim if not non-exsistent. 
In the developing world, profit sharing is particularly important. It makes possible 
extension of finance to artisans, and handicrafts; supplying them with machines that 
suit their talents, as well as machines that are adapted to local conditions; level of 
technology, and using raw material available in those countries". If such finance 
is widely extended to those classes this will promote and modernize the handicraft 
industry; and if labour intensive industries are encouraged and established by those 
banks, such methods may act as a break to the vicious circle of poverty prevailing 
in many countries of the developing world. By doing so, these institutions can 
transform the urban poor into a productive sector of the population. It will be an 
important achievement and can act as a true vehicle of development. 
(3) Bank's relations with the farmers are satisfactory 
32% of the farmers indicated that Bank's relation with the farmers are satisfac- 
tory. Though the percentage is not high the general impression gathered in the 
survey is that the farmers feel that they have been treated well by the Bank based 
on justice and fairness. 
The Islamic teaching of brotherhood and equal treatment of all individuals in so- 
ciety and before the Law would not be meaningful unless accompanied by economic 
justice so that everyone gets his due for his contribution to society or to the social 
product and that there is no exploitation of one individual by another. The Prophet 
Salama, A. A., 'Islamic Banks Economic Significance and Methods of Control', Faisal Islamic 
Bank Sudan Publication, Khartoum, English Series 3. 
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aptly warned: "Beware of injustice for injustice will be equivalent to darkness on 
the Day of Judgement". This warning against injustice and exploitation is designed 
to protect the rights of all individuals in society and to promote general welfare, 
the ultimate goal of Islam. 
This treatment is expected from an Islamic institution like SIB which sees the 
small farmers as people who have the talent, with no capital of their own. The 
financial capital is thus shared between ýbe Bank and the farmer based on profit 
and loss sharing. 
In case of a loss, a borrower, with no capital of his own, not only faces the 
unbearable liability to return the borrowed capital alongwith interest, but also faces 
starvation for himself and his family. Compare to this, the Islamic system which 
guarantees the minimum living needs of human beings (through various institutional 
arrangements private as well as public) and where the financial capital can only 
share the profit and losses and cannot earn interest. Firstly, the stake is not as 
serious as in the interest based system and secondly, whatever the stake, it is shared 
between the user and the owner of the financial capital. The entire financial loss is 
to be borne by the owner of the financial capital. In case of loss, there is no liability 
for the return of capital and there is also no fear of starvation as society guarantees 
subsistence. 
11.11. Conclusions 
It may have been observed in Chapter Six that equity financing operations are 
highly complex and risky by nature. Thus all development banks were, as a rule, 
required to concentrate primarily on loan financing. In the case of certain insti- 
tutions, there was a prohibition on equity financing in the initial years. Even at 
present, the situation has not basically changed. 
In sharp contrast to the foregoing situation, musharakah financing was made one 
of the principle functions of the Sudanese Islamic Bank. This was for the reason 
that musharakah financing is deemed to be a highly desirable operation from the 
shaiiah point of view, insofar as it avoids interest. 
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The experience of the Sudanese Islamic Bank, with the adoption of mu-sharakah as 
the major financing instrument, represents a positive example which Islamic banks 
in Sudan and elsewhere should seek to emulate. It corroborates the viability not 
only of musharakah as a financing instrument, but also of financing operations in 
the productive sectors of the economy. The experience provides an exemplary tool 
for viable developmental interventions among the poorer sections of the population 
in underdeveloped countries. 
One basic problem underlying the failure of most development interventions . 
among the poorer sections of the Sudanese people is that developmental projects are 
conceived and formulated in virtual disregard of the perceptions of the beneficiaries. 
Such projects often involve high cost complicated equipment which the beneficiaries 
cannot afford or maintain. In effect, the continuity of the project depends on 
continued subsidies provided by the implementing agency. As soon as the subsidies 
cease, the project would collapse. In the conception of its development interventions, 
however, the SIB seeks to avoid the limitations of such an approach. It seeks to 
ensure that its interventions would meet three basic requirements: acceptability, 
continuity and replicability. 
Projects have to be familiar to beneficiaries: they should be based on pre-existing 
techniques and inputs but with a view to developing them further to promote pro- 
ductivity. The continuity of projects requires that the developed techniques and 
inputs should not be costly, so that when SIB pulls out from involvement in the 
project, the beneficiaries could on their own take over and continue the project. 
Replicability means that projects should be sufficiently acceptable and sustainable 
so that others who are not direct beneficiaries could emulate it. 
Musharakah financing attracts active participation of both the Islamic banks and 
their clients in order to ensure success of their investment operations. On the one 
hand, Islamic financing institution do not depend for their revenues on fixed interest 
rates in the manner conventional banks do. They rather generate revenues in the 
form of a percentage of net profit, and this prompts close scrutiny and assessment 
of the viability and implementation of their investment transactions. On the other 
344 
hand, the clients who become partners contributing capital would be more eager to 
ensure the success of the transaction to increase the volume of total profits and, by 
extension, the volume of their share in these profits. The ultimate result is not only 
a search by the two partners for the success of their joint investment operations, 
but also a concurrent expansion of the production base of the national economy. 
Rural development projects are generally complex, containing several complemen- 
tary components. For this type of project to be implemented successfully, a high 
standard of project management is required. Management information systems can 
make a valuable contribution to efficient implementation of such projects. Evalua- 
tion and review of projects can result in experience that will lead to improving the 
design and execution of follow up projects of a similiar nature. 
For the success of musharakah financing in agriculture, the small farmers, who 
are the "target group in these new schemes" to be directly affected, should partic- 
ipate to a far greater extent in the planning and implementation process; greater 
attention should be paid to the attitudes, aspirations, perceptions and priorities of 
farmers. Traumatic change imposed from above is frequently resented and so is sel- 
dom successful in modernizing agriculture. Change must be gradual and within the 
comprehension and experience of the farmer whom it affects. The study suggests 
that the introduction of musharakah as new mode of financing without fully con- 
sidering the farmers' attitudes and reservations are, at best, ill-advised, and that a 
more fruitful approach is to include a high degree of participation by farmers during 
every stage. To ignore the farmers' attitudes and perceptions is to ignore reality. 
The second finding that the study suggests is that local farmers should participate 
in the operation and management of their scheme. Much criticism was levelled at the 
management of the local farmer union because of their lack of genuine interest and 
concern in the musharakah financing scheme. There may, therefore, be considerable 
merit in advocating that an elected group of local farmers, who have a genuine 
stake in the musharakah scheme and who are responsible, reliable and involved 
in the reality of the situation, should take on the task of local management. The 
scheme would then become a co-operative in practice and will benefit a large number 
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of small farmers. 
The third finding is that the organization of the rural development department 
(RDD) is of great importance for the successful implementation of Musharakah fi- 
nancing in agriculture. Therefore the department which has been given the vital 
assignment of rural development, should be relatively decentralized and nonauthor- 
itarian if it is to facilitate effective participation of the small farmer in the new 
scheme. A centralized decision making process appears to inhibit the progress of 
the department in implementing the scheme efficiently. 
The fourth finding is that although the farmers' income has improved relatively 
after the introduction of musharakah, their savings have not. It is the Bank's 
responsibility through its RDD to change the farmer's attitudes and perception and 
to make them think about saving for the future through the adoption of voluntary 
savings schemes". In other words the extension officer should encourage them to 
form group savings funds, the proceeds from which are invested by the Bank. In 
practice the officers are not always successful; sometimes, indeed, they have even 
been unable to explain to group members what a savings scheme is, and have left 
them with the idea that it is a form of government tax. 
This leads us to stress the importance of rural education, a task for which the 
RDD should be responsible. Education has always been considered a crucial ele- 
ment in rural development. It provides everyone involved in agriculture, including 
farmers, extension agents, distributors of agricultural supplies, and policy makers, 
with both technical knowledge and attitudes toward change and experimentation. 
On the whole the experience of the Sudanese Islamic Bank is unique. It has helped 
the small farmers (who in the recent past were not considered to be creditworthy 
by traditional development banks like the Agricultural Bank of Sudan) to be in 
partnership with the Bank. The experience should be encouraged and emulated by 
other Islamic banks. 
30 Mosley, P. and Dahal, R. P., 'Lending to the Poorest: Early Lessons from the Small Farmers' 
Development Programme, Nepal', Development Policy Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, Nov. 1985, p. 
203. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the final chapter of this thesis, we intend to summarise the conclusions 
reached in the previous chapters. The analysis will focus on the main findings 
of the fieldwork carried out in the schemes managed by the Sudanese Islamic Bank 
to see how far the experiment of musharakah financing has succeeded in helping 
the small farmers. We point to the advantages of introducing such techniques in 
agriculture and the difficulties which the Bank encounters in its implementation of 
the rural development programme. Some practical recommendations are made and 
further research is suggested*. 
12.1. Summary 
In Chapter One, a brief survey of all modern theories of interest has been under- 
taken. It is argued that economists have failed to convincingly justify the payment 
of interest. No satisfactory interpretation is available to explain the rationale of in- 
terest on capital funds. According to many analysts, the recurrence of trade cycles 
and fluctuations in economic activities can be explained by the presence of interest 
and the operation of banking in its present form. 
The practices of the conventional commercial banking system are in conflict 
with the principles of Islam which strictly prohibits riba (interest or usury). Islam 
is opposed to exploitation in every form and stands for fair and equitable dealings 
among all men. On the other hand, Islam does not forbid the profit motive, but 
restricts it to carefully defined limits. It is not considered wrong for a person to 
make money, provided he does this honestly and without harming the legitimate 
rights or interests of others. His economic activity, therefore, apart from earning 
money for him individually, should be designed to serve the general well-being of 
the community in helping it to meet its economic needs. 
In Chapter Two, the problems of debt financing have been examined in great 
The views expressed in this chapter are entirely mine and do not represent any official views 
or policies of any organisation. 
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detail. An assessment has been made of some of the issues raised such as gov. 
ernment debt, private sector debt, external debt and debt financing from a firm's 
point of view. We have also argued how debt financing is unjust and results in 
maldistribution of income and wealth in society. 
Under the conventional economic system the primary mode of finance is debt, 
and interest is the cornerstone of financial transactions. On the other hand in the 
proposed Islamic model, capital finance is provided on the basis of a joint venture 
or a partnership. Chapter Three analyses the farmework of mudarabah, the profit 
and loss sharing system of finance. It sets out the economic philosophy of Islam, 
under which Allah is the real owner of all that is in the universe, and man acts only 
as his vice-regent on earth. Thus man is accountable to Allah for all deeds. As a 
result economic institutions in Islam may not be solely concerned with maximizing 
profits but have also to think about "doing good to please Allah! '. 
The meaning of mudarabah and the various forms it takes is also the subject 
of Chapter Three, which in addition examines the requirements a mudarabah has 
to satisfy to be legitimate. An attempt has been made to examine contemporary 
Islamic banking and applications of mudarabah are discussed. It is argued that 
effects of a profit and loss sharing system on savings and investments are important 
and have to be addressed exhaustively by Islamic banks. Finally it is felt that the 
tnudarabah form of business organization is beneficial to the society as a whole. The 
labourers have a greater sense of participation and work harder to increase gross 
profits which in turn also benefit the financer. It has thus a great potential for 
growth. 
It has to be noted that the concept of an Islamic economic system is not one 
which has developed smoothly over the centuries. In fact it is only during the past 
two or three decades that serious studies have been undertaken in this regard after 
a very long interval of time. Over the years certain steps have been taken in a few 
countries towards implementing the ideas of an Islamic economy. 
An attempt has been made in Chapter Four to identify and define the various 
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financial instruments available to banks and other institutions under an Islamic eco. 
nomic system. Islam has laid great emphasis on social and economic justice, equity 
and fair play. These concerns are reflected in the financial instruments devised by 
Muslims of an earlier era. The first and foremost instrument of finance is 8hirkah 
or musharakah. It is a partnership between two or more persons who combine their 
capital or labour for their common good. They share the profits and losses eq. 
uitably and justly. In modern times the partnerships can be institutionalized in 
banks, limited companies and co-operative societies. Further, these can be regu- 
lated. In a musharakah the distribution of profits is dictated by the inputs made in 
capital, management or labour and based on a proportion agreed to in advance. On 
the other hand losses are to be borne by the partners only on the basis of capital 
invested. A party which has no capital invested in a project does not have to share 
in its loss. 
It follows that under Islamic principles the banking system has to be essentially 
equity based. The depositors of the Islamic bank are the shareholders - they cannot 
be guaranteed a fixed rate of return on their deposits. On the other hand the 
borrower is a partner of the bank in an enterprise. The bank enters the partnership 
on the basis of economic viability and profitability of a project and not on the basis 
of the credit-worthiness of a borrower. 
It has also been argued that equity financing will be an aid to mobilization 
of funds and also lead to stability in the economic system. It is however pointed 
out that an exhaustive study of stability under an Islamic system needs to be 
undertaken to draw definite conclusions. The chapter also defines other tools of 
Islamic financing such as leasing (ijara) and cost plus financing (murabaha). 
The major feature of an Islamic financial system is the absolute prohibition on 
all forms of interest. This requirement implies fundamental changes in the tools 
and operations of financial institutions. , 
Chapter Five focusses on the shape that fiscal and monetary policies are ex- 
pected to take in an Islamic system. To start with a number of complex issues 
349 
are raised by the requirements of an equity-based financial system without 'an as. 
sured rate of return. In this chapter we examine the operation of Islamic banks and 
the practices and instruments developed and used at present. Also the role of the 
stock market in an Islamic economic system is emphasised before an analysis of the 
objectives of fiscal policy. 
Zakat, which is an important part of Islam, is defined and its aims and conditions 
on its use are explained. From the discussion it is clear that zakat works in an Islamic 
state as a social security and as a method of redistribution of wealth. The absence 
of interest has led some Muslim economists to believe that monetary policy in an 
Islamic economy will have a very limited role. However it is argued that monetary 
policy does have an important role. 
In view of the recent trend to establish financial institutions working within the 
confines of the shariah, it is important to identify the obstacles to their successful 
operation. This has to be the first step in looking for possible remedies to the 
problems encountered by Islamic banks. 
Chapter Six attempts to undertake a study on the lines mentioned above. It 
is recognized that management and not capital is the critical factor in the success 
or failure of projects. As such it is suggested that in addition to the managerial 
capabilities of a high standard, the management of an Islamic bank should have 
a comprehensive entrepreneurial quality. Certain malpractices prevalent in present 
day banking are identified and the need to harmonise the accounting policies by 
Islamic banks is underlined. 
As often stated in this thesis, the financing of long term projects by Islamic 
banks has certain pre-requisites not encountered by commercial banks. Because 
financing by an Islamic bank is synonymous with entering a partnership it has to 
undertake a follow up of its projects in addition to initially undertaking feasibility 
studies and estimating the expected'profits. Also it has emerged that Islamic banks 
find it difficult to identify sound financing opportunities. 
Another problem identified is the risk of fraud which is more likely to affect 
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Islamic banks. To minimize the risk the Islamic banks can collect and use statistical 
data more effectively. The implementation of the Islamic law of contract may help, 
as may third party insurance and maintaining loss-compensating reserves. 
Quite often central bank regulation, particultarly those regarding montary re- 
serves and liquidity, impede a smooth functioning of Islamic banks. Taxation poses 
another problem as the bank's share of profit from a project is treated as taxable. 
Both these issues need a persuasive dialogue with the authorities concerned. 
Long term planning, in case of an Islamic bank, faces significant uncertainty as 
a result of frequently changing government policies. Coupled to all the difficulties 
identified above is the highly complex nature of equity financing. All of these require 
a much greater involvement of Islamic banks in research and training. 
As this study focusses on one Muslim country, namely Sudan, it is of relevance 
to point out characteristics of Sudanese economy. Though the average population 
density is around 8 per square kilometer in Sudan, nearly half of the country's 
population is concentrated on 15% of the land. Agriculture is the most important 
sector of the economy and its contribution is the subject of Chapter Seven. It also 
surveys the various crops grown and their yeilds over the last few years. 
Agriculture employs almost 80% of the Sudanese population. It makes also the 
largest contribution to export earnings, besides providing food for the people of 
Sudan. Yet it is disturbing to find that its share in the GDP shows a declining 
trend. It is felt that a positive improvement can only come about as a result of a 
complete restructuring of the economy. 
It was also found that agricultural and development policies in Sudan have been 
unbalanced. Agricultural development has depended on foreign capital and has con- 
tributed to the balance of payments deficits. Further it seems that investment has 
focussed on large scale and expensive projects with the transport and construction 
sector receiving more than their due share, at the expense of the productive sectors 
of agriculture and industry. 
Chapter Eight focusses on the financial institutions in Sudan. It has been 
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pointed out that primarily the banking system has developed after Sudan gained 
independence in 1956. The central bank called the Bank of Sudan was established 
in 1959. A major step was the nationalisation of the banking industry in 1970, 
with the multiple aim of improving banking facilities, gaining effective control over 
monetary policy and the control of capital investment. 
The prime objective of the governments' monetary and credit policies remains 
to contain inflation by restricting credit. At the same time it has to ensure adequate 
finance for productive economic activities. Consequently strict limits are prescribed 
on a commercial bank's lending to its customers. It is to be noted that 80% of 
total bank credit was utilised by the government for purposes of financing exports, 
agriculture and handicrafts etc. 
There are special purpose banks in Sudan: The Sudanese Real Estate Bank 
finances house building by individuals. The Industrial Bank of Sudan is charged 
with developing the private industrial sector. For the agricultural sector tile Agri- 
cultural Bank of Sudan was the major credit source prior to the introduction of 
Islamic banks. It was also pointed out that in the rural areas of Sudan, informal 
credit in the form of the "shail" system still plays an important role. 
The Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS) is the subject of Chapter Nine. It was 
established by the government to support agriculture and related activities. The 
ABS has till now limited its activities to short-term lending. For this purpose 
the Bank accepts as collateral land, buildings, crops to be harvested or in store 
and guarantees by the government, public institutions, autonomous agencies or co- 
operatives. 
The main sources of funds for the ABS are low interest (6.5%) loans from the 
Bank of Sudan and the profits accumulated in the course of its trading activities, 
rent from crops stored and the interest (12%) on agricultural loans and commercial 
commissions. It also accepts deposits from the public. 
The Chapter also includes the results of a survey carried out in two areas which 
are financed by the ABS. It was noticed that most of the farmers did not till their 
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land themselves, and almost all hired outside labour. The use of family labour is 
minimal. Among the produce, vegetable was dominant, while fruit and fodder al8o 
enjoy some importance. The data also indicates that a majority of fariners (78%) 
can be classified as well-off in the Sudanese context. 
The small farmer's experience with the ABS points to the several short-comings, 
not the least of which are the conditions attached to credit. Often, due to the strict 
procedures, the small farmers prefer to deal with the shail system. The fartners 
also complain of the Bank's neglect of the marketing and storage questions. A 
large number also point to the need of more credit facilities, and a majority did not 
recognize any advantage in receiving credit from the ADS. 
A major impediment in achieving rural development by institutions such as the 
ABS has been identified as the excessive centralization of all major decision making. 
The Bank has to pay more attention to conditions on the ground and modify its 
credit policY. 
Chapter Ten, deals with the Sudanese Islamic Bank. This was established 
in 1982, and is engaged in providing banking services in accordance with Islamic 
shaiiah laws. Its role in rural development cannot be judged merely by the growth 
in per capita income, but is also dictated by the question of moral values in bank. 
ing transactions. One distinctive feature is the belief that economic and social 
development cannot be isolated from spiritual and moral development. 
As the Bank has realized that the small farmer is the backbone of the country's 
agriculture, it has consequently targeted this long neglected section of society in 
its credit and musharakah operations in the rural sector. Judging from the records 
of the Bank, as dicussed in Chapter Ten, there has been an improvement in the 
conditions of the rural poor, yet there remains a lot to be accomplished. 
Since its inception the Bank has seen a steady increase in its fixed assets (2-1.1% 
in the year 1408H). Also there has been a growth in deposits though the Bank is 
hampered by a narrow lending ceiling, imposed by the Bank of Sud; ýn, in utilising P 
the deposits for investment. All in all, the Bank's performance is satisfactory. 
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The Bank's operations cover musharakah in trade and industry apart from agri. 
culture, and inspite of the stringent controls on credits imposed by the central 
bank, the SIB was able to offer a dividend to its shareholders. It was felt that 
there needs to be further improvement in its agricultural operations, especially for 
an autonomous and efficient rural development department. 
Chapter Eleven is based on a questionnaire distributed among small farmers 
involved in two agricultural schemes of the Sudanese Islamic Bank. It was found 
that the major produce are vegetables and that there is a need for the farmer to 
diversify his crop. Vegetable produdion is a traditional activity though prior to the 
introduction of musharakah financing it was not practiced on a commercial footing. 
Consequently most of the farmers are new to producing for the market. They have 
realized the potential of growth in the agricultural sector, and now an overwhelming 
90% cultivate their own farms. The figures suggest that niusharakah financing has 
been successful in stemming the rural to urban migration. 
The survey also indicated a rise in annual incomes of the farmers as compared 
to incomes before the musharakah partnership. However most of the farmers claim 
that the income from agriculture alone is not sufficient and consequently they arc 
involved in some off-farm work. The Bank has thus also introduced a family poultry 
scheme which would bring in useful extra income. As for now, most of tile farmers 
bridge the financial gap by private borrowing from friends or relatives. Tile Bank 
has not made sufficient inroads in this area and only 2% the farmers surveyed had 
borrowed from it. It was also found that most of the farmers had not opened a 
deposit account with the Bank. This fact points to the need for information and 
encouragement so that farmers enjoy the benefits of savings. 
It was also felt that the Bank's credit policy is concentrated on financing projects 
of a rather short-term nature. It 
, 
needs to be emphasised that medium or long-term 
financing should not be neglected. 
Even though the banking system is a relatively new development in the Su. 
dan, the SIB has succeeded in penetrating the rural areas, through its musharakah 
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financing projects. In order to build upon its successes the rural development de- 
partment (RDD) of the Bank has a crucial task. The need for decent ral izat Ion And 
devolution is strongly felt. The projects have to be conceived and implemented In 
partnership with the beneficiaries. Needless to say centralization has inore often 
than not resulted in inefficiency and failure. 
12.2. A Comparison of Fieldwork Surveys 
Agriculture being the dominant sector in Sudan and the mainstay of the rural 
economy, the growth of this sector will be pivotal for rural development. Wliether 
one takes the point of view of production or of equity and social welfare, to by-p. -, um 
the rural population in the crusade against poverty, hunger, inalnutrition, disease 
and ignorance will be committing not only economic but also social and political 
suicide. It is in the rural areas that the challenge of national development lies, 
and although a few successes have been recorded in specific local problem areas the 
overall war against poverty is still to be won. 
In Chapter Nine and Eleven we reported the results of a survey carricd out 
regarding the roles of a conventional bank (ABS) and an Islamic institution (SIB) 
respectively in rural development. Here, it is our purpose to submit the results to 
a comparison. 
In the areas of Kamelen and Jaili, which are served by the ABS, vegetables 
accounted for 70% of farm output and fruits made up 22%. On the other hand, in 
the Shehenab and Islang-Island projects managed by the SIB, fruit production was 
just 2% of the farm produce, whereas vegetables dominate with 94%. Significantly, 
in both areas, 40% of the farmers had embarked on agriculture after 1975. This 
may be explained by the concerted efforts of the Sudanese government, and the 
involvement of international financial institutions such as the World Bank. 
A significant difference in the two regions is noticed in the average size of the 
family. Among farmers dealing with the ABS, 44% had families of more than 10 
persons. The same figure for farmers dealing with the SIB is 22%. Average families 
of 6-10 persons form 40% of the total in the ABS schemes and 52% in schemes run 
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by SIB. Of significance in this connection is the farm size and the outside labour 
employed. 
It is to be noted that whereas in Shehenab and Islang-Island schemes farmers 
employing more than 10 persons as outside labour formed 6% of the totm', tile 
corresponding figure for Kamelan and Jaili schemes is 32%. This can perhaps be 
related to the fact that almost 18% of farms in the latter schemes arc large (more 
than 51 feddans) as compared to 4% in areas with the SIB. In fact the average 
farm size (11-25 feddans) under the ABS scheme accounted for 30% whereas the 
corresponding figure for the SIB project is 20% of the total number of farms. The 
data indicates that the SIB has, in implementing its scheme, targeted am. -III and 
poor farmers. Farmers holding 0-10 feddans formed 70% of the total in SIB project 
area whereas in the schemes financed by the ABS 28% of the farmers heM less 
than 10 feddans of land. Another important difference is observed in the number of 
farmers working on their own land and those who hire outside labour. Under the 
scheme run by the ABS, work on 56% of the farms was carried out by the farmers. 
The relevant number for the SIB schemes is 90%. It does seem that a farmer under 
musharakah financing is more involved in his farming in relation to his conventional 
colleague. 
A similar conclusion can be drawn from figures on the income of the farmers. In 
spite of smaller farms under musharakah financing 86% of the farmers had an annual 
income of more than CS 3000. On the other hand 78% of the farmers had a similar 
annual income in the area where the ADS operates. The benefits of inusharakah 
financing are also evident in the diminishing role of the shail system in SIB project 
area where only 18% of farmers used it for their credit requirements. In the ADS 
schemes as much as 50% borrowed from shail merchants. However borrowing froin 
a bank is still limited. In Shehenab and Islang-Island only 2% of the fartners had 
borrowed from the SIB. The corresponding figure is 8% for the project run by the 
ADS. 
Another difference in the operation of the conventional and Islamic banks is 
apparent on an examination of the figures relating to financing of agricultural inputs. 
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Under SIB, 20% of the farmers had 100% of their seed inputs financed through a 
musharakah compared to 4% who financed all of their seed input through a loan 
from the ABS. 
Both the ABS and the SIB fare equally well in providing Irrigation facilities. 
It may be mentioned here that the SIB has recently initiated a mobile workshop 
project to enable efficient maintenance and functioning of the irrigation system. 
However in the important area of marketing services 46% of SIB's partners feel 
satisfied with the help provided by the bank compared to 36% of ABS's clients. 
Another critical factor for perishables like vegetables and fruits is of appropriate 
storage facilities. While 50% of farmers dealing with SIB were satisfied with the 
storage facilities, only 22% were among the clients of ABS. 
The perceptions of farmers -regarding the two banks (ADS and SIB) are vastly 
different. 62% of farmers surveyed in the area where the ABS is active do not see 
any advantage in receiving credit facilities. Significantly 82% of those surveyed In 
the SIB schemes thought otherwise. 
The figures collected in the two surveys and compared above do appear to sup- 
port the argument that the Islamic mode of financing is more effective in promoting 
rural development. Musharakah in agriculture has been quite successful in attract- 
ing the small farmers in the two schemes of Shehenab and Islang-Island and the 
experiment needs to be emulated. 
12.3. The Current Economic Situation 
It is only fair that before we attempt to put forward some recommendations 
for consideration by the Sudanese Islamic Bank, we highlight the general economic 
situation in Sudan. The reason for this is that the performance of any financial insti- 
tution, regardless of its objectives, is highly affected by the economic and financial 
climate prevailing in the country. 
Sudan is currently experiencing the sharpest economic deterioration since the 
early 1970's as a result of the cumulative impact of a number of internal and external 
factors. The civil war in the south which costs millions of dollars a day and is holding 
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up several development projects, the influx of refugees from Ethiopia and Uganda, 
the impact of drought affecting as many as 11 million people, and a growing debt 
burden which is siphoning scarce resources, have made the prospect for recovery 
exceedingly dim. 
Economic difficulties, such as those facing Sudan are indeed complex and defy 
any of the simplistic solutions like exchange rate adjustment and liberalisation of 
price policy. The latest structural adjustment policy is a prescription for disaster 
since it is based on highly optimistic projections of foreign aid, international com- 
modity prices and improving weather conditions. Indeed, the prospects for primary 
products and simple manufactured exports, aid and borrowing in the 1080's are 
worse than the conditions experienced in the 1970s'. 
One of the major mistakes made by the government was that, despite the obvi. 
ous declining potential of the economy, the structural adjustment policies focused 
largely on generating sufficient foreign exchange earnings from expanded agricul- 
tural production whose prospects are uncertain. Furthermore, the successful im- 
plementation of the adjustment programmes depended largely upon the capacity 
of the government to attract external assistance. This was a serious error for two 
reasons. 
Every single element of the economic crisis in the country is not caused by 
foreign exchange shortage. Instead, external shocks, under-utilisation of existing 
institutions, infrastructure, human resources, financial and managerial indiscipline, 
are at the core of the economic predicament. 
The heavy reliance on external capital to rectify the current crisis was very unre- 
alistic. More so because no concerted effort was made to determine the main causes. 
The issue of sovereignty versus control should have been taken into consideration 
since there are no "free meals" in the present international political and economic 
environment. While Sudan's adjustment programme was hampered by too much 
external intervention, the projected foreign aid and credit did not materialise as 
donor agencies demanded major policy changes which the government was reluc- 
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tant to implement. Whatever the weight of external causes in the current crisis, 
domestic restructing is essential and must be based on a realistic identificatiol, and 
better utilisation of local resources and capabilities. For tile immediate future, tile 
first priority can no longer be expansion, but rather consolidation of whatever has 
been achieved during the last two decades. 
Ultimately the answer to the economic problems can only be found within their 
borders, not outside. It is unreasonable to expect that outsiders will be willing to 
sacrifice their privileged position in the world system so that the Sudanese can live 
better. Thus the basic structural factors that need to be adjusted with long-terin 
policies in the country are those of production, consumption, technology, distribli. 
tion and ownership. It is quite possible for the country to develop by relying mainly 
on its national resources, and there is no real alternative to this. 
12.4. The Challenge Facing the Banks in the Sudan 
It is against this background that the Islamic banks in Sudan should play a 
major development role through their heavy involvement in partnership financing, 
musharakah. Islamic banks have a moral obligation (which makes their role unique 
and superior than traditional banks) to fulfill in order to alleviate some of tile 
problems that face the country. This requires more hard work, dedication and 
commitment to the cause. By investing more in musharakah financing (which is 
more oriented towards development) than murabaha and mudarabah (which are 
commercially oriented) they can meet their moral obligations. Islam seeks the 
development of the human being rather than a quick profit accrued by some of tile 
Islamic banks which has benefitted the few at the expense of the masses. Without 
doubt, the Islamic banks have passed the stage of infancy during the last two decades 
and if they want to survive they have to support the masses in order to achieve 
justice and fairness. 
The rural development programme initiated by the Sudanese Islamic Bank an. 
swers some of the questions raised and criticism made in the recent p, -mt by different 
circles. Such criticism cannot however be borne by the Islamic banks alone. A tra- 
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ditional institution like the Agricultural Bank of Sudan also bears responsibility. It 
is felt that its role (as the formal agricultural finance institution in tile country) in 
the rural area is insignificant. The insistence of the ABS on collateral requirement 
from the farmers has not helped the cause of rural development. One way to tachieve 
this is to generate surpluses by reducing the cost of lending with a fixed revenue, or 
by increasing the revenue with a fixed cost or to reduce the cost and increase tile 
revenue if both can be manipulated. To achieve that the collateral requirements 
are an easy way to reduce lending costs by exempting the small borrowers who cost 
more to serve per unit of money lent. Although the collateral is often ineffective in 
preventing default, yet the ABS strongly insists on this requirement. Many A13S 
customers explained some of the following adverse effects of such requirements based 
on their experience. The requirement of collateral excludes many small borrowers 
from institutional credit, restricts the area cultivated and concentrates credit in tile 
hands of a few. It also increases the cost of borrowing which is more pronounced 
for the small borrower since the large borrower is able to spread the transaction 
cost of providing collateral over a large number of borrowed units. N-rthernlore, it 
also appears that a strong collateral requirement does little to assure repayment. 
Often when the loan procedure is completed the need for the loan is gone or tile 
small farmer has received financing from informal sources. The bank loan is then 
diverted by the borrower to other non-farm uses. Under such conditions no increase 
in farm productivity or farm income results from the use of institutional credit. 
As so much emphasis is placed on collateral requirements the pronlotional ac- 
tivities of the bank are neglected. Little effort, if any, is directed to collecting 
information about creditworthiness of the borrowers, his actual needs and credit 
use. Furthermore, it was observed that the collateral proved to be insufficient to 
guaxantee loan repayment. Clients know that a legal action takes years. Even when 
the court makes a resolution to sell the collateral the client can find one way or 
another to pay, for example by instalments. 
It is obvious from this study that the financial role of ADS is limited in the rural 
areas. The government's intention in setting up the Bank was to provide capital 
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at concessionary interest rates. It had also fixed the borrowers' interest rates at 
below the equilibrium levels, and then directed the Bank to increase the volunle of 
institutional credit going to agriculture in order to fight the Shail inercliant. The 
survey shows that the services of the ABS to agriculture are deteriorating and that 
the number of the rural poor served is decreasing. The findings of this research 
also show that the role of commercial banks in the Sudan is insignificant due to tile 
fact that these institutions do not provide loans for agricultural production and are 
reluctant and inefficient in mobilizing rural savings. Informal moneylenders were 
found to be dominant and flourishing in the rural areas although they charge a 
much higher interest as compared to formal institutions. 
The Sudanese Islamic Bank (SIB), in spite of being a young institutioll, has 
taken the initiative in "musharakah" financing and paved the way for other Islamic 
banks in the Sudan and elsewhere. It has demonstrated that musharakah financing 
is workable and profitable. The banks' experience has broken the inertia of bankers 
who thought that musharakah financing is a risky venture and should be avoided 
by concentrating on short and medium-term investment (through murabaha and 
mudarabah) rather than a long-term investment through musharakah. Needless to 
say that the continued success of musharakah financing will depend on the quality 
of management. 
However, rural development cannot be conceived in terms of isolated activities. 
It is a much more complicated process which requires a more comprehensive and 
integrated approach by the Sudanese Islamic Bank. This broader vision of rural 
development is not limited to economic development in the narrow sense, but em. 
braces the promotion of social development as well. This objective by itself requires 
close cooperation between the Sudanese Islamic Bank and the Agricultural Bank of 
Sudan in different fields, mainly financing, training and agriculture extension. The 
ABS has made successful attempts in the recent past to train its own staff locally 
and abroad in order to enhance efficiency of its own cadre and has also built good 
relationship with other institutions. A newly established institution like the SIB 
should benefit from the ABS in order to enrich its experiences in the area of rural 
361 
development. 
If steps are taken to make rural life more attractive, migration to urban arcas 
can be checked. This would also attract the skilled personnel required in agriculture 
services for promoting agricultural development, opening up feeder roads, provision 
of schools, hospitals, piped water and other services. The country's present system 
of education is regarded by the author as an escape route from the countryside. 
The primary school education is used mainly as a foundation for further education 
and has little value to offer to a child returning to an agricultural environment after 
a few years. Children who proceed to secondary school are often reluctant to work 
in the countryside. It is felt that a fundamental reform of the education system is 
needed. 
However, it may be emphasised that we have only looked at one facet of tile 
problem. Sudan faces problems of enormous complexity and gravity and 'it would 
be unwise to suggest that certain measures in the economic sphere would lead to 
utopia. 
12.5. Planning Problems 
It was pointed out earlier that a major problem of the agricultural sector in 
Sudan in general and the two institutions under examinations (the Agricultural 
Bank of Sudan and the Sudaneses Islamic Bank) in pa-rticular, is in the planning of 
a project. The factors behind this are both complex and numerous. 
An efficient extension service could have gone some way towards alleviating the 
problems of the inexperienced credit officer who lacks intensive training and is not 
prepared either culturally or socially to be able to advise the farmers on various 
crops. Unfortunately, during the work reported here no such extension service 
was available. Although meetings with groups of farmers were held, the officer 
concerned often found that it was only through personal contacts that any success 
was achieved. Farmers were keen on the idea of an extension service; indeed, at one 
particular farmer's meeting it was felt most strongly that closer supervision and 
more relevant agricultural advice were two highly important factors in furthering 
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rural development. 
The management of SIB is eager to establish the profitable nature of musharakah 
financing for all the partners involved. Nevertheless it should also bcar full respon. 
sibility in monitoring and follow up the projects. Also it has to be rc; dised that 
in keeping with the cooperative nature of the financed projects a greater local par. 
ticipation is crucial for increasing the confidence of the farmer in the viability of 
the musharakah. It was felt during the course of our study that some of the Pe(>. 
ple involved, in the cooperative projects of the SIB take only a limited interest in 
the musharakah. Unfortunately those people are among the most influential in the 
rural communities. The situation can be likened to the past when the na4zir of the 
area discouraged any form of change or progress because of the fear that it Nyould 
undermine tribal authority and loosen social ties. 
It is evident that the planners' aim for the (musharakah) financing scheme of 
the SIB under examination (Islang-Island) have not been realized. Farmers have re- 
sponded in unexpected ways. A principle explanation is that socio-personal factors 
were not fully taken into consideration in the planning framework. The result has 
been the emergence of a land-use pattern which conflicts markedly with the pro. 
posed system. Two main conclusions or recommendations relating to the planning 
process may be drawn from the fieldwork on Islang-Island project financed by SIB. 
First, it is suggested that some of the farmers who are to be directly affected 
by musharakah financing projects should participate to a far greater extent in the 
planning process; greater attention "should be paid to their attitudes, aspirations, 
perceptions and priorities. Imposed changes from above are frequently resented and 
so are seldom successful in implementing musharakah financing based theortically 
on justice and fair play. It is hoped that the present study has emphasized that 
introduction of the new musharakah financing techniques in agriculture, without 
fully considering the farmers' attitude is, at best ill-advised, and that a inore fruitful 
approach is to ensure a higher degree of participation by allparties involved during 
the planning stages. 
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Second, it is suggested that the management of the two institutions (ABS and 
SIB) should call for regular meetings or arrange seminars of a practical nature with 
and for the farmers to discuss various problems faced by farmers and to suggest 
some solutions. There may, therefore, be considerable merit in advocating that an 
honest elected group of local farmers, who have a genuine stake in the project, and 
who are responsible, reliable and involved in the reality of the situation, should take 
on the task of management. 
Countless development projects have been introduced throughout Africa. A 
good many have been marked by limited success. We have to stress that any 
proposal for social or economic reorganization of village life must take into account 
the views of the farmers to be affected. Planning decisions imposed from above, 
paying only limited attention to the farmer's problems, are highly questionable. 
Considering the fact that success of the Sudanese Islamic Bank depends greatly 
on the direction, guidance and support it receives from other Islamic banks, it is 
very important to strengthen and vitalise the contacts with them. The task assigned 
to the Bank is formidable and extensive and other Islamic banks should assist this 
young institution in 'its unique work. 
The task of decision making has to be shared as widely as possible instead of 
remaining concentrated at any one point. It is necessary to establish a system 
whereby decisions of different types and varying degrees of importance are made 
at various levels'. It is clearly not conducive for efficiency to concentrate decision 
making at one point in the organisation while other functionaries merely provide 
inputs or act in an advisory capacity. If the task of decision making is distributed, it 
will not only lead to elimination of delays but would result in a marked improvement 
in quality of the decisions themselves. In order to have an effective system of 
decision making, clear cut functions with adequate authority need to be specified 
and it should be ensured that those given the authority have the capacity to carry 
them out properly. A particular job which could be carried out at a lower level 
Meenai, S. A., The Islamic Development Bank: A Case Study of Islamic Co-operation, Kegan 
Paul Interuational, 1989, pp. 179-189. 
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should not be undertaken at higher levels in the Bank. For this reason, the bank 
must step up its efforts to prepare instructions, rules, regulations and guidelines so 
as to serve as a framework for decision making at various levels. 
The importance of training in any organisation is self-evident. It is particularly 
important for an institution like the SIB which is in the process of establishing itself 
and which has several special features. 
12.6. Recommendations Concerning the Sudanese Islamic Dank 
(A) Utilisation of University Graduates 
According to very recent (1989) estimates there are 36,000 university graduates 
in Sudan who are unemployed. The government has alloted to each of these unem. 
ployed youth a small piece of land for cultivation. These graduates, however need 
the necessary agricultural inputs. The Bank should utilise this unique opportunity 
to benefit not only the educated youth, but also to gain benefit from them in re- 
turn. The unemployed graduates can be provided jobs under a musharakah as well 
as becoming worthy partners in rural development. Coordination with the ADS 
and other government departments may be helpful in implementing this idea. 
(B) An annual seminar focussing on practical issues facing the small farmer 'in 
musharakah financing is deemed necessary. This will help the SIB to learn from its 
own mistakes and provide a useful feedback on its policies. Other Islamic banks, 
who in the last two decades have concentrated their investments on short-term 
mudarabah and murabaha financing and avoided the long-term musharakah will also 
benefit a lot from such an activity. These seminars will definitely enrich and widen 
the scope of Islamic banking. 
Other Islamic banks, commercial and development bankers and university aca. 
demics interested in Islamic financing should be invited to participate and contribute 
to these seminars. Ideally the seminars may be organised by the Rural Develop. 
ment Department of the Sudanese Islamic Bank and can be supplemented with field 
visits. 
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The seminars may result in a position paper which elaborates on the concepts of 
musharakah as a new mode of finance in agriculture, its objectives and applicability 
in view of the real situation obtaining in a particular rural area. Finally the paper 
should be followed by an operational plan including guidelines and time schedules, 
(C) Administrative Responsibility 
Meaningful work in agriculture requires dedication, commitment and ability of 
a competent director to take the right decision at the right time. For the success of 
musharakah as new mode of financing, it is felt necessary that the SIB should dele- 
gate complete responsibility to the director of the Rural Development Department 
(RDD) thus enabling him to concentrate on project monitoring and follow up. 
For successful administration of a project it is important that the director of 
the RDD should have the ability and competence to contact other institutions 
outside the project. Such contacts among the professionals, admininstrators and 
the research staff are essential for the success of a musharakah financing project. 
(D) Training 
The Bank should have a clear policy regarding the training of its staff. Since 
the institution is new it should benefit from the experience of other organisations 
involved. This would call for a great deal of collaboration and co-operation in this 
field with the Islamic Development Bank, through participating in their workshops 
and seminars. 
Field work training is vital for the staff of the Bank. Only then will the problems 
faced by the small farmers be identified. The success of any project depends not only 
on good management but also a good response from the farmer. It is important to 
choose farmers willing to participate in the workshop and assist the Bank in various 
ways and means to train its workers. 
In practicing agriculture inevitably means field work, it is thus necessary that 
RDD should have a unit in the rural areas where the administrative problems can 
be resolved on the spot. One has to bear in mind that the communication problem 
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is one of the main impediments to rural development in Sudan. On the other hand 
the establishment of such units in the field will undoubtedly lift the morale and give 
more incentives to the farmer in his hard work. 
The training should emphasise the very important aspect of bridging tile gap of 
communication between-the farmer and the Bank. It was noted during the course 
of the fieldwork reported here that the farmers talk very openly and lionestly about 
their problems once they are approached in the right way. The poor farmers have 
been neglected by the authorities in the past and need to be assured of the s*incercty 
and good purpose of the SIB in its musharakah financing operations. 
, 
(E) Promote saving among rural farmers 
Promotion of rural savings benefits both the rural people and the banks. 'The 
availability of saving opportunities discourages unproductive household consuIllp- 
tion by the poor while savings increase their capital and resource base and conse- 
quently their bargaining power. For the financial institution, savings increase tile 
funds available for lending. This translates in reduced dependence for funds on 
central banks or foreign agencies, and consequently less intervention by politicians 
and other vested interests. Savings pave the way for increased local participation 
in financing bodies, which makes them more responsible both to borrowers and de- 
positors. Through savings, banks can reach a much greater number of rural people 
than through loans and thus become aware of their needs, preferences, and cash 
flows. 
(F) Extension and Education 
Extension work is vital for the success of a musharakah project. Unlike formal 
school education, it endeavours to formulate a specific programme for each need 
served. It is felt that the success of an extension programme depends crucially 
on local participation. This is all the more so as the programme has to evolve 
with changing circumstances and emerging priorities. The best and most trusted 
process for planning extension programmes is to involve professionals and local 
leaders to jointly identify problems, set forth realistic objectives and suggest means 
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for achieving these objectives' 
Extension programmes should not rely on local leaders for planning purposes 
alone. The Bank should involve them also in the execution of its programmes. In 
order to supplement and complement the efforts of local extension workers, it may 
identify some innovative leaders, train them and involve them as volunteer "teach. 
ers" in their communities. This would reduce the time factor in the diffusion and 
adoption of recommended farm practices. Human development requires patience 
and thus takes time, more time than is generally allocated to technical projects 
with roughly similar goals for physical achievements. The extra time required is 
needed to organize the farmers into participative groups, as well as to allow for the 
learning process to take place by the extension worker and other staff of tile rural 
development department. 
(G) Data Bank 
A thorough understanding of the economic, political and social context in which 
a project is to be implemented is vital. The basic information relating to social and 
anthropological factors in most rural areas does not exist in a recorded form. As a 
consequence a lot of time is taken up in compilation of the relevant data. Possibly 
the banks and financial institutions involved in the rural areas can'pool the data 
collected by each into a common data bank for their common good. This can 
eliminate unnecessary duplication and thus save time. 
12.7. Advantages of Musharakah Financing 
With the advent of musharakah financing in agriculture things have derinitely 
changed. Improvements are evident in the areas under two SIB schemes which 
were surveyed. Whereas earlier many landowners used hired labour for farming, 
now they are more active themselves. The farmers n9w cultivate their land twice 
a year and have realized the potential for their economic and financi-rd well being. 
Douglah, M. A., 'Agricultural Extension: Principles and Constraints', Agriculture V De. 
velopment in Western Asia, Joint Publication of the United Nations Economic and Social 
Commission for Western Asia and The Food and Agriculture Organization of tile United Na- 
tions, December 1986, No. 9. p. 35. 
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Before the entry of the SIB, most of the land was unutilized and farming was only 
a marginal activity aimed at subsistence. With musharakah financing this marginal 
activity has become the major occupation of the farmers. Consequently the average 
annual income of the farmer has grown. 
A major success of musharakah financing appears to be in tackling the rural to 
urban migration. A significant number of young people are now involved in agri- 
culture, where the potential for growth is significant. Musharakah, thus has the 
potential for addressing successfully some of the important issues in rural develop- 
ment. 
Another significant achievement of this new mode of financing is the diminishing 
role of the exploitative shail system. The cooperative role of the bank- fArmer 
partnership is in line with Islamic concepts and needs to be emulated by other 
institutions. 
The storage and marketing facilities provided by the Bank under musharakah 
financing have led to considerable benefits to the farmer. With the consequent 
profits earned by the farmer, he has often financed his own seed inputs. In contrast 
the farmer was almost always reliant on the shail merchant for his inputs and had 
to pledge his future crop for the credit. 
12.8. The Bank's Problems 
A wide range of problems are encountered in the Sudanese rural sector. These 
vary from limited available resources to rural poverty, high unemployment and 
poorly developed economic activities. 
The Bank is facing many difficulties as a new institution involved in musharakah 
financing. The Bank wishes to promote rural development, a task which cannot be 
left alone to a young institution like the SIB. At the same time it has to maintain its 
financial position. 'Banks usually prefer short-term, instead of long-term, advances 
in the agricultural sector, particularly to small farmers. The reasons suggested 
are the high administrative costs associated with a large number of small scale 
credits. The banks find it expensive to employ specialist credit officers and meet 
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the high running expenses of its agricultural projects. In this respect there is sonic 
justification for financial assistance from the government'. 
There are, however, a number of potential weaknesses relating to the neces- 
sary institutional framework. A number of these were noted in the discussion. 
The greatest danger with a programme of this nature is over-extension of what 
are inherently limited resources in the attempt to overcome as many problems as 
possible. This is particularly evident with regard to financial resources and skilled 
manpower. Problems relating to the shortage of skilled manpower are accentuated 
by the need to spread rural development services to other branches in order to meet 
the requirement of the programme. 
A further potential problem with the programme is of communications between 
relevent organisations. The requirements of the programme are such that close 
contact between the head office and branches is essential. However, there was no 
evidence to suggest that liaison between all interested parties was good. 
We conclude that musharakah financing through farmer participation is benefi. 
cal in development projects and should be encouraged by other Islamic banks. 
12.9. Further Research 
There are many issues (not covered by this study) which need further research. 
The Islamic banks, in recent years, have seen a larger inflows of deposits. They 
are now well established and confidence in them has grown. One could study the 
various ways in which the SIB can help other Islamic banks who wish to invest in 
musharakah projects run by themselves. It would also be pertinent to enquire about 
the incentives which the SIB can offer to other institutions who wish to invest in 
projects of the SIB run on the musharakah mode of financing. 
We have also not considered the instruments for disinvestment whose need will 
arise when an outside investor wants to sell his shares. Further study would be 
needed in regard to the role of a stock market in an Islamic economic system, and 
Markings, S. M., Agricultural Problems of Developing Countries in Africa, Oxford University 
Press, Nairobi, 1978, p. 84. 
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also in determining the value of shares when inflation is taken into account. In 
short much more research has to be undertaken before an economic model can be 
developed in complete harmony with the principles of Islam. 
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Appendix (I) 
A QUESTIONNAIRE SUBMITTED TO FARMERS 
OF AGIUCULTURAL BANK OF SUDAN 
AND SUDANESE ISLAMIC BANK 
(A) General Information 
1. Type of activity: 
2. Date of starting farming activity: 
[a] 1950s 
[b] 1960s 
[c] 1970s 
[d] 1975 onwards 
3. What is the size of your family ? 
[a] up to 5 persons 
[b] 5- 10 
[c] more than 10 
4. Do you employ any laborer from outside other than your family ? 
[a] yes 
no 
5. If yes, how many do you employ from outside ? 
[a] up to 5 
[b] 6- 10 
[c] more than 10 
[d] others ( please specify 
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6. What is the size of your farm 
[a] up to 5 feddans 
[b] 5- 10 
[c] 11 - 25 
[d] 26 - 50 
[e) more than 51 feddans 
[e] others ( please specify 
7. Do you alone cultivate your farm ? 
[a] yes 
[b] no 
8. How many times do you cultivate your land each year ? 
[a] once 
[b] twice 
[c] more than twice (please specify) 
9. What kind of food crops do you grow ? 
[a] dura ( sorghum 
[b]dukhun 
[c] groundnuts 
[d] sugar 
[e] wheat 
[f] others (please specify) 
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10. What types of crops do you consume from outside your farm ? 
[a] sugar 
[b] wheat 
[c] vegetables 
[d] others (please specify) 
11 . What is the relative importance of the 
following crops? 
Very important Important Less important Not Important 
Dura. 
Dukhun 
Groundnuts 
Sesame 
Sugar 
[Others 
(specify) 
12. Which of the following cash crops do you cultivate ? 
[a] cotton 
[b] sugar 
[c] groundnuts 
[d] others(please specify) 
(q) What is the range of your annual income ? 
[a] IS 1000 or less 
[b] IS 1000 - 2000 
XS 2000 - 3000 
[d] more than XS 3000 
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Qs 
your annual income from Agricultural sufficient enough to support your family ? 
[a] yes 
no 
(PY f no, how do you bridge the gap. 
[a] by borrowing from relatives 
[b] from private sources outside the family. 
[c] from the banking sector 
[d] others (please specify) 
16. What are the main sources of your icome ? 
[a] Agricultural 
[b] other means ( please specify 
17. How do you finance your seed inputs 
Source of 
finance 
Percentage 
25%150% 75%1100% 
Yourself 
From a bank loan 
Other means (specify) 
Do you have a deposit account with a bank ? 
[a] yes 
no 
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(9 If yes, why did you open the account 
[a] my savings are safer in a bank. 
[b] I get a return on my savings. 
[c] The bank would only offer me a loan if I opened an account. 
[d] other ( please specify ) 
(B) CREDIT INFORMATION 
20. Have you ever dealt with banks before ? 
[a] yes 
[b] no 
21. When did you start to deal with banks ? 
[a] 1950s 
[b] 1960 
[c] 1970-1974 
[d) 1975 onwards 
(g. ) Have you approached more than one bank for credit ? 
[a] yes 
[b] no 
C3) If yes, which of the following you have dealt with : 
[a] Agricultural bank 
[b] Government credit agency 
[c] Islamic bank 
[d] others ( please specify 
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24. Does the bank help you in storing and marketing your crops ? 
[a] yes 
no 
25. What of the following problems do you face ? 
[a] Irrigation. 
[b] marketing problems 
[c] storing problems 
[d] others ( please specify 
26. What kind of incentives does the bank provide for you ? 
[a] Purchases of, Agricultural inputs ( such as seeds, fertilizer) 
[b] Marketing your crops 
[c] storing your crops 
[d] others ( please specify 
27. What is the credit terms extended by the bank ? 
[, aj under six months 
[b] six months - one year 
[c] over one year 
0 Do you require more credit facilties 
[a] yes 
no 
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If yes, why do you want more credit. 
[a] to introduce new crops 
[b] to undertake farm improvements ( e. g new irrigation work) 
[c] for family reasons 
[d] to pay off previous debt 
[e] other ( please specify ) 
ODo 
yo think the existing marketing facilities are satisfactory ? 
[a] yes 
[b] no 
31. Are their any advantages in receiving Islamic banks credit facilities ? 
[a] yes 
[b] no 
32. If yes, Is it because it is 
[a] cheaper than loans 
[b] no collatoral needed 
[d] sharing of risk 
[e] others ( please specify 
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33. If yes, Is it because it is : 
[a] more expensive than loans,, 
,, 
[b] procedures complicated to understand. 
[c) payment by installment 
[d] others (please specify ) 
34. If you have any further comments, please add them here ? 
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